FSC MAY 28 - GEORGIA INVOKES VD99 CHAPTER III OVER

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 USOSCE 000144 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA JCS FOR J5 OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) NSC FOR DOWLEY USUN FOR LEGAL, POL CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD UNVIE FOR AC GENEVA FOR CD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE GG MW RS XG SUBJECT: FSC MAY 28 - GEORGIA INVOKES VD99 CHAPTER III OVER APRIL 20 UAV INCIDENT REF: STATE 056557 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Georgia announced in the May 28 Forum for Security Cooperation it would invoke the Vienna Document Chapter III risk reduction mechanism to call on Russia to explain its actions as described in the recently released UNOMIG investigation of the April 20 UAV incident. Russia rejoined that this seemed an unproven and "top-heavy" approach as it could involve the entire Permanent Council and the FSC. Although Russia was prepared to meet with Georgia at any time, it would go along with the Chapter III request. The U.S. and UK endorsed Georgia's approach. The EU "supported" the UNOMIG investigation, but did not comment on the Chapter III request. ¶2. (SBU) The Forum adopted the decision updating the OSCE MANPADS principles to accord with recent Wassenaar Arrangement changes. The U.S. proposed changes to the draft decision on the publication of the Best Practice Guides on Conventional Ammunition; several delegations asked the U.S. to reconsider its position. The working group endorsed the latest version of the Russian proposal for a chair's statement calling for stricter compliance with the timelines for requesting Vienna Document inspections. There is at present no emerging consensus on the Russian proposals, on defining "specified area" and to provide prior notification of major military activities, meant to "enhance" implementation of the Vienna Document. End summary. Georgia Will Invoke Chapter III, VD99 -------------- ¶3. (SBU) After announcing that the UNOMIG report of investigation into the April 20 UAV incident had been released, Georgia announced that Georgia would invoke the Chapter III, Vienna Document 1999 mechanism for "consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities." Georgia noted that the UNOMIG report corroborated the authenticity of the evidence it provided, in particular the video tape shot by the camera on the ill-fated drone and the Georgian air traffic control radar plots. Georgia also highlighted that UNOMIG had described the Russian actions in Abkhazia as inconsistent with the 1994 Moscow Agreement. Russia Sees No Need for Chapter III -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) replied that there was only "scanty" experience with Chapter III, explaining that it had been invoked twice before: in 1991 during the Yugoslav crises and again in 1999, when Belarus questioned NATO bombing in Yugoslavia. The standard for invoking Chapter III should be the "military significance" of the events in question. Ulyanov questioned the need for a "top-heavy" approach like Chapter III when "we can meet bilaterally, even after today's (FSC) meeting, if you like." ¶5. (SBU) Nonetheless, he added, Russia recognized Georgia's right to invoke, without consensus, the Chapter III mechanism. Ulyanov said Russia might, in turn, also invoke Chapter III, which is based on the principle of "escalating discussions." Let's see how it goes, he concluded. Tepid EU Response -------------- USOSCE 00000144 002 OF 006 ¶6. (SBU) Slovenia, as EU president, announced it supported the UNOMIG investigation but did not comment on the contents of the UNOMIG report or Georgia's decision to invoke Chapter III. U.S. Supports Invocation of Chapter III -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) said it remained concerned about Russia's provocative steps in Abkhazia and welcomed Georgia's invocation of Chapter III. Neighbour said the U.S. also supported direct talks by Georgian and Abkhaz leaders to develop a peace initiative. He called for complete transparency by the sides to ease tensions. The U.S. strongly supported the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia. ¶8. (SBU) Neighbour said the UNOMIG report confirmed the findings of the U.S. experts who investigated the April 20 UAV incident. He invited Russia to share any corrections to information it had earlier provided to the FSC on the incident and again asked Russia to explain how its recent actions in the region were consistent with its role as peacekeeper rather than a party to the conflict. Neighbour noted that UNOMIG had concluded that there had been no large-scale Georgian deployments into the upper Kodori valley. He said that the UNOMIG report offered further evidence of Russian failure to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia. He called on Russia to withdraw airborne forces and artillery recently deployed in Abkhazia. ¶9. (SBU) Neighbour commended Georgian restraint and called on all parties to support direct talks and for an OSCE role in helping Georgia and Abkhazia resolve their differences and find a way forward to a lasting peace. ¶10. (SBU) The UK (Cliff) praised the UNOMIG report and described Georgia's decision to invoke Chapter III as a measured way forward. It was time, he said, for the OSCE to "reinvigorate itself" in the use of this mechanism. Events in Abkhazia constituted the "unusual military activities" that would trigger Chapter III; they were not just a bilateral issue, but of concern to the entire OSCE. The UK supported the territorial integrity of Georgia, while Russia, according to the UNOMIG report, had failed to do so. The UK called for continued dialogue between Georgia and Abkhazia and pledges its support to all parties in their quest for lasting peace. ¶11. (SBU) Latvia also supported the Georgian decision to invoke Chapter III. Russia Brings Up Kosovo and U.S. Belgrade Bombing -------------- -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Ulyanov said UK remarks about tensions in the Georgian-Russian relationship were based on a false premise. The real conflict is between Georgia and Abkhazia. Turning to the U.S., Ulyanov said it was hard to swallow U.S. references to "provocative Russian acts" given the U.S. support to the Kosovo Albanians. The U.S. had bombed Belgrade, killing journalists and destroying the Chinese embassy. Despite these acts, the U.S. then provided USOSCE 00000144 003 OF 006 peacekeeping forces in Kosovo and had recently recognized Kosovo's independence. It was clear that the U.S. had a "sorry past" that Russia had never duplicated. Ulyanov categorically rejected the U.S. arguments. ¶13. (SBU) Ulyanov noted the UNOMIG report supported his contention that Georgia often blamed other for problems it had caused. The UAV over-flights were described by UNOMIG as "military activities" inconsistent with the Moscow Agreement. The UAV over-flight of Abkhazia was the cause of the April 20 incident. Georgia even increased the frequency of its over-flights after April 20. As a result, Abkhaz air defense forces had shot down seven Georgian UAVs, of which three were confirmed by the UN as destroyed. He again denied that Russia had shot down the UAV on April 20. ¶14. (SBU) The U.S. replied to Russia that the subject in the FSC was Georgia, which earlier had welcomed Russia's willingness to engage in dialogue, not Kosovo nine years ago. Neighbour said delegations should consider the history, geography, and relative size of the parties in the Abkhaz conflict. Russia, he said, has warned Georgia it reserves the use of military force: why wouldn't Georgia be worried. Neighbour added that Russia's own January 2008 Vienna Document submission corroborated that there were Su-27s based in the area the Georgian radar tracks show the attacking aircraft returned to. Ulyanov dismissed the U.S. remarks, noting that the U.S. still could not say whether the attacking aircraft was a MiG-29 or a Su-27. ¶15. (SBU) Neighbour replied that while the U.S. had a national position on the question of MiG-29 or Su-27, the point was that UNOMIG report concluded the attacker was from the Russian air force and both the MiG-29 and Su-27 had the twin tails seen on the aircraft in the video. Ulyanov charged that Neighbour's comment about Russian statements on the use of force was a deliberate distortion. Russia was not threatening Georgia but warning against military adventurism in order to protect the civilian population. He also said that it was improper for Georgia to provide the Baltic and U.S. experts' conclusions to the UN team. Russian military experts are now reviewing the materials and the Georgian radar returns are not the same as Russia has. ¶16. (SBU) The Estonian FSC chair (Parts) noted that there was a strict timeframe for consultations under Chapter III and hoped there might be some information on these by the end of the week, i.e., May 30. Security Dialogue: MONDEM -------------- ¶17. (SBU) The manager for the UN Development Program in Montenegro (MONDEM),Gordan Ivanovic, reported on the status of the major components of the program: disposal of hazardous and toxic waste including rocket fuel and Napalm components, conventional ammunition stockpile management, demilitarization of conventional ammunition, and destruction and recycling of heavy weapons. Among challenges to the program, Ivanovic noted the dearth of general contractors available to work on depot improvement because of tourism-related construction on the coast; some uncertainty over the exact amount of ammunition to be destroyed because of uncoordinated actions by the government of Montenegro including sale of surplus stocks; a lack of in-country USOSCE 00000144 004 OF 006 capability for storage and disposal of ammunition and weapons stocks; and legal impediments to efficient transfer of funds from OSCE donors to MONDEM. ¶18. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) noted its bilateral contributions to Montenegro including destruction of MANPADS, naval mines and torpedoes, and larger munitions. In response to U.S. questions about MONDEM's progress on small arms ammunition destruction, Pierre Surprenant, the MONDEM chief technical adviser, explained that the actual size of the ammunition stocks to be treated was much smaller than originally estimated, partly because of government sales. Because of this, it was no longer economically feasible to acquire an explosive waste incinerator. The only option presently available is open-pit burning, which MONDEM dislikes because of its adverse environmental impact. MONDEM is seeking other options and is considering a process, offered by a U.S. contractor, which would convert the ammunition into fertilizer. Surprenant said that small arms ammunition was not a priority at the moment. He also confirmed that the new inventory being prepared does not include stocks from other than Montenegrin military sources. ¶19. (SBU) Denmark (Petersen) and Sweden (Nilsson) expressed concern over the lack of regular "formal" reporting by MONDEM to OSCE. Ivanovic said a formal report had been submitted in December 2007 and another would be submitted at the end of ¶2008. In response to concerns expressed by Denmark, Sweden, and Germany over the absence of a reliable funds transfer mechanism, the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) (Brandstetter) explained that negotiations were underway between the OSCE and the UNDP to establish a more reliable transfer device. As this would affect all cooperative work between the two institutions, not just MONDEM, resolution of the complex issues involved was time consuming. Brandstetter noted that joint programs in Belarus and Tajikistan were also affected by the funds transfer problem. MANPADS Decision Adopted -------------- ¶20. (SBU) The chair announced the decision to update the OSCE MANPADS principles to accord with recent Wassenaar Arrangement changes had been adopted on May 26 under the silence procedure, Belarus apparently having joined consensus (FSC.DEC/5/08). Publication of Ammunition BPG -------------- ¶21. (SBU) The U.S. (Silberberg),per reftel instructions, announced it could not join consensus on the draft decision to publish the Best Practices Guides (BPG) on conventional ammunition (FSC.DD/6/08/Rev.1) because it included a requirement that the OSCE brief the Third Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) on the BPG. The U.S. explained its position that ammunition is outside the scope of the BMS, which is convened to discus progress in the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The U.S. also suggested, per reftel, language that would require the FSC to take account of the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts when considering further development of the ammunition BPG. ¶22. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer),one of the sponsors of the decision, noted that it was needed for the OSCE to commit USOSCE 00000144 005 OF 006 funds for publication of the guides. He explained that the intent of the reference to the BMS was for the OSCE to alert BMS delegations of the work the OSCE was doing with conventional ammunition as well as small arms, as many of the delegates would also be working in both fields. The tasking could be fulfilled by a side exhibit at the New York meeting, outside of the formal meetings, similar to what was done at the OSCE Madrid Ministerial in 2007. Schweizer said the language the U.S. objected to was not meant to represent an OSCE policy position on the purview of the BMS. After the meeting, Sweden, France, and the UK urged the U.S. to reconsider its position on the draft decision. The CPC confirmed that OSCE funds are available for publication of the guide but must be committed before the end of 2008 or be forfeited. Vienna Document Inspection Requests -------------- ¶23. (SBU) The working group endorsed the latest version of the Russian proposal for a chair's statement that calls for strict compliance with the timelines for requesting inspections and evaluations under the Vienna Document (FSC.DEL/75/08/Rev.3). The U.S., per reftel, did not oppose. The statement will next be considered in the Plenary. Russia asked the CPC to prepare a report on compliance with the guidelines from May to November 2008. The CPC, at the chair's invitation, agreed. "Specified Area" -------------- ¶24. (SBU) Russia's draft decision to define the "specified area" for Vienna Document inspections at 25,000 square kilometers (FSC.DEL/493/07/Rev.2) received no support, although Denmark (Petersen) noted that an earlier version of the proposal also specified a maximum distance between two points of 200 kilometers. Denmark proposed restoring this to the text with an increase in the distance to 300 kilometers. Prior Notification of Major Military Activities -------------- -- ¶25. (SBU) Russia said it was returning to its proposal (FSC.DEL/495/07/Rev.3) to require annual notification of at least one "major military activity because the 2005 chair's statement urging participating States to make voluntary notifications was inadequate as only "ten or eleven" notifications had been received each year since 2005. ¶26. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) said there would be difficulty in reaching consensus on the proposal, noting that several pS had no or such small forces that they had not activities to notify. Why change, Schweizer asked, a well-functioning measure? Ulyanov replied that eleven notifications a year was hardly "well-functioning." What was needed was a politically binding decision. ¶27. (SBU) Sweden (Nilsson),while noting that it made voluntary notifications each year, said it could support the Russian proposal. Nilsson suggested changing "will" to "should" in operative paragraph 1 to allow for "exceptions." Austria, Belarus and Switzerland, (which had opposed the 2005 chair's statement as not strong enough),supported the Russian position that a politically binding measure was USOSCE 00000144 006 OF 006 necessary. Belgium regretted the infrequency of notifications since 2005 and conceded that the Russian proposal might be appropriate. ¶28. (SBU) Germany recalled that the chair's statement was the result of 18 months of negotiation over a draft decision that never gained consensus. Did delegations really want to repeat that experience? Has anything really changed since 2005, Schweizer asked? The present arrangement allows pS to decide which military activities are of political relevance to their neighbors. ¶29. (SBU) Luxembourg (Pilot) said the criterion for notification is a "concentration of forces that would pose a threat to other states." In light of changes since 1999, perhaps these notifications should be considered more as confidence-building mechanism. A change in the rationale for the notifications would require drafting changes and a new minimum or threshold for the activities would need to be established. Ukraine Melange Project -------------- ¶30. (SBU) The CPC (Brandstetter) reported that the Ukraine melange project was still delayed by negotiations over privileges and immunities issues. Germany had requested an update on the project at the May 21 FSC. Next Meeting -------------- ¶31. (U) The FSC on June 4 will hold a joint meeting with the Permanent Council that will be dedicated to cyber security. There will also be a special working group meeting on June 4 to prepare the OSCE contribution to the BMS and begin a review of the entire OSCE acquis on small arms and light weapons. FINLEY