FSC SEPTEMBER 17: RUSSIA AND GEORGIA CONTINUE FEUD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 USOSCE 000221 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA JCS FOR J-5 OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) NSC FOR HAYES USUN FOR LEGAL, POL EUCOM FOR J-5 CENTCOM FOR J-5 UNVIE FOR AC GENEVA FOR CD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG SUBJECT: FSC SEPTEMBER 17: RUSSIA AND GEORGIA CONTINUE FEUD ¶1. (SBU) Summary: At the September 17, FSC Russia and Georgia reprised their running feud over culpability for starting the August war. Russia presented an amateurish video purporting to show Georgia's responsibility for starting the conflict and evidence of Georgian attacks on civilian targets. Georgia vigorously replied, referring to Russian provocations leading up to the August conflict and accusing Russia of planning for an attack long before Georgia's strike on Tskhinvali. The U.S. called for Russia to observe the cease-fire agreement and cooperate with the OSCE in restoring peace and stability to the region. ¶2. (SBU) The head of security cooperation at the OSCE mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina briefed ongoing work there, including support to Dayton Article IV arms control, small arms and ammunition management, and defense reform. ¶3. (SBU) In the working groups, Estonia agreed that a work shop on cyber security could usefully occur before an information exchange on the subject, both proposed in its draft decision. Turkey and the U.S. urged avoidance of duplication of programs in discussing the German Food for Thought paper on landmines and explosive remnants of war. The U.S. and Azerbaijan noted they were not parties to the Ottawa Convention and would examine carefully any references to Ottawa in the paper. The revised Code of Conduct Questionnaire will be discussed at an informal meeting on October 3. The sponsors will then present a final version and push for consensus in time to adopt the revision before the Helsinki ministerial conference in late November. Washington, see para 32 guidance request. End summary. Russia Shows Home Movies, Repeats Litany of Georgian Sins -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) said Georgia's "criminal aggression" in South Ossetia had a lasting effect on international relations. Ulyanov said September 17 marked forty days since the conflict began: in Christian tradition this was the date to remember the dead. The events of "08/08/08" for Russia were akin to 9/11 for the U.S. and as a result of them Russia had lost any illusions about the effectiveness of international security but would draw some useful lessons. Russia was shocked, if not surprised. Ulyanov hoped his presentation would lead to more complete understanding for Russia's "partners." ¶5. (SBU) Ulyanov's comments were accompanied by an awkwardly produced multimedia presentation that included video news reports from unidentified networks and what appeared to be footage taken from cellular telephones or other hand-held cameras. He had repeated difficulties in synchronizing the presentation to his narrative. ¶6. (SBU) Ulyanov said Georgia began planning to expel all South Ossetians immediately after the "Rose revolution." Many South Ossetians did flee to Russia. Georgia began arming itself in anticipation of an attack on South Ossetia. Ulyanov displayed a table showing exports of tanks, APCs, artillery, air defense systems, and military aircraft to Georgia from Ukraine and the Czech Republic. Georgia, he continued, has omitted from their comments details of their preparations for attacking South Ossetia. These included the movement of shock troops, artillery, and armor to the zone of USOSCE 00000221 002 OF 007 conflict, increased reconnaissance flights over South Ossetia, and finally the movement of about 12,000 troops by truck into the area by August 7. Georgian peacekeeping troops left the Joint Peacekeeping Force headquarters just before the attack commenced on Tskhinvali. ¶7. (SBU) Georgia hoped the opening of the Beijing Olympics would divert international attention from its attack on South Ossetia. There was no Russian provocation of this attack and there was certainly no attack by Russian armored forces that required a Georgian "response." Georgian Atrocities -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Russia went on to charge that Georgia deliberately targeted civilians and civil institutions like hospitals, parliament buildings, and schools in Tskhinvali. Georgia destroyed most of the "old town" there, including the "Jewish quarter." Georgia used multiple-launcher rocket systems (MLRS) with cluster munitions against civilian targets. The result was a "humanitarian catastrophe" with 34,000 people trying to flee the war but unable to escape because Georgia had destroyed roads and transport facilities. There were no medical facilities, food, or water because of Georgia's destruction of civilian infrastructure. Ulyanov claimed the Georgian military called the attack on Tskhinvali "Operation Clear Field." He later showed a video that he said depicted a Georgian armored vehicle firing on civilian dwellings in Tskhinvali. The identity of the camera operator or the vehicle he was riding was unclear. ¶9. (SBU) Georgia also attacked Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia. These attacks and other instances of unusual brutality, to include the mutilation of corpses, were being investigated by Russian criminal prosecutors. ¶10. (SBU) Russia had warned it could not remain idle while its nationals and other civilians were attacked in South Ossetia. While Georgia and the U.S. viewed Russia's warning as a threat, Russia's calls for an agreement to the non-use of force were ignored. Russian forces were in control of the south end of the Roki tunnel by the morning of August 8 and their 58th Army Group and 135th Motorized Rifle Division moved into the region the same day. Russian aircraft attacked Georgian radar and other military targets. President Medvedev explained Russia's response as necessitated by Georgian aggression in violation of international obligations, citing the UN Charter recognition of the right of self-defense. Russian forces provided humanitarian assistance to civilians as part of their response to the Georgian attack. ¶11. (SBU) Ulyanov noted that "our partners have reprimanded us for our disproportionate use of force." This, he said, implied some use of force was legitimate. But how should "disproportionate" be defined, e.g., in comparison with the NATO air campaign in Kosovo. Russia used force with maximum restraint but sufficient to stop the aggressor. Russia admits that some civilians suffered as a result, but blame for that rests with the Saakashvili regime and its "criminal stunt." Who Knew the Russians Watched Fox News? USOSCE 00000221 003 OF 007 -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Showing satellite or aerial photographs of Tskhinvali and Gori, Ulyanov claimed they showed the massive amount of civilian infrastructure damage caused by Georgia in Tskhinvali and the limited damage caused by the Russians in Gori. He also showed an excerpt of an interview on the U.S.-based Fox news network of a 12-year old American girl and her aunt, who were both in South Ossetia during the August war and praised the Russian forces for saving them from the Georgian attackers. The aunt spoke English with a Russian accent. Russia Complains of Press Cynicism -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Ulyanov described as "cynical" a CNN report that was captioned "Russia invades Georgia." He said a "code of conduct" was needed for media covering local conflicts to prevent mass disinformation. ¶14. (SBU) A military officer on the Russia delegation, showed a power point presentation that he said had been captured from retreating Georgian forces. He described the slides as the operational plans for the August Georgian attack on South Ossetia. The captions on the slides were apparently in Georgian but had been transliterated into Latin script. The officer claimed Georgia had begun planning for the attack in 2006, which could in no sense be described as "spontaneous." Georgia Places the War in Context -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Georgia (Giorgadze) said it would defer a complete reply to Russian accusation until the September 24 FSC. The Russia presentation, although carefully prepared, was unconvincing. It was "disgraceful propaganda" and almost entirely untrue. Russia's title, "the Events of August 7-12," was significant as it omitted the larger context. The Russian invasion of Georgia was just the tip of an iceberg. Russia had ignored or rejected Georgia's peace proposals from 2004 on, including the proposal endorsed by the 2005 OSCE ministerial in Ljubljana. Russia lifted the arms embargo of South Ossetia in March. Russia established "illegal" links with South Ossetia and Abkhazia in April. Russia shot down a Georgian UAV. Assassination attempts were made against Georgian officials. Russia conducted large-scale military exercises in July immediately adjacent to its border with Georgia. ¶16. (SBU) Giorgadze said the separatists had rejected the German or "Steinmeier" peace plan. Separatist militias had shelled Georgian villages and their weapons were provided through the Roki tunnel, including large-caliber artillery in violation of the 1992 peace settlement. ¶17. (SBU) Georgia had called for peace negotiations on August 5 and 7 but the Russian representative to the JCC did not even attend the meetings. The separatists continued illegal military operations even after the cease-fire agreement. Ethnic cleansing of Georgians in the now-occupied areas continues. Giorgadze said the "empire of evil's" actions are similar to those of the Soviet Union in its invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia after World War Two. USOSCE 00000221 004 OF 007 Georgia Says Russia Prepared for War -------------- ¶18. (SBU) Giorgadze said Georgia made no secret of its rearming, required after it became truly independent with the "Rose revolution." He recalled Georgia tried to bring international attention to new Russian and separatist military facilities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia has only four brigades, one of which was involved in the August events while two were stationed near Abkhazia and the fourth had been in Iraq. While Russia comments on the several days needed to deploy the Georgian brigade from Gori to the zone of conflict, it does not explain how it was able to deploy an entire army group in a few days without extensive advanced preparation. He referred to the media report of intercepted cellular telephone conversations that suggest a large Russian armored column had been moved through the Roki tunnel before August 8. ¶19. (SBU) As to the "captured" operational plans in the power point, Giorgadze observed that military staffs are charged with preparing plans for all contingencies and Russia had not established that the plans displayed were actually those used by Georgia in August. EU to Send Monitors -------------- ¶20. (SBU) France (Simonet),on behalf of the EU, welcomed Russia's implementation of the September 9 agreement and the withdrawal of its forces to their lines prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The EU will send 200 observers who will begin deploying no later than October 1. The EU called for a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict based on international principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EU called for an inquiry into the conflict and has appointed an official to lead it. The EU will donate 500 million euros for the 2008-2010 reconstruction of the region. U.S. Calls Russia to Comply with Cease-fire -------------- ¶21. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) called for Russia to observe the cease fire agreement and cooperate with the OSCE in restoring peace and stability to Georgia. He described Russian actions after August 7 as "disproportionate." Who Armed Georgia? -------------- ¶22. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov),with regard to Georgia's upcoming presentation on September 24, said the question of who armed Georgia should be also discussed. Also, why was it legitimate to recognize Kosovo but not South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Ulyanov said Georgia's offensive was long- and well-prepared. Georgia also planned to invade Abkhazia, but Russia was able to deter this by moving a division there. The support Georgia receives from others only encourages it to make more attacks. ¶23. (SBU) The chair condemned the violence in the region and called for full implementation of the cease-fire. He called USOSCE 00000221 005 OF 007 on all sides to protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and allow the return internally displaced persons. The CiO (Finland) and the Council of Europe are assessing the state of human rights and compliance with the OSCE political-military acquis in the region. ¶24. (SBU) Note: Separately, the chair (Kangaste) informed the U.S. delegation that Russia will make a presentation on arms transfers to Georgia on October 1. End note. OSCE Pol-Mil Activities in Bosnia -------------- ¶25. (SBU) Brig General (retired) Ulrich Heider (Germany), director of the Department of Security Cooperation at the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH),reported on current political-military activities. Heider described the three main programs as support to the Dayton Article IV arms control implementation; elimination of excess SALW and ammunition and improved stockpile management; and defense reform, particularly through outreach and awareness-raising events on the democratic control of the armed forces with BiH parliamentarians. Heider said surplus ammunition was an immediate and critical issue if BiH is to avoid further depot explosions. He said efforts to control small arms in civilian hands were not very successful. His department was assisting in the drafting of legislation to address the issue. ¶26. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) praised OSCE efforts in BiH, particularly in helping BiH to implement the OSCE acquis as found in the Code of Conduct and the Documents on SALW and conventional ammunition. Cyber Security -------------- ¶27. (SBU) In the working group, Estonia (Tiigimae),sponsor with Lithuania of a proposal for an information exchange and workshop on cyber security (FSC.DEL/125/08/Rev.1),explained that the workshop could include a threat analysis, "good" practices, the roles of states and their armed forces, the private sector, and the individual. Tiigimae anticipated a broad discussion of cyber security across all OSCE dimensions resulting in norm- and standard-setting in the workshop. He also suggested a draft ministerial decision to endorse any FSC decision taken. The questionnaire for the information exchange could be developed at or after the workshop. ¶28. (SBU) Turkey, Germany, Denmark, and Austria supported the proposal and recommended the draft decision include more details, specifically the agenda and modalities for the workshop. Luxembourg (Pilot),urging dispatch, recommended deleting operative paragraph 1 on the information exchange and calling for a workshop in the first half of 2009 vice "within the next twelve months." Ireland, Switzerland, Slovenia, and Sweden preferred a workshop before the information exchange. The chair (Kangaste),in response to the U.S., said a joint workshop with the Permanent Council (PC) was not expected but he would share information with the relevant PC committees. SALW -------------- USOSCE 00000221 006 OF 007 ¶29. (SBU) The FSC coordinator for small arms and light weapons (SALW),UK Colonel Steve Hartnell, described ongoing work in: - Tajikistan: phase 2 on physical security and related training will close in late 2008 or early 2009. - Belarus: the pilot phase of a joint project with UNDP to improve stockpile management will conclude in late 2008. A donors' visit in May confirmed progress. The next phase, to start in 2009, will be based on a revised implementation plan that reflects increased contributions from Belarus, although pS funding is needed. There will be an informal meeting soon to discuss a donors' visit. - Kyrgyzstan: an assessment visit is planned for October in response to the Kyrgyz request for assistance. Funding is needed. Conventional Ammunition -------------- ¶30. (SBU) FSC coordinator for stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA),Danish Lt Col Nils Petersen, reported on projects in: - Kazakhstan: an assessment visit was conducted September 8-10, the report of which would be available soon. - Kyrgyzstan: an assessment visit in September in response to the Kyrgyz 2004 request for assistance in destroying SALW/SCA and improving stockpile management and security recommended OSCE help in re-establishing the Kyrgyz ammunition testing laboratory. The project is budgeted at 200,000 euros and donors are needed. - Montenegro: a donors' visit is planned for October 21-23. Meetings are scheduled with the defense minister, armed forces chief of staff, the OSCE mission, and project sites. Code of Conduct -------------- ¶31. (SBU) The FSC coordinator for the Code of Conduct, Austrian Colonel Anton Eischer, laid out the autumn plan of work on the revised Code Questionnaire (FSC.DEL/98/08/Rev.3): - an informal meeting on October 3 to discuss still pending proposals; - followed by circulation of the final revised draft, to be discussed at the October 15 working group A; - and subsequent distribution of a draft decision for approval in the working group action by the plenary before the ministerial conference at the end of November. ¶32. (SBU) GUIDANCE REQUEST: Mission request guidance/edits on the revised Code Questionnaire draft decision for use at the October 3 meeting. This may be the last appropriate time to voice our concerns without appearing obstructionist. USOSCE 00000221 007 OF 007 Landmine/ERW Food-for-Thought -------------- ¶33. (SBU) Turkey generally supports the German/French/Slovenian Food-for-Thought paper on landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) (FSC.DEL/126/08) but wants to avoid duplication of work done by other organizations. As Turkey is not a signatory to Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons it would to delete reference to it in the paper. The U.S. and Azerbaijan noted they were not signatories to the Ottawa Convention. The U.S. and Sweden also urged avoidance of duplication. Next Meeting -------------- ¶34. (SBU) The next FSC meeting will be on September 24. The Security Dialogue will feature presentations by the Swiss foreign ministry on the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development and by Georgia on its conflict with Russia. FINLEY