THE DECEMBER 3, 2008 NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 USNATO 000471 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2018 TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS KV AF SUBJECT: THE DECEMBER 3, 2008 NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING ON NATO OPERATIONS. Classified By: Ambassador Kurt Volker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) Participants: U.S. Ambassador Kurt Volker EUR A/S Dan Fried EUR PDAS Ries Damon Wilson, NSC NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer NATO COUNTRIES Albania: FM Lulzim Basha Belgium: FM Karel De Gucht Bulgaria: FM Ivailo Kalfin Canada: AMB Robert McRae Croatia: FM Gordan Jandrokovic Czech Republic: FM Karel Schwarzenberg Denmark: FM Per Stig Moller Estonia: FM Urmas Paet France: FM Bernard Kouchner Germany: FM Frank-Walter Steinmeier Greece: FM Dora Bakoyannis Hungary: FM Kinga Goncz Iceland: Ambassador Thorsteinn Ingolfsson Italy: AMB Stefano Stefanini Latvia: FM Maris Riekstins Lithuania: Under Secretary Zygimantas Pavilionis Luxembourg: D/FM Jean Asselborn Netherlands: FM Maxime Verhagen Norway: AMB Kim Traavik Poland: FM Radoslaw Sikorski Portugal: FM Luis Amado Romania: FM Lazar Comanescu Slovakia: FM Jan Kubis Slovenia: FM Samuel Zbogar Spain: AMB Carlos Miranda Turkey: FM Ali Babacan United Kingdom: FM David Miliband EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: On the second day of the December 2-3 NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels, the North Atlantic Council convened to discuss NATO operations. NATO Secretary General (SYG) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and foreign ministers pointed to the Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan (CSPMP),agreed at the Bucharest NATO Summit in 2008, as the legitimate guiding document for the Alliance in Afghanistan. The SYG was visibly frustrated that the agreed strategy had no mechanisms to force Allies to deliver resources for the ISAF mission or for Afghan National Security Force development. However, his admonishment that the Alliance continues to publicly reiterate its commitment to the Afghanistan mission, but take little action to fulfill shortages, came at the end of the meeting. The U.S. and other Allies stressed the need for NATO to remain engaged in the Western Balkans and particularly in Kosovo and BiH. Slovenia cautioned against a premature KFOR drawdown, EU High Rep Solana reported that the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was moving into place, and Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia expressed support for KFOR's new tasks of demobilizing the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and standing up the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). The U.S. and Canada expressed support for NATO's counter-piracy mission and the need to work with the EU and UN, while High Rep Solana said the EU would launch its mission the following week, and Turkey cautioned on the need for NATO-EU cooperation to take place in accordance with agreed frameworks. The SYG asked the Allies for support on NATO HQ reform. END SUMMARY. -------------- AFGHANISTAN: FRUSTRATION APPARENT -------------- ¶3. (C) Secretary General (SYG) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and foreign ministers emphasized that the Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan (CSPMP),agreed at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, remains the over-arching guidance for NATO in USNATO 00000471 002 OF 006 Afghanistan. The SYG's frustration was apparent when he commented that the Alliance continues to reaffirm Afghan National Army (ANA) training as the most urgent short-term priority for improving security, but then fails to create means to pay for the an expanded ANA force and its sustainment. He said NATO is in a poor position to successfully generate an Elections Support Force in time for Afghan electoral processes, let alone fulfill the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). ¶4. (C) The SYG was particularly concerned about deficits in numbers of police and army trainers and mentors. He added that the Alliance has taken no concrete steps toward increasing its role in Afghan National Police (ANP) development. He warned that failure to implement the agreed strategic plan could leave the Alliance "stuck in analysis," leading it to face an equally dire or worse situation in Afghanistan when foreign ministers reconvene the NAC next year. (Comment: Unfortunately, the SYG's strong words came at the end of the meeting and failed to elicit idea sharing on how Allies might creatively approach persistent shortfalls in the coming year. End comment.) ¶5. (C) The SYG called on nations to satisfy ISAF partners' and some Allies' requests for an ISAF-format meeting to update the CSPMP and evaluate its implementation prior to the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in April. Acknowledging that the hosts are struggling logistically to arrange this meeting, he suggested the NATO Defense Ministerial in Krakow in February as an appropriate forum. -------------- SYG CONCERNED ABOUT KARZAI CRITICISM -------------- ¶6. (C) The SYG characterized the situation on the ground in Afghanistan as a "mixed picture," and presented three areas of concern. He was shocked that on his recent trip to Kabul, President Karzai told him, "You are bringing your war to my sovereign nation." As Karzai postures for 2009 elections, he is making increasingly critical public remarks against the international community, the SYG continued. Such comments are unhelpful and may damage Allies' ability to retain popular support and governmental commitment to the Afghanistan mission. Second, the Afghan government must decide the timing of 2009 elections and use precedent to resolve any constitutional issues, the SYG said. Kai Eide, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan, and the SYG want to give Karzai a joint message that the international community can best support security for the elections in the fall. Finally, the SYG noted that there are still legal hurdles to clear among several nations before NATO can make the Budapest Defense Ministers' decision on counter-narcotics operational. -------------- SECURITY OVERVIEW -------------- ¶7. (C) Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Craddock gave a brief overview of security across Afghanistan. He called the current fighting season a stalemate, and said although violent incidents began declining in RC-East in November, there was an overall 40 percent increase in attacks in the east and south in 2008. He said the insurgency in northern and western provinces remained isolated in Pashtun-inhabited pockets. SACEUR noted that the insurgency in eastern provinces was more fragmented than in southern provinces, but the safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan permit eastern insurgents to operate like syndicates. He was optimistic that the forthcoming Afghan Social Outreach Program conducted by the Afghan Independent Directorate of Local Governance could have positive security effects at the community level. -------------- ALLIES BACK STRATEGY, FAULT IMPLEMENTATION -------------- ¶8. (C) Allies expressed near universal agreement that NATO's strategy was good, but needed to be implemented better. Foreign ministers said presidential elections would be the critical landmark for 2009, and security failure during the USNATO 00000471 003 OF 006 elections would have catastrophic consequences for Afghanistan's democratic process. They reiterated Bucharest decisions that building the capacity of the ANA and ANP was critical to success in Afghanistan, and that NATO needed an integrated security approach that included more training of indigenous police and military forces. Several ministers urged NATO to improve its cooperation with the European Union on police training. ¶9. (C) Nearly all Allies said the Comprehensive Approach needed to be implemented better in order to improve coordination of the international community's activities, including the efforts of non-governmental organizations. Norway called on Allies to permit themselves to be coordinated by UNAMA. Ministers said they would ask United Nations headquarters to provide more personnel and resources to UNSRSG Kai Eide. Improving strategic communications with European publics was a common theme, but ministers identified communicating with the Afghan people about NATO's activities on security and infrastructure development as a higher priority. Several interventions included references to helping Afghanistan form a more effective national reconciliation program. Ministers generally agreed that a political solution must accompany military action. Romania pointed out that Central Asian states worry that their region could become "narcotized" if instability reigns in Afghanistan. -------------- AGREEABLE NEW APPROACHES -------------- ¶10. (C) UK FM Milliband proposed a three-pronged approach for NATO in 2009 for "Afghanization, Localization, and Civilianization." Afghanization referred to increasingly giving Afghan army and police units the lead in joint operations with international forces. Localization called for a district approach to concentrate on helping the lowest levels of Afghan government provide security and essential services. Civilianization would require nations to "double surge" military efforts with increased civilian presence at Provincial Reconstruction Teams and district coordination offices. Milliband and other ministers echoed that additional civilians must be mobile, not base-bound. Spain expressed concern that it would be much more difficult to secure civilians in a decentralized, district-level effort. ¶11. (C) The Czechs said they were hesitant to give soldiers a role in police development, and asked the Alliance to maintain clear lines between military and civilian duties as NATO considers a larger role with ANP. Poland,s Foreign Minister characterized the situation in Afghanistan as a classic counter-insurgency, although NATO has not agreed to use this term. -------------- NATO ENGAGEMENT WITH PAKISTAN -------------- ¶12. (C) There was general consensus that Afghanistan and Pakistan should be considered one theatre. The SYG asked the Alliance to improve its links with Pakistan in the military sphere and open political dialogue with Pakistan. The Polish, UK, and Danish Foreign Ministers said NATO should take advantage of having a cooperative Pakistani President in office, and support Zardari as he attempts to fight on several fronts (Taliban, al Qaeda, other insurgent groups) at once. Ministers agreed that Pakistan had a similar need as Afghanistan to extend security, governance, and development to its tribal areas. -------------- ANA TRUST FUND -------------- ¶13. (C) Only the U.S. and The Netherlands encouraged the rapid expansion of the ANA Trust Fund to pay for sustainment costs of an enlarged ANA force. Ambassador Volker said the Alliance must clearly enunciate its unshakable long term commitment to Afghanistan and rise to the effort of supporting ANA expansion despite costs and challenges. He underlined the importance of NATO's strategy, but challenged Allies to resource, implement, review, and adjust it more effectively. Ambassador Volker explained the short term need USNATO 00000471 004 OF 006 to add military resources to Afghanistan to secure the population. Public safety, he said, will set the atmosphere for a successful long term approach in governance and infrastructure development. In order to eventually replace international soldiers, the Alliance must prioritize the development of ANA and ANP by paying for their training and sustainment. Volker continued that the existing ANA Trust Fund is the best mechanism to cover recurring costs. Since Allies agreed this week that expansion of the fund is technically feasible, Volker urged an immediate formal decision followed by staff action to enable sustainment contributions. ¶14. (C) The Netherlands announced that it contributed 10 million Euros to the existing ANA Trust Fund to be used for sustainment costs, if possible once the scope of the fund expands. The Dutch asked all nations to consider generous contributions to ANA recurring costs. -------------- ANNOUNCED CONTRIBUTIONS -------------- ¶15. (C) Foreign ministers announced the following new contributions to the effort in Afghanistan during their interventions: -- Denmark's Parliament meets on December 5 and will likely decide to increase forces. -- Germany has increased forces from 3,500 to 4,000. -- Germany will increase its 2009 civil reconstruction budget by 70 percent. -- Poland took over Ghazni province and added 400 troops for total 1600. They are prepared to do more including adding police trainers at the provincial and possibly district level. -- Slovenia will strengthen its participation in an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in 2009. -- Romania has one OMLT and will contribute one more in 2009. -- Lithuania will try to increase its involvement in the south, paired with British forces. -- Canada has increased its committed enablers in Kandahar, including helicopters. -- Netherlands will increase its efforts in police training, and contributed 10 million Euros to the existing ANA Trust Fund. -- Albania will double its current troop strength during the first quarter of 2009. -------------- WESTERN BALKANS: NOT THE TIME TO DISENGAGE -------------- ¶16. (C) Czech Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg, Slovene Foreign Minister Zbogar, Ambassador Volker, and the Norwegian PermRep emphasized the need to remain engaged in the Western Balkans due to the continuing potential for dangerous instability and particularly called attention to the situation in Bosnia. The Czech FM said NATO should customize the tools it uses for each country to keep them on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration and should maximize NATO-EU cooperation. Slovenia said it was prepared to assist Montenegro to prepare for a Membership Action Plan (MAP). Hungarian Foreign Minister Goncz advocated coordinated NATO-EU messages to BiH and, supported by Ambassador Volker, called for EUFOR to remain in place. ¶17. (C) Portuguese Foreign Minister Amado expressed concern about the EU's ability to meet Belgrade's expectations on EU accession and said that now is the time for a "new impulse" to ensure Belgrade continues on a pro-EU path. The Bulgarian, Czech, and French foreign ministers and the Norwegian PermRep all stressed the need for the Alliance to continue engaging Serbia. The Czech and Slovene foreign ministers expressed hope that there would soon be a resolution to the name issue so that Macedonia could join the Alliance. -------------- -------------- KOSOVO: MOVING FORWARD ON EULEX AND KFOR'S NEW TASKS -------------- -------------- ¶18. (C) French FM Kouchner and Ambassador Volker cautioned that Kosovo is on the right path but that much remains to be done and now is not the time to disengage. Slovenia added USNATO 00000471 005 OF 006 that it was not yet time to begin thinking about drawing down KFOR. Albanian Foreign Minister Basha said that NATO and the EU must not let up but rather should continue to push in Kosovo and throughout the Western Balkans. Ambassador Volker and the Norwegian PermRep stressed that NATO must continue to do its part in Kosovo. ¶19. (C) Hungarian FM Goncz applauded the restraint of Kosovo authorities in recent months and said Allies must monitor Kosovo's development, particularly with regard to the protection of minorities. Portuguese FM Amado stressed the need to continue working on the political and security processes simultaneously and the necessity of having Belgrade,s support in Kosovo. ¶20. (C) EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Solana said that the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was already moving into place as of December 2 and that positive Serbian public statements toward EULEX had been very important. FM Kouchner stressed the French EU Presidency's satisfaction with EULEX's deployment but said EULEX must be very cautious, particularly in northern Kosovo. Ambassador Volker expressed U.S. appreciation for the EULEX mission, and Canada indicated the necessity for EULEX to deploy throughout Kosovo. ¶21. (C) Bulgarian Foreign Minister Kalfin stressed the importance of NATO's new tasks of demobilizing the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and standing up the Kosovo Security Force (KSF),saying Bulgaria would contribute funding to these tasks. He also said Allies should press the Kosovo authorities to implement proper standards and press Belgrade not to isolate Kosovo. Slovenia said it would also contribute to the KSF stand-up trust fund, and Albania indicated it now planned to donate 250,000 euros. Czech FM Schwarzenberg said the Alliance must work to turn the KSF into a politically independent and reliable instrument to help ensure Kosovo,s survival. ¶22. (C) Romanian Foreign Minister Comanescu said for the record that Romania's agreement to communique language on Kosovo -- which includes references to "Kosovo authorities" and the "Kosovo Security Force" -- did not imply a change of policy toward Kosovo in terms of recognition. -------------- PIRACY: NATO-EU-UN COOPERATION IS KEY -------------- ¶23. (C) Ambassador Volker said the U.S. was pleased with the NATO counter-piracy mission and intended to take up the piracy issue further in the UN. The U.S. supports the upcoming EU mission and looks forward to strong NATO-EU cooperation. Canada saluted NATO's counter-piracy efforts and said it favors NATO studying options for future NATO missions, in coordination with the UN and EU. Italy indicated that NATO had done its share for the time being but that the Alliance needed to remain alert and keep an open mind about what can be done. Danish Foreign Minister Moller stressed the need to find a way to deal with the detention and prosecution of suspected pirates. ¶24. (C) EU High Representative Solana indicated that the EU would launch its anti-piracy operation the following week with a mandate to "deter, escort, and protect" and would have robust rules of engagement. He seconded the Danish FM's view that there could be no resolution except on land in Somalia and EU would cooperate with NATO "to the fullest." Turkish Foreign Minister Babacan said the principle of complementarity does not mean NATO will automatically support other organizations, that NATO-EU cooperation on piracy should be in accordance with agreed frameworks, and that the UN should probably have the lead on the anti-piracy effort. -------------- - NATO HQ REFORM: SYG ASKS FOR ALLIANCE SUPPORT -------------- - ¶25. (C) The Bulgarian FM emphasized support for the SYG's NATO headquarters reform effort. The SYG warned that the current headquarters was still a "Cold War" HQ that would not last another five years. He asked for all Allies' support as he moved toward presenting a package on NATO HQ reform at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009. USNATO 00000471 006 OF 006 VOLKER