NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000058 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR T, EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, AND AC/SEA DEFENSE FOR GSA (BENKERT, GROSS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2018 TAGS: MARR MCAP MNUC NATO PARM PREL SUBJECT: NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP) STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING, JAN 16, 2008 Classified By: DEFAD BRUCE WEINROD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) The Steering Committee for the NATO Senior Defense Committee on Proliferation (DGP) met at NATO HQ on January 16, 2008 and was jointly chaired by Ms Laura Gross (OSD/GSA) and Mr. Pawel Durys (MoD Poland). ¶2. (C) The Steering Committee received a briefing by the U.S. on plans for providing &deliverables8 to the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Bucharest. The SECGEN,s roadmap for Summit planning contains &21st Century Challenges8 as one of its focus areas and the DGP has identified four options that are suitable to be highlighted under that rubric: an information campaign featuring pamphlets, video clips or exhibits; a pro forma DGP progress report via the Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP),with the addition of a detailed matrix tracking progress on various initiatives; a framework document for a proposed overarching NATO WMD strategy; and the contribution of appropriate language to the Summit communiqu. The four options found general acceptance by the committee. Canada supported communiqu input but reminded the group of its continuing questions about a standing maritime interdiction force. The Chair pointed out that inputs to the communiqu are best made by nations rather than the NATO staff. In light of time, it was announced that the food-for-thought paper will not be put under silence, but that each individual component will undergo silence procedure. ¶3. (C) The U.S. then provided an overview briefing on the framework document for an overarching NATO Policy to Prevent the Proliferation of WMD and CBRN Defense. The development of the policy will entail a review of all existing WMD-related documentation and the identification of new concepts and policies that would provide a roadmap for transformation of the Alliance's CBRN defense posture. As the framework document had only recently been distributed, comments from the nations were largely informal and general in nature. France indicated that it had comments to make on several sections and, in particular, had a preference for the word &dialog8 rather than coordination. Italy felt that the civil-military link had been appropriately highlighted at Riga and should be stressed in all follow-on work. Turkey provided general support but felt that the notion of outreach might be exceeding the remit of NATO. It thought that work with host nations and the EU should be a higher priority. Several nations voiced concern that the framework document was ambitious but the committee went on to accept that comments would be submitted by February 1 with the objective of having it ready for the Bucharest Summit. ¶4. (C) The WMD Centre provided an update briefing on the topic of Improved Cooperation and Coordination on CBRN Defense. This effort seeks opportunities to invite the NATO Military Authorities (NMA) and NATO's lead committees to brief on ongoing progress to improve NATO CBRN defense capabilities. The next step in this project is an Ad-Hoc workshop of NATO Bodies to take place on February 26 at NATO Headquarters. Attendance is expected by national experts and heads of about ten NATO committees at plenary level. An agenda will be developed shortly with the aim to foster an exchange of views on current CBRN work in NATO, discuss the use of CBRN scenarios and plan a program of regular consultations. France commented that it wished to look further at any dialog with civilian bodies and felt that prior approval would be required before any coordination could be considered. ¶5. (C) The WMD Centre introduced the 2007 NAC WMD Seminar lesson-learned document by reviewing the objectives and the actual seminar discussion topics, which fell broadly into three areas: capabilities, exercises and training, and outreach. Most of the topics have reached general consensus however several nations chose to speak on the subject of NATO common funding. The UK offered wording to the effect that the subject should be &investigated8 and that it be done in consultation with the NATO Senior Resource Board (SRB). Greece wished the operant verb to be &explore.8 Italy wanted the terminology to include &multi-national funding.8 Turkey addressed a number of issues: it did not wish to see additional bodies created for intelligence sharing, the existing arrangements were sufficient to accomplish the outreach goal, it was uneasy with external coordination referred to in the overarching strategy area, and was clear that any support to host nations must be based on established needs and a verified risk. France wanted the area of civil-military coordination better defined and pointed out that procedures were already otherwise established. External coordination should only be considered on a case-by-case basis with a view to the added value. Work with the EU is to be done within the remit of the NATO-EU Capability Group. She pointed out that the review of Intel procedures may be appropriate but the description in the document is not specific enough. The Chair requested that nations submit all of their comments by February 1. The WMD Centre will prepare a revision thereafter and the document will be placed before the DGP plenary in late February for approval. ¶6. (C) Allied Command Operations (ACO) updated the committee on Alliance CBRN defense capabilities. The Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Centre of Excellence (CoE) is located in Slovakia with an establishment of about 100 personnel. They recently conducted a Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) workshop there and now manage a course at the NATO School in Oberammergau. ACO reminded the committee that there is no standing Reach-Back capability other than that provided through national resources when the Joint Assessment Team (JAT) is activated. Reach-Back is part of the general intelligence fusion process to be provided by the NATO facility at JAC Molesworth. Two officers from the JAT will be assigned to Molesworth to support CBRN Reach-Back and an experienced CBRN expert from the CBRN CoE in the Czech Republic will be assigned to SHAPE to develop the management structure. ACO reported that the new CONOPS now supports the Reach-Back concept and the full range of tasks outlined in the Render-Safe concept. ¶7. (C) The International Military Staff (IMS) provided the current status of the Multinational Medical Analysis Centre in Munich. The planning group for the facility recently met and decided to use the French ASTER system as an architecture and to prepare a real-world trial, situated in Kosovo, to make progress on operating details, in line with the ACT experimentation program. The trial will take place in the 3rd quarter of this year and will set the stage for the permanent establishment of the facility toward the end of the year. In response to a question from Turkey, the IMS explained that the Munich Centre is, in effect, a gap effort, i.e., it is intended to provided an interim capability for a few years and is not a formal NATO structure. The concern about how intelligence is handled at Munich will need to be worked out but the working principle will be that it is available to all troop contributing nations and, for the most part, will not be classified because of the large number of civilian actors involved. ¶8. (C) A briefing entitled "Disease Surveillance and CBRN Defense: Opportunities to Improve Preparedness" was given by Col Donald Thompson of OSD/GSA. The assessment from the ISAF Medical Advisor in Afghanistan was that NATO nations maintain only basic medical reporting systems while deployed and that interoperable systems were not available. He stressed that civil-military cooperation is indispensable for a future system and cited the operational and scientific challenges that must be overcome. The center-of-gravity in biological defense is disease surveillance and the long-term solution is MEDICS. Five recommendations were provided: the quick involvement of the Multinational Medical Analysis Centre in Afghanistan to provide reach-back support for disease surveillance data integration; develop an immunization and casualty tracking system for ISAF; integrate and cooperate with other relevant international data sources such as the World Health Organization (WHO); integrate efforts with similar processes in U.S. and NATO security oriented agencies such as the U.S. Biological Threat Reduction Program; integrate with other efforts in civil consequence management, disaster preparedness and host nation capacity building projects. Turkey returned to the subject of intelligence sharing and expressed concern about its status: if it is unofficial it may not be actionable. The Munich facility should have a NATO blessing of some sort such as that for EUROCORPS. In a reply to France, the briefer explained that his message was not about new initiatives but about reinforcing existing arrangements that should already be in place. ¶9. (C) The committee began its discussion on outreach with an intervention from the IS section responsible for supporting the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC). The IS representative explained how the DGP effort fits in to the NUC work on defense and security sector reform and characterized the joint DGP workshop with the Ukraine as a unique contribution. We should find opportunities for their participation in NATO operations. The Chair shared a letter from Ukraine containing their view on items of interest for discussion. The Czech Republic briefed the agenda and administration arrangements for the workshop which was to begin later that same day. The workshop objective is to identify project areas for cooperation with Ukraine that can then be put on the agenda for another workshop with Ukraine at plenary level to be held in May. The Chair asked the WMD Centre to prepare a report of the workshop by February 1 in time for nations to provide comments at the February DGP meeting. ¶10. (C) The second DGP outreach effort is the annual joint meeting with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which will take place on February 27. The focus of the meeting will be the DGP Host Nation Support paper and the International Partner's Tabletop Exercise (TTX) to follow in April. The Host Nation Support paper will be enclosed with an invitation to EAPC members to be sent out shortly. Some partner nations will be invited as well. ¶11. (C) The third outreach item is the TTX which will be held on April 15th. The scope of this event is much wider than the EAPC with attendees invited from nations in the Mediterranean Dialogue Group, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and selected contact nations as well. The program will consist of a general threat and capabilities briefing followed by some scene-setting video clips featuring a bio-attack on deployed forces. Nations will then be invited to brief on how they would deal with the situation and what capabilities they would employ. The event is expected to have some public interest and the Public Diplomacy Division will be asked to prepare public affairs products that can be used. ¶12. (C) The Chair informed the committee of a tasking received from the NATO Senior Political Committee (SPC) requesting inputs to a document entitled "A Framework for Further Work on Raising NATO,s Profile in the Field of Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation." She stated that the DGP will submit a response to the SPC by February 1 citing the DGP work on Maritime Interdiction. ¶13. (U) The next DGP meeting will be at plenary level on February 27. OLSON