FSC JULY 9: U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY PRESENTATION

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000176

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL XG
SUBJECT: FSC JULY 9: U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY PRESENTATION
HIGHLIGHT; U.S. ISOLATED IN WORKING GROUP A.

REF: A. STATE 65190

B. FALLON-MEYER EMAIL 07/07/08

C. STATE 70638


1. (SBU) Summary: During the July 9 Forum for Security
Cooperation, Russia (Ulyanov) read a Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) statement that sharply criticized the
recent U.S.-Czech Missile Defense (MD) agreement. The U.S.
did not respond. In Security dialogue, U.S. Assistant
Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Homeland Security McHale
discussed the U.S. Military's transition to meet 21st century
threats to homeland security and to respond to natural and
man-made disasters. His presentation was very well received.
Croatian MFA advisor, Dr. Dijana Plestina, outlined current
demining activities in Croatia.
2 (SBU) In Working Group A, Participating States (pS) agreed
to move to the plenary for adoption the decision on updating
reporting categories of weapons and equipment systems subject
to the information exchange on Conventional Arms Transfers
(CAT). Decisions on preventing destabilizing transfers of
SALW by air, and on an exchange of End User Certificates
(EUC)s, stalled following U.S. interventions. Several
states, including Allies, chided the U.S. requesting basic
clarifications and proposing fundamental changes so late in
the process. Inter alia, the U.S. is isolated on
FSC.DD/98/08/Rev.3 regarding changes to Annex I and stands
alone with Belarus in opposition to "adopting" best
practices. Washington see guidance request in para 19.

Russia's Delegation Mourns the Loss of a Long-time Delegate
--------------


3. (SBU) Estonia as Chair began the session by offering
condolences to Russia on behalf of the FSC on the passing of
long-time delegate, Alexander Ivanov, who was recently
diagnosed with cancer. Russia thanked the Chair for its
sentiments, noting that Ivanov's death was a severe blow to
the Russian delegation.

Russia Sharply Criticizes U.S.-Czech Agreement on Missile
Defense
--------------


4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) read a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
statement issued the previous day, July 8, 2008, in response
to the U.S.-Czech agreement on missile defense. In brief, the
statement noted that the U.S.-Czech agreement, which is based
on an alleged minor threat from Iranian missiles, and which
is highly controversial within Czech society, will not
provide the Czech Republic with additional security. The
Russian opposition to missile defense is well known and
Russian alternatives have been ignored.


5. (SBU) Ulyanov went on to say that if the agreement is
ratified by the Czech parliament and the U.S. is deployed,
"...we shall be forced to respond not by diplomatic methods
but through military means of a technical nature." Despite
continued U.S. guarantees that the system poses no threat to
the Russian Federation there has been little progress, and
proposals for transparency measures suggested by Russia have
also been ignored. The decision to move forward with this
program undermines the principles of the Sochi Decision.
Russia will continue to closely monitor developments in
missile defense and the general strategic setting. Text of
the Russian Federation's statement was published as an annex
to FSC.JOUR/558.


6. (SBU) The U.S. delegation did not respond.

Civil-Military Emergency Planning
--------------


7. (SBU) The Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Security, opened the Security Dialogue
by speaking on the transition of the U.S. Military post 9-11

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to meet demands of homeland defense. AS McHale described the
U.S. military's support of homeland security through new
war-fighting roles in the land, air, sea and cyber domains.
AS McHale spoke of updating mission sets and strategies to
address 21st century threats while emphasizing the continuing
importance of the rule of law and civilian control over armed
forces.


8. (SBU) AS McHale then transitioned to the new consequence
management role the military will play, under direction of
the Department of Homeland Security, following natural or
man-made disasters. Noting lessons learned following
Hurricane Katrina, he emphasized the importance integrating
military and civilian planning for a variety of potential
scenarios down to the tactical level. In conclusion, AS
McHale postulated that the OSCE could play a role in
encouraging pS to develop national plans and by assisting
with the integration of military and civilian capabilities
across the OSCE area.


9. (SBU) There were some six plus questions centering on the
role of maritime security, challenges of transition, and the
decision making process in joint civil-military command
structure. Spain, which advocated the special CMEP session in
September 07, showed particular enthusiasm for AS McHale's
brief and, in all, the presentation was very well received.

Mine Action in Croatia
--------------


10. (SBU) Following AS McHale, Dr. Dijana Plestina, Advisor
to the Foreign Minister of Croatia, briefed the forum on
status of demining in Croatia and the work of the Croatian
Mine Action Center (CROMAC). Current estimates place the
number of landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)
within an area in Croatia of approximately 997 square
kilometers at approximately 110,000 and 60,000 respectively.
GOC revenues provide over half of the current 340 million
Euro budget for demining, followed by public company
contributions (19 percent),private donations (17 percent)
and World Bank loans (8 percent). Despite significant
progress (the number of injuries from mines and ERWs fell
from 88 in 1998 to only 4 to date in 2008),Croatia requires
another 650 million Euro over the next ten years to
completely clear remaining ordinance. Dr. Plestina
specifically noted USG contributions to Croatia's efforts
several times. She ended by calling for more OSCE involvement
in eliminating weapons sets which, in her words, pose a
greater threat to innocent civilians than they do to military
personnel.


11. (SBU) During Q and A, Germany, referencing the forum's
special mine action meeting in January, postulated that
enough potential remains in this area to consider holding
another special session on demining. France, Austria, Ireland
and Turkey posed questions, respectively, on the provision of
minefield locations by former belligerents, the role of
public awareness in decreasing incidents, budgetary
challenges and the accessibility of a new mine victims center
to non-Croatian victims.

CAT Update
--------------


12. (SBU) FSC.DD/7/08/Rev.2 was agreed in WG A and will be
added to the July 16 Plenary agenda. Mission is prepared to
make a statement upon adoption per REFTEL.

EUCs
--------------


13. (SBU) Per ref email, Mission noted the U.S. would provide
comment on FSC.DD/9/08 shortly, and requested clarification
on the intent of OP para 2. After a brief attempt to answer
the question, the drafting pS, Belarus, indicated they would

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contact Mission separately to discuss our concerns.


14. (SBU) In a particularly sharp admonishment, GE
(Schwitzer) expressed surprise that the U.S. was only now
asking for a fundamental clarification. He noted that further
bilateral consultations could likely kill any chance for an
agreement this session. Regarding Mission's question, Germany
offered that the purpose conducting an overview of EUCs
exchanged by pS as envisaged in OP para 2 was to create an
exemplar that could be posted on the restricted OSCE website.
Germany views this decision as a logical follow-on to OP para
5 of FSC.DEC/05/04, on Standard Elements of End-User
Certificates and Verification Procedures for SALW Exports.
Germany emphasized that the intent of the current draft
decision was not to compare national practices. Like OP para
2 of FSC.DEC/11/07 on brokering, the overview would be
limited to the provision of statistical data related to
implementation. Supporting Germany, Spain also noted that
timing was tight if the FSC was to adopt this decision before
the summer break.

SALW Transfers by Air
--------------


15. (SBU) Turkey opened discussion on FSC.DD/98/08/Rev.3 by
noting that it was still awaiting instructions. Belarus
followed, noting that it objected to the use of the term
"adopt" to refer to a Best Practice Document. Germany
countered that others had made similar arguments in earlier
drafts, and that the term "guide" had been removed for this
reason. What was left was the original Wasennaar Arrangement
language "Best Practices," and adopting best practices was,
in Germany's view, appropriate. In follow-on discussions,
Germany made it clear that it was looking for a politically
binding decision that would adopt best practices.


16. (SBU) As coordinated with the Chair and the drafters
(France and Belgium) in a pre-session meeting, Mission noted
that it was working with the Chair to resolve U.S. concerns
over possible redundancy between the draft decision and work
in other fora. In response, Germany requested an explanation
U.S. concerns, and at the request of the Chair, Mission
summarized the U.S. position as outlined in REF C. As before,
Germany retorted that it was disappointed to see the U.S.
submitting fundamental changes to the DD so late in the
process. Italy also chided the U.S. for coming in so late,
and complained that such changes would delay any decision
until next session.


17. (SBU) Germany, France, Italy and Switzerland among
others, argued that the U.S. proposal to exchange the actual
Wassenaar Arrangement Decision on SALW Shipments by Air for
the current Annex I would set a precedent in the FSC. All
argued that, with the exception of UN documents, the FSC does
not reference decisions from other bodies. Switzerland
offered that the FSC decision on 1540 was a similar case
where the FSC created its own decision using existing text
from another forum's document. As not all OSCE members are
members of Wassenaar, it would be difficult for non-Wassenaar
states to rubber stamp a Wassenaar decision.


18. SBU) The United Kingdom offered a compromise to reference
the work of Wassenaar in the preamble, a suggestion that
Finland supported. Cypress stated that it would not support
the reference to Wassenaar in Annex I, but that it could live
with the reference in the preamble.


19. (SBU) Mission assesses that the U.S. is isolated on the
issue of substituting the Wassenaar Decision on Best
Practices for Annex I. Also, the U.S. appears to stand alone
with Belarus in opposition to the term "adopt" in OP para 1.
Mission requests further guidance on how to proceed.
FINLEY