FSC DECEMBER 10: UNSCR 1540 COMMITTEE CHAIR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 USOSCE 000293 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI JCS FOR J-5 OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) NSC FOR HAYES USUN FOR LEGAL, POL EUCOM FOR J-5 CENTCOM FOR J-5 UNVIE FOR AC GENEVA FOR CD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS CY XG SUBJECT: FSC DECEMBER 10: UNSCR 1540 COMMITTEE CHAIR VISITS; CYBER SECURITY AGENDA REF: A. WRIGHT-SILBERBERG DECEMBER 9 EMAIL ¶B. STATE 124486 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Ambassador Jorge Urbina, chair of the UNSCR 1540 Committee, told the FSC its members were in the vanguard of states implementing the resolution, which calls on all states to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems to non-state actors. Urbina said the Best Practice Guide being compiled by the FSC would benefit all states by setting standards. The entire OSCE could usefully further 1540 goals by assistance to states in developing border controls and sensitive item dual-use lists. ¶2. (SBU) In the working groups, several delegations objected to the new U.S. edits to the draft agenda for the March 2009 cyber security workshop. With Russia now accepting the current draft agenda, the U.S. is now alone. A working group meeting will now be held before the plenary on December 17, the last meeting of the autumn session. France and Germany supported the latest version of the Russian proposal for a single defense planning deadline. The AIAM agenda will be forwarded to the plenary for adoption on December 17. Turkey and Russia are still waiting for instructions on the Code of Conduct questionnaire. Washington, see para 19. End summary. Russia Says Georgia Freezes South Ossetia -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) accused Georgia of cutting off natural gas to South Ossetia, threatening civilians in their homes, schools, and hospitals with privation as winter approaches. Russia, as a consequence, has taken actions to assure gas is supplied to South Ossetia and is constructing a gas pipeline to the region through North Ossetia. Ulyanov charged Georgia with a premeditated suspension of gas delivery, akin to a "blockade." Ulyanov said the situation was similar to the Balkans war in the early 1990s. Then, too, Russian had ensured gas supplies to a threatened minority, the Muslim Croatians, as a humanitarian act. Ulyanov asserted that Slobodan Milosevic, although tried as a war criminal, never used gas supplies as a weapon. ¶4. (SBU) Ulyanov acknowledged Georgia claims the pipeline was damaged during the August conflict: if so, he asked, can Georgia describe the damage and predict when the pipeline will be repaired? Did Georgia not see it was hurting its own people still living in South Ossetia? Ulyanov called on the EU and the U.S. to consider the matter and take appropriate action. In the meantime, if the situation had not dramatically improved, Russia would return tot e subject at the nest meeting of the FSC. Georgia Claims Russia Prevents Repairs -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Georgia (Kvachakidze) replied that the relevant facts included Russia's invasion of Georgia, the six-point peace agreements, Russia's support for ethnic cleansing, and Russia's continued denial of access to South Ossetia for humanitarian aid and unarmed OSCE monitors. Russia now had over 5,000 troops each in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgian jurisdiction needed to be restored, particularly to the Alkhagori region. USOSCE 00000293 002 OF 006 ¶6. (SBU) Kvachakidze recalled that two gas pipelines in North Ossetia that supplied Georgia with Russian gas had been bombed in 2006. Russia described these as "terrorist" attacks yet never investigated them or other similar attacks. ¶7. (SBU) Kvachakidze said Russia knows that the pipelines were damaged during the August war. Georgia was repairing them, but could not make repairs in South Ossetia as the Russians denied them access. Georgia expected to complete repairs, where it could make them, soon. Ulyanov countered that the South Ossetian pipeline was repaired; this was instead a case of Georgia diverting the supplies. Georgia's report, he allowed, was encouraging, but he would still need to return to the subject at the next meeting. Security Dialogue: UNSCR 1540 Committee Chair -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Costa Rican Jorge Urbina, chair of the UN Security Committee Resolution 1540, praised the OSCE for its progress in implementing the resolution, which requires all states to prevent the proliferation of WMD and delivery system to non-state actors, in particular for terrorist purposes. Urbina noted the FSC workshop on 1540 in late 2006 and the Ministerial decision 10/06 on supporting national implementation. Urbina reported all participating States have submitted reports to the 1540 Committee and over half have offered assistance on 1540 implementation to other states. He cited the Best Practice Guide on 1540, currently under preparation, as an example of the standard setting for which regional organizations like the OSCE were particularly well-suited. Eleven pS Request Help on 1540 -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Urbina urged pS to follow through on their 2006 decision by preparing implementation plans and sharing them with the OSCE and the 1540 Committee. He reported that at least eleven pS had requested technical assistance in full implementation; the 1540 Committee could help arrange partnerships to help these states and has developed an assistance template for states seeking help. ¶10. (SBU) UNSCR 1810, adopted in 2008, extends the mandate of the 1540 Committee until 2011 and reinforces the need for cooperation among international and regional organizations. Urbina noted the role of NGOs in full implementation, citing a conference in Ankara arranged in part by SIPRI on dual-use goods export controls. He urged pS to identify and address the gaps remaining in their full implementation of the resolution. Plenty of 1540 Work for Both PC and FSC -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Urbina said the implementation of 1540 overlapped the work of both the Permanent Council and the FSC. He suggested the OSCE consider developing rosters of national experts as well as 1540 points-of contact. He also noted the presence in Vienna of other international organizations helping to implement 1540, the IAEA and the UNODC, and called USOSCE 00000293 003 OF 006 for the OSCE to cooperate with them. (FSC.DEL/190/08) ¶12. (SBU) France, Turkey, the UK, and Finland welcomed Urbina and expressed national support for 1540. The UK (Gare) asked Urbina it specify some of the lacunae in pS implementation. Urbina deferred to Richard Cuppitt (U.S.),a 1540 Committee staff member, who noted that the committee has identified 382 measures states should take to implement 1540; the pS had, on average, taken about 215. Urbina said the establishment of a "regional center" to focus implementation efforts could be an appropriate role fore regional organizations. U.S. Proposes 1540 Workplan for OSCE -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) also expressed support for the resolution and noted that control of WMD-related items instilled greater confidence among trading partners that their trade does not support illicit activities; increases legitimate access to advanced technologies; makes trade more secure from theft and diversion; and enhances market research and inventory control. ¶14. (SBU) The U.S. is seeking expansion of the G-8 Global Partnership against the spread of WMD that will provide financial support for implementation of 1540. Neighbour said that the 1540 Committee alone cannot do the work of promoting implementation. The OSCE can assist by further work on the Best Practice Guide; take steps to exchanging 1540-related data among all pS and the Partners and forwarding same to the committee; identify an OSCE liaison with the 1540 Committee who would develop lists of national experts and points-of-contact; and support greater cooperative efforts between the PC and FSC as well as with the IAEA and UNODC. (Full text of U.S. intervention will appear in the December 10 FSC Journal of the Day.) Crimean ERW Clean-Up -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Ambassador Lubomir Kopaj, the OSCE project coordinator in Ukraine, described plans for remediation of explosive remnants of war (ERW) in the Crimea, much of it dating to the Second World War and earlier. OSCE estimates the project will cost over 361,000 euros, most of it to be spent on the provision of modern equipment and specialized training to Ukrainian government explosive ordnance officials. OSCE experts visited the Crimea in October to assess the scope of work. Kopaj added that the project to clean up ERW at Novobohdanivka was successfully completed and the area had been returned to local control. Cyber Security Workshop Agenda -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Russia supported the draft decision on an agenda and modalities for the March 2009 cyber security workshop. Ulyanov added that Andrey Kortskiy, a deputy director of the Russian MFA arms control and security affairs department, would speak on "political aspects of ensuring international cyber security. Germany and Greece announced they would provide speakers. USOSCE 00000293 004 OF 006 ¶17. (SBU) The U.S. (Silberberg) expressed general support but proposed minor changes to the agenda for working session 1 to reflect greater emphasis on responses and remediation and less on threats and attacks because of the difficulty in identifying the sources of attacks and because the technology used by attackers was changing so rapidly (ref A). The U.S noted particular interest in session 2 on good practices and legal frameworks and offered a speaker from the Department of Justice. ¶18. (SBU) Germany, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, and Luxembourg (Pilot) said they would need to consider any changes to the agenda carefully, Pilot observing that delegations were free in any case to bring up whatever they wanted at the working sessions. Separately, Estonia (Tiigimae) and Finland (Kangaste) complained that omission of reference to threats from the agenda would defeat the goal of the workshop to have a comprehensive overview of cyber security. Estonia reported that Russia would need to rerun to capital for instructions, which could delay the decision until well into 2009. Kangaste pointed out that the organizers of the March 17-18, 2009 event would be handicapped if the agenda was not determined until only a few weeks before. ¶19. (SBU) The U.S. is apparently alone in its views of the agenda. Mission requests Washington guidance whether to join consensus on the current version of the agenda (FSC.DD/17/08). Single Defense Planning Deadline -------------- ¶20. (SBU) Russia Ulyanov noted the incorporation of German edits into the latest version of the proposal for a single deadline for submission of defense planning information under the Vienna Document. He urged all pS to support the proposal. Germany and France announced they could now support. Azerbaijan reported it lacked final instructions. Separately, the chair, Finland (Kangaste) asserted that Azerbaijan's position was related to its failure to submit defense planning information for the last four years. Kangaste said he was considering asking the CPC to send a reminder to Azerbaijan that its submissions were overdue. AIAM Agenda for 2009 -------------- ¶21. (SBU) The draft agenda and modalities for the 2009 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting will be redistributed as a chair's draft decision and forwarded to the plenary for adoption on December 17. SALW -------------- ¶22. (SBU) Colonel Walter Schweizer (Germany),chair of the informal group on small arms and light weapons (SALW),noted the adoption of Ministerial decision 6/08 that calls for a review of the OSCE Document on SALW. Schweizer said he planned to brief the FSC in January 2009 on a work plan after consultation with the troika. SCA USOSCE 00000293 005 OF 006 --- ¶23. (SBU) Lieut. Colonel Nils Peterson (Denmark),FSC stockpiles of conventional ammunition coordinator, announced a December 16 meeting to review melange elimination project work in Ukraine and Albania. Code of Conduct -------------- ¶24. (SBU) Belarus (Krayushkin) argued that reference to the UN Charter in the preamble of the draft decision on updating the Code of Conduct questionnaire (FSC.DD/14/08) was not relevant to a "technical" subject like the questionnaire. Also, Krayushkin asserted, the reference instead to the Helsinki Final Act Belarus proposed (FSC.DEL/186/08) did not require the extended description of the act's purpose subsequently suggested by Denmark and Sweden (FSC.DEL/18808). Their edits would include reference to fundamental freedoms "without distinction as to," inter alia, sex. Denmark and Sweden had earlier proposed a reference to UNSCR 1325 on the role of gender in security issues, but this lacked support from many delegations. In any case, Belarus would need more time to consider the Danish/Swedish proposal. ¶25. (SBU) In response to prompting from the chair, Turkey and Russia reported that final instructions they lacked were expected to contain edits to both the text of the decision and the questionnaire. ¶26. (SBU) Colonel Anton Eischer (Austria),the FSC Code of Conduct coordinator, proposed considering "supplementary" proposals for enhancing implementation of the Code. He reported a draft decision proposing annual assessment of the Code is in preparation. Separately, Eischer identified Germany as the author. Cypress MANPADS Project -------------- ¶27. (SBU) An informal meeting chaired by FSC SALW coordinator Colonel Steve Hartnell (UK) was held December 10 in response to a request by Cypress for technical assistance in the destruction of slightly more than 300 MANPADS (SA-7). Cypress (Zivanas) made clear it was not looking for financial assistance, but rather for technical expertise and advice on the best way to get rid of these weapons. Zivanas said his government had no preference between destruction or demilitarization, nor whether the process should be accomplished on Cypress or somewhere else. He said these choices would depend on the results of an assessment visit, tentatively scheduled for February 2009. ¶28. (SBU) Several delegations, including the UK, Italy, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, and Ireland, offered one kind of assistance from another, ranging from experts for an assessment visit to demilitarization or destruction of the weapons at dedicated national facilities (Hungary and Italy). The U.S. (Silberberg),per guidance (ref B),announced its interest in helping and, subject to the scope of work, leading the project. ¶29. (SBU) Hartnell suggested that the next step should be for USOSCE 00000293 006 OF 006 each country interested in participating in the project to submit in writing a proposal for assistance, including costs and logistical requirements. He would like to see these written ideas by the end of January 2009. This would be followed by an assessment visit, which would result in a forma; report to the OSCE. ¶30. (SBU) The Conflict Prevention Center (Martynyuk) (CPC) said there were too many volunteers for the project. There are currently ten to twelve experts offered for a visit to look at slightly more than 300 missiles. Hartnell supported this observation by asking delegations to consider how important for each of them to be involved in this particular project. Next Meeting -------------- ¶31. (SBU) The next and final meeting of the autumn session of the FSC will be on December 17. FINLEY