SUDAN: SANCTIONS COMMITTEE SPLITS ON PROPOSALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001134 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2018 TAGS: PREL UNSC PGOV ETTC SUBJECT: SUDAN: SANCTIONS COMMITTEE SPLITS ON PROPOSALS REF: A. USUN 915 ¶B. USUN 970 Classified By: DEPUTY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ELLEN GERMAIN, FOR REASONS 1. 4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Sudan Sanctions Committee on December 2 discussed two separate proposals for action: first, a Belgian suggestion to invite the Permanent Representatives of Chad and Sudan to discuss with the Committee the last Sudan Panel of Experts (POE) report (ref A),and second, an offer from a non-governmental organization, Human Rights First (HRF),to brief the Committee on issues related to the Darfur arms embargo. The U.S., UK, and French UN missions worked behind-the-scenes to put these issues on the Committee's agenda (as envisioned in ref B non-paper). Most of the Committee supported inviting the Perm Reps, although Libya, China and Russia objected. After much debate on the form and tone this invitation might take, the Committee agreed that the Chair will approach the Perm Reps of Chad and Sudan informally to extend this invitation. Russia was skeptical about inviting the NGO and asked for more time to consider the request of HRF; the Chair decided to draft a letter and submit it under silen ce procedure for the committee's consideration. END SUMMARY. Inviting Perm Reps: Committee Split Along Familiar Lines -------------- ¶2. (C) On December 2, the Sudan Sanctions Committee considered two proposals for action. The first proposal, which was formally submitted to the Committee by Belgium, was to invite the Perm Reps of Chad and Sudan to speak with the Committee. Belgium proposed that such a meeting would help the Committee better understand the political situation and allow the Perm Reps to present their own viewpoints on the findings of the recent Panel of Experts (POE) report (ref A). Indonesia, Panama, Costa Rica, South Africa, and Burkina Faso supported the initiative, which had already received strong backing from the UK, U.S., Croatia, Belgium, and France. ¶4. (C) Belgium and the UK explained that such a meeting would fulfill the Committee's mandate by encouraging dialogue between the Committee and all interested states in and beyond the region. Indonesia and South Africa noted that to truly fulfill its mandate, the Committee should extend the invitation to all interested countries that might wish to speak to the Committee. ¶5. (C) Libya, however, argued that an invitation at this point would send the wrong message, and said the Committee should first await a response to a letter requesting information that had been sent to the Perm Reps from the Committee, and only then follow up if it proves to be insufficient. The Libyan delegate stated that they are "not in a hurry to get specific information from Sudan." China questioned how appropriate an invitation would be, expressed its concern that a letter of invitation would indirectly communicate an "obligation" to meet with the Committee, and then suggested that the Chair first approach the delegations informally to see if they would be receptive to such an invitation. Russia also signaled its opposition to specifically inviting the two Perm Reps, noting that while Moscow would support the two coming to speak if they wanted to, there should be no obligation for them to do so. The (what nationality?) Chair, unable to get a consensus to send a letter under Chinese objections, sugges ted he would instead approach the Perm Reps informally to extend this invitation. Russia later said that his delegation could not support any sort of invitation, written or spoken, and wished that the Chair would simply "remind" the Perm Reps that they could address the committee if they so chose. The Chair promised that he would work to ensure that neither of the two Perm Reps feel pressured in any way and to notify the Committee of this meeting's outcome (possibly by email). Possible Human Rights First Briefing -------------- ¶6. (C) The Italian Chair noted that he had recently received a request from the NGO Human Rights First (HRF) to brief the Committee on information about potential violations of the Darfur arms embargo and recommendations for improving compliance. The Chair stated that he saw much merit in this opportunity for dialogue and proposed to schedule a briefing. The U.S. agreed that this briefing would be a welcome supplement to the committee's work, and Panama spoke up to support this. ¶7. (C) The Indonesian delegate said that while he was familiar with HRF, he was concerned about its "incorrect understanding" of the arms embargo. He stated that Indonesia would support such an invitation but would like the Chair to stress "the precise nature of the arms embargo regime" in his letter. Russia stated that they had just received this information and requested more time for careful review. The Chair agreed and informed the Committee that he would draft a letter and submit it under silence procedure for consideration. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Although producing meager results, the Committee's deliberations accomplished an important goal: they showed that the Sudan Sanctions Committee remains a viable forum for monitoring compliance with the sanctions measures imposed on Sudan. Working closely with P3 counterparts, USUN will continue to sustain activity in the Committee, even as other delegations seek to prevent the Committee from meaningfully carrying out its mandate. END COMMENT. Wolff