OSCE/FSC: 23 JULY PLENARY: NAVAL CSBMS--ALLIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000194 SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA JCS FOR J5 OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) NSC FOR DOWLEY USUN FOR LEGAL, POL CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD UNVIE FOR AC GENEVA FOR CD E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2009 TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE XG SUBJECT: OSCE/FSC: 23 JULY PLENARY: NAVAL CSBMS--ALLIES VERY SKEPTICAL, STOP SHORT OF OUTRIGHT "NO" TO RUSSIA REF: STATE 73257 Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The final meeting of the OSCE,s Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) of the winter/spring session included a presentation by Ireland on the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Dublin agreement). Russia Also led a discussion under Security Dialogue on its Naval CSBM proposal. Britain, Canada, Italy, Greece, France, Germany, Ukraine, Latvia, Finland and Sweden joined the U.S. in expressing various levels of skepticism over Russia's proposal. None supported it. Citing CFE suspension, Canada also rejected it outright. ¶2. (U) Reports were also provided by the Chef de File for the FSC contribution to the ASRC and by Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on SALW on the recent biennial meeting of states on the UN program of action on SALW. The Chair (Estonia) ended the session by reporting on the work accomplished during Estonia's chairmanship. End summary. Russia Promotes Its Naval CSBM Proposal -------------- ¶3. (U) Russia (Ulyanov) provided a presentation on Russia's Naval CSBM proposal, first distributed 4 July under FSC.DEL/120/08. Ulyanov stressed that he wanted to engage in a dialogue and welcomed all comments, "both pro and con." He began by attempting to address some of the criticism he expected to receive. He pointed out that the proposal is meant to improve transparency on a significant military capability not currently covered by a CSBM. ¶4. (SBU) Ulyanov noted that pS always ask the question, "Does Russia perceive a threat that this CSBM would address?" In response, he said that each pS has the right to raise issues not only concerning their own security, but also issues affecting pan-European security. The Russian proposal would add to, not detract from, transparency and security. ¶5. (SBU) Ulyanov referenced Ukraine's work in the Black Sea sub-regional CSBM as a positive, if limited example. On the pan-European level, we have only one minor reference to naval forces in the Global Exchange of Military Information, and that refers to aggregate naval force levels. ¶6. (SBU) Ulyanov then said the in Russia's view the following are Pros: -- Since three out of four sides of Europe are surrounded by seas, it is only logical to cover those areas with CSBMs. The proposal only applies to the seas bordering pS. -- Russia's proposals are modest and similar to those employed for land forces. -- The proposal does not impact current law of the sea because they only apply to planned exercises. ¶7. (SBU) He then proceeded to describe what Russia viewed as legitimate but surmountable concerns. -- There are those who say the measure lacks reciprocity as not all pS have naval assets, we can dismiss this but could, USOSCE 00000194 002 OF 005 hypothetically, overcome this issue under Chapter X, with an agreement only among those pS with navies. However, we would rather not segregate sP into groups. Not all pS have territory in Europe or have armed forces, but all pS enjoy the same rights and privileges. -- Some pS require verifiability. Russia believes that National technical Means is sufficient for this, however, if other want verifiable measures, we can discuss it. -- Some argue that there will be an added cost. Transparency has a price, and in this case it is minimal and related to visits. But if the added cost is beyond resources of some pS, we can look at non-standard solutions, such as requiring the requesting pS to bear the cost of the visit. -- The measure has been tabled twice before--once in the days of the cold war and once in the late 90's--and it was rejected twice. We think this measure might be a good test to see if the old block mentality as changed. Skepticism of Russian Proposal -------------- ¶8. (SBU) In all, twelve pS, including the U.S., responded to Russia's presentation. Most noted that their comments were preliminary, and half remarked that Russia's proposal would require some time to thoroughly study. None suggested a time when they would finish their "study." The majority registered skepticism, noting that nothing had changed in the proposal since the last time it was rejected in 1999, and that even Russia conceded in the proposal that there is no current security concern posed by naval forces in the zone of application. Others touched on more technical aspects such as the definition of the "zone of application," "combat vessels"...etc but most offered to at least consider the proposal. Canada (Gosal) was particularly critical, stating that more should be done to ensure current CSBMs are being fully implemented before considering new CSBMs. Canada was also the only pS to publicly link its pessimism to Russia's suspension of its obligations under CFE. ¶9. (SBU) Without rejecting Russia's proposal outright, the U.S. (Neighbour) pointed out that the U.S. sees no added value in discussing the proposal because there is no recognized security concern to be addressed with a CSBM. Naval CSBMs were discussed and dismissed before in the OSCE, including long after the Cold War ended. Neighbour concluded that in the absence of a concern to address, the U.S. did not see how it would be productive to discuss measures which do not provide any collective benefit to OSCE states. ¶10. (SBU) To counter Russia's point that transparency is important even in the absence of a specific security concern, the UK (Gare) said that the UK is in favor of transparency, but it should shed light on areas where others are concerned. She emphasized the difference between the need for CSBMs on land which is sovereign territory, and at sea, i.e., international waters where anyone can go at will. Gare added, "There is no transparency with the Forum regarding the layout of my dining room furniture, but there is also no concern. I would be happy to invite the Forum to my home to let them view the layout of my dining room furniture if there was a concern. Transparency for transparency's sake is not a security benefit." (Note: Shortly after the FSC meeting the Spanish Mission sent an official Note Verbale to the United USOSCE 00000194 003 OF 005 Kingdom requesting permission to inspect Gare's dining room for "furniture of mass destruction." End note.) ¶11. (SBU) Additional interventions expressing various degrees of skepticism were made by Italy, Greece, France, Germany, Ukraine, Latvia, Finland and Sweden. To Ulyanov's discomfort, Italy pointed out that Russia,s proposal would cover Allied ships operating in the Persian Gulf. Finland and Sweden both observed that the tonnage threshold was set so high and their naval ships today are so small, that that not a single one of their naval units would be covered by the CSBM. Deaf to Hints, Russia Ignores Skepticism -------------- ¶12. (C) Ignoring the trend, Ulyanov responded by thanking all pS for the constructive comments and noted with pleasure that the proposal had generated a great deal of discussion. He confirmed that the current proposal had not changed from previous proposals, explaining that Russia understands that there is no consensus on Naval CSBMs, and therefore a bolder proposal would be pointless. He also noted that Russia had no special reason for tabling this proposal now other than to respond in part to the Madrid Ministerial decision requesting that the FSC review CSBMs. ¶13. (SBU) Ulyanov pushed back against Canada's comments, stating that there is no reason that the FSC can not improve the implementation of existing CSBMs while working on new measures, and flatly rejected any connection between CFE and Russia's current naval proposal. Russia concluded by stating that the Russian proposal is not a "take it or leave it proposal" and that Russia is open to discussion on any aspect of the proposal. Ulyanov said Russia looked forward to further discussion, and said he would like to see another discussion on the plenary, followed by more technical discussions in the appropriate Working Groups. ¶14. (C) Afterwards, Ulyanov privately told USDel (Neighbour) that irrespective of skepticism expressed, he was pleased with the discussion, that there had been a lot of engagement. When USDel reminded him that nobody had favored, and that while the U.S. had not slammed the door shut, the view of the U.S. and many was that discussing a naval CSBM would not be productive, Ulyanov said that was not a problem. He then launched into an attack on Canada and questioned Ottawa's right to have a voice in the OSCE. ¶15. (C) Note: In a separate conversation on the margins with USDel (Meyer) the incoming FSC Chair, (Finland, Kangaste) opined that Russia may have tabled a decision they know will fail in order to build a case for submitting a negative report on CSBMs to Ministers in Helsinki, with the objective of reporting that the CSBM regime is broken. Both Finland and Germany (in previous discussions) opined on a link between Russia's recent actions in the FSC regarding CSBMs and Medvedev's Pan-European Security initiative. End Note. Cluster Munitions Convention -------------- ¶16. (U) Lieutenant Colonel J. Burke from Ireland's Defense Forces also provided the Security Dialogue with a presentation on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which was agreed in Dublin on May 30, 2008. LTC Burke touched on USOSCE 00000194 004 OF 005 the basic characteristics of cluster munitions, concerns countries have with their use, the evolution of discussions from small group of like-minded states in 2002 to a consensus on the convention by 111 states in Dublin this year. While pleased with the results from Dublin, Burke noted that 90 percent of current stockpiles of these munitions are held by non States Parties to the convention. (LTC Burke's briefing has been distributed as FSC.DEL/134.08) ¶17. (U) France (Simonet) reported on its parallel work on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva, the goal of which is to bring in other states that are not signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. France, and the United Kingdom (Gare) asked Burke to comment on efforts to bring others into the fold. Spain recounted its recent decision to emplace a unilateral ban on the production, trade and use of such munitions. ¶18. (U) The U.S. (Neighbour) reported on recent change to U.S. Department of Defense policy on cluster munitions. Drawing from Reftel, Neighbour explained the new U.S. policy objectives, timelines and efforts toward clearing areas affected by such munitions. ¶19. (SBU) Following the U.S. statement, Burke noted that while the U.S. policy does not go as far as the convention, it does represent a welcome significant step. To reinforce this point, Burke noted that unexploded munitions which were rendered safe through a self-destruct or self-disarming mechanism did not count toward the U.S. one percent acceptable failure rate, giving the U.S. an even more rigorous standard. He also said the new U.S. standard was to be measured in a natural environment, not under ideal laboratory conditions. Burke's largely helpful comments reinforced the U.S. position. Reports and other Business -------------- ¶20. (U) Following Security Dialogue, the Chef de File for the FSC, (Finland, Kangaste) presented a brief report on the FSC contribution to the 2008 ASRC. The Chairperson for the Informal Group of friends on SALW (Belarus, Pavlov) followed with a report on the Third Biennial Meeting of States on the 2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit trade in SALW in All its Aspects. The reports have been issued under FSC.DEL/139/08, and SEC.GAL/125/08 respectively. ¶21. (U) Under any other business, Ireland reported it had endorsed the statement of principles to the Global Initiative to Combat the Spread of Nuclear terrorism and had notified the Russian and U.S. embassies in Dublin. Colonel Huub Vellinghs, Dutch Royal Army, introduced himself as the new Senior Military Representative to the Netherlands. The U.S. (Neighbour) introduced two new U.S. del members, Joe Porto and Colonel J.C. Crownover, and noted that Jon Claus would soon return to Washington. ¶22. (U) The Chair wrapped up with a comprehensive report on the work accomplished during Estonia's Chairmanship (FSC.DEL/140/08),followed by a brief introduction of the Finish agenda for fall, which was released under (FSC.INF/11/08). The next FSC plenary and Working Group meetings will take place on 10 September. USOSCE 00000194 005 OF 005 ¶23. (U) USDel will note septel unfinished FSC working group and other items that will be taken up again in September. SCOTT