GERMAN NON-PAPER ON NATO MISSILE DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000382 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2018 TAGS: PREL PARM MARR MNUC SUBJECT: GERMAN NON-PAPER ON NATO MISSILE DEFENSE ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Please see text of German food for thought paper in paragraph 2, which was passed to the Executive Working Group (EWG) on 10 Oct 2008. The non-paper explains Germany's thoughts on the criteria the EWG should use to assess the NATO missile defense architecture options. Germany has proposed "implications on arms control efforts" as one of the criteria. This is reminiscent of attempts by Germany prior to the Bucharest Summit to link missile defense and non-proliferation/arms control. The U.S. delegation made clear that missile defense and non-proliferation/arms control are separate issues, discussed in separate committees at NATO, but that we believe missile defense supports non-proliferation. German representative stressed that he agrees missile defense would have a positive effect on non-proliferation efforts and implied Germany is not trying to block NATO efforts on missile defense. He also said the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested that non-proliferation/arms control issues be addressed when missile defense is discussed. The U.S. questioned whether "implications on arms control efforts" is an effective criterion for evaluating missile defense options, but stated that we want to work with Germany to complete the analysis of the options. The U.S. suggested that Germany review the U.S. draft analysis for one of the options, and suggest language on non-proliferation/arms control which might meet MFA guidance. We will pass this language to Washington when we receive it. ¶2. BEGIN TEXT German Food for Thought Paper on Future DRAFT EWG(R) REPORT TO COUNCIL ON OPTIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE MISSILE DEFENCE ARCHITECTURE Chapter IV Chapter 4: Criteria for the assessment of architecture options for NATO missile defence in accordance with the CNAD Report on the Riga and June 2007 Defence Ministerial Taskings on Missile Defence Background: CNAD was tasked in Riga and at the June 2007 Defence Ministerial to assess the technical implications of the US missile defence system on the MD FS proposed architectures and on the CNAD work stemming from the Riga taskings. At the Bucharest summit meeting in April 2008 Heads of state and government tasked the Council in permanent session bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity, to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the United States system for review at our 2009 Summit, to inform any future political decision. The CNAD report identified architecture options against the combined 4 threat scenarios from the MD FS as well as against each threat scenario taken individually. This report, of a technical nature, forms the basis for further political-military discussion and was noted by NATO Defence Ministers at their formal meeting on June 13, 2008. Aim: The aim of this food for thought paper is to identify a set of possible criteria to assess the architecture options developed by CNAD for the comprehensive EWG (R) Report to be prepared for the next summit meeting. Considerations: Political criteria: Strengthening collective defence and Alliance cohesion At the Bucharest summit meeting in April 2008 Heads of State and Government tasked that future work on options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture should be based bearing in mind the principle of indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity. The implementation of these fundamental political principles calls for a broad participation including in collective planning, consultation, command and control and communication. A comprehensive participation of Allies will be the best example for the cohesion and resolve of the Alliance. Implications on arms control efforts Missile defences could become over time an integral element of NATO's broad based approach to security. Therefore architecture options for a possible NATO missile defence system should be assessed taking into account possible implications in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Implications for third countries A comprehensive missile defence architecture may affect security interests of third countries in many ways. It may require mobile sensors outside NATO territory. During a missile defence operation missiles will fly over Non-NATO nations and an intercept may cause damage in Non-NATO nations. These will require involvement of third countries, which may range from exchanges of situational awareness information to cooperation. Cooperation with Russia At the Bucharest summit meeting in April 2008 Heads of State and Government tasked to strengthen NATO Russia missile defence cooperation. NATO is committed to maximum transparency and reciprocal confidence building measures to allay any concerns. NATO encourages the Russian Federation to take advantage of United States missile defence cooperation proposals and expressed its readiness to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time. Therefore, architecture options should be assessed taking into account the potential impact on this Bucharest summit task. Military criteria: Strengthening Deterrence In a dynamic, complex and uncertain security environment Missile Defence must be seen by potential adversaries as a capable and credible military instrument of the Alliance's political resolve. Missile Defence must have characteristics that can demonstrate NATO's political cohesion and compel a potential adversary to pursue options other than war. Credibility and Reliability An important aspect is the question of credibility. The Alliance must be confident that missile defences will perform, if employed. This question is crucial in relation vis-a-vis the possible scenarios as examined in the Missile Defence Feasibility Study as well as vis-a-vis the Alliance. A proven technical reliability will be important to win support of DOMESTIC constituencies to include missile defences as serious factor into security policy planning as well as to commit budgetary resources to a possible programme. Fexibility Another important issue will be flexibility. The architecture options should be viewed against their adaptability to various contingencies. It is assumed that a possible future NATO missile defence system will not be put on a 24/7 hair-trigger alert. It seems more likely that a crisis situation will develop over time. It is further assumed that a possible contingency will develop not simultaneously vis-a-vis all the 4 scenarios of the MD FS. A significant asset of an architecture option will be, therefore, its capacity to provide for a quick and credible response to an emerging crisis situation. Since 3 out of the 5 architectural options include the NATO ALTBMD Programme Reference Architecture, special emphasis should be given to this programme. The ALTBMD Architecture is, however, designed for the protection of deployed forces, and is not designed to be permanently positioned to provide territorial defence for NATO. This limitation has to be taken into account. END TEXT REID