Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USUNNEWYORK123
2008-02-11 16:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:
CDG MINUS COUNTRIES UNITED IN CONCERN ABOUT KOSOVO
VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUCNDT #0123/01 0421605 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 111605Z FEB 08 ZDK FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3688 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0230 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1142 RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 1115
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000123
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC YI
SUBJECT: CDG MINUS COUNTRIES UNITED IN CONCERN ABOUT KOSOVO
DI-RECOGNITIONS GAP
Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro Wolff, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000123
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC YI
SUBJECT: CDG MINUS COUNTRIES UNITED IN CONCERN ABOUT KOSOVO
DI-RECOGNITIONS GAP
Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro Wolff, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: The Coordinating and Drafting Group Minus
Russia (CDG-1) on February 8 discussed the run-up to a Kosovo
declaration of independence (DI) and its aftermath. There
was agreement that there should be no pretext provided for
Russian efforts to de-legitimize Kosovo's independence.
Therefore, the EU's Solana should not send any kind of letter
to SYG Ban regarding the ESDP Rule of Law mission before a
declaration and that no other written communication should
come to Ban from the US or EU that he would have to pass on
to the Council. There was also general agreement that group
members should try to be as low key as possible in New York
from now until a declaration and not pressure Ban to the
extent that they are not compelled to do so by Russia. The
group considered but did not come to agreement on other
questions including: 1) Should CDG-1 ambassadors make a
strong public statement after any emergency session called by
Russia; 2) what are the best arguments to use if Russia calls
an emergency session during a gap between a DI and
recognitions; 3) What are the best arguments to make if the
joint actions re ESDP are attacked in New York (presumably
before a DI)? End Summary.
CDG MINUS RUSSIA COUNTRIES DISCUSS POSSIBLE UNHELPFUL RUSSIAN
UN ACTIONS
2. (C) Deputy Permreps of the CDG Minus Russia (US,UK,
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Croatia) on February 8
discussed how to handle in New York the run-up to a Kosovar
declaration of independence and its immediate aftermath. UK
DPR Pierce suggested that participants work to minimize the
extent to which the Security Council takes a view on a DI and
also to ensure that Russia cannot use the Security Council to
block actions on the ground or, later, block the SYG from
allowing the transfer of authorities in Kosovo and the
downsizing of UNMIK. She said we also need at a minimum the
SYG to not annul a DI or send the question of UNMIK's
reconfiguration to the Security Council. Pierce also asked
whether participants supported making a joint statement
following a post-DI emergency UNSC session that Russia might
call. She underscored that the group should also be prepared
for Russia to take other possible, unhelpful actions, such as
raising Kosovo in the General Assembly.
3. (C) Ambassador Wolff agreed that Pierce had raised the
right questions, but underscored that Russia might well take
any of these actions even before a DI. Thus, it would be
important to make sure there is no action in New York from
the EU or US from now until a DI that could provide Russia a
hook for such actions. He also stressed that it is critical
to minimize the time gap between a DI and U.S. and EU
recognitions because the CDG-1 countries will be on much
firmer ground defending a DI if complemented by the
recognitions of their capitals.
4. (C) French DPR LaCroix said an emergency session called by
Russia could even be positive in the sense that it would
demonstrate again blockage in the Security Council. LaCroix
agreed that the SYG will be on much firmer ground after
recognitions. Belgian Permrep Verbeke concurred with others
that it is necessary to ensure that Russia has no hook before
a declaration. German DPR Ney expressed strong concern about
the gap and expressed hope that Quint Political Directors
would address it in an upcoming discussion. Germany was
doubtful that a CDG-1 statement would be workable before
recognitions because of the weaker ground the group would be
on. Italy agreed.
5. (C) The UK Polcoordinator reviewed UK thinking on how a
Russian request for a Security Council meeting on the ESDP
decision in advance of a DI might play out and argued that EU
Council members should say it involved a sovereign EU
decision that does not require Security Council action and,
furthermore, that discussion is premature because the recent
decision to approve the ESDP mission involved only one stage
in a complex process that has not yet become operational.
Italy argued that for the time being the group should stick
to arguing that ESDP has nothing to do with status and is
full legitimized under EU law.
6. (C) The UK's Pierce suggested that it would be helpful to
convey to Ban that the group would have no objection if he
chose to be absent, perhaps even from New York, on the likely
date of a Security Council emergency session. All agreed to
task experts with drafting counter-arguments against Russia,
drawing on what had they had discussed during the day's
meeting.
KHALILZAD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC YI
SUBJECT: CDG MINUS COUNTRIES UNITED IN CONCERN ABOUT KOSOVO
DI-RECOGNITIONS GAP
Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro Wolff, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: The Coordinating and Drafting Group Minus
Russia (CDG-1) on February 8 discussed the run-up to a Kosovo
declaration of independence (DI) and its aftermath. There
was agreement that there should be no pretext provided for
Russian efforts to de-legitimize Kosovo's independence.
Therefore, the EU's Solana should not send any kind of letter
to SYG Ban regarding the ESDP Rule of Law mission before a
declaration and that no other written communication should
come to Ban from the US or EU that he would have to pass on
to the Council. There was also general agreement that group
members should try to be as low key as possible in New York
from now until a declaration and not pressure Ban to the
extent that they are not compelled to do so by Russia. The
group considered but did not come to agreement on other
questions including: 1) Should CDG-1 ambassadors make a
strong public statement after any emergency session called by
Russia; 2) what are the best arguments to use if Russia calls
an emergency session during a gap between a DI and
recognitions; 3) What are the best arguments to make if the
joint actions re ESDP are attacked in New York (presumably
before a DI)? End Summary.
CDG MINUS RUSSIA COUNTRIES DISCUSS POSSIBLE UNHELPFUL RUSSIAN
UN ACTIONS
2. (C) Deputy Permreps of the CDG Minus Russia (US,UK,
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Croatia) on February 8
discussed how to handle in New York the run-up to a Kosovar
declaration of independence and its immediate aftermath. UK
DPR Pierce suggested that participants work to minimize the
extent to which the Security Council takes a view on a DI and
also to ensure that Russia cannot use the Security Council to
block actions on the ground or, later, block the SYG from
allowing the transfer of authorities in Kosovo and the
downsizing of UNMIK. She said we also need at a minimum the
SYG to not annul a DI or send the question of UNMIK's
reconfiguration to the Security Council. Pierce also asked
whether participants supported making a joint statement
following a post-DI emergency UNSC session that Russia might
call. She underscored that the group should also be prepared
for Russia to take other possible, unhelpful actions, such as
raising Kosovo in the General Assembly.
3. (C) Ambassador Wolff agreed that Pierce had raised the
right questions, but underscored that Russia might well take
any of these actions even before a DI. Thus, it would be
important to make sure there is no action in New York from
the EU or US from now until a DI that could provide Russia a
hook for such actions. He also stressed that it is critical
to minimize the time gap between a DI and U.S. and EU
recognitions because the CDG-1 countries will be on much
firmer ground defending a DI if complemented by the
recognitions of their capitals.
4. (C) French DPR LaCroix said an emergency session called by
Russia could even be positive in the sense that it would
demonstrate again blockage in the Security Council. LaCroix
agreed that the SYG will be on much firmer ground after
recognitions. Belgian Permrep Verbeke concurred with others
that it is necessary to ensure that Russia has no hook before
a declaration. German DPR Ney expressed strong concern about
the gap and expressed hope that Quint Political Directors
would address it in an upcoming discussion. Germany was
doubtful that a CDG-1 statement would be workable before
recognitions because of the weaker ground the group would be
on. Italy agreed.
5. (C) The UK Polcoordinator reviewed UK thinking on how a
Russian request for a Security Council meeting on the ESDP
decision in advance of a DI might play out and argued that EU
Council members should say it involved a sovereign EU
decision that does not require Security Council action and,
furthermore, that discussion is premature because the recent
decision to approve the ESDP mission involved only one stage
in a complex process that has not yet become operational.
Italy argued that for the time being the group should stick
to arguing that ESDP has nothing to do with status and is
full legitimized under EU law.
6. (C) The UK's Pierce suggested that it would be helpful to
convey to Ban that the group would have no objection if he
chose to be absent, perhaps even from New York, on the likely
date of a Security Council emergency session. All agreed to
task experts with drafting counter-arguments against Russia,
drawing on what had they had discussed during the day's
meeting.
KHALILZAD