FSC JULY 9: U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY PRESENTATION

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000176 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL XG SUBJECT: FSC JULY 9: U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY PRESENTATION HIGHLIGHT; U.S. ISOLATED IN WORKING GROUP A. REF: A. STATE 65190 ¶B. FALLON-MEYER EMAIL 07/07/08 ¶C. STATE 70638 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: During the July 9 Forum for Security Cooperation, Russia (Ulyanov) read a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) statement that sharply criticized the recent U.S.-Czech Missile Defense (MD) agreement. The U.S. did not respond. In Security dialogue, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Homeland Security McHale discussed the U.S. Military's transition to meet 21st century threats to homeland security and to respond to natural and man-made disasters. His presentation was very well received. Croatian MFA advisor, Dr. Dijana Plestina, outlined current demining activities in Croatia. 2 (SBU) In Working Group A, Participating States (pS) agreed to move to the plenary for adoption the decision on updating reporting categories of weapons and equipment systems subject to the information exchange on Conventional Arms Transfers (CAT). Decisions on preventing destabilizing transfers of SALW by air, and on an exchange of End User Certificates (EUC)s, stalled following U.S. interventions. Several states, including Allies, chided the U.S. requesting basic clarifications and proposing fundamental changes so late in the process. Inter alia, the U.S. is isolated on FSC.DD/98/08/Rev.3 regarding changes to Annex I and stands alone with Belarus in opposition to "adopting" best practices. Washington see guidance request in para 19. Russia's Delegation Mourns the Loss of a Long-time Delegate -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Estonia as Chair began the session by offering condolences to Russia on behalf of the FSC on the passing of long-time delegate, Alexander Ivanov, who was recently diagnosed with cancer. Russia thanked the Chair for its sentiments, noting that Ivanov's death was a severe blow to the Russian delegation. Russia Sharply Criticizes U.S.-Czech Agreement on Missile Defense -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) read a Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement issued the previous day, July 8, 2008, in response to the U.S.-Czech agreement on missile defense. In brief, the statement noted that the U.S.-Czech agreement, which is based on an alleged minor threat from Iranian missiles, and which is highly controversial within Czech society, will not provide the Czech Republic with additional security. The Russian opposition to missile defense is well known and Russian alternatives have been ignored. ¶5. (SBU) Ulyanov went on to say that if the agreement is ratified by the Czech parliament and the U.S. is deployed, "...we shall be forced to respond not by diplomatic methods but through military means of a technical nature." Despite continued U.S. guarantees that the system poses no threat to the Russian Federation there has been little progress, and proposals for transparency measures suggested by Russia have also been ignored. The decision to move forward with this program undermines the principles of the Sochi Decision. Russia will continue to closely monitor developments in missile defense and the general strategic setting. Text of the Russian Federation's statement was published as an annex to FSC.JOUR/558. ¶6. (SBU) The U.S. delegation did not respond. Civil-Military Emergency Planning -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security, opened the Security Dialogue by speaking on the transition of the U.S. Military post 9-11 USOSCE 00000176 002 OF 003 to meet demands of homeland defense. AS McHale described the U.S. military's support of homeland security through new war-fighting roles in the land, air, sea and cyber domains. AS McHale spoke of updating mission sets and strategies to address 21st century threats while emphasizing the continuing importance of the rule of law and civilian control over armed forces. ¶8. (SBU) AS McHale then transitioned to the new consequence management role the military will play, under direction of the Department of Homeland Security, following natural or man-made disasters. Noting lessons learned following Hurricane Katrina, he emphasized the importance integrating military and civilian planning for a variety of potential scenarios down to the tactical level. In conclusion, AS McHale postulated that the OSCE could play a role in encouraging pS to develop national plans and by assisting with the integration of military and civilian capabilities across the OSCE area. ¶9. (SBU) There were some six plus questions centering on the role of maritime security, challenges of transition, and the decision making process in joint civil-military command structure. Spain, which advocated the special CMEP session in September 07, showed particular enthusiasm for AS McHale's brief and, in all, the presentation was very well received. Mine Action in Croatia -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Following AS McHale, Dr. Dijana Plestina, Advisor to the Foreign Minister of Croatia, briefed the forum on status of demining in Croatia and the work of the Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC). Current estimates place the number of landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) within an area in Croatia of approximately 997 square kilometers at approximately 110,000 and 60,000 respectively. GOC revenues provide over half of the current 340 million Euro budget for demining, followed by public company contributions (19 percent),private donations (17 percent) and World Bank loans (8 percent). Despite significant progress (the number of injuries from mines and ERWs fell from 88 in 1998 to only 4 to date in 2008),Croatia requires another 650 million Euro over the next ten years to completely clear remaining ordinance. Dr. Plestina specifically noted USG contributions to Croatia's efforts several times. She ended by calling for more OSCE involvement in eliminating weapons sets which, in her words, pose a greater threat to innocent civilians than they do to military personnel. ¶11. (SBU) During Q and A, Germany, referencing the forum's special mine action meeting in January, postulated that enough potential remains in this area to consider holding another special session on demining. France, Austria, Ireland and Turkey posed questions, respectively, on the provision of minefield locations by former belligerents, the role of public awareness in decreasing incidents, budgetary challenges and the accessibility of a new mine victims center to non-Croatian victims. CAT Update -------------- ¶12. (SBU) FSC.DD/7/08/Rev.2 was agreed in WG A and will be added to the July 16 Plenary agenda. Mission is prepared to make a statement upon adoption per REFTEL. EUCs -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Per ref email, Mission noted the U.S. would provide comment on FSC.DD/9/08 shortly, and requested clarification on the intent of OP para 2. After a brief attempt to answer the question, the drafting pS, Belarus, indicated they would USOSCE 00000176 003 OF 003 contact Mission separately to discuss our concerns. ¶14. (SBU) In a particularly sharp admonishment, GE (Schwitzer) expressed surprise that the U.S. was only now asking for a fundamental clarification. He noted that further bilateral consultations could likely kill any chance for an agreement this session. Regarding Mission's question, Germany offered that the purpose conducting an overview of EUCs exchanged by pS as envisaged in OP para 2 was to create an exemplar that could be posted on the restricted OSCE website. Germany views this decision as a logical follow-on to OP para 5 of FSC.DEC/05/04, on Standard Elements of End-User Certificates and Verification Procedures for SALW Exports. Germany emphasized that the intent of the current draft decision was not to compare national practices. Like OP para 2 of FSC.DEC/11/07 on brokering, the overview would be limited to the provision of statistical data related to implementation. Supporting Germany, Spain also noted that timing was tight if the FSC was to adopt this decision before the summer break. SALW Transfers by Air -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Turkey opened discussion on FSC.DD/98/08/Rev.3 by noting that it was still awaiting instructions. Belarus followed, noting that it objected to the use of the term "adopt" to refer to a Best Practice Document. Germany countered that others had made similar arguments in earlier drafts, and that the term "guide" had been removed for this reason. What was left was the original Wasennaar Arrangement language "Best Practices," and adopting best practices was, in Germany's view, appropriate. In follow-on discussions, Germany made it clear that it was looking for a politically binding decision that would adopt best practices. ¶16. (SBU) As coordinated with the Chair and the drafters (France and Belgium) in a pre-session meeting, Mission noted that it was working with the Chair to resolve U.S. concerns over possible redundancy between the draft decision and work in other fora. In response, Germany requested an explanation U.S. concerns, and at the request of the Chair, Mission summarized the U.S. position as outlined in REF C. As before, Germany retorted that it was disappointed to see the U.S. submitting fundamental changes to the DD so late in the process. Italy also chided the U.S. for coming in so late, and complained that such changes would delay any decision until next session. ¶17. (SBU) Germany, France, Italy and Switzerland among others, argued that the U.S. proposal to exchange the actual Wassenaar Arrangement Decision on SALW Shipments by Air for the current Annex I would set a precedent in the FSC. All argued that, with the exception of UN documents, the FSC does not reference decisions from other bodies. Switzerland offered that the FSC decision on 1540 was a similar case where the FSC created its own decision using existing text from another forum's document. As not all OSCE members are members of Wassenaar, it would be difficult for non-Wassenaar states to rubber stamp a Wassenaar decision. ¶18. SBU) The United Kingdom offered a compromise to reference the work of Wassenaar in the preamble, a suggestion that Finland supported. Cypress stated that it would not support the reference to Wassenaar in Annex I, but that it could live with the reference in the preamble. ¶19. (SBU) Mission assesses that the U.S. is isolated on the issue of substituting the Wassenaar Decision on Best Practices for Annex I. Also, the U.S. appears to stand alone with Belarus in opposition to the term "adopt" in OP para 1. Mission requests further guidance on how to proceed. FINLEY