Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USUNNEWYORK116
2008-02-08 20:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

USUN STRATEGY ON BURMA

Tags:  PREL PHUM UNSC BM 
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O 082058Z FEB 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3677
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3070
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000116 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM
SUBJECT: USUN STRATEGY ON BURMA

REF: A. USUN 96


B. USUN 107

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000116 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM SUBJECT: USUN STRATEGY ON BURMA REF: A. USUN 96 ¶B. USUN 107 Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) In response to a request in the February 7 Deputies Committee meeting, USUN provides the following plan of action on Burma over the next few weeks. USUN will continue to engage the Secretary General, the P-3 and other Council members to build support for stronger steps. ¶2. (C) In a discussion with Ambassador Khalilzad on February 3, Secretary General Ban agreed to ratchet up the pressure on the Burmese regime. He proposed to write a letter to Than Shwe and contact Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and China to press the Burmese to cooperate with the UN. Ban also agreed that Special Advisor Gambari needed to travel to Burma before the end of the month (ref A). In a subsequent P-3 meeting, the UK and French PRs agreed that a letter to Than Shwe would be useful as an effective means to convey UN expectations to the regime (ref B). The P-3 also discussed the British proposal for a Group of Friend's meeting before Gambari travels to China (Feb. 15) as a way for Ban to report on the failure of the Burmese government to cooperate with his "good offices" mission so far, outline his expectations for progress, including Gambari's return to Burma this month, and brief on what he conveyed to Than Shwe. The UK and France also agreed to reach out bilaterally to China, Indonesia, and Vietnam and other members of the Council to build support for further action. ¶3. (C) The UK and France continue to express concern about prematurely introducing tougher measures, including sanctions, and prefer first to "prepare the battlefield" by expanding support for the view in the Council that Burma has failed to respond to the objectives outlined in the Council's Presidential Statement of October 11 and subsequent press statement, and that the Council needs to take further action. ¶4. (C) USUN is pressing Ban to get a strong letter to Than Shwe out as early as possible next week, and to focus it on the benchmarks established by the Council, including the release of all political prisoners and remaining detainees, including Aung San Suu Kyi, the beginning of a genuine dialogue leading to inclusive national reconciliation, and cooperation with the UN's "good offices" mission by receiving Gambari. USUN is urging Ban and Gambari to convene a meeting of the Group of Friends early in the week of February 11 to seek support for his strategy. The objectives would be either to move the Burmese regime to make serious progress on the elements of our October 11 PRST, or, if the Burmese fail to respond or respond inadequately, set the stage for a SecGen report to the Council that his good offices mission has not worked. The latter would set us up best for a move in the Council on further measures. KHALILZAD

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