Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USUNNEWYORK1019
2008-11-05 13:58:00
UNCLASSIFIED
USUN New York
Cable title:  

63RD UNGA/FIRST COMMITTEE (UNFC): DAY FIVE AND SIX

Tags:  CD CDG PARM PREL UNGA 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 14 USUN NEW YORK 001019 

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CD CDG PARM PREL UNGA
SUBJECT: 63RD UNGA/FIRST COMMITTEE (UNFC): DAY FIVE AND SIX
OF THEMATIC DEBATE - CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

This is UNFC-7

---------------------
C1 Days 5 and 6 10-20 and 10-21 of Thematic Debate on
Conventional Weapons - Summary
---------------------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 14 USUN NEW YORK 001019 E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CD CDG PARM PREL UNGA SUBJECT: 63RD UNGA/FIRST COMMITTEE (UNFC): DAY FIVE AND SIX OF THEMATIC DEBATE - CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS This is UNFC-7 -------------- C1 Days 5 and 6 10-20 and 10-21 of Thematic Debate on Conventional Weapons - Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) Summary: The First Committee on Disarmament and International Security conducted its thematic debate on conventional weapons from October 20 to 22. On October 20, the Chairperson of the Governmental Group of Experts (GGE) on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) opened the debate. Representatives from the following states then spoke: France on behalf of the European Union (EU),Brazil on behalf of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and Associated States, Indonesia on behalf of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), Barbados on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Haiti on behalf of the Central American Integration System (SICA) and Mexico, and Denmark. ¶2. (U) During the morning of October 21, the Chairperson of the Third Biennial Meeting of States (BMS3) on small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) opened the debate. Representatives from the following states then spoke: Ireland, Chile, Japan, South Africa, Pakistan, Jordan, Argentina, Jamaica, Mali, Kazakhstan, Norway, Fiji, Finland, and New Zealand. ¶3. (U) During the afternoon session of October 21, the Chairperson of the Governmental Group of Experts (GGE) on conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus opened the debate. Representatives from the following states then spoke: Russia, Lithuania, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Sweden, Australia, Cuba, Indonesia, Mozambique, Thailand, Turkey, Republic of Korea (ROK),Canada, Cote d'Ivoire, Uruguay, Israel, United Kingdom, Tanzania, and Burkina Faso on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In a right of reply, Syria responded to Israel's statement that it supplied arms to Hezbollah. Syria argued that Israel continued to violate the Lebanese border and had brought terrorism to the Middle East. -------------- 10-20, Day 5 - Chair of the GGE ATT, France on behalf of the EU, Brazil on behalf of MERCOSUR and Associated States, Indonesia on behalf of the NAM, Barbados on behalf of CARICOM, Haiti on behalf of SICA and Mexico, and Denmark. ¶4. (U) The Chairperson of the GGE on an ATT, Roberto Garcia Moritan of Argentina, highlighted the instruments the GGE considered important for an ATT, namely the guidelines adopted in 1996 by the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) and the 2001 UN Program of Action (PoA) on SA/LW. The GGE considered the feasibility of an ATT from different perspectives. It added that the GGE was the first opportunity that the UN had to analyze the possibility of such an instrument. The GGE urged states to adopt national systems and domestic controls that apply strict standards but added that international agreements would be necessary to implement them. ¶5. (U) Egypt stated that it believed an ATT might be a very useful initiative. It advocated continued discussion with the "authors," including the United Kingdom, on the issue. It expressed hope that the language remained close to that of the GGE. Russia also spoke, stating that it believed the question of arms trade regulation was very complicated and called for further, balanced steps to be taken. It also stated that achieving consensus should remain a priority. ¶6. (U) France on behalf of the EU: Called on states to commit national legislation to address illicit trade of SA/LW. The EU expressed support for the Third Biennial Meeting of States' (BMS3) efforts in implementing the action program. It regretted, due to the attitude of one delegation (Iran), that the BMS3 report had to be adopted by a vote. The EU called on states to implement fully the UN PoA on SA/LW. It deemed the 2007 GGE report on SA/LW "substantial" and added that states should adopt its conclusions. The EU reiterated support for an ATT, as well as the need to establish a UN working group on that issue. The EU expressed support for expanding, by categories, the Register of Conventional Arms to include purchase information, production and national allocations, as well as SA/LW as a separate category. ¶7. (U) Brazil on behalf of MERCOSUR and Associated States: Stated that transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) were an important way to boost world security. It reiterated its support, since the 59th UN General Assembly (GA),for the Argentinean resolution on confidence building measures (CBMs) in the conventional weapons field. MERCOSUR called for a follow-up mechanism on the UN PoA on SA/LW. It welcomed Palau's signing of the Ottawa Convention. MERCOSUR noted the GGE report on an ATT and added that there was growing support to establish standards to regulate arms trade. ¶8. (U) Indonesia on behalf of the NAM: Called on states to provide assistance to strengthen the implementation of the UN PoA on SA/LW and advocated its early and full implementation. The NAM also expressed support for the full implementation of the international marking and tracing instruments. The NAM urged states to provide assistance to land mine clearance operations, victim rehabilitation, and access to technology, among other things. It noted both the Cluster Munitions Convention (CMC) and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) but did not explicitly express support for either. ¶9. (U) Barbados on behalf of CARICOM: CARICOM called for greater transparency in arms trade and expressed support for strong arms trade regulation in that regard. CARICOM reiterated its commitment to implementing the 2001 UN PoA on SA/LW. It lamented an increase in drug trafficking and crime in the region, noting the closure in Barbados of the regional UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). It added that reopening the office would signify a recommitment to combating those issues. ¶10. (U) Honduras on behalf of SICA and Mexico: SICA expressed support for the UN PoA on SA/LW, as well as for the BMS3. It highlighted its July 2007 Biennial Meeting outcome document advocating the need for a follow-up mechanism on the UN PoA on SA/LW. It also expressed support for the UK resolution proposing establishing a group to discuss the issue, and eventually, to create an ATT. SICA urged the donor community to provide technological and financial support to finalize de-mining tests and victim assistance. (NOTE: Member States include Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. END NOTE.) ¶11. (U) Denmark: Stated that it supported the ATT initiative and added that an absence of arms trade regulation continued to contribute to conflict and terrorism. Denmark emphasized that it supported the adoption of an ATT within the UN system, while respecting states' rights to possess weapons. Denmark called on states to prevent arms transfers that could contribute to violations of humanitarian law. It welcomed the work and recommendations of the GGE on that issue and called for establishing an open-ended working group. -------------- 10/21, Day 6 - Chair of the BMS3 on SA/LW, Ireland, Chile, Japan, South Africa, Pakistan, Jordan, Argentina, Jamaica, Mali, Kazakhstan, Norway, Fiji, Finland, New Zealand, Chair of the GGE on conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus, Russia, Lithuania, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Sweden, Australia, Cuba, Indonesia, Mozambique, Thailand, Turkey, Republic of Korea (ROK),Canada, Cote d'Ivoire, Uruguay, Israel, United Kingdom, Tanzania, and Burkina Faso on behalf of ECOWAS -------------- ¶12. (U) The Chairperson of the BMS3 on SA/LW, Dalius Cekuolis of Lithuania, stated that states agreed on the importance of regional approaches (e.g., meetings) on PoA implementation. He also called for establishing the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs' (UNODA) PoA Implementation Support System and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research's (UNIDIR) database to enhance information exchange and build national capacities. He highlighted the need for national reporting, better use of civil society expertise, and bridging the New York and Geneva disarmament communities. ¶13. (U) He stated that states agreed to implement recommendations of the GGE on illicit brokering and to use end-user certification/verification to address that issue. On stockpile management and surplus disposal, he stated that states agreed to focus on enhanced cooperation and compile lessons learned. Concerning the International Tracing Instrument (ITI),he stressed the need for record keeping. ¶14. (U) Ireland: Reviewed the main provisions of the CMC, referring states to the following web site: http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/conventi on.asp. It praised the consensus adoption of the CMC. Ireland quoted UN Secretary General (SYG) Ban Ki-moon, stating that the UN is ready to assist states to implement the Convention. It urged its rapid entry into force. ¶15. (U) Chile: Praised the Oslo process for having concluded with the CMC's adoption. Chile added that it supported the regional conferences on cluster munitions and mentioned the upcoming conference in Quito, Ecuador, to take place before the CMC signing in December. It also praised progress toward pursuing an ATT, noting that it had co-sponsored the resolution establishing an open-ended working group on that issue. ¶16. (U) Japan: Highlighted the adoption of the BMS3 report and stated that the PoA Implementation Support System would be very helpful, noting that it had donated $48,000 to the 1998 United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms database. Japan advocated the need to establish international standards, highlighted its participation in the GGE meeting on an ATT, and noted its co-sponsorship of the UK resolution proposing further discussion of that issue. Japan stated that it had been working to universalize the Ottawa Convention and added that it had donated $51 million to contribute to victim assistance. ¶17. (U) South Africa: South Africa welcomed the BMS3 outcome and called on states to implement fully the UN PoA on SA/LW. South Africa stated that the Mine Ban Convention conference in November would entail requests for extension to clearance deadlines and called on states planning to request extensions to redouble their de-mining efforts. ¶18. (U) Pakistan: Recalled that the first UNGA Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I) Final Document deemed global military expenditure a waste of resources and lamented the continued existence of such expenses. Pakistan stated that there was a need to address trade in SA/LW but added that it should not divert focus from the impact of trade in combat aircraft, aircraft carriers, airborne and early warning and control systems, missile defense, etc. It advocated the Treaty on Convention of Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) as a model for pursuing military security agreements in other regions. Pakistan suggested that the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) could register arms information and added that that could serve as an early warning system. ¶19. (U) Jordan: Introduced a draft resolution on the Ottawa Convention, noted that Australia and Switzerland were cosponsors, and stated that it included only procedural and technical changes. Jordan called on the international community to provide more resources for mine clearance and victim assistance. It stated that it had destroyed all of its anti-personnel mine stockpiles in 2003 and hoped to meet its treaty obligations by 2009. ¶20. (U) Argentina: Introduced a draft resolution on an ATT. Argentina emphasized that the resolution recognized UN Charter Article 51 concerning states' rights to individual or collective self-defense in the event of armed attack, as well as states' rights to buy and sell weapons for defense needs. ¶21. (U) Jamaica: Stated that it implemented measures (e.g., a police anti-trafficking unit) over the past four years, with the assistance of U.S., UK, and French officials, to assist in combating drugs and crime. Jamaica called on the developed states to assist developing states with implementing the UN PoA on SA/LW. It expressed support for an ATT and advocated that it address the export, import, and transit of all conventional arms, including components, ammunition, and technology for their manufacture. ¶22. (U) Mali: Stated that it set-up a framework for transboundary cooperation to exchange intelligence on criminal groups. Mali added that it would soon host a conference in Bamako at which states can reaffirm their commitment to establishing peace and security in the region and to discuss the common problems they are facing (e.g. terrorism, drug trafficking, etc.). ¶23. (U) Kazakhstan: Highlighted that it has provided information to the UN Register of Conventional Arms since ¶1992. Kazakhstan noted that it introduced a new law on export control last February. Kazakhstan stated that its Parliament was finalizing the ratification process of the CCW and added that while it was not a signatory of Protocol II; it would comply with its provisions after its entry into force. Kazakhstan also noted that it hosted a joint UN-EU regional seminar on promoting CCW universality in Central Asia last September. ¶24. (U) Norway: Welcomed the adoption of the CMC and cautioned that cluster munitions could easily reach the magnitude of the land mine problem. Norway added that it would work with other states parties on CMC implementation and universalization. It advocated that mine clearance deadline extension requests should be well documented. Norway reconfirmed its support for the UN PoA on SA/LW and stated that it has provided financial support for its implementation. ¶25. (U) Switzerland: On an ATT, it stated that the appropriate next step was to establish an open-ended working group. Switzerland called on states to submit information to the UN Register of Conventional Arms and noted that the number of states providing information on imports and exports of light weapons has increased. Switzerland noted the Ottawa Convention resolution, as well as challenges associated with meeting mine clearance and stockpile destruction deadlines. ¶26. (U) Austria: Noted a project on the "Elaboration of a Legal Instrument for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Central Africa," as well as the development and administration of training courses on stockpile management in Africa and the Balkans. On cluster munitions, Austria stated that it adopted a law banning their use. Austria highlighted its financing of projects (1.6 million Euros) relating to anti-personnel mines in Africa and southeastern Europe. ¶27. (U) Colombia: Expressed support for the BMS3 and noted it implemented measures on the issue within the framework of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). Colombia called on states to honor their commitments pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540. It praised the GGE on an ATT and reiterated that it should reflect, under UN Charter Article 51, states' rights to individual or collective self-defense in the event of armed attack, and to buy and sell weapons for defense needs. ¶28. (U) Nigeria: It lamented rising military expenditures in light of increasing global poverty and highlighted the 1978 SSOD-I calling for a reduction in military spending. Nigeria noted the report of the GGE on an ATT and the BMS3 report to consider a PoA on SA/LW. Nigeria quoted former U.S. President Eisenhower: "Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed." It added that those words remained true today. ¶29. (U) Belarus: Established a system of state control on trade, use, and destruction of SA/LW. Belarus also stated that under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),it is implementing a project on SA/LW storage. Regarding meeting its Ottawa Convention obligations, it lamented that it still faces the challenge of disposing of more than 3 million PFM1 mines and called on the international community for assistance. ¶30. (U) Fiji: Welcomed the establishment of an open-ended working group on an ATT. It urged member states for increased transparency and confidence building measures (CBMs) on registering conventional arms and reporting military expenditures. Fiji stated the need for a follow-up mechanism on the UN PoA on SA/LW, and in particular, the acquisition of SA/LW by non-state actors. ¶31. (U) Finland: Stated that the adoption of the BMS3 outcome document was a sign of progress and welcomed the recommendations of the GGE. It expressed support for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) convention on small arms and hoped it would soon enter into force. Finland stated that it expressed support for an ATT and for the GGE consensus report on that issue. ¶32. (U) New Zealand: Stated that it would sign the CMC in December. On the CCW, it stated that it continued to have reservations regarding the current approach being taken in the GGE on cluster munitions. It reiterated its "strong" support for an ATT. New Zealand called on states parties of the Ottawa Convention to provide assistance to states that would have difficulty meeting deadlines. ¶33. (U) The Chairperson of the GGE on conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus, Michael Hasenau of Germany, warned of the threats that poorly managed stockpile management pose, such as compromising peacekeeping operations. He also spoke on how to attain successful stockpile management, such as the use of physical security systems to discourage loss or diversion. He stated that the GGE recommended the implementation of training to develop "national skill" for stockpile management and added that those measures could be undertaken at the local, regional, and international levels. He said that the GGE believed that the international stockpile management guidelines would be useful to facilitate international cooperation. In addition, the GGE urged states to pursue legislation governing stockpile management. ¶34. (U) Russia: Stated that the 2001 small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) UN program of action (PoA) report failed to address important issues, such as the need for end-user certificates. Russia advocated halting production of SA/LW on the basis of expired licenses, checking storage of those weapons, tightening control on their re-export, and introducing a ban on SA/LW to non-state end-users. Russia criticized the GGE for not addressing whether an arms trade treaty (ATT) was practically feasible. It agreed with the GGE's recommendation that it address the issue gradually. Russia argued that the "appropriate European mechanisms," such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),were malfunctioning. It expressed intent to develop the UN Conventional Arms Register, however, it added that the Caucuses crisis called into question the practicality of such a measure. ¶35. (U) Lithuania: As the President-designate of the Second Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V, it stated that the July Meeting of Experts had implemented a firm but flexible framework for international cooperation. Lithuania stated that it would present the meeting's recommendations at the Conference in November. It added that establishing an Implementation Support Unit would secure continuity and stability of states' support. ¶36. (U) Trinidad and Tobago: Commended the GGE on ATT for exploring a comprehensive legally binding treaty to regulate arms. Trinidad and Tobago stated that the GGE's report served as a sound basis for future efforts to address the issue. It called for an ATT consistent with the UN Charter and international human rights and humanitarian law. ¶37. (U) Sweden: Introduced a draft resolution on the CCW. Sweden reviewed the purpose of the CCW and stated that it was a tool to respond to humanitarian crisis. Sweden noted U.S. ratification of CCW protocols and the amendment to Article 1. ¶38. (U) Australia: Australia stated that it would make further contributions to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) clearance of cluster munitions in Lebanon. It reiterated its support for an ATT and welcomed the report of the GGE on an ATT. Australia called on states to ensure that their national measures (e.g., internal controls) were of the highest possible standards. ¶39. (U) Cuba: Reiterated its support for the UN PoA on SA/LW and advocated states' rights to manufacture, import, and possess SA/LW in accordance with UN Charter Article 51. It noted that the report of the GGE on an ATT highlighted the need for step-by-step consideration. Cuba argued that for almost five decades a military superpower (the United States) had subjugated it to a policy of hostility and aggression. For that reason, Cuba argued, it was impossible for it to be a state party to the Ottawa Convention, as it needed such weapons to preserve its territorial integrity. ¶40. (U) Indonesia: Welcomed the Third Biennial Meeting of States (BMS3) outcome and stated that it would continue to facilitate meetings in its region. Indonesia expressed support for an ATT, provided that it respected states' rights outlined in UN Charter Article 51. It added that it supported establishing an open-ended working group on an ATT. Indonesia noted that it had fulfilled phase one of its Ottawa Convention obligations last February. It highlighted that it co-hosted a workshop on the Convention's implementation and universalization in Bali. ¶41. (U) Mozambique: It stated that it had done its best to clear land mines but that constraints on financial resources remained a burden. As a result, Mozambique noted that it submitted a request to extend the mine clearance deadline to ¶2014. It added that it recently approved a national Mine Plan of Action for 2008 to 2012, aiming to eradicate mines and return people to their homes. ¶42. (U) Thailand: It stated that it cleared approximately 63 percent of the total mine-suspected areas and added that this year it set aside approximately $41 million to that end. Thailand noted the early October deaths of two Thai Army Rangers that occurred when they stepped on anti-personnel mines during a routine patrol. It stated that it suspected the mines were of foreign origin. ¶43. (U) Turkey: Expressed support for the BMS3 and highlighted its recommendation to establish a follow-up mechanism to the PoA. It noted the international organizations' visit to the Turkish Munitions Disposal Facility and the Rehabilitation and Health Care Center for Mine Victims. As of September 30, Turkey stated that it needed to destroy 1,980,109 anti-personnel mines, while underscoring that it had already destroyed the fuses of all those stockpiled. ¶44. (U) India: Stated that it would contribute significantly to the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States. India added that it would continue to pursue a ban on anti-personnel mines that addresses states' legitimate defense requirements. It reiterated its proposal for a dialogue to consider a new and strengthened format of the CCW. India also stated that it hoped for productive discussions in the November GGE meeting on cluster munitions in Geneva. ¶45. (U) Republic of Korea: Noted that it joined CCW Protocol V which entered into force for the ROK in July 2008. It added that it contributed to GGE discussions on cluster munitions. It welcomed the report of BMS3 to consider the UN PoA on SA/LW. It added that the report would serve as a valuable guide to point the way forward for implementation of the PoA and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). ¶46. (U) Canada: Expressed support for the BMS3 outcome, the GGE report on an ATT, and the draft resolution calling for an open-ended working group on ATT. It also welcomed the ROK's draft resolution on illicit brokering. Canada called on High Contracting Parties to the CCW to participate in the final week of negotiations on cluster munitions. It noted that it provided $50 million to "mine action." ¶47. (U) Cote D'Ivoire: Noted the 2006 creation of an ECOWAS convention that stipulated control over SA/LW production. Cote D'Ivoire stated that it would heartily welcome an ATT. It added that the ECOWAS convention could serve as a guide to the international community as it contained many principles of an international ATT. Cote D'Ivoire warned that if the international community did not address illicit trade in SA/LW, it would continue to preclude sub-Saharan Africa from achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). ¶48. (U) Uruguay: Stated that it had a set of laws related to the production, import, export, transit, and re-transfer of SA/LW. Uruguay noted that it had destroyed 35,000 illegal weapons between 1998 and 2008. It highlighted that it organized a national seminar to discuss a new arms law that concluded with a commitment from all Uruguayan parties to submit it as soon as possible. Uruguay reaffirmed that it would sign the Cluster Munitions Convention (CMC) in December. ¶49. (U) Israel: Warned that Hezbollah, supported by Iran, has armed itself since 2006, and that HAMAS is following closely in its footsteps. Israel lamented the transfer of arms from Iran and Syria to Hezbollah, and called on the international community to address the transfer of arms to terrorists. It highlighted its export control system, which it stated met standards set by the international supplier's regime. Israel expressed support for the BMS3 outcome but regretted that a consensus could not be reached due to Iran's protest. It added that Iran was the biggest supplier of arms to terrorists in the region. ¶50. (U) United Kingdom: Stated that it had already taken practical steps to implement the CMC and reiterated its support for the Ottawa Convention. It regretted that member states could not adopt by consensus the UN PoA on SA/LW but added that those that rejected it did so because of the process and not the content. The United Kingdom reaffirmed support for an ATT, noting that some states were questioning the need for such a treaty. However, it emphasized that "the time for an arms trade treaty is long overdue." ¶51. (U) Tanzania: Warned that illicit trade in SA/LW has affected the entire African continent and could "suck in" the developed world. Tanzania highlighted the link between development and security, noting the current financial crisis. It lamented that Security Council resolution 1653 (2006) had not accomplished its goal of disarming the Great Lakes region. ¶52. (U) Burkina Faso on behalf of ECOWAS: Stated that the effects of the illicit trade in SA/LW in West Africa were evident and highlighted the ECOWAS convention established to address that issue. ECOWAS advocated pursuing a legally binding treaty to regulate arms trade, which it argued would reduce conflict and promote human rights and democracy. ¶53. (U) Right of Reply: Syria: In response to Israel's statement that Syria facilitates arms trade to Hezbollah, Syria stated that the border commission and Lebanese officials denied that there were arms transfers. Syria accused Israel of violating the border and of dropping more than a million cluster munitions in Lebanon. Syria also argued that Israel had brought terrorism to the Middle East. Khalilzad

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