GEORGIA SRSG VERBEKE CONSIDERS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001181

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA SRSG VERBEKE CONSIDERS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
UN MANDATE

Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Georgia SRSG Johan Verbeke told Ambassador
DiCarlo on December 16 he would likely propose a more
robust UN mandate for the United Nations Observer Mission
in Georgia (UNOMIG) when drafting the next periodic report
on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia. The report will be
completed mid-January and released in early February.
Verbeke outlined advantages and disadvantages of another
technical rollover for UNOMIG when it expires on February
15, and sought out U.S. views on such a move. He believed
Russia would fight against a technical rollover. Instead,
he believed Russia would push to establish a reduced
mandate that would solidify the status quo and allow Russia
to argue that implementation of the September 8 ceasefire
agreement is complete. Verbeke believed the Abkhaz could
be allies in establishing a more robust international
presence in Abkhazia. END SUMMARY.

Robust Monitoring Mission
--------------


2. (C) Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(SRSG),Johan Verbeke, told Ambassador DiCarlo and Poloff
on December 16 he would propose a more robust UN mandate
for Abkhazia/Georgia when he submits his periodic Report of
the Secretary-General (SYG) to the UN Secretariat. Verbeke
believes that a full-fledged "classical peacekeeping
mission" might not be feasible, but he will likely propose
it as a straw man in the report with the understanding that
it would be reduced to a "robust monitoring mission" during
the course of Security Council negotiations. Verbeke is
currently concentrating his efforts, through the Geneva
process, on reaching consensus on a security regime for
Abkhazia. The SRSG would support a Security Council
resolution that would enshrine both the security regime and
the enhanced mission to monitor its implementation. (Note:
DPA and DPKO experts have provided us with additional
details about the UN Secretariat's likely recommendations,
which will be reported septel.)

Technical Rollover
--------------

3. (C) Verbeke said he understood that there was a
prevailing view in the Secretariat and among interested
countries that another technical rollover of UNOMIG may be
necessary due to the short time between release of the
report with his recommendations (February 5, 2009) and the
expiration of the UNOMIG mandate (February 15, 2009),and
also due to the lack of a coherent view among the UN, OSCE,
and EU on a way forward. He warned that a technical
rollover would further delay a decision on the future
international presence in Abkhazia, which could work
against Georgia's interest if international support for
Georgia's role in the August conflict continues to wane.
On the other hand, he thought another rollover would
provide an opportunity for the UN and EU to synchronize a
review of options for the UN mandate with the EU's review
of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM),due to occur at the
end of March 2009.


4. (C) Verbeke thought Russia would resist a technical
rollover, but instead would seek to establish a reduced
mandate for the UN in Abkhazia that would enshrine the
status quo and allow Russia to claim that the issue had
been resolved. Resolving the issue in February would also
preempt any coordinated inter-institutional exercise
between the UN and EU in March. Verbeke pointed to the
ongoing discussions in Vienna over renewal of the OSCE
Mission in South Ossetia (which expires at the end of 2008)
as illustrative of tactics we might expect from Russia
during discussions of the UN mandate. Russia, he posited,
prefers to deal with the South Ossetia and Abkhazia
mandates on their own merits, as it is easier to whittle
away at the mandates by tackling them separately. Verbeke
believed Russia would eventually acquiesce to a minimal
OSCE mission in South Ossetia, as it would allow Russia to
claim that the security discussions mandated by the August
12 and September 8 agreements have been completed. A
renewed OSCE mandate would also provide an incentive for
the EUMM to hasten the completion of its own mission.


5. (C) Ambassador DiCarlo agreed that Russia would make
difficulties when it came time to renew the UN mission, but
she framed the question of whether to approve a technical
rollover in terms of whether it would buy us time to make
sure the eventual UN mandate was something we wanted. If
we were to pursue a technical rollover, it would be
important to be certain that an underlying process was in
place to come to a workable arrangement for security. The
U.S. wants to see a strong international presence in

USUN NEW Y 00001181 002 OF 002


Abkhazia, she said, but our soundings in New York indicated
weak desire on the part of the Europeans to transform the
EUMM into a longer-term observer presence-- making it more
important to have a robust UN presence.


6. (C) Verbeke thought the Abkhaz de facto leaders could be
helpful in trying to establish a more robust UN mission.
He said there were "elements in their proposals on which we
can construct something meaningful," referring to proposals
that had been solicited by the Geneva co-chairs during the
second round of talks in November for an incident response
and resolution mechanism. DiCarlo agreed that the Abkhaz
have an interest in maintaining an international presence
in order to help them maintain some distance from Russia,
but she also thought it would be difficult to dodge Russian
attempts to achieve implicit recognition of Abkhazia, when
negotiating the new UN mandate.
Khalilzad