NATO SENIOR DEFENCE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000368 SIPDIS STATE FOR T, EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, AND AC/SEA DEFENSE FOR GSA (BENKERT, GROSS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2018 TAGS: MARR MCAP MNUC NATO PARM PREL SUBJECT: NATO SENIOR DEFENCE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP) PLENARY MEETING, OCTOBER 2, 2008 Classified By: DEFAD BRUCE WEINROD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The NATO Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) held a Plenary meeting at NATO HQ on 2 Oct 08. The meeting was co-chaired by Mr. Joe Benkert of the U.S. (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs) and Mr. John Laugerud of the Norwegian MOD. Major items discussed during the meeting included the drafting of &NATO,s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy to Prevent the Proliferation of WMD and Enhance the Alliance,s CBRN Defence8; the DGP,s work on maritime interdiction of WMD, related materials, and their means of delivery; cooperation between the DGP and the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee; the report from the 2008 DGP Seminar; lessons identified by the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force during NATO Response Force rotation 10; the Czech Republic's food-for-thought paper on the transformation of CBRN defense units; the way ahead for DGP consultations with Ukraine; and preparations for the 2008 NAC WMD Seminar, the 2009 DGP Away Day, and the 2009 International Partners Outreach Event. The next meeting of the DGP will occur at Steering Committee-level at NATO HQ on 29 Oct 08. ¶2. (C) The U.S. Co-Chair initiated discussion on the DGP,s efforts to draft &NATO,s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy to Prevent the Proliferation of WMD and Enhance the Alliance,s CBRN Defence8 by briefly reviewing the history and structure of the document. He then described the next steps in its development (a revised draft to be published by 20 Oct 08 for discussion at the DGP Steering Committee meeting and Ad Hoc NATO CBRN Bodies meeting, both on 29 Oct 08) and stated that the ultimate goal is to have the policy ready for submission to Defense Ministers at their meeting in Feb 09 and for subsequent approval by Heads of State and Government at the Apr 09 Summit. Following this, he opened the floor for comments from nations. The United Kingdom stated that paragraph 11 of the policy should reflect the fact that NATO already has a strong declaratory policy, that paragraph 12 should not contemplate the failure of deterrence, and that additional thought is required on how to treat NATO,s nuclear forces in paragraph 13. France commented that they were skeptical about the ability to achieve synergy between the policy,s three pillars (preventing proliferation, protecting against and countering the threat of WMD, and recovering from WMD use against the Alliance) and that funding arrangements must be considered where appropriate. ¶3. (C) The U.S. Co-Chair next turned to the DGP,s on-going work on maritime interdiction of WMD, related materials, and their means of delivery. First, he gave the floor to the International Military Staff (IMS) to brief the group on progress made in the various streams of work involved in the project. Then, he stated that two papers on the topic had recently been published (a U.S. food-for-thought paper on courses of action and a Netherlands non-paper on legal aspects) and asked the group to provide their comments on these papers within three weeks. The first paper is intended to further clarfy tasks from already agreed DGP policy guidanceon counterproliferation-related maritime operation. The second paper is intended to establish an greed legal framework for such operations. Finaly, he opened the floor for comments by the natios. France stated that NATO should not become inolved in the Proliferation Security Initiative (SI) because its involvement could alienate some no-western nations, that the mandate of Operation Ative Endeavour (OAE) should not be expanded to iclude counter-proliferation, and they consideredfreedom of navigation in international waters tobe very important. The U.S. Co-Chair clarified tht the DGP had no intention of linking its work onmaritime interdiction to PSI or of proposing an xpansion of the OAE mandate at this time. Latvi commented that the issue of liability and legalconsequences is important and must incorporated n the DGP,s work. Finally, the U.S. Co-Chair gav the floor to the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operaions Training Centre (NMIOTC) to brief the groupon their capabilities to train NATO and partner forces to participate in maritime interdiction operations. Following this presentation, Greece commented that NMIOTC is a unique facility in which they have invested extensive resources and called on nations to contribute personnel to the Centre,s multinational staff. ¶4. (C) The Norwegian Co-Chair initiated discussion on the issues of cooperation between the DGP and the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC). He made a few comments about the history of cooperation between the two committees, stated that a food-for-thought paper on the issue had recently between published, and proposed that a joint DGP-SCEPC meeting could be held in Jan 09 to discuss some of the issues raised in the paper. He then opened the floor for comments by the nations. France commented that military participation in SCEPC work should be limited to those areas where value can clearly be added and that civil participation in military operations should only occur in cases where the requirement has been proven by the commander. The United Kingdom stated that they support civil-military cooperation, that they desire to see it harnessed at the tactical level, and that the CBRN Coordination Group is a good venue for such cooperation. Germany remarked that cooperation between the DGP and the SCEPC will enhance development of the third pillar of the Comprehensive Policy (discussed in paragraph 2). Latvia commented that the desired outcome of the joint meeting must be considered in advance (e.g., joint report, areas of practical cooperation, etc.) The Norwegian Co-Chair then asked for comments on the food-for-thought paper within three weeks, stated that the Co-Chairs would write a letter to the Chair of the SCEPC inviting his committee to the meeting, and that a draft agenda for the session would be published in time for discussion at the next DGP Steering Committee meeting. ¶5. (C) The Norwegian Co-Chair invited Bulgaria to brief the group on preparations for the DGP Away Day to be held in Sofia in Mar 09. Bulgaria stated that arrival would be on 23 Mar 09, that a DGP Plenary meeting and national capabilities demonstration would be planned for 24 Mar 09, and that 25 Mar 09 would be reserved for cultural activities and the departure of delegates. They further commented that more detailed administration arrangements would be published at the DGP Steering Committee meeting in Dec 08. ¶6. (C) The U.S. Co-Chair initiated discussion on the report from the 2008 DGP Seminar. He stated that comments received from nations would be incorporated into the report and a revised version would be published under a two-week silence. Turkey and Greece asked for clarification about the purposes of the two annexes to the report, about which were open for comment, and which would be agreed under silence. After some discussion, it was agreed that Annex 1 (the executive summary) would be published under silence and eventually forwarded to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) for notation but that Annex 2 (detailed record of proceedings) would not be modified from its original version, would not go under silence, and would simply be retained as a reference for the DGP. ¶7. (C) The U.S. Co-Chair then invited the WMD Centre to brief the group on preparations for the NAC WMD Seminar scheduled for later the same day. The WMD Centre reminded delegates that the this year,s Seminar was unique in that the scenario focused on a WMD attack on a NATO nation,s territory, that other NATO committees would be more intimately involved, and that the outcomes of the event would serve to drive development of the Comprehensive Policy (discussed in paragraph 2). They then proceeded to brief the group on the sequence of events and other administrative arrangements for the event. The U.S. Co-Chair concluded by saying that he looked forward to a good Seminar with extensive discussion by the Permanent Representatives. ¶8. (C) The Norwegian Co-Chair invited the Chair of the NATO CBRN Training Working Group to present a briefing on lessons identified by the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force (CJ-CBRND-TF) during NATO Response Force rotation 10. Following this presentation, the Czech Republic commented that it had prepared a paper describing a proposal to use national and/or multi-national funding to create enough standing CBRN forces to permanently solve the on-going force generation problems that plague the CJ-CBRND-TF. They distributed the paper for the delegates, information and stated that it would be further developed by the CBRN Defence Center of Excellence. The U.S. Co-Chair concluded by inviting the Czech Republic to introduce this paper for discussion at a future DGP Steering Committee meeting when they felt it was sufficiently mature. ¶9. (C) The Norwegian Co-Chair then invited the Czech Republic to brief the group on the status of their food-for-thought paper on the transformation of CBRN defense units. The Czech Republic thanked the delegates for the comments provided thus far and stated their intention to revise the paper in cooperation with interested nations and publish a new version in time for discussion at the DGP Steering Committee meeting in Dec 08. After the floor was opened for comments from nations, France stated that the scope of this paper must be limited to capabilities alone and that the term &unit8 must be more clearly defined. ¶10. (C) The U.S. Co-Chair initiated discussion on the topic of DGP consultations with Ukraine. After giving a short history of the DGP,s efforts at CBRN defense cooperation with Ukraine and a few remarks on the way ahead, he asked the WMD Centre to brief the group on the proposed agenda for the DGP-Ukraine Workshop scheduled for Feb 09. Following this briefing, he invited nations to submit proposals on how to obtain tangible, practical results from this workshop rather than just allowing it to be a series of information briefings. Next, the U.S. Co-Chair called on the Czech Republic to provide an update on preparations for the DGP Plenary meeting scheduled to be conducted in Kyiv in May 08. The Czech Republic stated that, due to personnel rotations in the Ukrainian Delegation to NATO, planning was still in its infancy so they would prefer to delay the update until the next DGP Steering Committee meeting. The Chair then closed this topic with a reminder that interested nations would be invited to discuss support for the development of Ukraine,s CBRN defense policy in the margins of the next DGP Steering Committee meeting. ¶11. (C) The U.S. Co-Chair then invited the IMS to brief the group on the status of preparations for the International Partners Outreach Event scheduled to be held at the Belgian NBC Defence School in Namur in Apr 2009. Following this presentation, Germany stated that they have selected an officer to serve as exercise director for the event as previously agreed. ¶12. (C) The Norwegian Co-Chair asked if nations had any items to introduce as &Any Other Business.8 Latvia announced that they have agreed to serve as the DGP,s European Co-Chair during the work year 2011-2012. This news was uniformly welcomed by the group. ¶13. (U) The Co-Chairs closed the meeting by stating that they looked forward to a good NAC WMD Seminar in the afternoon and a busy work year ahead. Finally, they concluded by reminding the group that the next meeting of the DGP would occur at Steering Committee-level at NATO HQ on 29 Oct 08. REID