OSCE REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE: DEFENDING KOSOVO CDI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000031 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE, AND EUR-L (ANNA MANSFIELD AND PETER OLSON) E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2018 TAGS: OSCE PGOV PREL KV SR SUBJECT: OSCE REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE: DEFENDING KOSOVO CDI Classified By: Ambassdor Julie Finley for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (U) This is a request for guidance. Please see para 4. ¶2. (C) Summary: Following a coordinated declaration of independence (CDI) by Kosovo, Serbia will likely use the OSCE as an important venue to lay out its case before world opinion on why it believes its territorial integrity has been violated and why recognition of Kosovo's independence is illegal. Backed by Russia and a few other OSCE participating States, Serbia will try to elevate media attention by convoking a special meeting of the OSCE through the organization's "Berlin Mechanism," last used in 1999 by Russia in relation to NATO's bombardment of the former Yugoslavia. Such a meeting could take place in Vienna as little as five working days following CDI. The context of the OSCE debate will focus as much on the legality of independence under the Helsinki Final Act as its legality under UNSC 1244. USOSCE, therefore, would appreciate timely guidance from the Department on the most effective way to defend our decision to recognize Kosovo's coming independence (please see paragraph 4 for our specific guidance requests). End Summary. -------------- Serbia's Game Plan at the OSCE Post CDI -------------- ¶3. (C) Following CDI, we believe Serbia's strategy at the OSCE will be to paint itself as the victim of a U.S.-led plot to illegally strip it of control over Kosovo, in contravention of the Helsinki Final Act (HFA),the OSCE's founding document. By invoking the organization's Berlin Mechanism, Serbia hopes to stage a special emergency meeting of the OSCE (which could last up to two days) in order to elevate media attention and dramatize its case in front of world opinion (see paras 6-11 for details on the mechanism). With CDI looming, Serbian PermRep Mira Beham has been energetically making the rounds among delegations in Vienna, and claims to have lined up more than the twelve participating States (pS) Serbia needs to convoke the special meeting. -------------- Guidance Request -------------- ¶4. (C) In order to prepare for this coming debate, we would appreciate detailed Department guidance on the following: a. the overall tone we should take in defending CDI. Given the delicate state of Serbia's ruling coalition and our interest in encouraging the country's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, how aggressively - or sympathetically - should we respond to Serbia? b. the legal arguments explaining why independence and recognition do not violate the HFA, the UN Charter, the Charter of Paris, and other applicable international agreements. Previous Department guidance has made the argument that "the Helsinki Final Act makes clear that the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity need to be interpreted taking into account the other core principles mentioned in the Act." Should we interpret this to mean that our decision to recognize Kosovo will not violate the HFA because of the need to balance Article IV (territorial integrity) against Article VII (respect for human rights) and Article VIII (self-determination)? If this interpretation is correct, USOSCE would appreciate further Department elaboration of this approach. c. the moral arguments for independence (that is, the crimes of the Milosevic regime, ethnic cleansing, etc.). Serbia's tendency to play the victim has intensified in recent months in Vienna. In her PC interventions, Beham consistently portrays Serbia as the grievously wronged party, despite its willingness to compromise, and has taken to enumerating all the abuses she alleges the remaining Serbian community in Kosovo has suffered since the UN took over administering the province in 1999. To what extent will we want to correct the record - that is, to what degree would we want to dredge up the behavior of the Milosevic regime in Kosovo that ultimately led us to where we are today? Similarly, to what extent, if any, do we want to indicate that post-Milosevic Serbia also bears responsibility for "losing" Kosovo by failing in any meaningful way to address the problems of the Kosovo Albanian population? And to what extent, if at all, do we want to emphasize the moral arguments for independence USOSCE 00000031 002 OF 003 over the legal ones? d. why Kosovo is not a precedent for other conflicts (that is, Kosovo's "extraordinary circumstances"). These are arguments that are especially meaningful for OSCE participating States facing breakaway regions. -------------- Coordinating our response with Allies -------------- ¶5. (C) The most likely scenario following CDI is that Serbia will direct its ire against us and our Quint partners, although it is possible we may be singled out. After Serbia sets the Berlin Mechanism in motion, we will have 48 hours in which to respond in writing to its charges that we are violating the HFA. Following our response, the Chair will have up to three days to schedule a special emergency meeting of the OSCE, provided Serbia can persuade twelve other pS to support this demand. The last time the Berlin Mechanism was invoked in 1999, NATO allies responded to Russia with identical letters. We are not certain a coordinated response with our Quint allies will be as easily achieved, but request Department consideration of this approach. Given the short time line, such a response would probably be best coordinated in advance of CDI. Serbia ultimately may fall short of its goal of finding twelve other pS necessary to convoke a special meeting under the Berlin Mechanism. Even if Serbia fails in this effort, the debate over the legality and legitimacy of CDI will likely continue at the OSCE for some time at the Permanent Council level. It therefore behooves us to coordinate as closely as possibly with our Allies on the legal and moral arguments we will make as well as the manner and tone in which we deliver them. -------------- -- Background on the Berlin Mechanism - what it is -------------- -- ¶6. (U) The Berlin Mechanism for consultation and cooperation with regard to emergency situations was adopted by OSCE participating States at the first meeting of the Ministerial Council in June 1991. The mechanism was designed to facilitate the resolution of serious emergency situations resulting from a violation of one of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act in one or more of the participating States. The procedures foreseen by the mechanism mean that, from initial invocation to convocation of an emergency meeting, approximately five to seven days will elapse. An initial written response will, however, be required within 48 hours of the initial triggering of the mechanism. -------------- How the mechanism works -------------- ¶7. (U) If a pS concludes that a "serious emergency situation" is developing as a result of a violation of one of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, that State may seek clarification from the State or States involved. The requested State(s) is expected to respond to this complaint. (The decision states that the State(s) "will provide within 48 hours all relevant information in order to clarify the situation giving rise to the request".) ¶8. (U) Should the situation remain unresolved, any of the States involved in the procedure thus far may address to the Chairperson of the Permanent Council (PC) a request to hold an emergency meeting of the PC. The Chairperson will immediately inform all pS of the request. If, within 48 hours, twelve or more pS second the request to hold an emergency PC meeting, the Chairperson will immediately notify all pS of the date and time of the meeting. ¶9. (U) The meeting will be held at the earliest 48 hours and at the latest three days after this notification. The meeting will be held in Vienna and last no more than two days. The agenda will have only one item; the Chairperson will ensure that discussion does not depart from the subject of the agenda. The Chairperson will introduce the meeting by recalling the facts and stages of development of the situation. He/she will then open the floor for debate. If consensus exists, the meeting may agree on recommendations or conclusions, or decide to convene a meeting at ministerial level. -------------- How it has been used in the past USOSCE 00000031 003 OF 003 -------------- ¶10. (U) The Berlin Mechanism was used several times in the period 1991-1993 with regard to the war in Yugoslavia. However, since the creation in December 1993 of the Permanent Council, this Mechanism has fallen into disuse. Issues of concern are now brought up at the PC's regular weekly meetings in Vienna, rather than at emergency meetings triggered by the Berlin Mechanism. The Mechanism was last invoked by the Russian Federation in 1999, in relation to the NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia. ¶11. (U) In April 1999, Russia addressed a Note Verbale to 19 pS, all NATO members, invoking the mechanism on the grounds that the NATO bombardment had violated a number of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. Within 48 hours, 17 of the 19 pS responded with individual - yet identical - Notes Verbale (emailed to EUR/SCE Kosovo Future Status Coordinator Joshua Black). The responses categorically rejected Russian allegations that the NATO countries had violated Helsinki Final Act principles, and categorized NATO's actions as humanitarian assistance. Russia failed to secure the support of twelve pS, so no emergency meeting of the PC was ever held. FINLEY