SOMALIA: COUNCIL FRUSTRATED AT LACK OF PROGRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001106

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO UNSC SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: COUNCIL FRUSTRATED AT LACK OF PROGRESS

REF: A. STATE 123225

B. USUN 791

C. USUN 689

Classified By: Amb. Rosemary DiCarlo, for reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) SUMMARY: A downbeat briefing on political developments
combined with continued lack of progress toward a
Multinational FORCE (MNF) or peacekeeping operation (PKO) led
to frustrated reactions from Council members in a November 20
meeting on Somalia. Several members noted that the prospect
of a new international stabilization FORCE seemed out of
reach, and called instead for strengthening the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Not all of these states
envision rehatting AMISOM as a UNPKO, but their statements
suggest that any future U.S. push for a PKO will be more
successful if packaged as an effort to "strengthen AMISOM"
using all available tools. The U.S. draft resolution
extending the anti-piracy authorities of Resolution 1816 was
tabled (Ref. A) and well-received, with initial expert-level
consultations scheduled for Monday, November 24. End Summary.

UN briefs on political developments...
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2. (SBU) The Security Council met on November 20, 2008 to
hear a briefing on the Secretary-General's November 17, 2008
report on the situation in Somalia. Briefing for the
Department of Political Affairs (DPA),Assistant
Secretary-General Haile Menkerios cited three key positive
events during since the last report:

- on October 25, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS)
signed a cease-fire agreement;
- on November 4, the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS)
facilitated a visit by the head of the ARS, Sheikh Sharif, to
the Somali regions of Johar and Beledweyne -- Sharif's first
visit to Somalia since the Ethiopian incursion of 2006;
- Ethiopia withdrew from the region of Johar and handed over
the former Ministry of Defense compound in Mogadishu to
forces of AMISOM.


3. (SBU) Menkerios was particularly positive in his
description of Sheikh Sharif's visit to Somalia, noting that
the warm reception he received indicated the strong support
enjoyed by the ARS in south-central Somalia. He also noted
the October 25 agreement to form a national unity government
and said that this agreement enjoyed broad support inside
Somalia. Menkerios delivered some bad news, citing expanding
operations by hard-line groups, the suspension of NGO
operations in response to al-Shabaab threats, and the
displacement of over 37,000 civilians from Mogadishu in
October. Menkerios told the Council that tensions continue
between TFG President Yusuf and PM Nur Adde, that the 2-week
timetable for a national unity government set by the
Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had not
been met, and that the next move lay with the TFG Parliament,
which was expected to vote on a cabinet slate proposed by PM
Nur Adde but opposed by the president.


4. (SBU) In follow-on consultations, Menkerios cautioned
against confusing opponents of the TFG with al-Shabaab. He
said flatly that the perception that al-Shabaab seized the
southern port of Kismayo is wrong. The reality, he said, is
that one clan's monopolization of income from the town's port
had provoked a rival clan into seizing the town. He said
that al-Shabaab is not a discrete entity with a coherent
structure.

...and on security
--------------


5. (SBU) Briefing for the Department of Peacekeeping Affairs
(DPKO),Officer-in-Charge for Africa Ray Zenenga said that of
more than 50 countries and organizations targeted by the
Secretary-General for contributions to a possible MNF for
Somalia, only 7 had responded. Of these, four countries had
responded that they were "over-stretched," two regional
organizations had said that they were ready to help, and one
country had offered logistical and financial support. (NOTE:
Though Zenenga did not mention it, the latter country is
clearly the United States. End note.) Zenenga said that
conditions were not ripe for a UN PKO and defended DPKO's
planning for a MNF as "minimalist." He appealed to countries
to form a coalition to help stabilize Mogadishu similar to
the emerging coalition of countries countering piracy off the
Somali coast.


6. (SBU) In a subsequent military briefing delivered in
closed consultations, DPKO head military planner Col. Brian
Norman (U.S.) identified four critical tasks for a potential

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MNF in Somalia. Such a FORCE must be able to quickly and
autonomously deploy, monitor Ethiopia's withdrawal, provide
limited security for peace process venues, and secure AIR and
sea supply routes into Mogadishu. He said that planning for
a MNF included rules of engagement and had gone as far as it
could go without the identification of a lead nation. (NOTE:
Menkerios said in his briefing that a MNF could be
particularly useful to the political process by securing
peace process venues in Mogadishu that would allow the SRSG
and other facilitators to access political figures who would
otherwise remain outside the political process. End note.)
Norman echoed Zenenga in stating that a PKO could not deploy
under current conditions. He said that pending a technical
assessment visit to Somalia (which he claimed would be
impossible given the UN's assessment of security conditions)
UN planning called for a PKO of 22,500 troops whose mandate
would focus on protection of civilians and safeguarding aid
delivery corridors and humanitarian personnel.

IMO, AU and Somalia address Council
--------------


7. (SBU) The Council then heard interventions from
International Maritime Organization Secretary-General
Efthimios Mitropoulos, AU Permanent Observer Lila
Ratsifandrihamanana and Somali PermRep Elmi Ahmed Duale.
Mitropoulos spoke with concern of the increasing number of
pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia and the associated
risk to the safety of mariners, maritime commerce and the
environment. He urged clear rules of engagement for
anti-piracy efforts, to include actions against pirate
"mother ships" and the establishment of an effective legal
mechanism to bring suspected pirates to justice. Somalia
thanked member states for helping to counter piracy and asked
the Council to renew the authorities in resolution 1816 for
one year. Amb. Duale urged that various regional and
international initiatives on Somalia be coordinated under the
authority of SRSG Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah and said that there
was an urgent need in Somalia for immediate deployment of an
international force. Amb. Ratsifandrihamanana threw the AU's
support behind all efforts to strengthen peacekeeping in
Somalia. She urged early deployment of a UNPKO, mentioned
the AU's efforts to strengthen AMISOM and welcomed the SYG's
advocacy of a MNF, stating that AMISOM stood ready to
integrate into a future international force.

Council lets its frustration show
--------------


8. (SBU) Council members' reactions were markedly more
pessimistic than in previous sessions (Ref. B). South
Africa, previously a strong advocate of a UNPKO for Somalia,
said that the underlying message of the SYG's report is "we
can't do it" and that the Council should speak candidly about
this in order to avoid giving false hope to Somalis and
AMISOM forces. Other delegations that had previously
supported early deployment of a MNF or PKO called instead for
increased efforts to strengthen AMISOM. Libya said that
deployment of a new international FORCE was "outside our
grasp" and that efforts to develop a new mission would be
better spent expanding the political process and
strengthening AMISOM. Indonesia said that a stabilization
force seemed impossible and pressed the Secretariat for a
backup plan. AMISOM was set to expire in January -- how did
the Secretariat plan to reinforce AMISOM if a MNF or PKO was
not forthcoming? Panama said that strengthening AMISOM
seemed to be the only realistic option before the Council and
regretted that "the bureaucratic forces of this organization
have unfortunately prevented such an approach." Costa Rica
said that it was important for the SC to facilitate the
delivery of humanitarian assistance and to ensure the
security of the port and airport of Mogadishu to this end.
Two delegations that had formerly been forward-leaning on
movement towards a PKO seemed to be swayed by the SYG's
report. Vietnam welcomed the SYG's planning and urged early
deployment of a MNF. Burkina Faso supported a MNF and
eventual PKO in line with the DPKO's phased approach.

Some are pro-PKO
--------------


9. (C) Italy delivered a meandering and somewhat unhelpful
intervention, saying that while AMISOM was the only FORCE
available at the moment, it was "not loved" by Somalis and
should be reconfigured in order to gain the confidence of the
population. Responding to the Secretariat's analysis with a
"yes we can," Italy said that approval of a PKO was
ultimately a political decision and that the situation in
Somalia was no worse than in DRC, where MONUC had recently
been expanded. Italy also pressed the Secretariat to put a
time limit on its MNF generation efforts, after which DPKO
should present the Council with alternatives if a FORCE could

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not be generated. China continued to strongly support
peacekeeping efforts, saying that it was "vital" that AMISOM
continued to perform its duties smoothly and that it made
"moral sense" to deploy a UN peacekeeping FORCE to take over
AMISOM functions. China also supported the SYG's MNF
efforts, noting that a MNF could serve as a transition to a
PKO. Delivering the U.S. intervention, Amb. DiCarlo stressed
the importance of AMISOM to securing humanitarian aid
delivery to Somalia and said that the UN should develop
contingency plans for every scenario, including the
deployment of a UNPKO. In closed consultations in the
afternoon, Amb. DiCarlo formally tabled the U.S. draft
anti-piracy resolution (Ref. A),emphasizing the important
role that the 1998 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Traffic can play in
ensuring that pirates are brought to justice.

Others just say no
--------------


10. (SBU) European delegations referred to the SYG's report
to justify their skepticism of a possible PKO. The UK said
that the situation in Somalia was getting worse, and that a
MNF would be necessary in order to create conditions for a
PKO. UK Amb. Sawers said that the Council should learn the
lesson of deploying a PKO without the required capabilities
and that a solution to the situation in Somalia could not be
"scaled to what's available." France said that it supported
a "robust MNF" to be centered on Mogadishu that could supply
the necessary conditions for a PKO to eventually deploy.
Belgium stated that conditions did not exist for a PKO and
Croatia threw its weight behind the SYG's planning for a MNF,
though both said that AMISOM needed to be strengthened in the
meantime. Russia said that the best solution for Somalia
would be a more inclusive political dialogue and stressed
that conditions did not exist to deploy a PKO in Somalia.
Russia alone refused to give its support to the SYG's MNF
proposal, saying only that it was "following closely" his
efforts.

Piracy
--------------


11. (SBU) While Council members did not have time to react
substantively to the U.S.-introduced resolution extending the
authorities of Resolution 1816, many members did address the
problem of piracy in their national interventions. South
Africa, Indonesia, the U.S., China, Belgium and Russia all
emphasized that piracy was linked to the broader conflict in
Somalia and could not be addressed through maritime efforts
alone.

Comment:
--------------


12. (C) The Council's reaction to the Secretariat's most
recent briefing on Somalia is less positive than in the past,
but can help us better package our push for a Somalia PKO
going forward. While a number of members are strongly
opposed to immediate deployment of a 25,000-person PKO as
DPKO envisions, a large majority favor strengthening AMISOM.
Our strongest argument for a PKO is to confront Council
members with the real possibility of an AMISOM and Ethiopian
withdrawal and its attendant consequences, and to build a
coalition around the argument that rehatting is the most
effective tool to strengthen AMISOM under the current
circumstances. End Comment.


Wolff