NATO POST-MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE READOUT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000456

NOFORN

SIPDIS

BELGRADE PASS TO PODGORICA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2018

TAGS: PREL, NATO, MARR, ECON, PGOV, UN, XG, XA, AF, GG, UP,

RS

SUBJECT: NATO POST-MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE READOUT

REF: A. USNATO 447

B. USNATO 448

Classified By: CDA S. REID FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: The two-week long communique drafting

session for the December 2-3 NATO Foreign Ministerial was a

difficult and, at times, contentious affair. Two issues cast

a long shadow over the negotiations: how to handle the

Membership Action Plan applications of Georgia and Ukraine

and how to address NATO-Russia relations. Ukraine and

Georgia was discussed by PermReps outside the framework of

the rest of the communique and was only finally settled by

ministers. NATO-Russia was discussed by the communique

drafters, but the inability to agree a way forward meant that

it too was only resolved following a ministerial discussion.

The negotiations also highlighted ongoing problems in our

relationships with two key Allies: Germany and France.

Germany demonstrated once again that it is strategically in a

different place than the U.S. (and the UK) on a wide range of

issues. These differences are further exacerbated by German

FM Steinmeier's efforts to appeal to the German domestic

audience as he gears up for his election challenge to

Chancellor Merkel. While the French were more pragmatic than

the Germans on some issues, two interrelated trends--their

need to defend to the end statements by their mercurial

president and their need to defend (and try to get NATO to

accept unconditionally) decisions of the EU presidency--meant

that they had extremely rigid and unhelpful instructions on

issues such as NATO-Russia, Kosovo, piracy, and comprehensive

approach. While the birthing was difficult and often

painful, we believe the resulting communique (reftels)

represents significant progress on a number of U.S.

initiatives, such as missile defense. Equally important, the

willingness of Allies to eventually compromise and find

diplomatically ambiguous language for the Ukraine/Georgia and

NATO-Russia sections shows that Allies are finally ready to

move past our differences for now on these issues. END

SUMMARY

UKRAINE/GEORGIA

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2. (C/NF) Initial attempts by the U.S. and UK to find

compromise language on Ukraine and Georgia which would shift

many of the reform tools currently found in the Membership

Action Plan to the NATO-Ukraine Commission and NATO-Georgia

Commissions, while leaving ambiguous whether or not they

would eventually need to go through MAP, were initially

strongly rebuffed by Germany. Berlin was insisting that it

could only accept language which made clear that the two

countries still had to go through MAP. Germany's strongest

support was from the BENELUX countries. France played a more

moderate role on this issue, willing to accept a compromise

proposal from the Secretary General which Germany said it

could not accept. The final compromise--which moved tools to

the two commissions "without prejudice to further decisions

which must be taken about MAP"--was only reached following

ministerial discussion. There is, thus, creative ambiguity

on whether MAP will still be required for these two

countries, while moving us forward on the more important

issue of providing support and assistance to these countries

as they move along the reform path.

RUSSIA

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3. (C/NF) As expected, there was a fundamental divide

between Allies on the approach to Russia. France posed

serious issues to reaching a compromise on the Russia

language, insisting it reflect EU language and the EU's

understanding of Russian fulfillment of its obligations under

the ceasefire agreements with Georgia. Paris would also only

allow carefully crafted language regarding Geneva talks,

refusing until the last minute any reference to access for

monitors. Polish persistence on a reference to the Russian

threat of missiles in Kaliningrad succeeded at the last

moment. The U.S. pushed for strong language throughout the

section on relations with Russia (i.e. a reference to Russian

assertion of a sphere of influence) and was supported

strongly by Canada, the Czech Rep., Eastern European Allies

(minus the Slovak Republic and Hungary) and the Baltic

countries. A response to President Medvedev's European

security proposal was included in the beginning of the

communiqu. The language prompted disagreements, with France

refusing a reference to the importance of maintaining the

existing European security "framework" in the paragraph and

Germany and Italy insisting "future dialogue" references be

included, suggesting they wanted to be more flexible in their

approach to this issue. The U.S. achieved last minute success

in including the phrase "within this framework" and an

explicit indication that dialogue on the Medvedev proposal

would take place within the OSCE.

AFGHANISTAN

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4. (C/NF) Due to Afghanistan being NATO's top priority ,

there was a lot of dialogue with the only significant

resistance in the area of counter-narcotics (C-N). As

expected, Germany pushed hard to keep any C-N language out of

the text, highlighting that they did not want or need to

reaffirm the Defense Ministers decisions from Budapest. The

other main line of resistance was on providing the proper

resources for the efforts in Afghanistan. Belgium, with

German and Dutch support, obstructed positive language on the

Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund expansion to include

sustainment costs, and several nations ) including the

Netherlands and Germany ) tried to weaken language aimed at

providing "the necessary resources." Italy also led an effort

to highlight reconciliation while Canada (unsuccessfully)

pushed hard for NATO - as NATO and not bilateral nations )

to do more police training, a traditional French/EU third

rail issue.

NATO-EU, PIRACY AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

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5. (C/NF) The trifecta of these issues highlighted the

tension and lack of trust between Turkey and EU member

Allies, particularly France and Greece. After several days of

intensive behind the scenes work on the NATO-EU paragraph,

France tabled a proposal that was able to stand with

high-level negotiations to ensure references were included on

piracy, and a strengthened EU defense capability, as well as

coded language about Turkish concerns over European Defense

Agency access. On Piracy, Spain, France and Belgium attempted

to elevate the EU flag while the U.S., UK, Turkey and Greece

worked hard to keep some realism in the text. The major

contention was on EU members insisting that the NATO

operation be complementary to any EU efforts (and indeed NATO

only could do counter-piracy if working with others),while

Turkey and other Allies wanted to ensure that NATO's ongoing

operation was noted and there was not duplication if/when an

EU operation kicks off. On the Comprehensive Approach, EU

members led by France resisted references to cooperation

"within organizations," because it continued to insist that

NATO has no civilian capabilities. Turkey insisted on

references to "shared openness" and "more coherent

application of crisis management instruments" to hem in the

EU states and the U.S. battled for civil-military

coordination inclusion.

ENLARGEMENT, ALBANIA and CROATIA

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6. (C/NF) The highly-charged atmosphere around the

Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine and Georgia

discussion bled over into discussions on "open door" and

future enlargement mechanisms. Germany led a caucus of

nations (including BENELUX and Spain) insisting on cementing

MAP as the only process for accession, and tried to increase

the requirements and standards to be deemed worthy of

Alliance membership. Poland and others insisted on including

text on the Open Door policy. Additionally, the Netherlands

insisted upon specific ICTY language and tried to pin Croatia

down on increasing efforts in order to help with Dutch

accession ratification. The U.S. attempted to keep the "open

door" clearly open while others tried to close it. Some

(Germany and the BENELUX) even tried unsuccessfully to add a

screen door, too.

KOSOVO

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7. (C/NF) Those Allies who have not recognized Kosovo yet,

particularly Spain and Romania, posed serious obstacles to a

compromise on the Kosovo text. The two opposed initial

attempts to use UN language in the paragraph (i.e. "Kosovo

authorities" versus "authorities in Kosovo" which they

insisted upon until compromising in the final moments). They

also insisted that a line encouraging Serbia to cooperate in

the transfer of authority in Kosovo be balanced by language

encouraging the Kosovo authorities also to cooperate. A

reference to the "new tasks," the Kosovo Protection Corps,

the Kosovo Security Force and related trust funds was

particularly contentious among Allies, but ultimately

prevailed in tandem with a Romanian ministerial statement

that the new communiqu text did not change Romania's

national position on Kosovo recognition.

MISSILE DEFENSE and ARMS CONTROL

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8. (C/NF) Negotiations on missile defense text were linked

to the arms control paragraph, as the U.S. and Germany

adopted various tactics to ensure their preferred language

was maintained in the text. Norway joined Germany in being

particularly difficult on the missile defense language,

refusing to accept strong language or positive affirmation of

the defense minister tasking to complete analysis for a

comprehensive missile defense architecture. The reference to

the Czech and Polish agreements with the U.S. posed one of

the greatest obstacles, with Norway and Germany, joined by

Italy and Slovakia, adamantly refusing the notion of NATO

"welcoming" the agreements, insisting on more neutral

language of "note". A showdown with the Czechs persisted

until the final minutes on this issue, when a compromise was

reached, reading "note as a relevant development." Germany

insisted on strong language in the arms control text and the

U.S. refused to accept German additions until concessions

were made in the missile defense text and a reference to arms

control as a tool "part of a broader response to security

issues" was included in the arms control text.

WESTERN BALKANS

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9. (C/NF) Allies were torn on language regarding NATO's

response to Montenegro's request for MAP but only because of

how they wanted to embed repetitive references to MAP in the

text. Really only the U.S. and Slovenia were in favor of even

remarking on Montenegro's interest in further developing

Euro-Atlantic ties. Occasional Montenegro-supporter Hungary

was silent, probably because of their observation that

Germany, to whom they often defer at NATO, so resisted the

Montenegrin mention. The UK and France also considered

Montenegro's aspirations sincere, but unconvincing because of

Podgorica's immature institutions. Portugal offered a

compromise Allies found acceptable, drawing on the "without

prejudice" language agreed by ministers for Ukraine and

Georgia. A divide emerged among Allies on how welcoming

NATO's response should be, with Germany, Spain, Norway,

Netherlands and others opposed to excessively positive

language and Slovenia, Turkey, Hungary and others in favor.

10. (C/NF) The U.S. and the U.K. made a strong case for firm

language on Bi-H's current political situation and was able

to strike a balance with Allies, such as Hungary and Italy,

which wanted to be more positive in tone. Allies varied in

their approach to Serbia, with Italy, Hungary and Norway

proposing language praising the Euro-Atlantic direction in

which Belgrade has begun to head and the U.S. cautioning on

drawing public attention to Belgrade's emerging Euro-Atlantic

aspirations. The Dutch proved very demanding on language in

the Serbia section, refusing "to offer Serbia more than it

has asked for" and holding a hard line against "undue praise

for Serbia,"--as advocated by Hungary, Norway, and

Italy--regarding developments in the ICTY.

REID

NATO POST-MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE READOUT

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