OSCE 2008 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 USOSCE 000060 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA JCS FOR J5 OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) NSC FOR DOWLEY USUN FOR LEGAL, POL CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD UNVIE FOR AC GENEVA FOR CD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE XG SUBJECT: OSCE 2008 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING: POLITE BUT DULL ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The 2008 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) on March 4-5 was not contentious, delegations restricting themselves to broad recommendations that were intended for further concrete development in the Forum for Security Cooperation. Russia did not spend much time berating participating States for the lack of progress in adopting its various CSBM proposals, and refrained from lengthy discussion of them. Many of the topics discussed were aired at previous AIAMs, including the inspection "quota race," improving the rate of defense planning and budget submissions, and reporting significant military activities. There was no attempt to negotiate proposals in the AIAM, although Germany drew much support when it referred to its "quota race" Food-for-Thought paper. Discussion of improved implementation was desultory and brief. In the closing minutes, Germany, Turkey, Italy, France and others opposed linking the impasse over CFE to work on the Vienna Document 1999 and other CSBMs. End summary. WORKING SESSION 1 Annual Exchange of Military Information -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The coordinator (Donagh, Ireland) asked if presentations by participating States (pS) at the FSC Security Dialogue on their submissions to the Annual Exchange of Military Information (AEMI) would enhance transparency ¶3. (SBU) Sweden (Nilsson) said that while the AEMI enhances transparency the quality of submissions differ. France (Fournier) asked why there were so few responses to paragraph 10.3 on "surplus" forces. Switzerland (Chaudhuri) commended the training provided on the Vienna Document 1999 (VD99) to participating States (pS),noting the recent workshop in Kyrgyzstan. Finland (Olin) hoped a recent decision on electronic filing (FSC.DEC/17/07) would enhance transparency. (Note: Finland was the original sponsor. End note.) Finland commended the high rate of returns, but recommended improvement in the quality of the information submitted. Defense Planning -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The coordinator noted there were four returns fewer in 2007 than the year before. There were five nil reports and 32 pS had consistently provided information over the last five years. ¶5. (SBU) France (Fournier) asked the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) whether budget calendars accounted for late or missing submissions of defense planning information. The CPC (Werth) said the data was ambiguous on this question. Russia (Uskov) called for support of its earlier proposal to create a single September 30 deadline for submission of annual defense planning and budget information (FSC.DEL/494/07/Rev.2). The single deadline, Russia claimed, would make it easier for the CPC to track responses and would improve the information exchange. ¶6. (SBU) Finland saw nothing that would prevent pS from submitting defense planning and budget information at the same time and could support the Russian proposal of a single deadline. Finland said the problem was not the calendar but a lack of national will to provide the information. Sweden USOSCE 00000060 002 OF 008 offered support for any proposal, including Russia's, which would increase the number of returns and enhance compliance. Ireland (Hynes) recalled that compliance was better when there was a deadline. Canada (Higgins) supported the status quo, adding that the accuracy of the information provided was more important than the timing of the submission and transparency was more important than the convenience of the CPC. Canada doubted a single deadline would enhance compliance. Italy (Amadei) and the UK (Osment) supported Canada. (Note: Only Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan do not provide the required information on a continuing basis. End note.) ¶7. (SBU) Russia and Switzerland tentatively supported the coordinator's suggestion of a workshop on defense planning. Risk Reduction -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The coordinator noted that VD99 Chapter III risk reduction mechanisms were not invoked over the last year and asked why. He noted the CPC director (Salber) briefed the range of OSCE risk reduction mechanisms available to pS last November (Note: This was in the aftermath of the FSC Security Dialogue discussion of the August 2007 Russian missile incident in Georgia. End note.) ¶9. (SBU) Greece (Sourani) said the lack of use was not a question of lack of need for these mechanisms but lack of will to invoke them. There was also some confusion among pS because of the complexity and number of these mechanisms. Greece recommended updating and streamlining the mechanism to correspond with current conditions. Perhaps this effort could begin in the FSC with a discussion of the CPC paper on risk reduction mechanisms that was circulated in late 2007 (SEC.GAL/216/07). ¶10. (SBU) Russia, referring to its earlier CSBM proposals for requiring notification of transit and deployment of military forces through the OSCE area (FSC.DEL/20/07, FSC.DEL/21/07), said it wanted to introduce more measures that would enhance transparency and security. Although there had been little engagement on these proposals by pS, Russia remained hopeful they could be discussed in 2008. ¶11. (SBU) Finland noted that its concept paper for the 2008 Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) included discussion of an OSCE "toolbox" of risk reduction mechanisms (CIO.GAL/27/08). ¶12. (SBU) Belarus declared support for its joint proposal with Russia for an information exchange on rapid reaction forces (FSC.DEL/545/06) and recommended a special working group meeting to discuss it. Significant Military Activities -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Russia said that the same pS from year to year reported sub-threshold significant military activities. The only notification under this provision in 2007 was Swiss training. However, there were significant activities during the last year, particularly those involving rapid reaction forces. Russia had proposed in 2005 to make such reporting mandatory but there was no consensus. Russia had more USOSCE 00000060 003 OF 008 recently made another proposal on reporting significant military activities and called for discussion of it (FSC.DEL/455/07/Rev.2/Corr.1). Russia also noted that VD99 paragraph 44.1 required notifications of land exercises held with air or naval components. ¶14. (SBU) Sweden declared that it had provided notification of six activities in 2007. Sweden explained that "significant" activities need not include large numbers of military personnel. ¶15. (SBU) Switzerland said it had earlier notified that over 9,000 soldiers would provide support to civil authorities during the UEFA football games in June. ¶16. (SBU) Finland said it supported mandatory reporting of significant military activities, but wondered whether provision of information on sub-threshold activities enhanced transparency. Air Base and Military Facilities Visits -------------- ¶17. (SBU) The coordinator (Gare, United Kingdom) noted a new five-year period began in 2007 that might explain the four visits to air bases or military facilities in 2007 compared to 18 in 2006. She asked if more pS would participate in the visits if technical or financial support were provided. ¶18. (SBU) The UK (Osment) suggested developing a Best Practice Guide for conducting air base and military facility visits. Germany said it could participate in the drafting of a guide, but warned that the effort would not excuse continued efforts by pS to fulfill their obligations in this area. The UK also announced a combined airfield/military facility visit for May 12-16 involving a visit to RAF Marham, a Tornado GR-4 base, and the Royal School of Artillery at Larkhill, where the British light gun and Mastiff armored personnel carrier would be displayed. The UK POC is Lt Col Philip Osment, tel 44 207 218 3562 email philip.osment574(at symbol)mod.uk. ¶19. (SBU) Switzerland suggested less experienced pS could be invited to observe the planning and implementation of these visits. Evaluations and Inspections -------------- ¶20. (SBU) The coordinator noted 88 inspection were requested in 2007 and 84 were conducted, with four refusals, of which three were unexplained. ¶21. (SBU) Ireland (Hynes) asked if EU membership status had an impact on the conduct of inspections and evaluations. (Note: Ireland was alluding to possible restraints on intra-EU inspections. End note.) ¶22. (SBU) Armenia (Yedigarian) noted it had received three inspections in 2007, and had already in 2008 hosted two inspections from Greece and Turkey. Armenia hosted an air base visit in 2007, its second, and asserted it was the only South Caucasus pS to host an air base visit, calling on the others to follow its example. Armenia noted the value of VD 99 in the South Caucasus, where security concerns and threat USOSCE 00000060 004 OF 008 perceptions were higher than in other parts of the OSCE area. ¶23. (SBU) Germany (Eichorn) called for a remedy to the annual VD99 inspection "quota race", and referred to its proposal for reorganizing the inspection year into three periods during which only a portion of the annual quota would be available (FSC.DEL/51/08). This would, at the very least, avoid the need to conduct many inspections in the winter months when military activities were less frequent and climatic conditions made inspections more difficult. The proposal would not, Germany asserted, require reopening VD99. (Note: On the margins of the meeting, Germany emphasized to USDel that it was open to other proposals to address the problem of the quota race and stressed it would welcome U.S. edits to the text. End note.) ¶24. (SBU) Greece supported the German proposal, although it would prefer a less complicated calendar. Norway, Belgium, the UK, and Sweden welcomed the proposal, Sweden noting that it had voluntarily forgone performing inspections prior to March 15 this year to ameliorate the quota race. Italy called the German proposal "useful," noting that the real problem was the absence of military activities to inspect in the first months of the year. The quota race is contrary to the "spirit" of VD99. Finland suggested other solutions could include bilateral agreements or guest inspectors. France noted it continued to study the proposal. It endorsed multinational inspection teams as a possible solution. ¶25. (SBU) Russia (Geyvandov) termed the German proposal "interesting," noting that in 2007 inspection quotas for Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, and the U.S. were exhausted within the first two months of the inspection year. (Note: Russia was probably referring to the U.S. evaluation quota as the U.S. lacks an inspection quota. End note.) Russia said it would be useful to analyze the data to know who goes where, noting that Ireland had suggested EU membership might affect inspections and NATO members presumably do not need to inspect each other. Regional Measures -------------- ¶26. (SBU) Lithuania (Ziugzda) announced it had bilateral agreements with Russia and Belarus to supplement the VD99. Hungary (Szatmari) described the provisions of its bilateral agreements with Serbia and Ukraine that enhance the transparency provided by the VD99. The U.S. (Silberberg) called for the continued use of regional, sub-regional, and bilateral measures. Germany and Belarus also supported regional measures, Belarus adding that "knowing who is on the other end of the telephone" greatly enhances confidence. OSCE Communications Network -------------- ¶27. (SBU) Greece noted that although new OSCE Communications Network (CommNet) software had been distributed to all pS in 2007 (INA version 2.2),the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had not installed it and instead used an altered template. As installation of the latest version of the INA was mandatory and partial installation of it was not allowed, Greece asked the CPC to address this concern. ¶28. (SBU) Ireland (Donagh) noted that delegations in Vienna USOSCE 00000060 005 OF 008 did not ordinarily have access to the CommNet and recommended that they be provided terminals. Global Exchange of Military Information -------------- ¶29. (SBU) The coordinator asked if there would be any advantage to combining the deadlines for the submission of data under the GEMI and AEMI. Although Sweden, Finland, and Serbia insisted that single deadline would be more efficient and enhance compliance, the UK, Canada, Greece, Italy, and the U.S. preferred separate deadlines and submissions, citing differences in the purpose and nature of the two exchanges. WORKING SESSION 2 Conventional Arms Transfers -------------- ¶30. (U) There were no comments. Non-proliferation -------------- ¶31. (SBU) The coordinator (Pavlov, Belarus) asked what had been done in the FSC to address earlier proposals on non-proliferation, including enhancing implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and reviewing the OSCE principles of non-proliferation. ¶32. (SBU) The U.S. commented favorably on the progress made throughout the year on non-proliferation initiatives, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and UNSCR 1540. The U.S. invited pS to contribute to the UNSCR 1540 Best Practices Guide and urged them to develop national action plans for implementation of UNSCR 1540. Stabilizing Measures -------------- ¶33. (SBU) The coordinator asked why the provisions for stabilizing measures had never been used since their adopting in 1993. Greece (Sourani) reprised its comments from earlier in the AIAM that lack of political will explained why stabilizing measures were not used, not a lack of crisis situations. Canada (Linteau) compared this agreement to a fire extinguisher, pointing out that just because he had not used it in ten years did not mean that he did not need it. Instead, he suggested, as Greece had earlier, that the measures should be reviewed to see if they were still adequate. Anti-Personnel Landmines -------------- ¶34. (SBU) Discussion focused on the results of the special January 23 FSC meeting on anti-personnel landmines (APL) and the need to make the proposals from that session "more tangible." Germany, Canada and Turkey discussed ways of improving the OSCE's role in the international effort to eliminate APL. Code of Conduct -------------- USOSCE 00000060 006 OF 008 ¶35. (SBU) The pS welcomed the recently adopted FSC Decision (FSC.DEC/1/08) on awareness raising and outreach for the Code of Conduct. Several pS stated the Code was very important as one of the most important contributors to security and stability in the OSCE area. ¶36. (SBU) There was an extended discussion on the latest proposal to update the Code Questionnaire, which was introduced by the FSC Coordinator for the Code (Eischer, Austria). Turkey asserted some of the new questions went beyond the scope of current Code provisions and will need extended further discussion before the updated Questionnaire could be approved. Finland (Olin) said that past surveys have "proven" that the Questionnaire needs to be updated while Sweden (Nilsson) said that this was "probably one of the most important issues for the rest of the year for the FSC." Small Arms and Light Weapons -------------- ¶37. (SBU) Pavlov (Belarus) introduced the topic, speaking as both session coordinator and chair of the Informal Group of Friends of SMALL Arms and Light Weapons (SALW),by giving a status report on the projects in Tajikistan and Belarus. (Comment: Pavlov mentioned plans for a donor visit to Tajikistan in September or October 2008. As a major donor, delegation recommends that U.S. should participate in the visit. End comment). ¶38. (SBU) Discussion followed on an OSCE contribution to the 2008 Bilateral Meeting of States (BMS) of the UN Program of Action (POA) for SALW. Several states including Finland, Germany, and Belarus supported a special FSC session to prepare for the BMS. ¶39. (SBU) Finland (Olin) pointed out that reported quantities of SALW exported from one country and imported by another do not always correspond in the OSCE data exchange. Turkey offered that one possible explanation could be that importing and exporting pS use different rules to determine when to add the equipment to their registers. Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition -------------- ¶40. (SBU) Turkey also suggested adding information about stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA) to the Annual SALW Data Exchange. Switzerland supported Turkey. The coordinator pointed out that the data exchange requirement was contained in the OSCE Document on SALW, but not in the Document on SCA, and pointed out that the negotiations "could be difficult." Turkey rejoined that many negotiations in the past at the FSC had been difficult and this issue could be solved as previous issues had been. MANPADS Export Controls -------------- ¶41. (SBU) The coordinator reminded that there was still a Food-for-Thought on the table for updating the OSCE principles on MANPADS export control to reflect December 2007 Wassenaar Arrangement amendments (FSC.DEL/46/08/Rev.1). In response to a question posed by Russia, the U.S. confirmed that its MANPADS proposal (FSC.DEL/52/08),which would adopt USOSCE 00000060 007 OF 008 the latest Wassenaar amendments without reopening the 2004 FSC decision (3/04),was still on the table. SALW Brokering -------------- ¶42. (SBU) The CPC (Kitomaki) gave a brief synopsis of the results of the "one-off" exchange of information on SALW brokering. She reported that 39 States had submitted the information in time to be included in the Survey, and that three more had submitted the information since then. Finland (Kangaste) proposed that the CPC be tasked to issue a revision with information from the three other States included, then this could be followed up with a more detailed discussion in the FSC on ways to improve implementation. End User Certificates and Verification for SALW Exports -------------- -------------- ¶43. (SBU) Sweden (Nilsson) recommended that the FSC follow the pattern established for the other "principles," i.e., MANPADS export controls and SALW brokering of SALW, by agreeing to a one time data exchange, to be followed by an assessment of the implementation. This item would also be useful under the "future activity" entry for an OSCE contribution to the UN BMS on the UN SALW POA. WORKING SESSION 3 Improvement of Implementation -------------- ¶44. (SBU) The coordinator (Kleinjan, Netherlands),who had not distributed a separate agenda for the session, invited comment on any aspect of implementation. Apart for the brief comments noted below, there was no discussion and the session finished an hour early. ¶45. (SBU) Germany said each pS should decide what they can and will do to enhance implementation of VD99. For example, Germany had decided to include information and notifications beyond what was required in the document. Germany believed it was important to set an example of enhanced compliance. Belarus asserted its preference for FSC decisions rather that Chairman's statements as a means to improve implementation. ¶46. (SBU) Turkey noted that although one State Party's suspension of its CFE obligations was a problem, pS should beware of allowing this concern to cause a "self-destructive domino effect." The impasse over CFE should not be allowed to kill debate in the FSC on the VD99 and other CSBMs. Turkey would continue to welcome discussion of all CSBMs in the FSC and consider each on its own merits. CLOSING SESSION: "Keep CFE Out of FSC Work on CSBMs" ¶47. (SBU) Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Slovenia, and Sweden called on pS to continue their work in the FSC on CSBMS "without reference to problems encountered in other arms control fora," as Germany put it. Italy said that "artificial linking" of the CFE problem to other arms control work should not be allowed. ¶48. (SBU) Spain and the UK traded reservations over the application of the VD99 to Gibraltar in light of their USOSCE 00000060 008 OF 008 dispute over sovereignty. SCOTT