CFE: APRIL 29 JCG PLENARY, ALLIES REFUTE RUSSIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000118 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM NSC FOR DOWLEY JCS FOR J5/COL NORWOOD OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2016 TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS SUBJECT: CFE: APRIL 29 JCG PLENARY, ALLIES REFUTE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL ON ELEMENTS OF PARALLEL ACTION PACKAGE Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary: At the April 29 Joint Consultative Group (JCG),Dr. Szabolcs Osvat of the Hungarian MOD provided an academic-style briefing to the JCG on the topic of "Stationing and Temporary Deployment During CFE Adaptation and Beyond, 1996-1999." Inter alia, the brief noted how the CFE Final Act commitments were an integral part of adaptation. Although the brief was intended to be an academic exercise, Dr. Osvat's mention of unaccounted for and uncontrolled Treaty Limited Equipment (UTLE) initiated heated exchanges between Armenia and Azerbaijan. ¶2. (C) Following Hungary's presentation, Russian Chief Arms Control Delegate (Ulyanov) proposed that the JCG begin work on the details of three elements of the parallel actions package: definition of substantial combat forces; accession terms for the Baltic countries and Slovenia; and lowering NATO's collective ceiling. In response, Germany, the U.S., and the UK flatly rejected Russia's view. The Allies told Ulyanov that Russia must agree to the parallel actions package before detailed negotiations on specific elements of the package can take place. The three also refuted Russia,s contention that the package was "Russian actions for Allied promises." End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - The Hungarian Brief - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) As part of the "focused dialogue" series of presentations by NATO members of the JCG, Dr. Szabolcs Osvat of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense provided an academic-style briefing to the JCG on the topic of "Stationing and Temporary Deployment During CFE Adaptation and Beyond, 1996-1999." In his eighty-minute presentation (JCG.DEL/18/08),Dr. Osvat explained the various "notions" (he noted that they were not "definitions") of stationing, and deployment. He focused on the problem in the flank area, some of the solutions considered during the negotiation, and the diplomatic resolution to the issue. ¶4. (C) Dr. Osvat spent the largest portion of his brief on Central Europe, where stationing and deployment was a concern due to NATO enlargement and was the region of greatest interest to his country. He highlighted the adaptation requirements, Russian concerns and the negotiated solution that lead to the 1999 Adaptation of Agreement. The content of the brief drew little response from the forum. (Comment: Hungary's presentation reinforced a lot of contentions Allies regularly make in relation to the CFE Final Act commitments, e.g., that it was all a package agreed upon by all States Parties at that time. Nothing in Osvat's presentation can be used to undercut our arguments. End Comment). ¶5. (SBU) Germany, the U.S., the UK, and Greece thanked Dr. Osvat for his presentation. Germany (Richter) reminded all that States Parties still have to give consent for force deployment in its territory. He opined that the strategic compromises by all States Parties resulted in a positive solution to the adaptation negotiations. While referring to the parallel actions package, Richter stated that there is currently a compromise on the table and appealed to Russia to give a "positive signal" on agreeing to the compromise. The U.S. (Neighbour) observed that Osvat's presentation again showed how the CFE Final Act commitments were an integral part of the adaptation package. This included express consent of host States Parties, an element that was understood and agreed by all. ¶6. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) deployed his standard complaint stating that A/CFE no longer takes into account the current security situation and therefore more work needed to be done to keep the Treaty viable. In a remark aimed at what Russia perceived to be the lack of substantive work in the JCG, Ulyanov commented that he was envious of the productivity of the JCG during 1997 and 1999 when details of stationing and deployment were worked out. Russia will review the Hungarian brief and plan to address it at a later date. ¶7. (SBU) Although Turkey agreed with the majority of Dr. Osvat's briefing, Turkish representative (Guc) noted the speaker's portrayal of the 1996 Flank Agreement. Guc reminded everyone that there should be no question on the validity of the Flank Agreement as being an equal part of the CFE Treaty. He stressed to all that the Flank Agreement is an integral and legally-binding part of the Treaty. ¶8. (SBU) Azerbaijan (Jafarova) found the presenter's analysis of unaccounted for and uncontrolled Treaty Limited Equipment (UTLE) to be incomplete. Jafarova pointed out to the JCG that UTLE in Nagorno-Karabakh were actually under the control of Armenia. This initiated a 30 minutes of heated verbal exchanges between the Armenian and Azerbaijan representatives with each side accusing the other of past wrongdoings. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Russia: Let's Work The Details Now - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (SBU) Following Dr. Osvat's briefing and at the urging of the Russian delegation, Belarus representative (Pavlov) delivered a prepared statement in which Belarus welcomed previous statement by the Baltic countries and Slovenia that they would accede to A/CFE. Belarus wanted more information on specific steps that States Parties would take to ratify A/CFE and wondered if a special JCG meeting would be useful in this regard. Additionally, Pavlov also calls for work by the JCG on the details of the parallel actions package regardless of the status of play of the package agreement. ¶10. (SBU) Russian Arms Control Chief Delegate (Ulyanov) asked when it would be appropriate for the JCG to take on three elements of the parallel actions package: definition of substantial combat forces; accession terms for the Baltic countries and Slovenia; and lowering NATO's collective ceiling. Ulyanov stated that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) statement of 28 March had acknowledged that the three elements needed discussion. He said that NATO had suggested that the discussion would take place after the parallel actions package is agreed upon. However, there is no guarantee that discussion would occur, but just promises that the elements would be considered. Ulyanov complained that, according to the plan, Russia is required to take immediate actions on Moldova and Georgia while NATO would only have to start the ratification process. He thought the parallel actions package is really a "plan for Russian actions and NATO promises" and that it was an imbalance plan that Russia will not agree upon. ¶11. (SBU) Ulyanov said he did not want to break up the package. He wanted to work the details on the elements now in order to "infuse" the package in order to make it "stronger and more viable." He proposed that the JCG begin detailed work on the definition of substantial combat forces now so when the package is signed, the JCG would be able to come to an agreement on this element. Ulyanov couldn't understand why Allies are opposed to his work proposal. He wondered if Allies wanted the package agreement without the details in order to gain an advantage on Russia in future negotiation of the three elements. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Allies Just Say "NO" (Again) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (SBU) In response to Ulyanov's intervention, Germany (Richter) reminded the forum of the various topics of the ongoing focused dialogue discussion that addresses some of Russia's concerns. He reiterated German openness for substantive dialogue in the JCG, but reminded Russia that the parallel actions package must be agreed upon conceptually first before detail work can be initiated. He pointed out that the package, as indicated in the NAC statement, would required all parties to take action in parallel and at the same time. He asked Russia for a positive signal on their willingness to agree to the parallel actions package. ¶13. (SBU) Using cleared language from previous guidance and the NAC statement of 28 March (JCG.JOUR/660, Annex 3),the U.S. (Neighbour) rejected Russia's proposal for piecemeal discussion of the package. Neighbour reminded Russia that discussion on the three elements could only take place after the parallel actions package is signed. Neighbour also refuted Ulyanov's claim that the package is "Russian actions for NATO promises." Neighbour called for Russia to agree to the parallel actions package. ¶14. (SBU) U.K. representative (Gare) supported the interventions made by Germany and the U.S. Gare suggested that Russia,s characterization of the package as "actions for promises" was incorrect and that parallel actions package is really "promises for promises" by all States Parties. Gare questioned the wisdom of disaggregating any portion of package. She retorted that if Russia is concerned about the sequence of events, why wasn't it brought up in the Fried/Antonov discussion? ¶15. (SBU) In response to Gare's comments, Ulyanov said he was referring to language in the NAC statement of 28 March and not the U.S. ) Russia bilateral discussion. Ulyanov thought the NAC language was problematic. He concluded that the text "Allies will move forward" was a weak and ambiguous formulation and does not equate to ratification of A/CFE. Ulyanov called for a reformulation that would make clear that ratification would begin immediately. Germany (Richter) reassured Ulyanov that if the parallel actions package is signed, all States Parties will comply with the agreement and its commitments. He again called upon Russia to agree to the package currently on the table. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - JCG-T Confirms Allies' Approach - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶16. (SBU) In response to a question from a previous JCG meeting Azerbaijan provided information on its A/CFE Treaty ratification process. In short, the National Assembly would have to ratify the Treaty. The timing required is difficult to determine since there are "loop-holes" in the Treaty and political concerns that may be problematic for Azerbaijan to ratify. ¶17. (SBU) The May 6 JCG was canceled due to conflict with the HLFT meeting in Brussels. The next JCG will be on May ¶13. Germany will provide a briefing on CFE force limitations and trends. ¶18. (C) The JCG-T was held an hour prior to the JCG under Portuguese leadership. Dr. Osvat provided a quick overview of his presentation to the group. Germany, the U.S., and the UK discussed ways to deal with anticipated Russian request to take on tactical issue of the parallel actions package. Allies confirms that we would need Russia to agree to the package, that there would be no "disconnection" of the elements in the package, and that we would remain open for dialogue but no negotiation of the parallel actions package or parts of the package in the JCG. FINLEY