ASRC WORKING SESSION II, JULY 2: ARMS CONTROL AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000171 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA JCS FOR J5 OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) NSC FOR DOWLEY USUN FOR LEGAL, POL CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD UNVIE FOR AC GENEVA FOR CD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE XG SUBJECT: ASRC WORKING SESSION II, JULY 2: ARMS CONTROL AND CSBMS ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The keynote speakers at the 2008 Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) arms control and CSBMs working session expressed concern over the CFE impasse caused by Russia's suspension. Alyson Bailes said the underlying cause was a "globalization of the security agendas" of the expanded NATO and EU. Adam Kobieracki agreed the security environment had changed, and said any follow-on to CFE, although based on it, would need to reflect the changed conditions. Russia blamed NATO "expansion" and U.S.-backed European missile defense for destroying OSCE unity on arms control. Russia said the U.S. must stop talking and immediately ratify Adapted CFE if it wants to preserve the European security regime. The U.S. insisted that Russia needs to again implement its CFE obligations and fulfill other conditions before ratification will occur. Germany, Turkey, and the Czech Republic offered varying degrees of support for the U.S. position. Russia concluded by announcing a new proposal for naval confidence- and security-building measures that parallel existing provisions in the Vienna Document 1999. End summary. A Return to Europe -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Alyson Bailes, a retired British diplomat and formerly the director of SIPRI, identified the enlargement of NATO and the EU as among the underlying causes of present impasses in conventional arms control. Bailes said this enlargement can be viewed as a "strategic act" that appears to threaten "some" states, instead of an expression of the transformation and desire of individual countries. She also said the "globalization of the security agendas" of NATO and the EU, including "military actions on a huge scale outside the OSCE area" contributed to the weakening of the OSCE arms control acquis. Alluding to the U.S., she said a "philosophy of action" had replaced risk-limitation and self-restraint. A return to Europe, in order to "guard the rear," might be the means to restore unity to the OSCE region and would include the "rescue" or preservation of OSCE arms control and confidence-and-stability building. CFE II -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Adam Kobieracki, of the Polish MFA emphasizing he was speaking personally, said the CFE regime was an integral part of the OSCE arms control framework but was near collapse. Its information exchange and verification mechanisms were not functioning and the Adapted Treaty was still not in force. Although there was no immediate military threat to European security, except perhaps on its "southern flank," the CFE crises had serious political implications. Kobieracki said "principles of modern arms control," reflecting changes in the security environment since the negotiation of the original treaty, should shape any follow-on agreement to the existing CFE regime. This would include: arms control measures based on the CFE Treaty but more cooperative than restrictive; provisions for predictability, transparency, and greater flexibility; more confidence-building measures than previously; and limits not based on the "out-dated" numerical balance of forces between groups of states. Russia: Outlook Bleak, But We're Ready to Talk -------------- - USOSCE 00000171 002 OF 004 ¶4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) said the outlook for arms control was far from positive as he rhetorically rambled using old statements to prove his point. NATO enlargement had destroyed the balance and CFE no longer had any connection to reality. The Adapted Treaty had not entered into force because it has been artificially connected to other issues. For some states, arms control was less important than the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from Transnistria or the "expulsion of Russian military pensioners" from Georgia. Some states cavalierly disregard the OSCE principle that states should not purchase their security as the expenses of other states. Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence was "legal nihilism" and has set a dangerous precedent that will be used by separatist movements everywhere. Existing multilateral forums, like the FSC, were not equal to these challenges. ¶5. (SBU) Despite these problems, Russia was ready and open to serious dialogue in Vienna to escape the impasse over CFE and other arms control issues, as evidenced by its recent proposal for a new European security treaty. Russia has tried to solve these problems in the JCG and NATO-Russia Council Arms Control Experts, but other states have removed themselves from arms control. Solutions will require the joint efforts of all involved states, as occurred several years ago with the negotiation of the Adaptation Agreement. Russia was ready to work with its "main partner," the United States, and others. Allies Defend CFE -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Germany (Foreign Office Deputy Political Director Pohl) called for a return to full implementation of CFE, followed quickly by entry into force of the Adapted Treaty. Although acknowledging that the security landscape in the OSCE had changed since CFE was negotiated and holding were far below thresholds, the Treaty still had application in a time of asymmetric threats. Further changes to the CFE regime, beyond those found in the Adapted Treaty, were not necessarily good, although some of the ideas raised at the October 2007 FSC meeting on the future of arms control should be explored. ¶7. (SBU) The Czech Republic (Pocuch),echoing Kobieracki, said that doing nothing about the impasse over CFE was not an option, and described Russia's suspension as a catalyst for the continued erosion of European security. ¶8. (SBU) Turkey said its position was reflected in the Bucharest NATO-Russia Council statement. Entry into force of the Adapted CFE would allow a review of all provisions. Turkey was never insensitive to the security concerns of its partners and expected they would show the same consideration to Turkey's needs. Russia's suspension undermined the benefits of the CFE regime for regional and sub-regional security. Belarus: New Mechanisms, Like Naval CSBMs -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Belarus (Pavlov) agreed that the FSC should be used for intensive dialogue: it had been created for this. As the OSCE's political-military instruments were not working USOSCE 00000171 003 OF 004 efficiently, they need to be updated to reflect changing military organization, doctrine, and technology. Pavlov recommended considering the additional measures, including naval CSBMs, contained in the non-consensual annex to the 1994 Lisbon Document. ¶10. (SBU) Switzerland said participating States need to continue to implement the OSCE principles and norms. The FSC, as Russia had said, was the forum to discuss implementation and new measures like those raised in the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting and the special FSC meeting in 2007 on the future of arms control. Continued efforts at outreach and awareness-raising for the Code of Conduct were also important, e.g., the Code seminar for OSCE Partners in Almaty planned for September. ¶11. (SBU) Armenia (Tabibian) in his initial intervention called for all participating States that have agreed to arms control agreements to live up to their obligations and not unilaterally refrain from fulfillment of distasteful commitments and obligations. He noted that doing so creates mistrust and instability with neighbors. U.S. Urges Russia to Resume CFE Implementation -------------- - ¶12. (SBU) The U.S. (DASD Daniel Fata) said if the OSCE wants to build on the CFE, then it needs a CFE in force. Russia needs to return to compliance and fulfill those conditions prerequisite to the ratification of the Adapted Treaty by the other States Parties. Fata said two large questions still remain. First, how do the States Parties get to the stage where changes to the Adapted Treaty would be possible? Second, how would it be possible to negotiate a treaty that all 30 States Parties would benefit from? ¶13. (SBU) Fata said the portrayal of Russia as the aggrieved party because of NATO enlargement and missile defense may be good political theater, but not good policy. Russia's security is enhanced by stable, secure neighbors. No state was building up its forces because of Russia or had declared Russia an enemy. Even Russia Will Benefit from Missile Defense -------------- ¶14. (SBU) On missile defense, Fata said the NATO communique at Bucharest made clear that the system proposed offered all Europe a response to the common threat of long-range ballistic missiles. Russia itself had privately acknowledged concern over this threat. The U.S. and its European partners want relations with Russia based on mutual security. Russia Wants Actions, Not Words -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) said if the U.S. wants to save CFE it needs to start ratification immediately. Russia was ready to work with its partners in Vienna, but it needs actions, not just words. Russia Proposes Naval CSBMs -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Ulyanov added that the OSCE needs to improve the USOSCE 00000171 004 OF 004 European CSBM regime. Naval forces have traditionally been outside that regime but Russia was now distributing a food-for-thought paper that proposed naval CSBMS (FSC.DEL/120/08). Ulyanov said there was nothing outrageous in them and suggested discussion of them should begin at the July 23 FSC under the rubric of "CSBMs in the maritime field: arguments for and against." ¶17. (SBU) The naval CSBMs would include: an information exchange on personnel and major equipment of naval forces; prior notification and observation of naval activities; annual exchange of naval plans; a list of naval contacts. Much of the language of these provisions is borrowed from the corresponding sections in the Vienna Document 1999. As in the Vienna Document, the area of application is defined only as "the waters adjacent to the region of the OSCE." ¶18. (U) A complete readout of the ASRC, including the other working sessions and the address by SACEUR General John Craddock, will be provided septel. FINLEY