U.S. AND JAPAN DISCUSS IRAN, EAST TIMOR, BURMA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000139

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM KUNR IR BM AF KS SU
SUBJECT: U.S. AND JAPAN DISCUSS IRAN, EAST TIMOR, BURMA,
SUDAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND UN REFORM


Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff,
per 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. During a regular U.S.-Japan bilateral
meeting on February 8, Amb Khalilzad and Japanese PermRep
Takasu discussed Iran, Burma, Afghanistan, DPRK, and a range
of other issues (UN Reform discussion covered septel). On
Iran, Takasu reiterated Japanese support for the draft UNSCR,
but emphasized the importance of a unanimous Security Council
vote. He said Japan had approached Vietnam and Indonesia to
lobby for their support. Takasu agreed that the
international community seemed to be losing momentum in
Burma, and argued that China should play a more constructive
role. He agreed that the Friends Group on Burma should meet
before Gambari's next trip. On Afghanistan, the two sides
agreed that someone must be appointed SRSG as soon as
possible. Takasu said Japan wants to be involved in the
upcoming review of UNAMA's mandate. On North Korea, Takasu
lamented the lack of progress in the Six-Party Talks, and
suggested the U.S. was partly to blame for appearing "too
flexible" in response to DPRK duplicity last year. He argued
for a reconsideration of the Six-Party process and urged
greater U.S.-Japan-South Korea coordination on DPRK issues.
The two Ambassadors also discussed East Timor,
Ethiopia-Eritrea, the Peacebuilding Commission, and Japan's
plans for an African development summit. End Summary.

Iran
--------------


2. (C) Amb Khalilzad reported that some of the elected UNSC
members (E10) want to wait until the next IAEA report is
released, sometime between Feb 15-25, to proceed with the
next Iran sanctions UNSCR. South Africa, Libya, Indonesia,
and possibly Vietnam had questions about the draft UNSCR,
particularly with regard to its provisions about inspection
of cargo, and Libya appeared to be hardening its position on
sanctions in general. Amb Khalilzad emphasized that although
UNSC unanimity is important, we do not see any link between
the IAEA report and the UNSCR, and may have to push the
resolution to a vote even if certain countries abstain.
Takasu reiterated Japan's support for the UNSCR as part of a
dual-track strategy with Iran and emphasized the importance
of E10 unanimity on the resolution. He noted that Japan had
approached Vietnam and Indonesia to urge them to vote in
favor of the resolution.

Burma
--------------


3. (C) Amb Khalilzad noted that the U.S. and Japan share the
same goals and have experienced the same frustrations in
Burma. The Burmese must cooperate with UN envoy Gambari, he
said, and the SYG should play a useful role in this process
-- including by engaging China and India and by speaking out
publicly about inadequate Burmese cooperation with Gambari.
Noting that the U.S. had just imposed additional bilateral
sanctions on Burma, Amb Khalilzad observed that the UNSC
needed to at least increase pressure incrementally on the
Burmese regime.


4. (C) Takasu agreed that the international community seemed
to be losing momentum in Burma. He said Japan had urged the
Burmese Foreign Minister, who had recently visited Tokyo, in
the "strongest language" that Burma must accept a visit from
Gambari in mid-April. Noting that Gambari would visit China
from February 18-19, and possibly Singapore next, Takasu
argued that the PRC should play a more constructive role with
regard to Burma at the highest levels. He argued that the
SYG should speak out about Burma's non-cooperation before the
international community gives any thought to sanctions.
After initially expressing skepticism about a meeting of the
Friends Group, Takasu later agreed that the Friends should
meet before Gambari goes to China. He emphasized that Burma
should not/not be invited to attend this meeting, as some
members of the Friends Group had reportedly suggested.

Afghanistan
--------------


5. (C) Amb Khalilzad emphasized that a new Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Afghanistan
must be identified as soon as possible. Turning to the
renewal of the UNAMA mandate in March 2008, Amb Khalilzad
said the mandate may need a review, similar to the work that
was done on the UNAMI (Iraq) mandate. This process should
build on the recent Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
(JCMB) meeting held in Tokyo.


6. (C) Takasu agreed that the new SRSG should be appointed as
soon as possible and opined that the candidate should come
from a NATO country. He suggested that Kai Eide would be
interested if the Norwegian official thought the U.S. backed
his candidacy. Takasu affirmed that Japan would want to be
involved in the process of reviewing UNAMA's mandate, and in
this context, recalled two main conclusions from the Tokyo
JCMB meeting: first, that UNAMA has weak leadership and no
strategy, and second, that Afghan Ministers have become very
nationalistic. Amb Khalilzad and Takasu also discussed an
idea, proposed by Brahimi, that key international donors and
President Karzai or his staff should meet to exchange frank
views about the problems they see in sustaining an effective
international-Afghan partnership. Such a meeting could help
the two sides get beyond the usual complaints and focus on
working together.

North Korea
--------------


7. (C) Although Takasu said the Six-Party Talks were
important, he warned that the process appeared to be entering
stalemate. Speaking frankly, Takasu wondered if the North
Koreans interpreted U.S. flexibility to secure as a deal as a
license to "cheat" and not suffer any consequences. He
speculated that the DPRK may want to wait for a new U.S.
Administration before trying to "sell" the commitments it had
already undertaken but failed to satisfy. Takasu noted there
had been no comprehensive declaration of the DPRK's nuclear
programs, and that the disablement process had proceeded very
slowly. He also said there had been "no change" in the
abductee issue and "not much" improvement in DPRK-Japan
relations. Takasu reported that Japanese PM Fukuda would
attend the new South Korean President's inauguration, in
light of the new South Korean desire to enhance its
relationship with Japan, and he urged greater coordination
between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea on policy towards
the DPRK.

Sudan
--------------


8. (C) Reviewing the slow rate of UNAMID deployment, Amb
Khalilzad said that Sudanese President Bashir appeared to be
dragging his feet at every turn and attempting to renegotiate
the deal with the UN. Although there is still no Status of
Forces Agreement, Amb Khalilzad said he expects it to be
completed by February 10. There is also an issue of the
sequencing of troop contributor deployments. Bashir
reportedly told the SYG that he would accept the Nigerian and
Rwandan contingents and then the Nepalese and Thais.
Separately, the Ethiopians had offered helicopters, but the
Sudanese had asked why attack helicopters had been included
in the mix. Amb Khalilzad also noted that the ongoing
dispute between Sudan and Chad also threatened to complicate
the Darfur issue, and that the credibility of the peace
process and the UNSC was at stake. Takasu agreed and asked
if Libya was helping Sudan foment instability in Chad. Amb
Khalilzad said we had not seen evidence of Libyan involvement
but were certain that Sudan was behind the rebels in Chad.

East Timor
--------------


9. (SBU) Takasu argued that the mandate of the UN mission in
East Timor should be extended. Amb Khalilzad agreed that the
UN must not leave East Timor prematurely but added that the
UN should be wary of creating a culture of dependency in
which countries come to rely on UN missions rather than
making the hard choices needed to consolidate post-conflict
peace.

Ethiopia-Eritrea
--------------


10. (C) Amb Khalilzad reported that the P-5 had failed to
agree on a joint warning to Eritrea to cooperate with UNMEE
because China had insisted on conducting its discussions with
Asmara bilaterally. Noting indications that Eritrea appeared
to want war with Ethiopia, Amb Khalilzad said the SYG ought
to be cautious in terms of cooperating with the Eritreans.

Africa Development Summit
--------------


11. (SBU) Takasu reported that Japan would host its first
conference on African development from May 13-14 in Yokohama.
This event would be repeated every five years. Takasu said
Yokohama would not/not be a pledging conference, but instead
focus on the three pillars needed for successful development
strategy in Africa: vibrant economic growth, consolidation
of peace through good governance and the rule of law, and

sustainable environmental policies. Japan envisioned a
declaration resulting from the Yokohama summit, which would
be drafted in the course of two or three preparatory meetings
in Africa.

Peacebuilding Commission
--------------


12. (SBU) Recalling that the Japanese PM Fukuda had recently
committed Japan to being a "peace-fostering nation," Takasu
argued that the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) could be a
useful advisory body to the UNSC. Although he admitted that
the PBC had in the past not chosen "strategically important"
countries, certain PBC countries like Guinea-Bissau had
become main transit points for international drug shipments,
which increased their strategic relevance. Noting that Japan
had recently opened a bilateral aid office in Guinea-Bissau,
Takasu urged the USG to focus more of its attention on the
PBC. Amb Khalilzad agreed the PBC had potential and that
ttention to peacebuilding could help reduce the length of
time for which peacekeeping operations are needed. But hehe
expressed concern that the PBC could simply be another effort
to extract additional aid money without improving
coordination of existing UN efforts.
WOLFF