SOMALIA: COUNCIL FRUSTRATED AT LACK OF PROGRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001106 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018 TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO UNSC SO ET SUBJECT: SOMALIA: COUNCIL FRUSTRATED AT LACK OF PROGRESS REF: A. STATE 123225 ¶B. USUN 791 ¶C. USUN 689 Classified By: Amb. Rosemary DiCarlo, for reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A downbeat briefing on political developments combined with continued lack of progress toward a Multinational force (MNF) or peacekeeping operation (PKO) led to frustrated reactions from Council members in a November 20 meeting on Somalia. Several members noted that the prospect of a new international stabilization force seemed out of reach, and called instead for strengthening the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Not all of these states envision rehatting AMISOM as a UNPKO, but their statements suggest that any future U.S. push for a PKO will be more successful if packaged as an effort to "strengthen AMISOM" using all available tools. The U.S. draft resolution extending the anti-piracy authorities of Resolution 1816 was tabled (Ref. A) and well-received, with initial expert-level consultations scheduled for Monday, November 24. End Summary. UN briefs on political developments... -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Security Council met on November 20, 2008 to hear a briefing on the Secretary-General's November 17, 2008 report on the situation in Somalia. Briefing for the Department of Political Affairs (DPA),Assistant Secretary-General Haile Menkerios cited three key positive events during since the last report: - on October 25, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) signed a cease-fire agreement; - on November 4, the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) facilitated a visit by the head of the ARS, Sheikh Sharif, to the Somali regions of Johar and Beledweyne -- Sharif's first visit to Somalia since the Ethiopian incursion of 2006; - Ethiopia withdrew from the region of Johar and handed over the former Ministry of Defense compound in Mogadishu to forces of AMISOM. ¶3. (SBU) Menkerios was particularly positive in his description of Sheikh Sharif's visit to Somalia, noting that the warm reception he received indicated the strong support enjoyed by the ARS in south-central Somalia. He also noted the October 25 agreement to form a national unity government and said that this agreement enjoyed broad support inside Somalia. Menkerios delivered some bad news, citing expanding operations by hard-line groups, the suspension of NGO operations in response to al-Shabaab threats, and the displacement of over 37,000 civilians from Mogadishu in October. Menkerios told the Council that tensions continue between TFG President Yusuf and PM Nur Adde, that the 2-week timetable for a national unity government set by the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had not been met, and that the next move lay with the TFG Parliament, which was expected to vote on a cabinet slate proposed by PM Nur Adde but opposed by the president. ¶4. (SBU) In follow-on consultations, Menkerios cautioned against confusing opponents of the TFG with al-Shabaab. He said flatly that the perception that al-Shabaab seized the southern port of Kismayo is wrong. The reality, he said, is that one clan's monopolization of income from the town's port had provoked a rival clan into seizing the town. He said that al-Shabaab is not a discrete entity with a coherent structure. ...and on security -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Briefing for the Department of Peacekeeping Affairs (DPKO),Officer-in-Charge for Africa Ray Zenenga said that of more than 50 countries and organizations targeted by the Secretary-General for contributions to a possible MNF for Somalia, only 7 had responded. Of these, four countries had responded that they were "over-stretched," two regional organizations had said that they were ready to help, and one country had offered logistical and financial support. (NOTE: Though Zenenga did not mention it, the latter country is clearly the United States. End note.) Zenenga said that conditions were not ripe for a UN PKO and defended DPKO's planning for a MNF as "minimalist." He appealed to countries to form a coalition to help stabilize Mogadishu similar to the emerging coalition of countries countering piracy off the Somali coast. ¶6. (SBU) In a subsequent military briefing delivered in closed consultations, DPKO head military planner Col. Brian Norman (U.S.) identified four critical tasks for a potential USUN NEW Y 00001106 002 OF 003 MNF in Somalia. Such a force must be able to quickly and autonomously deploy, monitor Ethiopia's withdrawal, provide limited security for peace process venues, and secure air and sea supply routes into Mogadishu. He said that planning for a MNF included rules of engagement and had gone as far as it could go without the identification of a lead nation. (NOTE: Menkerios said in his briefing that a MNF could be particularly useful to the political process by securing peace process venues in Mogadishu that would allow the SRSG and other facilitators to access political figures who would otherwise remain outside the political process. End note.) Norman echoed Zenenga in stating that a PKO could not deploy under current conditions. He said that pending a technical assessment visit to Somalia (which he claimed would be impossible given the UN's assessment of security conditions) UN planning called for a PKO of 22,500 troops whose mandate would focus on protection of civilians and safeguarding aid delivery corridors and humanitarian personnel. IMO, AU and Somalia address Council -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The Council then heard interventions from International Maritime Organization Secretary-General Efthimios Mitropoulos, AU Permanent Observer Lila Ratsifandrihamanana and Somali PermRep Elmi Ahmed Duale. Mitropoulos spoke with concern of the increasing number of pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia and the associated risk to the safety of mariners, maritime commerce and the environment. He urged clear rules of engagement for anti-piracy efforts, to include actions against pirate "mother ships" and the establishment of an effective legal mechanism to bring suspected pirates to justice. Somalia thanked member states for helping to counter piracy and asked the Council to renew the authorities in resolution 1816 for one year. Amb. Duale urged that various regional and international initiatives on Somalia be coordinated under the authority of SRSG Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah and said that there was an urgent need in Somalia for immediate deployment of an international force. Amb. Ratsifandrihamanana threw the AU's support behind all efforts to strengthen peacekeeping in Somalia. She urged early deployment of a UNPKO, mentioned the AU's efforts to strengthen AMISOM and welcomed the SYG's advocacy of a MNF, stating that AMISOM stood ready to integrate into a future international force. Council lets its frustration show -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Council members' reactions were markedly more pessimistic than in previous sessions (Ref. B). South Africa, previously a strong advocate of a UNPKO for Somalia, said that the underlying message of the SYG's report is "we can't do it" and that the Council should speak candidly about this in order to avoid giving false hope to Somalis and AMISOM forces. Other delegations that had previously supported early deployment of a MNF or PKO called instead for increased efforts to strengthen AMISOM. Libya said that deployment of a new international force was "outside our grasp" and that efforts to develop a new mission would be better spent expanding the political process and strengthening AMISOM. Indonesia said that a stabilization force seemed impossible and pressed the Secretariat for a backup plan. AMISOM was set to expire in January -- how did the Secretariat plan to reinforce AMISOM if a MNF or PKO was not forthcoming? Panama said that strengthening AMISOM seemed to be the only realistic option before the Council and regretted that "the bureaucratic forces of this organization have unfortunately prevented such an approach." Costa Rica said that it was important for the SC to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to ensure the security of the port and airport of Mogadishu to this end. Two delegations that had formerly been forward-leaning on movement towards a PKO seemed to be swayed by the SYG's report. Vietnam welcomed the SYG's planning and urged early deployment of a MNF. Burkina Faso supported a MNF and eventual PKO in line with the DPKO's phased approach. Some are pro-PKO -------------- ¶9. (C) Italy delivered a meandering and somewhat unhelpful intervention, saying that while AMISOM was the only force available at the moment, it was "not loved" by Somalis and should be reconfigured in order to gain the confidence of the population. Responding to the Secretariat's analysis with a "yes we can," Italy said that approval of a PKO was ultimately a political decision and that the situation in Somalia was no worse than in DRC, where MONUC had recently been expanded. Italy also pressed the Secretariat to put a time limit on its MNF generation efforts, after which DPKO should present the Council with alternatives if a force could USUN NEW Y 00001106 003 OF 003 not be generated. China continued to strongly support peacekeeping efforts, saying that it was "vital" that AMISOM continued to perform its duties smoothly and that it made "moral sense" to deploy a UN peacekeeping force to take over AMISOM functions. China also supported the SYG's MNF efforts, noting that a MNF could serve as a transition to a PKO. Delivering the U.S. intervention, Amb. DiCarlo stressed the importance of AMISOM to securing humanitarian aid delivery to Somalia and said that the UN should develop contingency plans for every scenario, including the deployment of a UNPKO. In closed consultations in the afternoon, Amb. DiCarlo formally tabled the U.S. draft anti-piracy resolution (Ref. A),emphasizing the important role that the 1998 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Traffic can play in ensuring that pirates are brought to justice. Others just say no -------------- ¶10. (SBU) European delegations referred to the SYG's report to justify their skepticism of a possible PKO. The UK said that the situation in Somalia was getting worse, and that a MNF would be necessary in order to create conditions for a PKO. UK Amb. Sawers said that the Council should learn the lesson of deploying a PKO without the required capabilities and that a solution to the situation in Somalia could not be "scaled to what's available." France said that it supported a "robust MNF" to be centered on Mogadishu that could supply the necessary conditions for a PKO to eventually deploy. Belgium stated that conditions did not exist for a PKO and Croatia threw its weight behind the SYG's planning for a MNF, though both said that AMISOM needed to be strengthened in the meantime. Russia said that the best solution for Somalia would be a more inclusive political dialogue and stressed that conditions did not exist to deploy a PKO in Somalia. Russia alone refused to give its support to the SYG's MNF proposal, saying only that it was "following closely" his efforts. Piracy -------------- ¶11. (SBU) While Council members did not have time to react substantively to the U.S.-introduced resolution extending the authorities of Resolution 1816, many members did address the problem of piracy in their national interventions. South Africa, Indonesia, the U.S., China, Belgium and Russia all emphasized that piracy was linked to the broader conflict in Somalia and could not be addressed through maritime efforts alone. Comment: -------------- ¶12. (C) The Council's reaction to the Secretariat's most recent briefing on Somalia is less positive than in the past, but can help us better package our push for a Somalia PKO going forward. While a number of members are strongly opposed to immediate deployment of a 25,000-person PKO as DPKO envisions, a large majority favor strengthening AMISOM. Our strongest argument for a PKO is to confront Council members with the real possibility of an AMISOM and Ethiopian withdrawal and its attendant consequences, and to build a coalition around the argument that rehatting is the most effective tool to strengthen AMISOM under the current circumstances. End Comment. Wolff