UNAMA HEAD KAI EIDE DISTANCES HIMSELF FROM NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000353 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/30/2018 TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PREL AF SUBJECT: UNAMA HEAD KAI EIDE DISTANCES HIMSELF FROM NATO DURING BRIEF TO PERMREPS, 29 SEPTEMBER Classified By: AMBASSADOR KURT VOLKER. REASONS: 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: During a September 29 briefing to NATO Perm Reps, UN Special Representative for Afghanistan Kai Eide painted a gloomy picture of the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, which he said was detracting international attention away from development agenda. He criticized nations for focusing development aid on "their" provinces and urged greater focus on building police, and provincial governments. Eide also stressed the differences between the UN and ISAF and indicated that he wanted to keep his distance from ISAF, saying repeatedly that he did not see it as part of his job to coordinate between the UN and NATO. He rejected the idea of joint investigations into civilian casualty incidents, saying it would hurt the UN's "impartiality", indicated he did not want to use the new media center that is also used by ISAF, and stressed the importance of civilian agencies like the UN and NGOs not being confused in Afghan eyes with the military. When pressed by the U.S. and other Perm Reps at an informal lunch on the necessity of his fulfilling the coordination role as part of the comprehensive approach necessary in Afghanistan, Eide stuck to his earlier positions on the importance of maintaining UN impartiality. END SUMMARY. NOT A ROSY PICTURE ¶2. (C) Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Kai Eide met informally with NATO PermReps on September 29 at NATO headquarters. In his briefing, Eide said that at the time of the June 12 Paris Donor's Conference the situation in Afghanistan seemed to be "sliding a little," but that now, according to most indicators, it is "sliding a lot." He noted that the security situation in the South and East has for a long time been difficult, but that now the instability has spread to areas around Kabul and is affecting the functioning of international organizations (IOs). He said he senses more pessimism and resignation in Kabul, particularly due to the increase in the number of serious attacks such as the Serena Hotel bombing and Afghan Independence Day parade attack. Additionally, the increase in attacks against food aid convoys and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs),and the fact that the UN itself is no longer spared from attacks )- as evidenced by the killing of three UN doctors in south Afghanistan and recent credible threats to UN offices -- make it difficult to argue security has improved. ¶3. (C) Eide relayed that the feeling of uneasiness in Kabul is sapping the momentum produced by the Paris conference, and everyone is struggling to "get back on the Paris track." He stated that the next six months are critical to gain initiative and demonstrate success in order to be in a better situation prior to the next fighting season in the Spring. He said institution building should take priority and that President Karzai had some tough decisions to make in this area. He also commented that the need for further work to fight corruption was obvious. ¶4. (C) Regarding security forces and Afghan National Army (ANA) expansion, Eide rhetorically asked, "How many international troops do we need?" He stated that focus should be concentrated on the police since they &hold8 territory and are critical to providing the security necessary for development. He said the police are in a "miserable state," however, and the international community and, more importantly, the Afghans need to figure out what they really want in their police force. ¶5. (C) Eide suggested that President Karzai needs to provide more support to the Provincial governments, including providing guidance as well as political and monetary support. Eide felt this was the best way to foster economic growth, which he noted was greatly needed. ¶6. (C) Eide discussed coordination of aid and how to gain more effectiveness in this area. He stressed the need to define criteria and measurements to support the implementation of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). He chastised nations for spending too much money in "their provinces" which leads to the ANDS being USNATO 00000353 002 OF 003 "un-implementable." Although he understood the political need for nations to support provinces where they had troops, he argued for a more "nationwide perspective" and allocation of resources. ¶7. (C) Turning to civil-military coordination, Eide asked rhetorically, "What does it mean?" He noted the "shape, clear, hold, build" military strategy, but then pointed out that there was no one on the civilian side to accomplish the "hold." He urged a look at the totality of resources and where to use those resources to the best effect. He suggested more investment in the "swing provinces" and less in areas where significant resources are accomplishing little progress. He also noted that civ-mil coordination has not been easy recently due to the issue of civilian casualties. He highlighted the different mandates of ISAF and UNAMA, and argued UNAMA was the most important defender of human rights in Afghanistan. He added that his task was to bring Afghanistan and the international community together. He also stated that he was ready to "move on" from the debate over the Shindand civilian casualty incident and develop a method to coordinate a quick response to civilian casualty events. He also highlighted the different viewpoints of UNAMA and ISAF in relation to the recent "Peace Day." ISAF had strongly criticized the Taliban for not living up to their assurances to refrain from attacks while UNAMA's view, in contrast, was that the day was a resounding success due to the distribution of over a million vaccinations on that day. QUESTIONS LEAD TO DISAPPOINTING ANSWERS ¶8. (C) NATO PermReps raised many questions for SRSG Eide concentrating on civilian casualties, the need for a "civil surge", regional/border issues, UNAMA coordination with other actors, counter-narcotics, progress on governance, level of support from the UN, political reconciliation, and suggestions to increase effectiveness in Afghanistan. ¶9. (C) Eide stressed that there was no need for new funding mechanisms to affect the "nationwide" approach to development he had advocated because nations "had their commitments from the Paris conference and they should live by them." He opined that there could be no success in Afghanistan if nations continue to work individually in provinces, and suggested that this approach was not supportive of the ANDS. ¶10. (C) Eide then moved on to civilian casualties, where he stressed the need for the international community and the Afghan authorities to jointly form a quick reaction to any future events. He stressed that UNAMA could not coordinate such a response, but that each entity should make the others aware of what they saw, correct mistakes, and inform each other of their findings. He emphatically rejected the idea of joint investigations, which he feels would compromise the UN's impartiality and would cause the human rights community to "riot." He relayed that he meets regularly with COMISAF but it has been difficult in the past weeks. He stated that Afghanistan needs a strong international military presence, but one that is popular in the communities. He said incidents such as the Shindand civilian casualty incident, house searches, detention policies, and day-to-day inconveniences created by the presence of international forces were eroding ISAF's support. He said COMISAF's statements after the Shindand incident had been unnecessary and unhelpful. ¶11. (C) Eide stated that a military surge would not help, and that the international community should focus more on political development. Responding to a question on a UN surge, Eide expressed his dismay with the "mind-boggling" bureaucracy at the UN, which he said is both frustrating and draining him. He said these bureaucratic obstacles had made it impossible to bring all the humanitarian players together. He noted the success of a UN office in Ghazni and said he wants to increase the nine current UN provincial offices by six in the future. He relayed that the central and northern provinces provided more chance for success than does the south, due to the security situation. In reference to rule of law, Eide noted the need to support Karzai's anti-corruption plan, and emphasized that if Karzai makes the appropriate ministerial changes, it would show the Afghan leader's commitment to fight corruption. USNATO 00000353 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) On development, Eide said it would take time to integrate private investment, but that this process was beginning. He noted the tender for two natural gas fields in the north as potentially huge projects. In regard to regional relationships, Eide stated Pakistan is very sensitive regarding its relationship with Afghanistan, but has asked for some contact with Eide's office. Interestingly, he stated that the UN's best contacts are with Tehran, because they provide priorities for their activities. Regarding reconciliation, Eide said the issue was not forgotten, but is an issue that does not lend itself to public conversation. He noted that there may still be Pakistani intelligence agency spoilers, but the agreement by the Quetta Shura to respect Peace Day showed the potential of future talks. ISAF: KEEP YOUR DISTANCE ¶13. (C) Notably, Eide expressed a desire to distance himself from ISAF and several other organizations. On the recently opened Kabul Media Operations Center, he stated he did not want to be bound to use this facility and said he will continue to have weekly press meetings elsewhere. He stressed that this should not be "THE press center" in Afghanistan. Additionally, Eide completely dodged all questions related to counter-narcotics. When asked about the potential to expand cooperation, such as recent ISAF assistance to a World Food Program convoy, Eide said he would only consider it where absolutely necessary. In addition, he specified that the UN must try to "keep its distance when it can." Finally, he noted the recent signing of the UN-NATO declaration does not make a difference to him on the ground. EIDE: IT'S NOT FOR ME TO COORDINATE NATO AND THE UN ¶14. (C) During a lunch discussion with Perm Reps that followed, Ambassador Volker along with Canadian PermRep McRae and Dutch PermRep Schaper stressed to Eide that NATO Heads of State had agreed at that last Summit in Budapest to pursue a Comprehensive Approach that coordinated the efforts of all international organizations in Afghanistan. UN Secretary-General Ban had attended that summit and UNAMA had a key role to play in making the Comprehensive Approach work. The PermReps stressed that it was not constructive for Eide to say he needed to keep his distance from ISAF or that he would not coordinate between NATO and the UN, since that was an essential part of the approach agreed by the world leaders. Eide defended his earlier statements and said it was important that civilian agencies in Afghanistan not be confused with the military. Seen from UN HQ in New York, NATO was a "party" in the fighting in Afghanistan and UNAMA needed to maintain its "neutrality." ¶15. (C) COMMENT: SRSG Eide's briefing was disappointing, not merely for its dour outlook on the situation in Afghanistan, but also for Eide,s contention that he needed to keep his distance from ISAF and his defense of keeping civilian and military efforts separate. While he blamed UN HQ in New York for the attitude that NATO was another "party" to the conflict in Afghanistan rather than an integral part of the international community effort, he echoed the theme himself and has adopted courses of action based on this view, such as refusing to be closely associated with ISAF. Eide's unwillingness to work with ISAF as a fellow UN-mandated partner may have significant impact on the ability of the international community to provide comprehensive support to the government of Afghanistan. ¶16. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Eide's upcoming visit to Washington provides an important opportunity to underline to Eide the importance of UNAMA's coordination role. We should also urge him to step up to this role and work as closely as possible with ISAF, the Afghan government, and international partners. He needs to be a forceful advocate of a single, comprehensive approach where civilian and military efforts are closely coordinated and seen as serving the same objectives. He can also play a key role in encouraging President Karzai to show more visible ownership and leadership in the eyes of the Afghan people and the international community. END COMMENT. VOLKER