FSC APRIL 30: FSC DEFERS TO UNOMIG TO INVESTIGATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 USOSCE 000120 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA JCS FOR J5 OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) NSC FOR DOWLEY USUN FOR LEGAL, POL CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD UNVIE FOR AC GENEVA FOR CD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL MOPS OSCE KCFE GG RS XG SUBJECT: FSC APRIL 30: FSC DEFERS TO UNOMIG TO INVESTIGATE GEORGIA UAV INCIDENT USOSCE 00000120 001.2 OF 006 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: At the request of the Finnish Chairman-in-Office under the OSCE's "Bucharest mechanism," the Forum for Security Cooperation held initial discussions of the August 20 UAV incident in Abkhazia. The EU and several of its members deferred to UNOMIG--as it had the "main responsibility"--to take the lead on an investigation. While delegations supported continued "discussion" on the incident in the FSC, Russia challenged the chair when it announced that the UAV incident would remain on the agenda to allow any experts to report. Despite Russia's charge that experts reporting in any national capacity would have no status compared to a report from UNOMIG, the Estonian chair declined to reverse herself. The U.S. called for transparency and calm, and invited other participating States to join it in sending experts to the region to investigate. Russia charged that the Internet video of the shoot-down was a hoax and that the Georgian UAV was engaged in impermissible "military activity" under the Moscow Agreement and UNSCR 1808 by over-flying Abkhazia. ¶2. (SBU) Although the UAV incident dominated discussions, on other issues Germany promised to table a revised version of its quota race paper after it digested comments from several delegations, including the U.S. Russia continued to insist that further measures were necessary to ensure compliance with the timelines for requesting inspections under the Vienna Document. Belarus is still waiting for instructions to join the other 55 delegations in supporting the MANPADS principles update decision. The Small Arms and Light Weapons Point of Contact decision will be taken up in the May 8 Plenary after reaching consensus in the working group. Belarus introduced a Food-for-Thought paper on SALW end-user certificates. Germany tabled a draft decision on the publication of a Best Practice Guide Handbook on Stockpiles of Conventional Weapons. A revised Code of Conduct Questionnaire draft decision is expected by mid-May. End summary. Security Dialogue: Georgia UAV Shoot-down -------------- ¶3. (SBU) After Russian objections prevented the Permanent Council failed from adopting a draft decision that would have asked the FSC for its "expert advice" on the April 20 Georgia UAV shoot-down, the FSC chair Estonia (Parts) informed that she had just received a letter form the PC chairman (CIO.GAL/67/08) making the same request for expert advice under the OSCE's "Bucharest mechanism" (MC.DEC/3/2001, paragraph 8). Estonia had already added the UAV incident to the Security Dialogue agenda the day before the FSC meeting (FSC.GAL/52/08/Rev.1). Parts also reported she had received a letter from Georgia (Dolidze),also invoking the Bucharest mechanism, and requesting the FSC send a group of independent experts to Georgia to investigate (FSC.DEL/84/08). EU: Let UNOMIG Do It -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Slovenia, on behalf of the EU, said it was seriously concerned but noted the "leading role" of the UN in Abkhazia and supported a UNOMIG investigation. While regretting the PC's failure to adopt the decision, the EU looked forward to continued discussion in the FSC consistent with the approach of the CiO. Croatia, Norway, Albania, Ukraine, and Iceland echoed the EU statement. Canada hoped that experts could USOSCE 00000120 002 OF 006 soon investigate and encouraged Russia to cooperate in any investigation. ¶5. (SBU) The U.S. (Finley) called for complete transparency in an investigation of the shoot-down and urged all involved in the region to show calm and restraint. She announced that the U.S. had already sent military experts to Georgia and invited other participating States also to send experts. Russia's Questions -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) had five questions for Georgia about the UAV shot down on April 20: (1) Why was the Georgian UAV in Abkhazian air space despite UNSCR 1808, which prohibits "unsanctioned" military activities? (2) What was the UAV doing: conducting a geological survey? (3) Another Georgian UAV was shot down on March 18: why did Georgia not alert the international community to this earlier incident? (4) Why did Georgian authorities initially deny the April 30 loss of the UAV but later admit it? (5) Does the Internet video constitute an "official statement" by Georgia and is the video to be seen as authentic? The Georgian Version -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Georgia (Dolidze) replied with a description of the shoot-down: at 0953 a Russian MiG-29 launched a missile at a Georgian Ministry of Internal Security UAV over Georgian "territory." Georgian military radar showed the Russian fighter returning to Russia at 1006 after the incident. Georgia based its identification of the aircraft on imagery from a video, Dolidze said, taken by the drone before its destruction. This shows a twin-tailed aircraft with air inlets under each wing. The video also showed a missile launch from the last or outer pylon under the left wing. The aircraft was first seen on Georgian radar flying near Gudauta and after the attack was seen again near Gudauta before returning to Russia. Dolidze noted that Abkhazia claims the aircraft was from its air force. Georgia Invokes OSCE "Bucharest Mechanism" -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Dolidze said Russia had not responded to Georgia's request for information. Georgia now requests the FSC direct an independent investigation under the mandate of the "Bucharest mechanism, referring to OSCE decision 2001 Ministerial in Bucharest (MC.DEC/3/01). Dolidze noted paragraph 8 of the decision called for greater use of the FSC to strengthen the political-military aspects of the OSCE. The independent investigation should: -- authenticate the radar data -- authenticate the video -- verify technical data of the aircraft involved -- determine from where the aircraft took off. ¶9. (SBU) Dolidze said all participating States were welcome to participate in the investigation, except parties to the incident, i.e., Russia and Georgia, and, by extension, any of USOSCE 00000120 003 OF 006 the member states of the CIS or GUAM. He also asserted Georgia could support a UNOMIG investigation provided it did not include any of the parties, i.e., Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia, and the Joint Peace-Keeping Force (JPKF),itself comprised of military forces from the parties. Turning to the specific questions from Russia, Dolidze replied that (1) the UAV was unarmed and flying over Georgian territory and (2) belonged to Georgia's Ministry of Internal Defense. Russia's Rebuttal -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Ulyanov claimed Russia was "happy" to have the FSC investigate. This would be consistent with its oft-stated preference for using the Security Dialogue and FSC to discuss important, if not contentious, issues rather than listening to another guest speaker. Ulyanov said the facts were that Abkhazian air defense forces shot down the Georgia UAV over Abkhazia. Rebutting Dolidze's suggestion that the UAV had no military function, Ulyanov noted UAVs were used, as seen in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, for military missions like reconnaissance and targeting. He charged that the flight violated the ban on military activities in Abkhazia found in the Moscow Agreement and UNSCR 1808, enacted only a few days before the incident. Russia, he claimed, had no military aircraft in the area because of a lull in activities before the Orthodox Easter. ¶11. (SBU) Turning to the Internet video of the shoot-down, Ulyanov asserted it was simply not credible. He claimed the behavior of the aircraft as it approached the UAV was "erratic" and improbable, describing how the fighter approached from below the UAV, "as if it wanted to be observed (by the UAV's camera)." He asserted there were no outer wing pylons on a MiG-29. While the vapor trail of a missile was visible of the video, air-to air missiles do not leave a vapor trail, Ulyanov said. Also, it was not clear when the video was made. Finally, he noted that the incident was supposed to have occurred over the coast of Abkhazia. Yet the video shows two roads parallel to the coastline; in Abkhazia there are no such roads. Also, the famous Abkhazian beach, visible even in satellite imagery, is missing from the video images. This was, Ulyanov concluded, "another hoax, and poorly done." ¶12. (SBU) Citing several incidents in the Kodori gorge where Abkhazian villages had been shelled and a subsequent UNOMIG investigation had refuted Georgian charges that Russia was responsible, Ulyanov said Georgia was asking the OSCE to investigate because UNOMIG had seen through earlier Georgian accusations of Russian aggression. Any investigation, Ulyanov continued, should be conducted by professionals through the proper mechanism. It was up to the UN to perform the fact-finding and "do-it-yourself" measures as the Georgians proposed should be avoided. The investigation conducted by independent experts of the August 2007 missile incident in Georgia was of dubious value. Why confuse things, Ulyanov asked, recalling the EU also supports a UNOMIG investigation. ¶13. (SBU) Dolidze rejoined that UNOMIG lacked capacity to perform an investigation without Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia, and the JPKF. Ergo, an independent inquiry was needed. He promised to have more responses to the Russian questions at a future FSC meeting. USOSCE 00000120 004 OF 006 Estonian Chair: UAV Stays on FSC Agenda -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The chair announced that, in the interim, the matter would remain on the FSC agenda. Ulyanov challenged the chair, noting the Forum will have to wait a while on the results of any investigation. Independent experts, he added, could only speak in their national capacity, so it would be better to wait for results from UNOMIG. The chair was unmoved, saying that she intended to invite experts to address the FSC when appropriate. Vienna Document Quota Race -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Switzerland (von Arx) criticized the German Food-for-Thought paper on the Vienna Document "quota race" (FSC.DEL/51/08) for eliminating "freedom of choice" by preventing pS from using their inspection quota at any time of the year. Some states might be able to "hide" military activities by waiting until the end of the inspection calendar "period." The FFT also would not eliminate the quota race but instead creates three separate "mini-races." The provision for carrying quota over into the first months of the following year unnecessarily complicates the inspection regime and is not allowed under paragraph 76 of the Vienna Document. ¶16. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) announced Greece and the U.S. had also provided comments, all of which will be reflected in a future version of the FFT. Schweizer said the revised paper will address the question of late exercises; the end-of-year quota carry-over provision will be dropped. He asked the chair to remove the paper from the working group agenda until the revised version is circulated. Vienna Document Inspection Request Timelines -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Canada (Gosal) objected to Russia's proposed chair's statement calling for strict compliance with the timelines for requesting inspections and evaluations under the paragraphs 85 and 112 of the Vienna Document 1999 (FSC.DEL/75/08). Gosal said the proposal did not address the full scope of the problem that for Canada included eleven-hour time zone differences, lengthy travel times, and occasional difficulties with communications. Participating States, he asserted, should retain the ability to accept even untimely requests. Russia (Ulyanov) disagreed, suggesting that if Canada had an ongoing problem with the timelines it could suggest a permanent change to them. ¶18. (SBU) Switzerland, Italy, and Sweden agreed with Russia that more discipline in complying with the timelines was required, but had reservations about the last sentence of the proposal, which would require refusal of untimely requests. This language, they cautioned, was more appropriate to an FSC decision. ¶19. (SBU) Ulyanov announced he had studied Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) data for 2007 and calculated that there had been 85 violations of the timelines, "many of them by Russia." Continued violations will seriously erode implementation of the Vienna Document, he said, noting that USOSCE 00000120 005 OF 006 early requests were also a problem. The chair agreed to task the CPC to perform a multi-year study of past violations to determine if the problem was, in the words of the UK (Gare), "a trend or a blip." MANPADS Decision -------------- ¶20. (SBU) Belarus (Pavlov) announced it still lacked instruction on the draft decision to amend the MANPADS Principles to include recent Wassenaar Arrangement changes (FSC.DD/5/08/Rev.1). Pavlov said he was sure Minsk would approve as Belarus was a member of Wassenaar. The decision will remain on the working group agenda. CAT Update -------------- ¶21. (SBU) Russia (Geyvandov) repeated its preliminary comments that updates to the conventional arms transfer (CAT) categories should be considered individually by the Forum rather than automatically made by the CPC as in Germany's draft decision (FSC.DEL/69/08),and data provided to the OSCE as part of CAT information exchange was not necessarily releasable to the UN. Germany replied that a reporting category update was fundamentally a procedural matter and did not require deliberation by the FSC; the CPC would in any case report the changes to the Forum. As to the sensitivity of information provided, he noted that operative paragraph 4 of the draft decision allows pS to decline to provide information to the UN. End-User Certificates -------------- ¶22. (SBU) Belarus announced it has circulated a Food-for-Thought paper on SALW end-user certificates (FSC.DEL/56/08). The paper proposes an information exchange on national practices. Pavlov thanked the CPC and Walter Schweizer, to soon replace Pavlov as the chair of the Informal Group of Friends of SALW, for their help in drafting the paper. SALW POC -------------- ¶23. (SBU) With the U.S. joining consensus, the Danish-authored SALW Point of Contact draft decision (FSC.DD/2/08/Rev.1) will move to the May 8 Plenary for adoption. BPG Publication -------------- ¶24. (SBU) Germany tabled a draft decision to publish the Best Practice Guides (BPG) on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition FSC.DEL/80/08). Sweden supported, noting that two further guides, on destruction and physical security, were nearing completion. Schweizer said he hoped the published BPG handbook could be displayed at the Biennial Meeting of States at the UN in July. Code of Conduct Questionnaire -------------- USOSCE 00000120 006 OF 006 ¶25. (SBU) Switzerland (von Arx),a co-sponsor with France and Austria, announced the proposed update of the Code of Conduct Questionnaire (FSC.DEL/49/08) will be revised based on extensive comments from pS. Von Arx hopes the revision will be available by mid-May. Next Meeting -------------- ¶26. (U) The FSC meets again on May 7. FINLEY