ARAB PERFORMANCE AT THE 63RD UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001175

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/3/2018
TAGS: PREL UNGA PHUM XF EG
SUBJECT: ARAB PERFORMANCE AT THE 63RD UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Classified By: POLMILCOUNS JEFFREY DELAURENTIS.
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
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1. (C) ARAB PERFORMANCE AT THE 63RD UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY WAS
A MIXED BAG, WITH DIFFERENTIATED VOTING ON SOME KEY ISSUES.
EGYPT MAINTAINED ITS USUAL ACTIVISM IN SHAPING AND DEFENDING
UNHELPFUL G-77, OIC, AND NON-ALIGNED POSITIONS. SYRIA ENGAGED
IN ITS USUAL RHETORIC AND POLARIZING TACTICS, AND ALGERIA
DISPLAYED SOME NEGATIVE BEHAVIOR AS WELL, SEEKING
(UNSUCCESSFULLY) TO BLOCK MOROCCO FROM SPEAKING AT A
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMEMORATIVE EVENT AND
PLAYING AN UNHELPFUL ROLE ON A RESOLUTION ON MORE TRANSPARENT
MANAGEMENT OF OIL REVENUES. BUT MOST ARAB DELEGATIONS,
ANXIOUS TO AVOID THE RISKS OF MORE ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND
LACKING THE STAFF TO DO SO, GENERALLY OPTED FOR A LOW PROFILE
AND SOUGHT REFUGE AND RELATIVE ANONYMITY IN REGIONAL
CONSENSUS POSITIONS.


2. (C) BRIGHT SPOTS IN ARAB PERFORMANCE AT THIS YEAR'S
GENERAL ASSEMBLY INCLUDED: SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED ARAB
ABSTENTIONS/ABSENCES DURING THE THIRD COMMITTEE VOTE ON THE
IRAN NO ACTION MOTION; THE DEFEAT OF THE IRAN NO ACTION
MOTION IN COMMITTEE BY A MUCH LARGER MARGIN THIS YEAR, THANKS
IN PART TO THE CRITICAL SHIFT OF FOUR ARAB VOTES FROM "YES"
TO ABSENT; IRAQ'S POSITIVE PERFORMANCE IN CHAIRING THE SIXTH
COMMITTEE (LEGAL AFFAIRS); THE HELPFUL ROLE OF MOROCCO,
LEBANON, AND IRAQ IN SUPPORTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTIONS
ON BURMA/MYANMAR AND NORTH KOREA; AND THE SAUDI-INITIATED
INTERFAITH DIALOGUE EVENT, WHICH PRODUCED A HELPFUL STATEMENT
ENDORSING FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND REJECTING THE USE OF
RELIGION TO JUSTIFY TERRORIST ACTIVITY. ON THE NEGATIVE
SIDE, ARAB PERFORMANCE AT THIS YEAR'S UNGA WAS MARKED BY:
PREDICTABLE SUPPORT FOR UNBALANCED AND UNHELPFUL RESOLUTIONS
ON PALESTINE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, AND
DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS, AMONG OTHERS; CONTINUING OPPOSITION
TO THE IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION (13 OUT OF 17
DELEGATIONS,INCLUDING IRAN); A TOTAL ABSENCE OF SUPPORT FOR
KOSOVO ON THE QUESTION OF SEEKING AN ICJ ADVISORY OPINION ON
ITS UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE; AND A NOTABLE
INCREASE IN ARAB ABSTENTIONS ON THIS YEAR'S COMPLIANCE
RESOLUTION CALLING ON STATES TO RESPECT THEIR ARMS CONTROL
AND NON-PROLIFERATION COMMITMENTS.

HELPFUL ARAB SHIFTS ON IRAN NO ACTION MOTION
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3. (C) IN THIS YEAR'S THIRD COMMITTEE VOTE, 12 ARAB STATES
(INCLUDING NON-ARAB IRAN) SUPPORTED THE MOTION AND FIVE ARAB
STATES EITHER ABSTAINED (JORDAN) OR WERE ABSENT (BAHRAIN,
LIBYA, MOROCCO, AND YEMEN.) A SIMILAR MOTION LAST YEAR WAS
DEFEATED BY ONLY ONE VOTE, WITH JUST TWO ARAB STATES (JORDAN
AND IRAQ) ABSENTING THEMSELVES. THIS YEAR'S ABSENCES
REPRESENTED A CRITICAL SHIFT OF FOUR "YES" VOTES AND
ACCOUNTED FOR A MAJOR PART OF THE TEN-POINT MARGIN OF VICTORY
(71-81(US)-28) IN DEFEATING THE MOTION. JORDAN'S SHIFT FROM
ABSENT TO ABSTAIN REFLECTED A DECISION TO ABSTAIN ON ALL
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC RESOLUTIONS, A FORMULA JORDAN FELT WOULD
MAKE ITS POSITIONS MORE CONSISTENT, MORE INSULATED FROM
OUTSIDE PRESSURE, YET RESPONSIVE TO OUR PRIORITY OF DEFEATING
THE NO ACTION MOTION. YEMEN'S ABSENCE, ACCORDING TO YEMENI
PERM REP ALSAIDI, WAS IN REACTION TO IRAN'S UNHELPFUL
MEDDLING WITH REBEL TRIBES IN YEMEN'S NORTH.


4. (C) LIBYA'S ABSENCE, PERHAPS THE MOST INTERESTING SHIFT IN
THE ARAB GROUP, REFLECTED LIBYA'S FITFUL EVOLUTION TOWARD
MORE RESPONSIBLE FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS, LIBYAN PERM REP
ETTALHI'S READINESS TO THINK OUTSIDE THE BOX, AND HIS DIRECT
TIES TO QADDHAFI. IN INFORMING NEA AREA ADVISER OF LIBYA'S
INTENTION TO BE ABSENT FOR THE VOTE, ETTALHI REGRETTED THAT
"THINGS MOVE SLOWLY IN LIBYA" AND THAT AN ABSENCE WAS THE
BEST LIBYA COULD DO AT THIS TIME. MOROCCO'S SHIFT TO AN
ABSENCE ON BOTH IRAN VOTES, COUPLED WITH ITS SUPPORT ON BURMA
AND NORTH KOREA, MADE MOROCCO OUR MOST HELPFUL ARAB PARTNER
ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. ON THE DOWNSIDE IRAQ THIS YEAR MOVED
FROM AN ABSENCE TO A "YES" ON THE NO ACTION MOTION,
EXPLAINING THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF SECURING APPROVAL FOR THE
SOFA, IT COULD NOT RISK FURTHER IRRITATING IRAN.

ARAB VOTES SO FAR HOLDING FIRM
FOR DECEMBER 18 PLENARY VOTE
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5.(C) THE PLENARY VOTES ON THIRD COMMITTEE ISSUES, INCLUDING
THE IRAN NO ACTION MOTION, ARE NOW EXPECTED FOR DECEMBER 18.
WITH THIS VOTE IN MIND, IRAN HAS MOUNTED AN ACTIVE LOBBYING
EFFORT TO BUILD SUPPORT, ESPECIALLY FROM COUNTRIES THAT HAD

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PREVIOUSLY SUPPORTED THE NO ACTION MOTION BUT THIS YEAR DID
NOT. FOR NOW AT LEAST, THE FIVE ARAB STATES THAT WERE ABSENT
OR ABSTAINED IN THE COMMITTEE VOTE SEEM TO BE HOLDING FIRM.
WITH VARYING DEGREES OF CERTITUDE, THE BAHRAINI, MOROCCAN,
LIBYAN, YEMENI, AND JORDANIAN PERM REPS HAVE ALL TOLD NEA
AREA ADVISER THEY EXPECT THEIR COUNTRY TO MAINTAIN ITS
POSITION IN THE DECEMBER 18 PLENARY VOTE. AS ALWAYS, THE
PROOF WILL BE IN THE PUDDING, AND WE WILL THUS MAINTAIN CLOSE
CONTACT WITH ARAB DELEGATIONS NEXT WEEK IN ORDER TO HELP
PREVENT ANY SLIPPAGE.

CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION ON IRAN
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6. (C) THIS YEAR'S SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION IN IRAN PASSED IN THE COMMITTEE VOTE
(70(US)-51-60). ARAB GROUP VOTING BROKE DOWN (0-13-2),WITH
TWO ABSENT. THOSE ABSTAINING WERE JORDAN AND THE UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES; THOSE ABSENT WERE IRAQ AND MOROCCO. MOROCCO'S SHIFT
FROM "NO" IN 2007 TO ABSENT THIS YEAR WAS SIGNFICANT BECAUSE
IT DEPRIVED IRAN OF A NEEDED "NO" VOTE. SIMILARLY, IRAQ'S
ABSENCE, BY DEPRIVING IRAN OF A NEEDED "NO" VOTE, HELPED
LIMIT THE DAMAGE FROM IRAQ'S UNHELPFUL SHIFT FROM ABSENT TO
SUPPORT ON THE NO ACTION MOTION. THE ABSTENTIONS OF JORDAN
AND UAE DID NOT MATERIALLY SHIFT THE BALANCE COMPARED TO LAST
YEAR'S VOTE BUT AGAIN HELPFULLY DENIED IRAQ POTENTIAL
SUPPORT, THE UAE'S ABSTENTION WAS A CONTINUATION OF ITS 2007
POSTURE AND, ACCORDING TO SOME OTHER GULF PERM REPS, SHOULD
BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IRAN-UAE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE.
JORDAN'S ABSTENTION, BY ACTIVELY SIGNALLING THAT JORDAN WAS
NOT WILLING TO SUPPORT IRAN, REPRESENTED A MODEST AND MAINLY
SYMBOLIC STRENGTHENING OF ITS POSITION. ALSO NOTABLE -- AND
REFLECTING THE FELT NEED OF REGIONAL STATES TO CAREFULLY
NAVIGATE CONFLICTING PRESSURES SURROUNDING THIS ISSUE -- IS
THAT THREE OF THE FOUR COUNTRIES THAT HELPFULLY ABSTAINED OR
WERE ABSENT FOR THE IRAN NO ACTION MOTION (BAHRAIN, LIBYA,
AND YEMEN) VOTED AGAINST THE SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION.

NO ACTION MOTION/SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION ON BURMA/MYANMAR
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7. (C) THE NO ACTION MOTION ON BURMA WAS DEFEATED IN THE
COMMITTEE VOTE THIS YEAR (54-90(US)-34),A SLIGHTLY POORER
SHOWING THAN LAST YEAR (54-88-34). ARAB GROUP VOTING BROKE
DOWN AS FOLLOWS: 13 YES (INCLUDING IRAN),3 NO (IRAQ,
LEBANON, MOROCCO),AND 1 ABSTENTION (JORDAN). THE ONLY CHANGE
FROM LAST YEAR'S VOTE WITHIN THE ARAB GROUP WAS ALGERIA'S
UNHELPFUL SHIFT FROM ABSENT TO SUPPORT. REGARDING THE
SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN
BURMA, THIS YEAR'S RESOLUTION PASSED (89-29-63) COMPARED TO
(88-24-66) IN 2007. ARAB GROUP VOTING WAS EXACTLY THE SAME AS
IN 2007 (3-6-7),WITH ONE ABSENCE (TUNISIA). IRAQ, LEBANON,
AND MOROCCO SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION; BAHRAIN, ALGERIA,
EGYPT, IRAN, LIBYA, OMAN, AND SYRIA VOTED AGAINST; AND
JORDAN, KUWAIT, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, UAE, AND YEMEN
ABSTAINED. THE DIFFERENTIATED VOTING UNDERCUT THE "DOUBLE
STANDARD" AND "PRINCIPLED OPPOSITION TO COUNTRY SPECIFIC
RESOLUTIONS" ARGUMENTS OFTEN USED TO JUSTIFY ARAB VOTING ON
IRANIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

ARABS EVENLY DIVIDED OVER HUMAN
RIGHTS SITUATION IN NORTH KOREA
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8. (C) THE SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION IN NORTH KOREA PASSED IN COMMITTEE (95(US)-24-62),
WITH THE ARAB GROUP THIS YEAR AGAIN TAKING NOTABLY DIVERGENT
POSITIONS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF JORDAN'S SHIFT FROM "YES"
TO "ABSTAIN", ARAB GROUP VOTING ON THIS YEAR'S RESOLUTION WAS
THE SAME AS IN 2007 -- (5-6-5) V. (6-6-4),WITH TUNISIA
ABSENT BOTH YEARS. BAHRAIN, IRAQ, LEBANON, MOROCCO, AND
SAUDI ARABIA SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION BOTH YEARS. THE SIX
"NO" VOTES WERE THE SAME BLOC THAT VOTED FOR THE NO ACTION
MOTION ON BURMA (ALGERIA, EGYPT, IRAN, LIBYA, OMAN, SYRIA).
THE FIVE ABSTENTIONS WERE FROM JORDAN, YEMEN, QATAR, KUWAIT,
AND THE UAE. JORDAN'S DECISION THIS YEAR TO ABSTAIN ACROSS
THE BOARD ON THIRD COMMITTEE HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTIONS, IN THE
INTEREST OF CONSISTENCY, WAS BEHIND JORDAN'S SHIFT. AS WITH
THE BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION, DIFFERENTIATED ARAB VOTING
ON THE KOREA RESOLUTION PUT THE LIE TO
"DOUBLE-STANDARD/PRINCIPLED OPPOSITION TO COUNTRY-SOPECIFIC
RESOLUTIONS" ARGUMENTS.

GCC SHIFT TO ABSTENTION ON FIRST
COMMITTEE COMPLIANCE RESOLUTION
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9. (C) ALTHOUGH THE U.S.-PROPOSED COMPLIANCE RESOLUTION
(CALLING FOR RESPECT FOR AND STRENGTHENED ENFORCEMENT OF ARMS

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CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION COMMITMENTS) PASSED HANDILY IN
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY PLENARY VOTE (158(US)-0-18),THERE WAS
DISAPPOINTING SLIPPAGE IN ARAB AND PARTICULARLY GULF SUPPORT.
THE BREAKDOWN IN ARAB GROUP VOTING WAS (6-0-10),WITH ONE
ABSENCE (OMAN). EGYPT, SYRIA, AND IRAN MAINTAINED THEIR
ABSTENTION POSTURE FROM 2005, WHEN A SIMILAR COMPLIANCE
RESOLUTION WAS LAST PUT FORWARD. HOWEVER, EIGHT ARAB STATES
SHIFTED FROM SUPPORT IN 2005 TO AN ABSTENTION OR ABSENCE FOR
THE 2008 VOTE. THOSE ABSTAINING OR ABSENT WERE: BAHRAIN,
KUWAIT, LIBYA, OMAN, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, UAE, AND YEMEN.
THOSE SUPPORTING THE RESOLUTION WERE: ALGERIA, IRAQ, JORDAN,
LEBANON, MOROCCO, AND TUNISIA. IRAQ MISTAKENLY ABSTAINED IN
THE COMMITTEE VOTE, ACCORDING TO THEIR PERM REP, BUT
SUPPORTED THE COMPLIANCE RESOLUTION IN THE PLENARY VOTE.


10. (C) GCC PERMREPS HAVE BEEN NOTABLY UNABLE TO PROVIDE A
CLEAR OR CONSISTENT EXPLANATION FOR THEIR WHOLESALE SHIFT TO
AN ABSTENTION. THOUGH THERE IS NO SUCH LANGUAGE IN THE TEXT,
TWO PERMREPS PURPORTED TO TRACE GCC ABSTENTIONS TO CONCERNS
OVER LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS OR OBLIGATORY SHARING OF
SENSITIVE INFORMATION, THE OMANI PERM REP TOLD NEA AREA
ADVISER THAT OMAN'S ABSENCE FOR THE VOTE REFLECTED A LACK OF
INSTRUCTIONS AND CLAIMED AS RECENTLY AS DECEMBER 12 NOT TO
KNOW WHAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S SPECIFIC CONCERNS WERE ON THE
RESOLUTION. IF WE PLAN TO SUBMIT SIMILAR RESOLUTIONS IN THE
FUTURE, UNDERSTANDING MORE PRECISELY THE NATURE OF GCC
CONCERNS THIS TIME AROUND AND MAKING ADJUSTMENTS WHERE
POSSIBLE TO ADDRESS THOSE CONCERNS WILL BE KEY TO GAINING THE
BROADEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT. IN THIS SPIRIT, DEPARTMENT MAY
WISH TO CONSIDER ASKING EMBASSIES, IN THE COURSE OF OTHER
BUSINESS, TO PROBE THE REAL COMPLIANCE RESOLUTION CONCERNS IN
CAPITALS.

IRAQI LEADERSHIP OF THE SIXTH COMMITTEE (LEGAL AFFAIRS)
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11. (C) IRAQI PERM REP AL-BAYATI AND HIS LEGAL EXPERTS
PROVIDED SMOOTH, STEADY, EFFICIENT LEADERSHIP OF THE SIXTH
COMMITTEE, SKILLFULLY MANAGING TO ENSURE THAT ALL RESOLUTIONS
HANDLED BY THE COMMITTEE WERE PASSED BY CONSENSUS. AL-BAYATI
PLAYED AN ESPECIALLY HELPFUL ROLE IN BRINGING THE SIDES
TOGETHER AND IN FACILITATING A FACE-SAVING, NEW
ZEALAND-INSPIRED COMPROMISE THAT ENABLED THE RUSSIANS TO STEP
BACK FROM A CONFRONTATION OVER THEIR PROPOSAL TO REVERSE
CURRENT UN POLICY OPPOSING HONORARIA FOR UN RAPPORTEURS. THE
EGYPTIAN LEGAL EXPERT ALSO PLAYED A HELPFUL ROLE IN BRINGING
THE G-77 AROUND ON THE QUESTION OF REFORM OF THE UN'S
INTERNAL JUSTICE/DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM.


EGYPTIAN MANEUVERING ON SECOND AND THIRD COMMITTEE ISSUES
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12 (C) THE EGYPTIANS ONCE AGAIN PROVED THEMSELVES HIGHLY
SKILLED, PROFUSE IN THEIR PROFESSIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AND
DESIRE FOR COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES, BUT FAIRLY
CONSISTENT IN PUSHING POSITIONS, LANGUAGE, AND RESOLUTIONS WE
FIND UNHELPFUL. THEY WERE ESPECIALLY ADEPT AT MARSHALLING
G-77, OIC, AND NAM SUPPORT FOR EGYPTIAN POSITIONS, EXPLOITING
THE LACK OF CAPACITY/INTEREST OF SMALLER AFRICAN DELEGATIONS,
AND THEN TAKING THE LEAD IN NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF THESE
GROUPS. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY THE CASE ON CONTROVERSIAL
THIRD AND FOURTH COMMITTEE ISSUES. IN PRACTICE, THIS HAS
MEANT: 1) CONSISTENT AND VOCAL OPPOSITION ON ISSUES RELATING
TO HUMAN RIGHTS, WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT, AND SOCIAL ISSUES; 2)
RESOLUTIONS PRESENTED BASICALLY AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI, WITH
EITHER NO NEGOTIATION OR ONLY MINIMAL NEGOTIATION DESIGNED TO
GET THE EUROPEANS ON BOARD; AND 3) THE ENDURING RITUAL OF
UNBALANCED, REPETITIVE, AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE PALESTINIAN
RESOLUTIONS.


13. (C) ON THE COMBATING THE DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS
RESOLUTION, EGYPT ASSUMED WHAT IT SAW AS ITS NATURAL
LEADERSHIP ROLE, ALTHOUGH UGANDA, AS THE CURRENT ISLAMIC
CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN, WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE THIS
RESPONSIBILITY. WHILE PROFESSING TO WANT TO BE HELPFUL IN
ADDRESING OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE RESOLUTION, THE EGYPTIANS IN
THE END MADE ONLY THE MOST MINOR CHANGES AND PUSHED THROUGH,
ONCE AGAIN, A VERY PROBLEMATIC RESOLUTION THAT, BY FOCUSING
ON DEFAMATION AT THE EXPENSE OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
BELIEF, UNDERCUTS FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND GIVES COVER FOR
REPRESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTION. THE ONLY CONSOLATION FOR US WAS
THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE NUMBER OF "NO" VOTES AND
ABSTENTIONS WAS GREATER THAN THE NUMBER OF "YES" VOTES. SYRIA
ALSO PLAYED AN UNHELPFUL ROLE ON SEVERAL THIRD COMMITTEE
ISSUES, OFTEN SEEKING TO INSERT PHRASING OPPOSING "FOREIGN
OCCUPATION" IN UNRELATED RESOLUTIONS ON SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
ISSUES.


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LOW-KEY BUT HELPFUL SUPPORT FROM LEBANON, MOROCCO, JORDAN
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14. (C) EXCEPT FOR THEIR OBLIGATORY SUPPORT FOR
PALESTINIAN-RELATED RESOLUTIONS AND HOT BUTTON ISSUES SUCH AS
THE OIC-SPONSORED COMBATING DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS
RESOLUTION, LEBANON, MOROCCO, AND JORDAN PLAYED LOW-KEY BUT
HELPFUL ROLES BEHIND THE SCENES. WHILE LEBANON VOTED AGAINST
US ON IRAN, GIVEN ITS CONCERNS OVER IRAN'S TROUBLE-MAKING
CAPABILITIES VIA HIZBALLAH, LEBANON VOTED WITH US ON BOTH THE
BURMA AND NORTH KOREA HUMAN RIGHTS VOTES. IT ALSO MAINTAINED
ITS SUPPORT FOR OUR COMPLIANCE RESOLUTION. IN THE SECOND
COMMITTEE, LEBANON UNHELPFULLY PUSHED THROUGH AN UNBALANCED
RESOLUTION CONCERNING OIL SPILLS ALONG THE LEBANESE COAST
ARISING FROM THE 2006 HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL. BUT IT ALSO
FACILITATED COMPROMISE LANGUAGE TO ACCOMMODATE U.S. CONCERNS
ON THE DESERTIFACTION RESOLUTION, PLAYED A HELPFUL ROLE ON
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, AND SOUGHT TO KEEP THE
SYRIANS FROM OVERLY POLITICIZING THE OIL SLICK RESOLUTION.
MOROCCO, AS NOTED ABOVE, VOTED WITH US ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS
RESOLUTIONS ON BURMA AND NORTH KOREA AND HELPFULLY SHIFTED
FROM A "YES" TO ABSENT ON THE IRAN NO ACTION MOTION. JORDAN,
FOR ITS PART, HAS SIMILARLY PLAYED A RESPONSIBLE AND
MODERATING ROLE WHERE IT COULD, HELPFULLY ABSTAINING ON THE
IRAN NO ACTION MOTION, SUPPORTING THE COMPLIANCE RESOLUTION,
FACILITATING CONSENSUS RESOLUTIONS IN THE THIRD COMMITTEE,
MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELI DELEGATION, AND
GENERALLY SEEKING TO BE PART OF THE SOLUTION AND NOT PART OF
THE PROBLEM.

LACK OF SUPPORT FOR KOSOVO ON ICJ REFERRAL ISSUE
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15. (C) NO ARAB STATE WAS WILLING TO SIDE WITH KOSOVO, A
FELLOW MUSLIM MAJORITY STATE, ON THE RESOLUTION REQUESTING AN
ICJ ADVISORY OPINION ON THE LEGALITY OF KOSOVO'S UNILATERAL
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. THE RESOLUTION PASSED (77-6
(US)-74). THE BREAKDOWN IN ARAB VOTING (INCLUDING IRAN) WAS
(4-0-9),WITH FOUR ABSENCES. ARAB DELEGATIONS HAVE VARIOUSLY
ASCRIBED THEIR LACK OF SUPPORT TO THE "FORMAL OIC POSITION"
ON RECOGNITION (WHICH THE OIC REP HAS TOLD US DOES NOT
EXIST),CONCERN FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY,
AND CAUTIOUSNESS ABOUT IRRITATING RUSSIA. AMONG THOSE
SUPPORTING THE ICJ REFERRAL WERE: ALGERIA, EGYPT, IRAN, AND
SYRIA. AMONG THOSE ABSENT WERE: IRAQ, KUWAIT, LIBYA, AND
TUNISIA. THOSE ABSTAINING INCLUDED: BAHRAIN, YEMEN, JORDAN,
LEBANON, MOROCCO, OMAN, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, AND THE UAE.
MORE POSITIVELY, THE UAE AND MALAYSIA SUBSEQUENTLY RECOGNIZED
KOSOVO, A STEP ARAB PERM REPS SEE AS FACILITATING RECOGNITION
BY OTHER ARAB STATES. IN ADDITION, ARAB PERM REPS HAVE
PRIVATELY VOICED SYMPATHY FOR KOSOVO, EXPRESSED EMBARRASSMENT
OVER THE FAILURE OF MUSLIM STATES TO SUPPORT A FELLOW MUSLIM
COMMUNITY, AND SAID THAT RECOGNITION WILL HAPPEN AND IS ONLY
A MATTER OF TIME. FINALLY, THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS THAT SAUDI
ARABIA IS ACTIVELY CONSIDERING A RECOGNITION MOVE.
Khalilzad