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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USUNNEWYORK17
2008-01-07 23:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

P3 AGREE TO PRESSURE CHINA ON UNAMID COOPERATION

Tags:   PGOV  PHUM  PREL  SU  MOPS 
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VZCZCXRO6416
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUCNDT #0017/01 0072338
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 072338Z JAN 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3500
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
						C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000017 

SIPDIS

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IO AND AF FOR FRONT OFFICE; PLEASE PASS TO SE WILLIAMSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SU MOPS
SUBJECT: P3 AGREE TO PRESSURE CHINA ON UNAMID COOPERATION

REF: USUN 1221

Classified By: Ambassador Jackie Wolcott for Reasons 1.4 B/D.



1. (C) SUMMARY: AMB Wolcott and USUN poloffs convened a P3
meeting on January 4 to discuss next steps on Darfur. AMB
Wolcott delivered the U.S. message on the need to persuade
China to intervene with Khartoum regarding cooperation with
UNAMID deployment. UKUN AMB John Sawers said that the P3
should begin working together "towards a credible threat" of
sanctions. The French Africa expert put forward his
government's proposal for a series of meetings on Darfur as
means of building diplomatic momentum. The P3 agreed to
coordinate a message of "growing impatience with Khartoum" to
China and Russia in mid-January. END SUMMARY.



--------------------------


AMB Wolcott Pushes for Coordinated
Approach with China on Darfur


--------------------------





2. (C) AMB Wolcott told the P3 that the U.S. was interested
in coordinating increased diplomatic pressure to convince the
Chinese to intervene with the Government of the Sudan (GOS)
regarding non-cooperation with UNAMID deployment. Currently,
the Chinese Mission assesses that they do not need to press
the Sudanese harder on issues related to UNAMID deployment,
as evidenced by their intransigence on basic procedural
issues related to upcoming discussions on Darfur. (NOTE: The
Security Council spent hours over the course of three
separate discussions to reach consensus on the format of the
January 9 meeting on UNAMID -- a public briefing by the
Secretariat followed by closed consultations. END NOTE.)

SIPDIS



3. (C) AMB Wolcott said the P3 need to work together to
pressure the Chinese to be more helpful. Otherwise, the
status quo will continue and UNAMID will fail. She said the
U.S. is open to ideas that would pressure the Chinese -- a
tough PRST, a threat of sanctions in the P5 context, or a
resolution listing current areas of non-cooperation that if
not addressed by GOS would result in further measures.



--------------------------


UKUN Urges Careful, Deliberate
Preparation of Sanctions Threat


--------------------------





4. (C) UKUN AMB Sawers concurred that the status quo is
unacceptable and that persuading China to intervene was the
key element of any strategy aimed at changing Sudanese
behavior. Sawers cautioned against a PRST as unlikely to
produce any substantive outcome in the context of continued
Security Council disagreement on Darfur. On sanctions,
Sawers concurred that a credible threat could force the
Chinese to act, "The Chinese won't vote for it and don't want
to veto it, which leaves them no option but to intervene with
their friends in Khartoum." Sawers assessed that China would

work hard to avoid a diplomatically embarrassing veto on
Darfur sanctions in the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Summer
Olympics. For this reason a credible threat of sanctions, by
itself, could spur the Chinese to be more helpful with the
GOS.



5. (C) Sawers added that a credible threat would require time
and careful diplomatic preparation. Likewise, the UK is
conscious of the timing of such a threat since FCO Minister
of State Mark Malloch Brown is scheduled to visit Khartoum
sometime in January. Sawer's offered UK Prime Minister
Gordon Brown's upcoming visit to Beijing as an opportunity
for the UK to deliver a bilateral message to the Chinese on
Darfur.



--------------------------


France Proposes UN/AU
Meetings


--------------------------





6. (C) Africa Expert Clement LeClerc said France shared the
U.S. analysis that pressure on Beijing was the key element of
any strategy to attain Sudanese cooperation. (NOTE: AMB
Jean-Maurice Ripert was absent from the meeting. END NOTE.)
LeClerc repeated the French proposal for a UN/AU meeting in
New York to be followed by a meeting in Addis Ababa with the
AU, Sudan, Secretariat, P5, TCCs and regional actors
(November 2006 format). LeClerc argued that these meeting
could build diplomatic steam towards a credible threat of
sanctions.


USUN NEW Y 00000017 002 OF 002




--------------------------


UKUN to Host Meeting on
UNAMID Shortfalls


--------------------------





7. (C) AMB Sawers said UKUN plans to host a January 16
meeting in New York to solicit TCCs to contribute the missing
helicopters and transportation assets. Sawers said the UK
approach is to break the components of the missing military
assets into discrete elements -- helicopters, crews,
maintenance, etc -- with the goal of finding donor countries
for the individual components. This approach might provide a
means for moving forward on the contracting arrangements
described in the UKUN paper (reftel).



8. (C) AMB Wolcott said the U.S. would assist with this
approach and offered the additional idea of transferring
helicopters from an existing peacekeeping mission. Sawers
concurred that an inter-mission transfer was an excellent
idea and noted that UNMIN (Nepal) was a helicopter heavy
mission that could be targeted.



--------------------------


Next Steps


--------------------------





9. (C) The P3 agreed to coordinate diplomatic pressure on the
Chinese during the coming weeks. As a first step, AMB Sawers
said UKUN would ask DPKO to prepare a paper for distribution
to the Security Council detailing ongoing impediments to
UNAMID deployment. This paper will establish metrics for
Council discussion of Sudanese non-compliance. The P3 also
agreed to deliver a strong message regarding the
unacceptability of the status quo during the January 9 UNAMID
discussion. Lastly, the P3 agreed to hold a P5 meeting
January 17 or 18 to deliver a message of "growing impatience
with Khartoum" to China and Russia.

Wolcott