RUSSIAN SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN: SORTING THE WHEAT

S E C R E T USNATO 000357

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN: SORTING THE WHEAT
FROM THE CHAFF

REF: A. MOSCOW 2895

B. MOSCOW 2687

Classified By: Ambassador Kurt Volker for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Russian officials have expressed a
willingness to continue cooperation with NATO for Afghanistan
(reftels) despite inconsistencies in the Russian message, but
have also said all bets on cooperation are off if Georgia is
offered NATO membership. Russian Ambassador to NATO Rogozin
has focused on the land transit arrangement with NATO in his
public comments -- an agreement, which is of only symbolic
value without similar agreements with both Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan. Rogozin, however, thus far has ignored NATO's
(as well as the United States') growing reliance on Russian
sources for 25 percent of the fuel for ISAF and 50 percent
for the critical RC South. ISAF has been working to
establish a 50/50 split for fuel delivery between Pakistan
and Russia to prevent over-reliance on Pakistan as the only
source. It is important to maintain the fuel arrangements
from Russian sources and any supporting projects, including
logistics inter-operability work in the NATO-Russia Council,
to reduce our total dependence on Pakistan. In addition to
ISAF-wide arrangements, Allies have many bilateral logistical
arrangements with Russia; many Allies, including Germany,
routinely transit Russian air space to supply their forces.
Moreover, sixteen ISAF contributors have a contract a Russian
firm in a NATO consortium for airlift to supply their forces
in Afghanistan. Fuel sourcing and airlift are done
indirectly through private Russian companies -- thus,
limiting direct GOR control. We also should consider
challenging Moscow to fund Afghan development and
infrastructure needs to test the depth of feeling in its
assertions of mutual interest in the international
community's interest with Kabul. Lastly, donations and
deployment of Warsaw Pact equipment from new Allies are
dependent on Russian licensing. End Summary.

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RUSSIA SEES AFGHANISTAN IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST
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2. (S/NF) In an August 25 interview, Zamir Kabulov, the
Russian Ambassador to Afghanistan, said the deal with NATO on
transit is no longer valid after Russia suspended military
cooperation with NATO. Kabulov's statement was immediately
contradicted by Dmitriy Rogozin, the Russian Ambassador to
NATO. Rogozin identified Afghanistan as an area in
NATO-Russia cooperation that affects Russian highest national
interest, but added the caveat "for now." Reporting from
Embassy Moscow (reftels) and recent statements by Russia's
Foreign Minister Lavrov contending that "Afghanistan is the
sphere where our interests coincide and where we must
continue to cooperate closely" indicate that Rogozin has won
this internal Russian policy debate. However, Rogozin said
more recently that offering Georgia membership to NATO would
put Russian cooperation for Afghanistan in doubt. In his
public comments, Rogozin and other Russian officials focus on
the land transit arrangement (and to a lesser extent the air
transit) with NATO and tend to ignore the more critical
aspects of Russian logistical support to ISAF and OEF, namely
fuel.

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TWO LESS THAN STABLE SOURCES ARE BETTER THAN ONE
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3. (S/NF) In 2005, ISAF transshipped 100 percent through
Pakistan. Since then, ISAF has been working to establish a
50/50 split for sources of fuel between Pakistan and Russia
to prevent over-reliance on Pakistan as a single source. By
June 2008, Russia sourced roughly 25 percent of ISAF fuel
overall and 50 percent for RC South. As of September 1,
2008, the U.S. sources 62 percent of its fuel for Bagram Air
Field and 100% for the Manas Air Base from Russia. Supreme
Site Services ("Supreme"),a company based in Dubai, UAE,
supplies the majority of fuel for ISAF, both through Pakistan
and from Russia, via Turkmenistan. Supreme buys the Russian
source fuel through a contract with BP and moves it via

convoy through Kabul or Herat to Kandahar. Supreme is
establishing a commercial fuel reserve near Kabul and
Mazur-e-Sharif, but this is only intended to handle a
temporary (1-2 weeks) loss of one supply and not for a
complete loss of a petroleum source. SHAPE views this as one
commercial entity doing business with another. Since the
ISAF contract is not directly with a Russian company but with
the intermediary, the Russian government has less direct
control over the transaction. This arrangement is in the
Russian interest since Russian companies are profiting and
Russia ostensibly seeks to be viewed as a reliable fuel
supplier.

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AIR TRANSIT AND LIFT - ALSO IMPORTANT
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4. (S/NF) Many Allies transit Russian air space to supply
their forces in Afghanistan. For example, Germany transits
Russian air space to supply its base in Termez, Uzbekistan to
re-supply its forces in RC North. The German mission to NATO
told us that this is so important that the German Embassy in
Moscow has one officer employed full-time to coordinate
overflight clearances. Some Allies, including Norway,
Germany, and France, transit Russian air space for personnel
flights.


5. (S/NF) Sixteen ISAF contributing countries use Russian and
Ukrainian owned aircraft to meet shortfalls in European
strategic airlift capabilities. In consortium through the
Strategic Airlift Interim Solutions (SALIS) program, NATO
countries signed a contract in 2006 with Ruslan SALIS, a
subsidiary of the Russian Company Volga-Dnepr. The countries
have committed to using the aircraft for a minimum of 2000
flying hours per year. Two AN-124-100 aircraft are on a
full-time charter and are drawn from the Russian company,
Volga-Dnepr, and the Ukrainian company, ADB.

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LAND TRANSIT - UNREALIZED POTENTIAL
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6. (S/NF) At the Bucharest Summit, Russia agreed to
arrangements for ISAF to ship non-lethal supplies through
Russia, but so far NATO cannot take advantage of the
agreement without similar arrangements from both Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan. The NATO International Staff (IS) is
negotiating transit agreements with these countries. If all
the pieces fall into place, the transit arrangement with
Russia would help NATO to reduce its dependence on Pakistan.
The IS estimates that shipping by land through Russia could
reduce shipping costs from Europe by up to 90 percent. The
IS reported that negotiations with Kazakhstan may be near
completion (ratification by its parliament is another story),
while the Uzbek negotiations are in a preliminary stage but
is likely to bear fruit sooner.

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WARSAW PACT EQUIPMENT
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7. (S/NF) Efforts to overhaul former Warsaw Pact equipment
donated to Afghanistan from new NATO Allies will be dependent
in large measure on both Russia continuing to grant original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) licenses to nations (including
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine),and
receipt of sufficient repair parts from Russia to complete
the overhaul of existing airframes. To date, Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary have offered to deploy MI-24P
attack and MI-17 transport helicopters to Afghanistan once
they are modernized and obtain the requisite spare parts for
such a deployment.


8. (S/NF) Allied arms provision to Afghanistan of
Russian-designed equipment is frustrating to Moscow because
it displaces their efforts to gain leverage on Kabul by doing
so directly. We could find a middle ground with Moscow and
scratch an Afghan itch if we worked a Kabul-Moscow-CSTC-A
deal for the Russian provision of aircraft for Kabul's

desired airwing.

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COMMENT - LET SLEEPING DOGS LIE
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8. (S/NF) Fuel sourcing from Russia to both ISAF and OEF is
by far the most important Russian support for the mission in
Afghanistan. It would be inadvisable to redirect fuel
sourcing entirely back through Pakistan for obvious reasons.
Russia has indicated that it will continue to support NATO in
Afghanistan, and at least for now, Russia focuses in its
public comments on land transit (and to a lesser extent air
transit),while fuel sourcing remains under the radar. We
should let on-going commercial arrangements with Russian
sources continue, while refraining from highlighting this
issue in political discussions with Russia. At NATO, this
includes supporting the continued work of the NATO-Russia
Council Logistics Working Group which contributes to
Russia-NATO fuel inter-operability. End Comment.
VOLKER