UN/SOMALIA SANCTIONS:

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001131 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018 TAGS: SO XW UNSC PGOV PRO ETTC SUBJECT: UN/SOMALIA SANCTIONS: Classified By: DEPUTY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ELLEN GERMAIN, FOR REASONS 1. 4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) This is an action request -- please see para 10. ¶2. (C) Summary: The UN Monitoring Group (MG) for Somalia has just released its latest confidential report on the implementation of the general arms embargo which includes a number of key findings likely to influence the policy debate on Somalia. The MG concluded that nearly every armed force, group or militia in Somalia, as well their financiers, active supporters, and foreign donors, are guilty of arms embargo violations. It alleged that the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea, and commercial entities in Yemen, have provided political, financial and/or military support to armed Somali groups, which constitutes arms embargo violations. The MG documented how external contributions to build TFG security forces, capacity have provided an important loophole through which arms, equipment and military skills are diverted to the open market or to armed opposition groups. This report also includes detailed information about Somali armed groups that will help the Somalia Sanctions Committee find appropriate targets for designating individuals and entities under the new targeted sanctions regime. The Sanctions Committee will meet with the MG in the coming weeks to discuss its findings further. USUN requests guidance on how to respond to this report. (END SUMMARY) ¶3. (C) The UN Monitoring Group (MG) for Somalia has just released its latest confidential report on the implementation of the general arms embargo which includes a number of key findings regarding the security situation in Somalia and the principal violators of the existing arms embargo. (NOTE: The Monitoring Group is a team of UN contractors charged primarily with investigating and documenting violations of the comprehensive arms embargo that the Security Council first imposed in 1992. END NOTE). The MG reported that most serviceable weapons and ammunition have been diverted to Somalia since the 1992 implementation of the arms embargo, and therefore almost all of them represent embargo violations. Every armed force, group, or militia in Somalia, their financiers, active supporters, and (in some cases) foreign donors, the MG asserted, are guilty of arms embargo violations. The MG concluded that armed forces on all sides are characterized by weak command and control, informal 
hierarchies, situational loyalties, frequent schisms and shifting alliances. Nevertheless, the report identified some key leaders who exercise sufficient authority to be held accountable for the actions of their forces. ¶4. (C) The MG reported that the pattern of arms embargo violations has remained constant over the mandate period, and appears broadly consistent with the previous report's findings. It asserted that the relatively low volume of arms transfers to Somalia reflects a number of factors: that the conflict is of relatively low intensity; that it is characterized by irregular warfare waged with small infantry formations; and the already high density of weapons in circulation. An important new feature of the security environment in Somalia, the MG noted, is the dramatic expansion of armed criminal groups, including maritime militias engaged in piracy and armed robbery at sea. It assessed that genuine economic hardship and a sense of grievance against foreign exploitation of Somalia's maritime resources not only inspire many pirates, but also serve to legitimize their activities in the eyes of their communities. The report proposed that some leading figures in piracy syndicates are responsible for arms embargo violations and should be considered for the new targeted sanctions measures imposed by UNSCR 1844, passed by the Security Council on November 20. The MG explained that UNSCR 1844 introduces the prospect of genuine accountability for violators, but the arms embargo exemptions also provide an opportunity for Somalia's international partners to demonstrate a norm of compliance through adherence to these procedures. ¶5. (C) The MG documented how external contributions to build the capacity of the TFG security forces have provided an important loophole through which arms, equipment and military skills are diverted to the open market or to armed opposition groups. As much as 80 per cent of the international investment in building the TFG security forces has been diverted to purposes other than those for which it was intended, explained the MG. Such facts, it argued, should be taken into account by governments planning training programs, and underscore the need for the Sanctions Committee to be notified in advance of any planned security sector support. The MG also explained that the practice of "self-exemption" from this requirement by providers of security sector support has been problematic. ¶6. (C) The MG asserted that the financing of embargo violations continues to reflect the absence of functioning government institutions or effective regulation of economic activity. The report notes a steady decline in the fiscal oversight and capabilities of the TFG, whereas armed opposition groups have expanded the areas under their control, acquiring possession of strategic economic assets and access to substantial revenue flows. As the TFG loses authority and cohesion, the MG observed, its leaders are squandering resources while its military assets are degraded and sold. Armed opposition groups, on the other hand, continue to mobilize resources quite effectively, while augmenting their military capability ) often with arms and equipment acquired from the TFG. ¶7. (C) The MG's report concluded that the arms embargo has been violated principally by two types of actors: (1) actors who committed substantive violations for which no exemption could be obtained, and (2) non-abiding partners, who provided support to the Somali security sector, whose activities might have been eligible for an exemption if notified to the Sanctions Committee. In the first group, the MG pointed a finger at Eritrea, which provides training, arms, and financial support to armed opposition groups in contravention of the arms embargo; Ethiopia, which has a military presence in Somalia and supplies weapons to Puntland authorities and other allied militias; and the Canadian-based Africa Oil Corp., which has not notified the Sanctions Committee of the recruitment of armed security guards or the hiring of foreign armed guards and trainers. The second group includes Ethiopia, which has trained 17,000 Somali security personnel and provided arms to the TFG military and police without notifying the Sanctions Committee or receiving an exemption; Yemen, which demonstrated serious shortcomings in implementing measures to enforce the embargo; and the UNDP, which recruits and manages Somali armed security personnel and trains the Somali police. ¶8. (C) During the current mandate, the MG said it witnessed the continuing erosion of the TFG's cohesion, the fragmentation of armed opposition groups and a dramatic escalation in the activities of armed criminal groups, including terrorism and piracy. Unless there is further progress toward a durable ceasefire, a credible political process and restoration of effective institution of governance, such trends are likely to continue. However, failure to enforce the arms embargo will gravely undermine the prospects for progress on any and all of these fronts. ¶9. (C) The MG's recommendations focused on the developments of transparent systems for the registration, management, and disposal of weapons, ammunition and explosive stockpiles in accordance with international practices. The MG also highlighted the importance of tracing arms in Somali territory, establishing more precise guidelines for the notification of support to Somali security sector institutions, and authorizing international naval forces in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean to seize any weapons encountered in the course of their operations and to actively interdict arms trafficking. ¶10. (C) ACTION REQUEST -- The Somalia Sanctions Committee will meet on December 11 with members of the MG. USUN requests guidance on how to respond to the MG's report. This meeting will provide the Committee with an opportunity to request clarification and to make suggestions for issues the MG should focus on after its mandate is renewed. Wolff