USNATO/USEU: NAC-PSC MEETING HIGHLIGHTS CONCERNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000403 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2018 TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS SUBJECT: USNATO/USEU: NAC-PSC MEETING HIGHLIGHTS CONCERNS OVER FRAGILE BIH POLITICAL SITUATION Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Kate Byrnes for reasons 1 .4 (b and d) ¶1. (U) This is a joint USNATO-USEU cable. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: NATO HQ Sarajevo Commander Major General Wightman and Deputy SACEUR and EUFOR Operational Commander General McColl briefed a joint meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) on October 27 on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Both commanders highlighted the excellent cooperation between the NATO and EU missions. MG Wightman described the rapid decline in the political climate in BiH but said that defense reform continued to move forward at a slow pace. General McColl assessed the security situation as stable. EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Solana said EUFOR probably would be changed into a "Non-Executive Training and Capacity-Building Operation," although no decision had yet been taken. Ambassador Volker said the U.S. would like a continued, robust EUFOR, warning that an early withdrawal would be problematic. EU Member States, including the French EU Presidency, did not speak at this meeting. END SUMMARY -------------- NATO-EU COOPERATION IN BIH A SUCCESS STORY -------------- ¶3. (C) NATO Secretary General (SYG) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer welcomed NATO HQ Sarajevo Commander Major General Richard Wightman (US) and Deputy SACEUR and EUFOR Operational Commander General John McColl (UK),saying that NATO-EU cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has been a success. MG Wightman characterized cooperation with EUFOR as excellent and said that the EUFOR mission complements NATO's efforts in BiH. He stated that Operation Althea is important as a tangible sign of international commitment to BiH. General McColl said NATO-EU cooperation on BiH was good at all levels and called "Berlin Plus" in BiH a proven success. -------------- POLITICAL SITUATION IN BIH IS SERIOUS CONCERN -------------- ¶4. (C) MG Wightman said that there has been a rapid decline in the political situation in BiH over the past two years. He assessed the current political environment to be reminiscent of the situation in BiH in the immediate aftermath of the Dayton Accords. There is no real cooperation among entities and little room for compromise between competing Bosniak and Bosnian Serb visions of BiH. Meanwhile, the Bosnian Croats are simply watching and waiting. EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana noted, however, that the EU's Stabilization Agreement can push the political and economic situation in a positive direction. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Volker said it was important to send a strong message to BiH that its future depends on its own actions. The Norwegian PermRep stressed that centrifugal forces were gaining ground in BiH and that the international community needed to pay more attention to developments. NATO and the EU must act together in BiH to send a tough, clear message that Euro-Atlantic integration is performance-based. The Bosnians must deliver on reforms. -------------- EU SEES SECURITY SITUATION AS STABLE -------------- ¶6. (C) General McColl characterized the security situation in BiH as calm and stable despite political turmoil. He foresaw no security problems in the short-term. General McColl said that Civilian Movement Control (i.e., authority to transport BiH-produced weapons--an EUFOR authority to be turned over to the state of BiH) remains blocked in Bosnia's parliament. EUFOR continues to provide needed advice to the combined BiH service chiefs. He stressed that the Dayton military tasks would be complete once Civilian Movement Control was handed over to the Bosnians--although he warned that international pressure may be necessary to get this legislated. General McColl concluded that when the Office of the High Representative/EU Special Representative (OHR/EUSR) no longer needs military support, EUFOR should go. -------------- NATO DEFENSE REFORM SLOWED BUT NOT STALLED -------------- ¶7. (C) MG Wightman characterized defense reform as a success story. The pace has slowed due to political problems but never stalled. Wightman stressed the importance of continuing to hold BiH to high standards. NATO membership is one of the few issues on which there is consensus in BiH, and Bosnian authorities continue to welcome NATO's engagement in guiding and pressuring for reform. ¶8. (C) The SYG noted the positive transition from separate MoDs in the entities to a state MoD as of December 2007, but stated that the MoD needed to be made more effective and efficient. The disposition of excess weaponry and transfer of immovable defense property to the state remain key issues. NATO had opened Intensified Dialogue with BiH in September 2008, and the process should provide BiH with an overview of the requirements for membership. The SYG stressed that defense reform was far from complete and that the Bosnians need to understand that past progress does not prejudge future NATO decisions with regard to BiH's NATO aspirations. -------------- EUFOR PROBABLY HEADING FOR TRANSFORMATION -------------- ¶9. (C) EU High Rep Solana said that based on the EU Defense Ministerial of 1 October, the EU is prepared to continue the EUFOR mission but has not yet reached a decision on how the mission might change. Defense Ministers will revisit the issue on 10 November. Solana stated that transformation into a "Non-Executive Training and Capacity-Building Operation" was the most probable outcome. ¶10. (C) General McColl said there were four options for EUFOR's future: (1) no change, (2) reconfiguration, (3) a non-executive training and capability-building mission, (4) and closure. McColl concentrated on option 3, an approach that would be directed toward ensuring that progress to date became self-perpetuating and work in harmony with NATO's tasks. He said the PSC had tasked this option be developed further. He stated that maintaining the current mission was only possible if there were sufficient will to do so by EU member states and that arguments against closure were "self-evident." He said reconfiguration, which would involve a revised OPLAN, reduced footprint, and fewer tasks, was not militarily recommended. ¶11. (C) Ambassador Volker said the U.S. would like a continued, robust EUFOR, warning that an early withdrawal would be problematic. Turkey warned against complacency and urged the EU to maintain EUFOR at current force levels. Turkey asked for greater consultation and sharing on options for EUFOR's future and requested more regular NAC-PSC meetings. -------------- SIDE DISCUSSIONS ON EU DYNAMICS -------------- ¶12. (C) Hungarian PSC Ambassador Andras Kos told the USEU DCM on the margins of the meeting that the EU informal defense ministerial in Deauville October 1 had been contentious on the question of EUFOR,s future. Kos said the French EU Presidency Defense Minister told the press that all ministers wanted to shut down EUFOR (i.e. pursue the Option 4 closure of the mission). Kos said that this was not in fact the case; various ministers preferred Options 2 or 3. Kos said a number of Member States protested privately to the French for misrepresenting their views. ¶13. (C) After the NAC-PSC meeting, French Presidency PSC Ambassador Christine Roger and Italian PSC Ambassador Andrea Meloni confirmed to USEU Ambassador and DCM that France and Italy preferred medium term closure or major drawdown. Roger commented that the military mission had ended, the troops were doing nothing substantial and as a result, their morale was suffering. Meloni agreed with this, as Roger claimed that it was hard to foresee a significant presence beyond March or April of 2009. ¶14. (C/NF) An Austrian military colleague from their EU mission approached the USEU Defense Advisor before the meeting to inquire about potential changes to U.S. policy after the election with respect to the transition of the OHR to an EUSR in Bosnia. He said the decision on the future of EUFOR Althea would be greatly influenced by the actions of the United States. Further, he said the most common view inside the EU is that member states would like to use their 2,000 troops currently in Bosnia for missions elsewhere. He also stressed that the Austrians and others are keen to continue an active Berlin Plus operation until such time as the EU takes over for KFOR under Berlin Plus so that NATO-EU connections remain intact. -------------- PIC TO DISCUSS OHR CLOSURE -------------- ¶15. (C) Solana stated that the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in November would discuss the evolution of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) into the EU Special Representative (EUSR). He did not expect a decision in November but stressed the need to prepare to move the dossiers forward in early 2009. Given the current political problems, Ambassador Volker said it was important for OHR to retain Bonn powers and authorities. The Norwegian PermRep stated that it might be prudent to delay OHR/EUSR reconfiguration until the second half of 2009. ¶16. (C) Ambassador Volker and the Norwegian PermRep expressed disappointment that High Rep for BiH Miroslav Lacjak was not present at the NAC-PSC meeting and said they hoped Lacjak would be invited to the next meeting. The Turkish PermRep said the NAC would have liked to hear Lacjak's views as the PSC had three weeks prior. Turkey stressed that the two organizations should be receptive to each other's requests. -------------- US BRINGS UP NATO-EU MISSIONS IN AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶17. (C) In addition to BiH, Ambassador Volker stressed the importance of NATO and the EU doing more in Afghanistan to build up the Afghan National Security Forces. ¶18. (C/NF) Comment: We find disappointing the silence of all 27 EU Member States throughout the NAC-PSC meeting. The only exception was the Maltese delegation, which expressed non-substantive courtesies relating to their invitation to the meeting. We believe that the EU Member States declined to comment on Bosnia and EUFOR during the meeting because of a lack of Member State consensus on these issues. Equally interesting, they seem to have agreed not to speak at all, perhaps to avoid exposing any differences in the presence of non-EU Member States. End Comment. VOLKER