UK HIGH COMMISSIONER TO PAKISTAN BRIEFS NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000399

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2018
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR MOPS AF
SUBJECT: UK HIGH COMMISSIONER TO PAKISTAN BRIEFS NATO
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kate M. Byrnes for Reasons 1.4(B) and
(D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Robert Brinkley, UK High Commissioner to
Pakistan, told NATO PermReps October 21 that Pakistan has a
profound sense of insecurity and sees its relationship with
Afghanistan through an "Indian lens." He relayed that
Pakistan is not confident the international community will
remain in Afghanistan, so it is hedging its bets to provide
flexibility for future influence. Additionally, he noted
several issues, including financial difficulties and
crumbling government services in the tribal areas, were
affecting Pakistan's ability to act. He notes some positive
areas: the government's offensive against militants in the
tribal areas, the fact that NATO supply lines remain open and
flowing, and Pakistan's commitments to continuing
consultations with India. Asked by several Perm Reps what
NATO can do to support Pakistan without being seen as
imperialistic, Brinkley said the Alliance should be "loyal
supporters, friendly critics, and close allies" in dealing
with Pakistan. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Robert Brinkley, UK High Commissioner to Pakistan,
addressed NATO PermReps October 21 on the Pakistani
perspective of Afghanistan, how it evolved and how Pakistan
assesses the situation. He noted that Pakistan has a
profound sense of insecurity, despite a large army and
nuclear weapons, primarily due to India and the contested
Kashmir area in the east, but also because of Afghanistan to
its west and China to the north. The many battles with India
and the loss of Bangladesh in 1971 make Pakistan constantly
preoccupied with India and reinforced a strategic view where
external threats were prioritized over internal threats.
Therefore, Pakistan continues to view Afghanistan through an
"Indian lens."


3. (C) Brinkley relayed that despite Pakistan's publicly
stated policy of supporting peace and stability in
Afghanistan, there are many recurring unofficial refrains,
especially from Punjabi elites. These refrains include
issues with the over 2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan;
suspicion of Afghan tribes which are seen as tricky and
untrustworthy; and Pakistan's feeling that it is
underappreciated despite the significant assistance it has
given Afghanistan. Additionally, due to its preoccupation
with India, the Pakistanis see Afghanistan as a "zero sum
game." The Pakistanis fear conspiracies, including alleged
US/UK covert support to Baluchistan and NATO plans to
establish a permanent operations base in the region. The
Pakistanis, "in somewhat paradoxical terms," do not really
want us there, he said, but also feel their future is tied to
the West's continued involvement in the region. Because of
fears that the International Community (IC) will not stay in
Afghanistan for the long haul, Pakistan "hedges its bets."


4. (C) Brinkley relayed several positive points on the
Pakistan view. First, Pakistan increasingly sees the threat
from the insurgency and the need for concerted action.
Pakistan's resolve is still intact, with operations
continuing in Bajaur despite the recent domestic bombing
attacks, and the public largely rejects suicide bombings and
jihad. Brinkley commented that there is some "space for
optimism." Examples include: President Zardari's government
is engaged in attacking the militants in the tribal areas,
NATO supply lines are open and flowing, and Pakistan's
commitments to continuing consultations with India.


5. (C) On the negative side, the Pakistani public believes
Pakistan is paying the price for being a "front line state"
in the war against terrorism, but is not getting sufficient
credit from the IC for its efforts to promote stability.
Brinkley relayed that Pakistan's problems are mainly due to
its past policies, which include supporting militants such as
Hekmatyr and the Taliban. Additionally, the government in
the tribal areas is crumbling, the military is
trained/equipped to meet a larger scale Indian threat, and
the justice system is "stuck," often taking over 5 years to
get a case to trial. The latter, he highlighted, encourages
citizens to pursue alternative Islamic justice outlets, where
it otherwise might not were secular courts functioning
properly.

HOW TO DEAL WITH PAKISTAN


USNATO 00000399 002 OF 002



6. (C) Brinkley recommended several actions in dealing with
Pakistan. First, although working on a positive relationship
with India over Baluchistan is desirable, the true "prize" is
peace in Kashmir. He noted that Afghan-Pakistani Joint
Border Coordination Centers are a good step forward, and we
should push for more Pakistan-Afghanistan cooperation to
diffuse tensions along the Durand line. He said the West
should praise Pakistan when it performs well. Additionally,
we should criticize bad actions and provide advice. Brinkley
noted that he would try to share UK intelligence assessments
with NATO to the maximum extent possible. He stressed that
the price of peace in Pakistan cannot be war in Afghanistan,
because this would destabilize the area and lead to further
difficulties for Pakistan. He also noted that Pakistan
responds differently to the IC when dealing with India, where
it desires to keep the IC involved, than with Afghanistan,
where it prefers to work bilaterally. Finally, Pakistan's
finances were particularly hard hit with increased fuel and
food prices, and a civil disturbance crisis situation may be
looming.


7. (C) To summarize, Brinkley stated that NATO needs
Pakistan, needs Pakistan to change by building its
counterinsurgency and governance capacity, and changing its
policies. We need Pakistan to be capable of grasping various
options to deal with its problems. NATO should look at
Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single space and avoid the trap
of "seeing one through the other's eyes." He stressed that
NATO's interests must come first and that we should be "loyal
supporters, friendly critics, and close allies" in dealing
with Pakistan.

PERMREP QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS


8. (C) PermReps asked a variety of questions to Mr.
Brinkley, which ranged from the degree of political support
for President Zadari, to what can NATO do to support Pakistan
without being seen as imperialistic. Brinkley's responses
included the following points:

- Reconciliation is a serious, key debate in Pakistan's
political forces, with the government committed to continuing
to fight "Pakistan's war, not someone else's."

- On the Comprehensive Approach, the G8 is doing good work
coordinating, but needs to go further in implementation.
Security is an issue in Pakistan, just as in Afghanistan.

- On increasing insurgent attacks, he thought insurgents felt
more freedom to act, but the operations in Bajaur have
changed this view. Pakistan has no capacity to deal with all
the insurgencies, so it is starting in the North and will
then move to the South when able.

- Economically, the IMF estimates Pakistan needs $4 billion
since it currently has only 6 weeks of reserves. China is
willing to support with projects but not cash, and the Saudis
are unwilling to delay payments for oil. Pakistan has no
other alternative, but to go to the IMF for help.

- On Afghan Defense Minister Wardak's proposal to start a
Joint Task Force of Afghan, Pakistan and ISAF troops,
Brinkley said "why not?" He is unsure if Pakistan has the
capacity to support, but it is worth a try.

- On the military role in Pakistani politics, he felt Gen
Kayani wanted to stay out of politics and restore the
professionalism of the Army leadership.

- The Pakistani Army is hesitant to take advice from others,
but will readily take funds or equipment. He did note the
recent success with U.S. and UK trainers, but stressed that
Pakistan remains suspicious.

- Pakistan's relationship with the UK is warm, unlike some
other former colonies, and he does not think NATO will be
seen as imperialists.
BYRNES