USING NATO TO ADDRESS PIRACY AND ENGAGE THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000365 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO EUN SUBJECT: USING NATO TO ADDRESS PIRACY AND ENGAGE THE EUROPEAN UNION Classified By: Ambassador Kurt Volker for Reasons 1.4(b) & (d) ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: Recent requests from the UN for temporary NATO naval escorts to World Food Program shipments to Somalia starting in October, and separate requests by France and the UK to the USG to provide direct military support to a planned EU anti-piracy operation starting in December, have presented us with a number of decisions we need to make. NATO should be used to conduct a near-term, limited duration mission in support of the WFP (as requested by the UN) while continuing to study a potential wider NATO role, including on how to bridge to the longer-term EU mission. In response to requests for the U.S. to directly engage with the planned ESDP anti-piracy operation and accept an EU HQ in Bahrain, we should continue to emphasize that NATO is the right venue for consultations and action involving American and European Allies, and that this case is a prime example on which to build more effective NATO-EU cooperation. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C/NF) Two issues - the WFP request for temporary NATO naval escorts and requests from some EU nations for direct support from the U.S. for the EU's planned anti-piracy mission, present us with important policy choices that should be addressed expeditiously. Decisions taken on this issue are important not only to the WFP, international trade, and Somalia, but also on how NATO and the EU cooperate. -------------- SHORT-TERM: SAYING YES TO THE WFP -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) The request from UNSYG Moon to NATO to provide naval escorts for WFP shipments from the time the current Canadian escort mission ends on October 23 until the EU assumes this mission around mid-December should be one that NATO can easily meet. Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG-2) is scheduled to sail on October 15 for a presence mission around the Horn of Africa and into the Persian Gulf. SNMG 2's mission could be altered to provide WFP escorts for the time requested. Turkey has informally told USNATO it can support this change in mission. NATO's international military staff has already circulated a draft decision sheet (with silence expiring on 8 October) to the Military Committee stating that such a change in mission is feasible. NATO MODs can then take up this issue at their meeting in Budapest on 9-10 October. ¶4. (C/NF) If NATO cannot agree to the use of SNMG-2 for a temporary escort mission, then the U.S. should consider providing its own assets (such as a Frigate) as a bridging element that can serve under a NATO flag. We could ask other Allies to join in any bridging mission. -------------- -------------- LONG-TERM: WORKING WITH THE EU AND LOOKING AT NATO's OWN ROLE -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) Looking beyond the WFP escort mission, NATO should examine how it can work together with the EU mission on our common goals, as well as with other players such as individual nations, CTF-150 and the United Nations. NATO also needs to consider its own longer term role. Staff contact between NATO, EU and other military staffs are ongoing for this purpose. ¶6. (C/NF) Outside of NATO channels, the UK and France have approached the United States, seeking direct U.S. military support to the planned ESDP anti-piracy operation. While such direct U.S. support t the EU is theoretically possible, practical military interests are served by working through NATO, where we have decades of interoperability, a robust command structure including American commanders, and a U.S. voice and veto in the North Atlantic Council. This is also in line with our standing policy that when the U.S. and European Allies are engaged together militarily, we should do so through NATO. ¶7. (C/NF) The piracy issue in particular lends itself to the Berlin Plus agreement, which provides a mechanism for the EU to draw upon NATO military assets and support for its own operations. The EU's planned piracy mission would be a purely military operation, exactly the type of mission for which Berlin Plus was negotiated. NATO should make this point clearly, and be clear that Berlin Plus is the proper mechanism for the EU to receive the type of support it is requesting bilaterally. We should also stress that NATO must be able to discuss and determine its own role without blockage from EU nations who are also members of NATO, such as France and Germany had been doing in the NATO Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council over the last two months. (France this week seems more amenable to supporting a NATO role to help the EU mission, however the UK and Germany have become more active in downplaying a NATO role.) ¶8. (C/NF) The mechanism for NATO assistance to the EU mission could be a NATO mission HQ at Bahrain, within which an EU presence could be established. This "bridging mission" would facilitate the sharing of full intelligence, Recognized Maritime Picture and other data sharing by the U.S. (and other TF-150 coalition partners) with NATO so that ultimately the EU may benefit from NATO provided data, rather than U.S.-only data. U.S. military entities (CENTCOM, NAVCENT, CFMCC CENT and CTF-150 in the case of anti-piracy operations off Somalia) should proactively pursue coordination with NATO to this end. We should also establish routine, fully transparent staff consultations between NATO and EU with reporting circulated to Allied and EU nations as agreed in the NATO-EU framework. We would also want NATO to engage in parallel consultations with the UN and CTF-150 and interested individual nations. ¶9. (C/NF) By supporting NATO bridging mission in this fashion we can take care of the short term needs of WFP and UN while developing longer term NATO support to an EU mission and laying a foundation for more effective NATO-EU cooperation in general. REID