SEPTEMBER 11, 2008 HLTF: ALLIES GRAPPLE WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 USNATO 000336 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018 TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE NATO RS OSCE SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 11, 2008 HLTF: ALLIES GRAPPLE WITH TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF CFE NEXT STEPS REF: (A) STATE 96113 (HLTF GUIDANCE) (B) RIGA 560 (BALTICS CONSULTATIONS 8-9 SEP 08) Classified By: A/DCM W. Scott Reid for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. At the September 11 NATO High Level Task Force (HLTF) and related meetings Allies discussed potential next steps on CFE in the context of Russian actions in Georgia and Russias continued "suspension" of CFE, based largely on the options advanced by the U.S. (ref a). There was general agreement on the need for a unified, measured CFE response that was "not business as usual," and which visibly demonstrated NATOs continued solidarity. All Allies: -- Agreed that maintaining NATO unity on CFE, and a unified NATO message must remain our top priority in both Brussels and Vienna. -- Agreed that, after Georgia, we should not do "business as usual" with Russia, but there were varied interpretations of what this means with respect to CFE. -- Underscored the continuing importance of maintaining conventional arms control within the existing European security architecture, and identified CFE as not only the best regime to serve that purpose, but also "irreplaceable" under current conditions. -- Agreed on the need to carefully consider all the pros and cons of any step - especially as regards timing. -- Understood that under the current circumstances in Georgia, A/S Fried cannot resume meetings with DFM Antonov on a CFE package; many expressed hope that this effort would be resumed as soon as possible. -- Considered it too early for a CFE Extraordinary Conference or for consideration of NATO suspension of fulfillment of Treaty provisions vis a vis Russia. ¶2. (C) In the broader discussion of a CFE response to Russia, three main groups emerged: -- Germany (joined in principle by Belgium, Greece and Italy) believes that CFE must be insulated from the troubles in Georgia. The Germans astonished many by insisting that Russian actions in Georgia did not violate CFE and the principles that underpin it, and that in fact the lesson of those events is the need for more extensive and more effective arms control. -- A broad middle group (France, Spain, Portugal, Poland, and Hungary with Turkey, Norway, and The Netherlands somewhat more hesitant) believes that Russias actions in Georgia violated the core principles of the CFE Treaty and that NATO should respond, but share Frances desire to assess how events play out in Georgia by mid-October. Turkey and Norway have high concern regarding any step that might diminish NATOs chances of saving the CFE Treaty or provide Russia with a pretext for killing CFE. -- The third group (U.S., UK, Canada, Romania, and Bulgaria) believes that Russias actions in Georgia violated core principles of CFE, and that NATO needs to respond. This group primarily differs from the cautionary group above primarily in readiness to consider a wider range of response actions more quickly. ¶3. (C) Allies will further address U.S. proposals and identify priorities at a near-term HLTF meeting in late September/early October, and then turn to longer term proposals at the Romanian-hosted day-long HLTF seminar later in October. END SUMMARY. CONTACTS and BILATERALS. ¶4. (C) The International Staff (IS) used the Head of Delegation lunch prior to the HLTF to discuss contacts and bilaterals specific to CFE (first agenda item for the HLTF) since the June 24 HLTF meeting. USNATO 00000336 002 OF 007 -- The IS (Paksoy) reviewed the efforts of NATO vis--vis Georgia since early August and reported that Georgia had indicated it would not be in a position to provide its annual CFE data in December. -- U.S. HLTF Rep State/VCI DAS Karin L. Look reported per reftel on the Fried-Antonov bilateral CFE meeting in July, which she noted was shaped in part by Allies suggestions for invigorating the CFE dialogue. She noted that events in Georgia significantly changed the context for CFE discussions: Russias actions were inconsistent with the core principles upon which the CFE Treaty is built - including the obligation to refrain "from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State." Look agreed with the IS Chair (Simmons) that the August 19 NAC Statement in which Allies agreed not to pursue business as usual and to signal displeasure with Russian tactics applies in the CFE context. She emphasized the criticality of Alliance unity and the need to not continue with business as usual with Russia as long as the ceasefire is not fully implemented. Look noted that A/S Fried would postpone further meetings with Antonov until the ceasefire had been fully implemented and Russia had taken steps to ease tensions in Georgia. ¶5. (C) THE WAY AHEAD. Allied views for managing CFE over the next months varied. Some indicated their governments are still assessing the implications of Russias behavior in Georgia and on CFE. Many cited CFE as an "irreplaceable" key element of European security architecture. But the mantra, as emphasized by the U.S. and France at the outset, was the need for measured steps and Alliance unity. Most agreed NATO should calibrate its actions on CFE in a way that advances both our message to Russia on Georgia, and our long term goals for CFE and the Istanbul commitments, but many need more time to deliberate over the specific steps and especially the timing. All understood the necessity to postpone the Fried-Antonov meetings until Russia complies with the cease fire agreement and takes actions to ease tensions in Georgia. With the exception of the four Allies not party to CFE (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia), plus Iceland (sending a representative from Reykjavik for the first time),Slovakia and Denmark, all Allies spoke in some detail during the course of the meeting. Allies generally fell into three groups. -------------- Group 1 - Insulate CFE from Events in Georgia -------------- ¶6. (C) With Germany in the lead, supported by Belgium, Greece and Italy, this small group is keen on insulating CFE from events in Georgia and advocates a mild response to Russia that does not significantly lessen opportunities for a continuing dialogue, which should include engagement on a regular basis in both the NRC/ACE and the JCG. Greece expressed concern that the Georgia crisis could undermine arms control while Italy called for no dramatic decisions that would "tie Allies hands." -- Germany (Biontino),by far the most vocal of the group, argued that Russian actions in Georgia: 1) bear no relationship to CFE; that 2) NATO should confine its response to Russia regarding activities in Georgia to issues other than arms control; and 3) that what we need is more extensive and more effective arms control. Biontino opined that CFE was a key strategic interest for Berlin, whereas the conflict in Georgia was only a "regional issue." He stated that Russias actions are a violation of international law, but not CFE, and lessons learned from the Russia-Georgia conflict will likely lead to the conclusion that we need more effective arms control to prevent such events in the future. In the course of the HLTF discussion it became evident that Germany is isolated in its interpretation of CFEs relationship to events in Georgia. -------------- Group 2 - Proceed with Caution -------------- ¶7. (C) This largest group of Allies (France, Turkey, USNATO 00000336 003 OF 007 Norway, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands, Poland, and Hungary) believes that Russias actions in Georgia violated the core principles of the CFE Treaty and that NATO should respond in ways that show it is not business as usual. But they agree strongly with France on the need to first assess how events play out in Georgia by mid-October based on timelines of the Sarkozy-Medvedev September 8 agreement. This group is keen on "measured steps," such as reducing the frequency of JCG meetings immediately, stressing the JCG schedule should be driven by substance which is currently lacking. Most agreed that it would be inappropriate to try to have a discussion of the parallel actions package in current circumstances and that it would be "bizarre" to pursue the Medvedev European Security proposal. There was no support for engagement on Russian CSBMs. Most can agree with the idea and general substance of the U.S.-proposed NATO statement on postponing discussions on the parallel actions package until the situation in Georgia has improved, but they are worried about the timing of a statement and its possible impact. The French, emphatically, pleaded not to consider a statement until after October 15. Most Allies in this group believe we need to see how events have played out in Georgia by mid-October and at that point they will be open to consideration of a statement. -- A subset of this group - Turkey and Norway, plus the Netherlands - made clear in the HLTF meeting and in bilaterals that they consider CFE to be a critical element of their security (or Europes) and do not want NATO to take any actions which could place the Treaty in still further peril. They are much more hesitant than others regarding a NATO statement, and are likely to oppose it even in October. -------------- Group 3 - No Business as Usual -------------- ¶8. (C) The third group (U.S., UK, Canada, Romania, Bulgaria - and the Czech Republic at the extreme) believes that in the August 19th NAC Statement Allies agreed that it would not be business as usual with Russia, and that this includes CFE. For these governments it is clear that Russia violated core principles of CFE, and that we need to take thoughtful steps in response. Patience is not enough. This group primarily differs from the "cautionary" group in its readiness to consider a wider range of response actions more quickly, but at the same time, expressed willingness to consider carefully the timing concerns advanced by France and others in developing a unified response. The Baltic states, although they did not speak at the HLTF, expressed views at Riga (Ref B) that clearly fell into this third group. -- The U.S. (Look) and the UK (Ford),as well as the IS and France (Raharinaivo),were clear that the NACs August 19 "no business as usual" applies to CFE and requires development of a coherent, unified response. Canada (Arpin) noted the U.S. proposals were in line with thinking in Ottawa and reinforced the need for Allies to act (to include public statements) and not ignore events in Georgia. -- The Czech Republic, open to immediate action, appeared to be uniquely in a group 3A, arguing that the CFE Treaty is all but lost, and that NATO should start preparing for a world without CFE. -------------- Key Issues -------------- ¶9. (C) Impact of Russia-Georgia Conflict on CFE: During discussions, Germany (Biontino) repeatedly argued that Russia did not violate CFE when it attacked Georgia. This did not garner open support, but the Geman Rep pressed this theme and offered to develo a paper on "lessons learned" from the conflict,which would highlight areas where "more arms conrol" might have been useful (since in the German view, current CFE had been irrelevant). Biontino sggested this could be a topic for discussion at he October HLTF seminar in Bucharest, and advancd the idea that the agenda should include a "revew" of the parallel actions package since the parts related to Georgia may need "adjustment." -- Advocates of the contrary view hit hard. The Netherlands (Kleinjan) stressed that both the spirit and the preamble of CFE were violated by Russias actions in Georgia. Turkey (Gun) contended that the conflict proved the urgent need for retaining a legally binding CFE Treaty, and the importance of the flank limits. The UK (Ford) provided the best sound bite of the day: "Russia drove a squad of T-72 tanks right through the preamble of the CFE Treaty, and if they decide to permanently station heavy forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, they will be in violation of Article IV para 5, which says that no state party will station conventional military forces on the territory of another state party without that state partys consent. And we look forward to debating whether South Ossetia and Abkhazia are still part of the territory of Georgia, because we do not agree with the Russian analysis on that point." ¶10. (C) Concerning the response options developed by the U.S. and set out as per reftel, Allies engaged at length, if on a preliminary basis: ¶A. Use the CFE Joint Consultative Group (JCG) to condemn Russian actions in Georgia and suspension of CFE, seek reduction in frequency of JCG meetings. -- Most Allies, except for Germany (Biontino),Greece (Daskarolis) and Belgium (De Witte) were open to reducing the frequency of meetings as long as the JCG track was kept open and the meetings were substance-driven. Greece noted there were another 7 States Parties to include Georgia who may prefer to keep this channel open. Greece suggested that, rather than actively limiting meetings, Allies could find "technical reasons" to cancel meetings, intentionally have meetings lasting 5-minutes, or not engage following Russian interventions. ¶B. Postpone Fried-Antonov discussions, to include possible NATO announcement regarding that postponement, until Russia has fully implemented the ceasefire agreement and taken steps to ease tensions in Georgia. -- Postpone discussions: Allies generally understood that under the current circumstances in Georgia, A/S Fried cannot resume meetings with DFM Antonov on a CFE package, although many expressed hope that this dialogue would be resumed as soon as possible. Allies response to the U.S. position on this point was probably mitigated by stress that Look and team laid on the idea that Fried was postponing the discussion in light of current circumstances that made further discussion impractical, not that we were taking the parallel actions package off the table or refusing to engage on CFE indefinitely. -- NATO statement on postponement: France (Raharinaivo) and others were supportive of a NATO statement, but hesitant about the timing, preferring to return to this after mid-October when all should be better positioned to judge the status of Russias compliance with the cease fire agreement. Turkey (Gun) argued in a private bilateral session and in the full HLTF that the August 19 NAC statement had set the right tone and did not need further elaboration. The Turks do not want to undermine prospects for a CFE resolution. (Comment: it is not clear that Turkeys position on this point will change after mid-October; there is no prospect of Turkish agreement to a NATO statement prior to that point. End comment.) -- Germany, Belgium, Greece, and Italy expressed reservations about the usefulness of a statement, with Germany suggesting that these were U.S.-Russia, not NATO discussions. Look countered that it had been clearly understood that the U.S. was negotiating on behalf of all Allies, and she hoped Allies were not distancing themselves from this effort. ¶C. Agree that NATO Allies will not engage on any new European Security Treaty proposals from Russia or engage on Russian proposals for new arms control measures (in the Vienna Document context). -- This proposal met broad support from those that commented on it, across all three groups identified above. Most indicated they had no interest in engaging with Russia on any new European Security Treaty proposals considering Russia was not abiding by existing agreements. Moreover, the onus was on Russia to clarify its position. Germany offered that it may be useful to have new CSBMs regarding Georgia, but that appeared to have no resonance with others. ¶D. Agree to consider convening a CFE Extraordinary Conference to condemn Russian actions in Georgia as inconsistent with the CFE Treaty. -- The consensus was that that Allies should not seek to hold an Extraordinary Conference without clear objectives, making sure that the substance and timing would serve Allied, purposes, not simply facilitate Russian withdrawal from the Treaty. The general view was that an Extraordinary Conference would (as the Netherlands put it) be a one-time "make or break" event that in current circumstances would more likely mark the end of the CFE Treaty rather than serve as a tool that would lead to a solution or way out of the impasse. France (echoed by NL, NO, and HU) called it a "one shot gun," Italy noted it would "put CFE in its grave," and Luxembourg and Portugal stated it would be the "end of CFE" while the UK and Canada noted it would be the moment to declare Russia in material breach of CFE. ¶E. Consider limiting Allied fulfillment of CFEs information and verification provisions to exclude exchanges with Russia at a future time, until Russia has fully implemented the ceasefire agreement and taken steps to ease tensions in Georgia. -- Across the board, Allies were not prepared to address this issue yet, and those that did indicated it was too early to consider suspension. Germany noted Allies took the high ground because they value the regime and would find it difficult to be the ones to end it - Russia should. Both the UK and Canada emphasized that, at present, there is a legal basis for declaring material breach which would enable imposing counter-measures, but also acknowledged that the timing for this may not yet be ripe. (Comment: as a legal matter, the U.S. views "countermeasures" as a separate available option that is distinct from a suspension of various CFE provisions such as the data exchange and notification requirements. But in Alliance discussions the term "countermeasures" was used generally, and not strictly in a legal manner. End comment.) Romania suggested monitoring how the current situation evolves and returning to this at a later date. The IS concluded it would be among the longer term options to be discussed in Bucharest. ¶11. (C) A Unified NATO Position on CFE. The IS Chairs (Simmons) summary of discussion rightly stressed the importance all speakers attached to maintaining a unified NATO position on CFE. This was the Alliances main strength in dealing with Russia; it was critical to maintain in Brussels and in Vienna. Other key points: CFE remains an important element of the European security structure, but the CFE context has changed as a result of Russias behavior. Allies need to seriously consider the implications for Istanbul commitments (in the context of the Gudauta base in Georgia and regarding Moldova),Open Skies and CSBMs as well. Simmons noted the minimum mandate from the NAC was that NATO should not engage in business as usual. He said that this means, for the short term that allies should 1) JCG: modify the pace of meetings and possibly develop a joint statement for Vienna; 2) Parallel Actions Package: remains the NATO position, but under current circumstances discussions cannot be continued although there is not yet consensus on a NATO statement to that effect due to the timing issue; 3) CSBMs and Medvedev proposal: Allies should avoid any further discussion of either and the burden lies on Russia to provide more details; and in the longer term 4) Extraordinary Conference: Allies would need to clearly define goals of such an event and address the question of material breach. ¶12. (SBU) NEXT MEETINGS. It was agreed to schedule another HLTF in late September/early October, and to slip the Romanian-hosted seminar until after October 15. At this time, in accordance with the September 8 Sarkozy-Medvedev Agreement, all Russian forces should have withdrawn to their August 6 pre-hostility positions in Georgia, international observation mechanisms to include at least 200 EU observers should be in place, and international discussions will have begun in Geneva. ¶13. (C) BILATERAL MEETINGS. Prior to the HLTF, U.S. Rep Look, EUR/RPM deputy director Laurendeau and the delegation conducted bilateral meetings with Romania, the Netherlands, Turkey, and Norway. En route to the HLTF on September 8-9, the U.S. delegation met with Baltic counterparts in Riga (Ref B). -- Romania: The Romanian rep (Micula) discussed the current situation and how the proposed HLTF meeting in Romania could be best timed to further Allied coordination. Micula noted the paper Romania had advanced on the consequences of the conflict in Georgia and emphasized that Russia was "challenging" Allies on a broader front as evidenced by Russias recent violations of the Open Skies Treaty. The sides agreed it would be advantageous to push the date of the Bucharest meeting past mid-October and shape the agenda to focus on a NATO CFE response and to prepare for upcoming Ministerials. -- Netherlands: Dutch hesitations about any step that could further imperil CFE were the hallmark of their reaction to U.S. ideas, particularly the notion of an Extraordinary Conference. But the Dutch appear to believe firmly that CFE - or its underlying principles - has been violated, and as depositary, they take that seriously. They welcomed the idea that A/S Fried was postponing his meetings with Antonov, but was not taking the parallel actions package off the table. -- Turkey: Turkish rep Gun agreed that NATO needed to respond to Russian actions, but argued that the August 19 statement had done the job. He pleaded that the U.S. not advance its idea of a NATO statement on postponing discussions on the parallel actions package. He stressed that Oct 15 would serve as a "trigger" for both serious decisions and the HLTF seminar in Bucharest. His main message was straightforward: CFE must be kept intact and NATO should take no action which might provide Russia with a pretext to "kill" the CFE Treaty with its legally binding flank regime, which in Turkeys opinion was the Russian goal. -- Norway: The Norwegian rep was clear about the linkage between CFE and Georgia. Norway shares the U.S. view of the need to be clear in a response and to ensure any response is aimed at positively influencing Russia. Norway was receptive to minimizing JCG meetings without "breaking" that channel of communication and not engaging in any new CSBM discussions, but concerned that an Extraordinary Conference without a clear objective could be counterproductive and that any form of "suspension" on the part of the Allies could lead to the loss of the Treaty. ¶14. (C) Meeting with France, Germany, UK, and U.S (QUAD): During the September 10 meeting with the Quad reps, Germany, France and the UK made many of the same points that they made in the main meeting. -- Germany (Biontino) made clear that Germany considers CFE, a "strategic" issue, completely separate from events in Georgia, which he characterized as a "regional" issue. Biontino asserted that Russia violated international law, a principle that is not/not a matter of CFE but simply reflected in it. Despite prodding by the U.S. (Look) and the UK (Ford) as to how Germany could possibly claim Russias actions did not violate the principles enshrined in CFE, Biontino insisted the HLTF reps could not go beyond the August 19 NAC statement. Germany does not want to use CFE as an instrument to express the Alliances displeasure with Russia, and Biontino gave no support to any option for doing so, lest the result be the demise of CFE due to Georgia. Biontino also asserted that CFE without Russia was still CFE and would apply in a regional context. Germany proposed developing a "lessons learned" paper for Allies that will consider better arms control measures as a response to events in Georgia which could be discussed at the October HLTF seminar in Bucharest. -- Both France (Jacques Raharinaivo, Camille Grands replacement) and the UK (Ford) indicated they are in the midst of an assessment in capitals as to what CFE course to take post-Georgia (the UK in the context of a broader assessment of Russo-UK relations). Ford claimed it is becoming increasingly "impossible" to talk of saving a/CFE in London and be taken seriously. The UK found the menu of options presented by the U.S. "appealing" and was willing to venture that a NATO statement on pausing the dialogue on the parallel action package might be a good idea, although hard to agree. Their bottom line - agree nothing that would paint us into a corner and ultimately give Russia what it wants. Ford also suggested reviewing a list of options available to Russia such as access to Verity and NATO courses as additional tactical measures for consideration. U.S. Rep Look indicated interest in taking a look at such tactical measures. -- France (Raharinaivo) remarked the key was to account for our own security interests especially with regard to any further spreading of instability to Eastern Europe or within the Caucasus. France was generally cautious on counter-action, although Raharinaivo did not take the extreme German view that there should be no connection between Georgia and CFE. He was vague on specifics, but willing to say "no business as usual" and consider reducing JCG meetings. France gave an "on the one hand, on the other hand" analysis of the possibility of the Alliance halting its data submission to Russia and came down on the side of caution. ¶15. (C) Meeting on the margins with IS: Following the HLTF, U.S. del member Peter Perenyi, OSD, met with IS member Mike Miggins (at Miggins request) who relayed several contacts during which Russian representatives (to include Ambassador Rogozin in a September 5 meeting with Ambassador Erdman) had listed areas where Russia wished to continue security cooperation with NATO, namely Afghanistan, anti-terrorism, non-proliferation, nuclear issues, and arms control. One contact suggested that a cooling off period was required and that conversations on these issues could be continued in low-profile contacts. In the same vein, Miggins recounted an earlier June meeting which included a conversation about arms control/CFE, with LTG Buzhinskiy, who covers international relations and arms control in the CHODs office. Buzhinskiy stated that Russia did want a legally binding security architecture and that despite much opposition in the MOD, those favoring arms control were in the majority. REID