UNGA 63: DEALING WITH WESTERN EUROPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001198 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018 TAGS: PHUM PREL UNGA US XG XH XT ZB SUBJECT: UNGA 63: DEALING WITH WESTERN EUROPE REF: 2007 USUN 1218 Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JEFF DELAURENTIS FOR REASON 1.4 (B&D) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION ¶1. (U) This cable was prepared by Robert J. Smolik who served as Senior Area Advisor for Western European Affairs to the 63rd United Nations General Assembly. ¶2. (C) During the fall session of the 63rd UNGA, EU and European Free Trade Association states generally aligned with U.S. objectives. They put their weight behind human rights resolutions and buttressed us on most other first, second and third committee work. Notably, the EU and allies quieted their call for the U.S. to engage at the UN Human Rights Council. However, the EU moralistically and even provocatively countered U.S. preferences on death penalty and religious intolerance/freedom of expression, and sexual orientation issues. ¶3. (C) One way to avoid needlessly exposing such transatlantic divisions (especially to the G-77) is to begin early, energetic, and detailed UNGA 64 consultations with the EU troika. Pre-consultation on key issues (before the EU establishes its common position) would save hours of damage-limitation negotiation in New York. More positively, it would allow us to work proactively with the EU to show transatlantic leadership at the UN. ¶4. (C) In an effort to build bridges to the G-77, Switzerland played a successful, efficient role as floor manager for a U.S.-inspired resolution on "Legal Empowerment of the Poor". Among the larger EU players, Spain most often contested U.S. interests. For example, Spain prevented (probably for domestic political reasons) a stronger EU showing against the Kosovo ICJ referral, and complicated the UN's Interfaith Dialogue (which Spain sees as infringing on its Alliance of Civilizations). Our relationship with Madrid on UN issues deserves sustained attention, not least because of Spain's mutliplier role in Latin America. ¶5. (SBU) France's EU presidency during UNGA 63 assured a fully-staffed and efficient European team of interlocutors; Sweden will need to step up to play a similar role next year. The Czech Republic's EU presidency in the first half of 2009 gives us a strong ally on human rights issues. ¶6. (C) This is another argument to engage the EU troika early to prepare as much of a common strategy as possible for ;UNGA 64. In the end, the EU may be so attached to its role as "moderator in New York" between the U.S. and the G-77, that U.S.-EU common positions on all issues may not be possible before UNGA 64. The bottom line is that the EU generally provides our core support within WEOG, as we often face overwhelming opposition from the G-77. So for us to maintain and grow our influence during UNGA 64, one key is to engage the EU proactively and in detail. END SUMMARY FRANCE'S STRONG EU PRESIDENCY COORDINATION; NEED TO INFLUENCE CZECH EU PRESIDENCY ¶7. (SBU) As expected, throughout the fall UNGA 63, the French Mission was organized and energetic in representing common EU positions. They worked with us to lobby African, Asian, Caribbean and Latin American delegations, effectively allocating tasks, sometimes in surprising extra-EU ways (Norway influenced Burundi's human rights votes). But at times, France also allowed EU partners to work against our interests. (EU PRs often turned this argument around, saying that U.S. positions of principle are on certain issues inimical to EU common positions). ¶8. (C) For example, EU gave Sweden latitude to insert a capital punishment clause (unacceptable to us) into a UN/COE resolution. This wasted hours of negotiation and generated pointless bad feeling, particularly since the clause was finally unceremoniously dropped. France also allowed the EU resolution on religious intolerance to cross our known red lines on freedom of expression, giving Egypt and Pakistan among the G-77 the chance to spotlight transatlantic differences. Determined negotiation allowed us to protect our constitutional freedom of speech requirements, and eventually to co-sponsor the resolution. Even though DRL had made our position clear to the EU several months before, the positive outcome in third committee required many hours of work in New York and even last-minute intervention at political director level in capitals. ¶9. (SBU) One way to save negotiation time and avoid bad perceptions is to engage the EU troika forcefully and early, USUN NEW Y 00001198 002 OF 003 before the EU agrees on a common position. Sweden will be in the EU presidency during the critical fall months of UNGA 64, Our best moment to influence the EU's UNGA 64 performance will be during the Czech presidency in the first half of ¶2009. The Czech PR is eager to coordinate with us, on third committee issues in particular, pointing out that the Czech Republic criticizes human rights abuses wherever they occur (including in Cuba.) Ambassador Martin Palous has personal experience with human rights, as a dissident during the Soviet period. WORKING WITH EUROPEANS TO BUILD BRIDGES TO G-77 AND AVOID ISOLATION ¶10. (C) In an effort to build bridges to the G-77, the U.S. Mission conceived a resolution based on the acclaimed work of Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto ("Legal Empowerment of the Poor and Eradication of Poverty"). His widely-praised proposals favor, inter alia, granting property rights to the poor so that they can borrow to build small businesses. Our concept with this proposal was to get beyond instinctive G-77 suspicion of U.S. proposals. We asked Switzerland (and Guatemala) to floor manage the resolution, which they did brilliantly. In achieving consensus, the resolution countered typical exchanges in second committee, where there is usually a deep divide between WEOG and the G-77. Switzerland intends to work with partners to pursue this resolution, implementing its provisions in a report that deals with practical problems of legal structures and economic development. ¶11. (SBU) Switzerland, as a non-threatening good citizen of the UN, opened the way for similar initiatives, perhaps to be proposed in the future by an EU member state. Along these same lines, USUN made a special effort this UNGA to avoid needless isolation on certain issues. We worked successfully with France and the UK in the first committee to this effect. On the series of Palestine resolutions, we were less successful, since several EU states who had moderated their positions on similar votes at the Human Rights Council in Geneva, reverted to an EU consensus abstention. ¶12. (SBU) On the positive side, whereas during UNGA 62 European PRs never failed to criticize us for disengaging from the HRC, at UNGA 63 they no longer mentioned Geneva, but worked effectively with us on human rights in the third committee. As during UNGA 62, the EU worked closely with the U.S. and Canada to push through human rights resolutions condemning Burma, DPRK and Iran. France/EU presidency effectively shouldered their responsibilities to share lobbying of G-77 members where they enjoy special influence. (They even asked Norway to use its predominant position in Burundi to lobby there.) Along with France and the UK, who traditionally lobby francophone and Commonwealth nations, Spain at our request, tried to influence GRULAC Latins, with some success. INTERFAITH DIALOGUE AND RESOLUTIONS ON RELIGION - WORKING WITH SPAIN AND THE VATICAN ¶13. (C) The Spanish Mission to the UN is extremely effective, both within the EU caucus (where they prevented a "free vote" on the ICJ Kosovo referral, achieving a disappointing block EU abstention) and working with Latin America (where we asked their PR to lobby for human rights votes against Burma, DPRK and Iran). The current PR, Juan Antonio Yanez-Barnuevo, also served in the 1990s as Spain's Ambassador to the UN and was Legal Adviser at his Foreign Ministry; he is tenacious. ¶14. (SBU) On the various UNGA 63 outcomes regarding religion, particularly during the Saudi-sponsored Interfaith Dialogue, Spain took a skeptical position, probably because they feared cross purposes with their own initiative, the Alliance of Civilizations. The "preparatory" meeting in Madrid left both the Spanish Government and the Vatican displeased with the Saudi closing declaration. However, thanks to hard work in Madrid and at the Holy See, the outcome document from the Interfaith Dialogue pleased all parties. ¶15. (C) On the Kosovo ICJ referral, Spain was the major EU state most opposing our position. Its intransigence prevented those EU members doubtful about the referral from voting a national position, and forced an EU abstention on the issue. Also, on a wide variety of issues that matter to us and the EU, from human rights to various religious issues to reproductive rights, the Vatican UN Observer played a quiet but influential role. The Holy See is worth cultivating on many issues likely to arise at UNGA 64. Others worth cultivating are tiny Europeans, like Liechtenstein and San Marino, whose long-serving and active Ambassadors at the USUN NEW Y 00001198 003 OF 003 UN give them influence disproportionate to their populations. Although they do not sit in EU coordinating meetings at the UN, they meet regularly with EU counterparts, both informally and in regularly scheduled format with the EU-27. ¶16. (SBU) Another EU initiative, a statement on sexual orientation/gender identity, was also adopted. The EU procedure in preparing their text was revealing. France/EU presidency approached likely supporters and shared their draft; others, likely to oppose, such as the Vatican, were held at arms length. We received the text fairly late in the process, after the French said some 55 co-signers were committed. This experience highlights the need for early, preemptive consultations with the troika before future UNGAs. Although a statement is not as formal a UN outcome as is a resolution, the text of the EU statement can and probably will be used as the basis for a future resolution. ¶17. (SBU) UN budget and resource issues are also still under negotiation in fourth committee. The EU representative is playing behind the scenes, not revealing his hand, but will reportedly argue for some budget stringency. This would be an improvement over the EU's open-handed, even unprincipled approach on budget issues during UNGA 62. However, in the heat of negotiations, the EU has sometimes failed to acknowledge our points of principle on PBI (program of budget increase),thus straining relations. The Hungarian PR chair of fourth committee is being even-handed. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION ¶18. (C) We need to work more proactively with the EU on our UNGA 64 agenda. We should recognize that EU interests at UNGA 64 may diverge in specific areas from U.S. objectives, even if we engage in early and detailed consultations with the troika. In substantive, strategic terms this will likely be the case for such issues as capital punishment and freedom of expression versus religious intolerance. In tactical terms, even on issues that should unite us, including many arms limitation and economic development matters, the EU may still choose to play "go between" with the G-77. The troika's consultations with the G-77 are institutionalized, which builds in a dynamic of accommodation. This tactical challenge is still another argument for us to engage the EU troika early to prepare as much of a common strategy as possible for UNGA 64. ¶19. (C) In the end, the EU may so relish its role as "moderator in New York" between the U.S. and the G-77, that pre-UNGA common transatlantic positions on all isues may not be possible. In the category of "preempting an excuse," early consultations with the troika can at least minimize situations where the EU Presidency argues that its UN text was so exhaustively negotiated at 27 that they cannot reopen it. The French Ambassador's remarks to hundreds of colleagues at France's end of presidency reception were provocative: "In the past at the UN, the EU was seen as 'the nice guy'. Now we want to be something more." Several EU PRs interpret this to mean that in future the EU will more forcefully defend its red lines. ¶20. (C) The bottom line is that the EU generally provides our core support within WEOG, as we often face overwhelming opposition from the G-77. So better UN outcomes can result from engaging the troika early and in detail on UNGA 64. The upcoming Czech presidency will give us that opportunity. Khalilzad