SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY: HELSINKI OSCE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000290 SENSITIVE SIPDIS FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO THE SECRETARY E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KDEM OSCE OVIP PHUM PREL PROG SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY: HELSINKI OSCE MINISTERIAL ¶1. (SBU) Madame Secretary, we look forward to seeing you at the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Helsinki. FM Stubb has succeeded in attracting a record number of ministers to this OSCE meeting, and hopes to rally the Organization in a renewal of the Q&Spirit of Helsinki.Q8 Following closely on the NATO Ministerial, Helsinki will come face to face with the challenge of dealing with increased Russian assertiveness (with a good sprinkling of intransigence),especially against the backdrop of last AugustQ,s conflict in Georgia. The Russians hope to convert the entire meeting into a showcase for President MedvedevQ,s proposals for a European Security Treaty. Our European allies are wary of RussiaQ,s approach, but seem all too willing to play along. Your participation in Helsinki will be important to keep our allies and the Organization focused on the values and common view of security that is reflected in the Helsinki Final ActQ,s balance, and to challenge Russia to explain the widening chasm between RussiaQ,s rhetoric and its flouting of OSCE commitments and principles. A 21st Century OSCE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The OSCE played an important role in helping to move toward a Europe whole and free. It remains the largest and most comprehensive regional security organization in the world, spanning Eurasia and North America, and including 56 countries and 11 Partners coalesced around a comprehensive security approach that includes human rights, economic freedoms, and political military confidence and security building measures. More recently, however, the consensus of the 1990s has broken down, and RussiaQ,s increasingly not constructive attitude has caused this consensus-based organization to drift. It is returning to its origins Q) a forum to confront directly and seek to work through issues with a resurgent Russian Federation. Helsinki -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Despite FM StubbQ,s efforts to rally the organization, expectations for Helsinki are low. Still, we can use the gathering to further our policy goals, particularly vis-Q-vis Russia, and to underscore and reaffirm existing commitments that underpin current European security. We should seek to have the Ministerial reassert, in both practical and symbolic ways, the values and commitments enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act (HFA). ¶4. (SBU) FM Stubb has hung his hopes for a successful ministerial on adoption of a political declaration that aims to articulate a common denominator consensus on European security and next steps. He has purposefully avoided the Vienna negotiating forum that has failed to deliver for the past half decade, hoping instead to make a pitch directly to ministers in Helsinki. His draft was delivered only one week before the ministerial gathering, and papers over significant differences obvious to all. Many of our European allies, led by Germany and France, are ready to adopt this approach in a desperate effort to deliver a message of common ground with Moscow. Given both the still raw emotions from the conflict in Georgia and swirling and conflicting expectations for a treaty and a summit, this declaration seems unlikely to serve simultaneously all the purposes intended for it. We will continue to negotiate in good faith, but in the end, foregoing the declaration may be necessary. European Security Architecture -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The other major element of the gathering is the Ministerial lunch, where A/S Fried will represent you. The Finns intend to focus discussion on ideas for EuropeQ,s future security, and this is where MedvedevQ,s wedge-driving proposal for a new security treaty and SarkozyQ,s codex for an OSCE summit next year come into play. The Finns perceive a gathering momentum for these proposals, but they are also sensitive to our view that the current architecture, were it to be respected, adequately serves EuropeQ,s security interests. They hope that a thorough airing of views, led on our side by A/S Fried, can help ease some of the emerging transatlantic differences on this issue, and their draft political declaration clearly signals they would like the ministerial to emerge with agreement to consider convening an OSCE summit in the near future Q) something that has not happened since 1999. Your work in Brussels at the NATO Ministerial can have an impact on Helsinki, as the tone of the NATO communiquQ should have an impact on attitudes around USOSCE 00000290 002 OF 003 the table in Helsinki and will likely influence the course of the discussion. ¶6. (SBU) We need to challenge Russia to explain exactly what it believes isnQ,t working well now, what it is proposing as a replacement and how it treats existing security frameworks. Moscow must explain why OSCE participating States should engage seriously with Russia on this initiative at a time when Russia has abandoned its CFE Treaty obligations and failed to honor the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a neighbor. Georgia -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Aside from MedvedevQ,s security treaty proposal, Georgia is sure to be a secondary topic in Helsinki. Unfortunately, it appears to us in Vienna that most of Europe considers the relationship with Russia too important to put in jeopardy by standing firm in favor of GeorgiaQ,s sovereignty. The Finns want any discussion to be Q&forward looking,Q8 and most delegations appear willing to Q&move on.Q8 We will have to press hard to keep a focus on Georgia, especially as Russia is threatening to close down the OSCE Mission in Georgia unless its legal mandate is adjusted to reflect MoscowQ,s version of Q&reality on the ground.Q8 No final decision on Mission mandate is required at the Ministerial, as the mandate formally expires on December 31. However, we see benefit in political-level consideration of this issue in early December, or we face a likely stalemate and possible mission closure four weeks later. We have advised the Finnish Chairmanship of our preference for resolution of this by the close of the Ministerial so that the situation receives prominence during the meeting. Other Issues -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Other issues that will form the context for Helsinki include RussiaQ,s decision late last year to suspend its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE),in large part because, it said, Allies had failed to ratify the adapted CFE treaty. The U.S. and Allies have repeatedly made clear their support for CFE and the future entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty. No specific action on CFE is expected at the Ministerial but it will be an important backdrop issue. The strong language agreed for the NATO Ministerial will be helpful in this regard. ¶9. (SBU) With these big ticket issues likely to lead to stalemate, however, the rest of the Ministerial will be small potatoes. Russia has played a destructive game in negotiating almost every proposed decision. In the end, we expect there will be Ministerial Decisions on: -- Trafficking in Persons Q) The Finns feel this decision is one of the signature achievements of their Chairmanship; its main feature is to adopt a Q&victim-centeredQ8 approach to combating human trafficking. -- Roma and Sinti Q) Seeking to highlight the plight of these minorities in Europe, this decision addresses a longstanding U.S. human rights concern and it looks likely to achieve consensus support. -- Rule of Law Q) This German initiative aims to focus on national legislation in conformance with OSCE human rights commitments. -- Inland Waterways Cooperation Q) a technical and non-controversial decision on pan-European cooperation with the International Maritime Organization and UNECE; ¶10. (SBU) In addition, many Western delegations had high hopes for a decision pegged to the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights that would seek to re-affirm the progress made in OSCE commitments on democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. Unfortunately, Russia has adopted a posture that clearly illustrates its effort to pare back commitments and distance itself from the OSCEQ,s achievements in the 1990s. ¶11. (SBU) The EU countries are also seeking a decision on the Security Aspects of Climate Change. We remain skeptical that the OSCE can find a role that adds value to this issue, but hope to find common ground with our European friends on this decision. Russia, however, is playing hardball. Our USOSCE 00000290 003 OF 003 preferred outcome: US and EU together, with Russia responsible for failure to agree to this high-priority for EU countries. Conclusion: -------------- ¶12. (SBU) OSCE has long been a key freedom and democracy tool in our toolbox, but Russian actions are taking a toll. The Finns are looking to navigate a safe course with a minimalist agenda that gets them a tangible outcome but perhaps at the expense of long-held security beliefs and principles. Failure to reach agreement is no tragedy, since it is more important to stand for common principles and values at this time than to accommodate RussiaQ,s bullying. Much will depend on the tactical game, and your involvement is critical to making certain that responsibility for current tensions fall squarely on Russia, which has put itself beyond the pale of OSCEQ,s prior commitments. FINLEY