CFE/JCG - END OF WINTER/SPRING ROUND: RUSSIAN VIEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000195 SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM, NSC FOR DOWLEY, JCS FOR J5/NORWOOD/CAMPBELL, OSD FOR ISA/PERENYI C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED SIPDIS CAPTION) E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2009 TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL SUBJECT: CFE/JCG - END OF WINTER/SPRING ROUND: RUSSIAN VIEW GAINING TRACTION ON PACE OF FRIED-ANTONOV MEETINGS Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During the course of the JCG's January-July session with 20 weekly meetings, Allies led by the U.S. repeatedly criticized Russia's instances of noncompliance, underscored the importance of Russia negotiating seriously on the basis of the parallel actions package, called on Russia to return to full implementation of the CFE Treaty, and supported U.S. negotiating strategies and leadership. While the Allies most inclined to criticize Russia were Germany, Britain, Romania and Turkey, the USDel often encouraged a half dozen or so states to pile on with criticism of Russia each week, depending on the topic under discussion. For its part, Russia complained about the European security landscape status quo, blamed Allies (the U.S. in particular) for the current crisis, and defended Putin's decision to suspend CFE implementation. ¶2. (C) As the session wore on, Russia increasingly took shots at the U.S. over the pace of talks, saying there have been only two U.S.-Russia meetings for negotiations since late-November 2007. Claiming it has always been ready to hold talks at more regular intervals, Russia called for supplementary meetings at lower levels--bilateral and/or with concerned treaty partners, in Vienna, Brussels, and/or elsewhere--to support the Fried-Antonov channel. This culminated in July, with Russia introducing a key topic from the parallel actions package which does not belong in the JCG, i.e., Russia's proposed definition of "substantial combat forces." ¶3. (C) The U.S. delegation accomplished all JCG-related tasks assigned. Inter alia, Allied solidarity held publicly in the JCG, motivated by Allied reporting of Russian non-compliance and the Allies' program of "focused dialogue" for the JCG, both buttressed by the 28 March NAC Statement on CFE. At the same time, seen from the Vienna perspective, Allies privately are becoming clearly apprehensive over the pace and format of bilateral negotiations, i.e., they are increasingly understanding of Russia's unfair allegation that the U.S. is not negotiating seriously with Russia as evidenced by the number of meetings. The end of round finds Allies still solidly in support of the parallel actions package concept, if unsure of its details. Nonetheless, many Allies, even Britain, are concerned about Russia's prospects of successful wedge driving using the pace of the Fried-Antonov talks, and that some Allies may be tempted to freelance and/or assert a leadership role in the fall, speculate on what will follow CFE, or show interest in Medvedev's pan-European security initiative. Moreover, many Allies are decidedly more sympathetic to Russia's siren call to draw the U.S. and/or Allies into "supportive" discussions at lower levels on elements of the package. End summary. Opening of Round--Vienna's Supporting Role - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) The winter round of the JCG opened following Russia's suspension of implementation of CFE on December 12, 2007, with the U.S. negotiating the parallel actions package on behalf of Allies, bilaterally with Russia at the Fried-Antonov level. The HLTF remained the primary forum for coordination of Alliance CFE policy, while the JCG assumed a supporting role, providing a useful venue for highlighting Russian compliance failures while the U.S. continued negotiation efforts elsewhere. Specifically, the U.S. Mission to the OSCE was charged with: -- Calling Russia out on all acts of non-compliance. -- Reaffirming the importance of all State Parties to fully implement the Treaty while urging Russia to reverse its suspension. -- Dissuading others from following Russia's example. -- Maintaining Allied solidarity in support of U.S. negotiating strategies. -- Sustaining previously discussed Allied position on Russia's concerns. -- Sustaining U.S. positions on the Treaty Operations Implementation Working Group. -- Discussing acts of non-compliance with others (e.g., Azerbaijan's exceeding TLE limits.) The Mission accomplished all of the tasks assigned. Alliance Solidarity Holds, for Now - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Throughout the session, Allied support of U.S. strategy to resolve the CFE crisis remained steadfast in the JCG. At the same time, public solidarity belied private misgivings by some Allies over the lack of progress in the U.S.-Russian bilateral format. From the outset of the session Allies remained lockstep, publicly in the JCG, with the U.S. over core concepts such as the value of CFE, the importance of Russia returning to full implementation, and that the parallel actions plan represented the only option for achieving ratification of ACFE. Allies also consistently stepped forward to call out Russia for failing to fulfill their Treaty obligations and in each case, Allies underlined the importance of the Treaty, to support the parallel actions package and to urge Russia to return to full implementation of the CFE Treaty. ¶6. (C) At the same time, as early as January, Allied reservations over the format and progress of bilateral negotiations surfaced in the JCG-T. These misgivings increased during the course of the session. Germany (Richter)--as has been the case for two years--was particularly vocal, lobbying Allies to increase the intensity of dialogue in Vienna. German attitudes were fueled by repeated Russian claims in the JCG that the bilateral process was all but stalled and that supplementary technical discussions in Brussels or Vienna would support bilateral negotiations. ¶7. (C) Occasional Russian compliments on Germany's willingness to engage in professional dialogue also encouraged Germany to push the edge of the envelope while others held a tighter line. Still, Russian rhetoric drew others into the debate from time to time including Luxembourg, France and Greece. Acting without instructions, Luxemburg (Pilot) made an especially unhelpful intervention in a February JCG-T, recommending that Allies begin to discuss post-CFE alternatives. While Allied anxiety never reached unmanageable levels, USDel, the United Kingdom, Netherlands and others at times had to remind Allies to withstand the temptation to disaggregate the package by getting drawn into discussions on specifics. Calling Out Russia on its non-Compliance - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) The reservations expressed by some Allies in Vienna at following a policy of "active patience"--a termed coined by the United Kingdom (Ford) at the 6 May HLTF--was mitigated, in part, by consistent Allied reporting of Russian noncompliance, the energy generated by an orchestrated program of "focused dialogue," and the endorsement of the 28 March NAC statement by Heads of States and Governments in Bucharest. Allies were quick to take up the cause of calling out Russia for its compliance failures. The U.S. took the lead on this process 8 February, followed by GE, US, GE, HU, BE, TU, GR, GE, RO and NL and with FR, CA, CZ, GR, IT and SP also actively participating. ¶9. (C) By the end of round, Russia had refused 14 inspections, and had failed to provide the 2008 annual data, quarterly data on Kushchevskaya, and the July "flank" data. USDel often encouraged a half dozen or more states each week, depending on the topic under discussion, to pile on with criticism of Russia. At each infraction, Allies coordinated a unified response in the JCG-T for the JCG, which consisted of a primary intervention from the affected party followed by one or more supportive statements. "Focused dialogue" and NAC Statement - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) Allies also developed a program of "focused dialogue" to serve as a vehicle to address Russian calls for dialogue in Vienna through discussion of relevant CFE/ACFE topics, while avoiding negotiations on package elements. In all, five Allies (UK, CA, RO, HU and GE) made six presentations, which were intended to assuage Russian concerns and support the Allied positions. Predictably, Germany, the most vocal of Allies in its calls for more intensive discussions in Vienna, made two presentations and also the most technical and detailed. However, if Germany and other Allies hoped to draw Russia back into implementation through their persuasive arguments, then the Allies came up short, as most of these presentations failed to strike a cord with the Russian delegation. ¶11. (C) The NAC Statement of 28 March on CFE had an immediate, but temporary, positive impact on Allied solidarity, and dissension subsided in the JCG-T as Germany focused on the fact that NATO now had an approved proposal. The decision and its subsequent endorsement in Bucharest also focused negative attention on Russia's failure to provide an official response to the offer, a point GE pressed repeatedly from April on. Russia's calls for dialogue on package specifics - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (C) Nevertheless, the Mission assesses that Russia's calls for substantive dialogue on package specifics will increasingly resonate with Allies in the absence of noticeable progress in bilateral talks. The prospect of taking Russia to task for every infraction is becoming stale and some have advocated skipping repetitive statements in the JCG in favor of simply noting an inspection refusal or missing data as a routine entry for record. In act, as early as April, Belgium required pressurefrom the U.S. even to make an intervention aboutthe refusal of their inspection. Without a clear understanding of how continued reporting will ipact negotiations, taking Russia to task will loe much of its initial appeal. ¶13. (C) Likewise, llies see few ways to extend the agenda on focusd dialogue without becoming repetitive and have ha little appetite to do so. Some have argued that Allies could reduce the frequency of meetings without sacrificing the Allied objective of reporting Russia's non-compliance, although Germany strongly wants to keep the full schedule of weekly meetings intact. Finally, Russia at times has told Mission and others that it is waiting until after he U.S. election, at least, to see how much more it can get. Most Allies also perceive that the ucoming U.S. presidential election season followe by a transition and an initial period of policyreview will further delay progress. Russia's Cosistent Drum Beat on its "Big 3" - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶14. (C) The Russian delegation to the JCG, ld by Head of Military Security and Arms Control delegation, Mikhail Ulyaov, remained on point and hammered away with a consistent message throughout the session. Russia's underlying objective from the beginning of the session seemed to be that of bringing negotiations on the parallel actions package to Vienna. Russia has attempted to "disaggregate" the parallel actions package and has tried to tempt Allies into dissecting the parallel actions package as early as February. Russia consistently deconstructed Allied statements in hope of fleshing out the issues surrounding various pieces of the package text. ¶15. (C) Perhaps in an attempt to test the waters, Belarus introduced a decision on Provisional Application (JCG.DEL/02/08) of the adapted Treaty in early February. Russia strongly supported the proposal, noting that while it would not be a panacea, it should be part of the package and could, after agreement, lead to Russia returning to Treaty implementation. After initial discussions, Russia attempted to bait Allies by characterizing he positions as "coming closer," and then attemping to show how Allied objections to provisional pplication could be overcome. Allies failed to ite and in the face of intense Allied opposition Russia finally dropped discussion of provisional application, turning its attention toward specific elements of the package. ¶16. (C) Beginning in April Russia began a constant chant that the JCG should take up discussions on the definition of "substantial combat forces," criteria for accession by NATO members that are not States Parties, and lowering NATO's "collective ceilings." While other points came and went, these "big three" remained on Russia's wish list. Russia has focused most of its attention on pinning down a definition for "substantial combat forces," and by the end of round Russia had tabled a proposed definition. ¶17. (C) Russia also attempted, with little success, to begin discussions now on terms for immediate accession of the Baltic States, hoping to hold them to agreed numbers later during the accession process. Ulyanov noted in his final statement of the round that Russia had adjusted their position from wanting to discuss accession of these States to CFE, in favor of discussing their accession to ACFE. Finally, Russia wanted to address the changed European security landscape by "restoring the military balance." Ulyanov called for all current States Parties belonging to NATO to reduce their individual current and future (under ACFE) ceilings so as not to exceed the level prescribed for the Western Group of States Parties in the current Treaty. Russia would prefer this to being allowed to increase its own ceilings. While a consistent talking point, Russia did not push this issue during the last couple months of the session. ¶18. (C) The intensity of Russia'a lobbying for discussion on the big three in Vienna increased as the session wore on. Finally, in July, Russia tabled its own proposed definition of "substantial combat forces" and had their proposal added as an agenda item for the final session. During the last meeting, Ulyanov drew on the number of Allied interventions regarding their proposal, while disregarding Allies' general negative tone, to conclude that initial discussions had been productive. On the margins Ulyanov remarked to USDel that it could expect more of the same in the future. ¶19. (C) Supporting Ulyanov's bid to move negotiations to Vienna were Russia's now familiar talking points, inter alia: -- NATO and the U.S. are responsible for Russia's moratorium. -- Russia has fulfilled its Istanbul commitments long ago. -- The moratorium is consistent with international law. -- ACFE is discriminatory toward Russia, especially on flanks. -- The U.S. is not negotiating seriously, as evidenced by the small number of meetings. -- Russia sees the parallel actions package as Russian actions for NATO promises. Russia's changing tactics - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶20. (C) While Russia's message remained constant, its tactics evolved somewhat through the session. At the outset in January, Russia called for more substantive discussion in the JCG. As noted above, Russia initially used Belarus as a surrogate to propose provisional application. In April, Russia refocused its attention on the big three and increased its calls for active dialogue in Vienna. By May Russia was actively lobbing individual Allies, attempting to sow discontent with U.S. leadership and its resistance to holding discussions in a more inclusive format. Germany seemed to be Russia's preferred conduit, being the first to warn Allies in a June JCG-T that Russia will likely present concrete proposals in the JCG on the "secondary issues that risen to the forefront." ¶21. (C) Russia also tried to create a sense of urgency in the JCG when its Ulyanov opted out of three consecutive meetings in June--a tactic that Russia likely thought would draw concern from the other States Parties. However, the impact of his absence was negligible and it had no bearing on the substance of discussions in the JCG. Finally, Russia has attempted to increase pressure by submitting specific proposal on a definition of substantial combat forces, again, noting they intend to table more in the future. Russia Remains Defiant - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶22. (C) Russia's initial reaction to Allied statements of Russian non-compliance was one of feigned confusion, surprise and several times, unpleasant sarcasm. Russia noted President Putin signed Russia's suspension into law, and that it should not surprise Allies if Russia did exactly as called for under Russian law. On July 9, a day following the JCG Plenary in which States Parties criticized the eleventh inspection refusal of Russia, Ulyanov told the USDel that Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov was "very angry" with the U.S. for continuing this tactic of making an issue out of each act of non-compliance. By the end of the round, Russia seemed resigned to the fact that they would be criticized for every refused inspection and missed data exchange. When the U.S. called out Russia on 22 July over a missed inspection, the Russian delegation listened silently. ¶23. (C) As the session closes, the Russian Federation continues to push for discussions on the definition of "substantial combat forces," accession of the Baltic States and Slovenia, and the lowering ceilings of all NATO States Parties. Indeed, a written Russian proposal "Defining Substantial combat Forces" was presented by Russia (Ulyanov) on July 15. ¶24. (C) Throughout the session the vast majority of debate occurred between Allies and Russia. With the exception of moderate support from Belarus, no other SP fell in on the side of Russia. Kazakhstan never took the floor. While two meetings witnessed Azerbaijan and Armenia square off over Nogorno-Kharabakh, there was no indication during the session that any non NATO SP was considering suspension. The Azerbaijani Wildcard - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶25. (SBU) Azerbaijan, however, remains a wildcard. Azerbaijani reps have told us that they do not believe that Azerbaijan will be able to ratify ACFE with the current TLE limits. USDel has repeatedly heard that Azerbaijan's National and Territorial Ceilings in ACFE are insufficient and its reps are worried about U.S. and NATO statements that ACFE will only be reviewed after its entry into force. Azerbaijan has made several interventions (the first back during the Third Review Conference) that it considers itself in a state of "force-majeure" regarding the Treaty. It regularly complains about the imbalance of its forces in comparison to Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Broken TOI's - - - - - - - ¶26. (C) The outgoing Chair (Fardellotti, Italy) held several informal sessions, and two "official" sessions. Russia (Solomenko) argued (rebutted by the U.S.) that future TOI work should focus only on ACFE issues. The only item discussed in any detail, and agreed, was that the POET Chair (Linteau, Canada) would become the next TOI Chair. USDel provided significant expertise and advice to both working group chairs, mainly to discourage bad ideas from surfacing in a vacuum. USDel coached both chairs on current negotiations, historical disagreements, and a way forward, to include some of the tasks that will be required to bring ACFE entry into force. Conclusion/Expectations -- Restless Allies - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶27. (C) Allies will remain on board initially, but with continuing growing apprehension in the absence of clear signals that progress is forthcoming. From a Vienna perspective, it all depends on perceived progress and efforts made, especially by the U.S., in the Fried-Antonov talks. Any perceived further loss of momentum seen to be caused by upcoming U.S. elections and administration transition will put pressure on Allied solidarity. In the absence of any progress toward an agreement on the parallel actions plan, more Allies may begin to echo Luxemburg's question, i.e., what will follow CFE; and Medvedev's pan-European security initiative will provide at a minimum, some curiosity. ¶28. (C) Russia will continue to press for dialogue up to and including negotiation of elements of the parallel action plan in Vienna, Brussels or elsewhere, to "support" the higher-level bilat talks. It will continue to hammer the U.S. for the pace of negotiations and is almost certain to continue to criticize U.S. leadership privately to individual Allies. USDel also expects Russia to table additional papers/proposals this fall in an attempt to draw out discussion on accession and "collective ceilings." ¶29. (C) Seen from the Vienna perspective, Allies privately are becoming clearly more apprehensive over the pace and format of bilateral negotiations. Nonetheless, Allies will remain on board as long as support holds in the HLTF. It will become very hard, however, to encourage Allied interventions in the JCG critical of Russia in the manner of the session that just ended. Lack of momentum, moreover, will motivate Germany and others to seek policy changes in capitals, especially if they perceive that local negotiations on specific technical points can support continued bilateral negotiations. SCOTT