AFGHAN MOD WARDAK PUSHES ANA EXPANSION AT NAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000320 NOFORN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2018 TAGS: MARR NATO PGOV PREL SNAR AF UN SUBJECT: AFGHAN MOD WARDAK PUSHES ANA EXPANSION AT NAC REF: USNATO 00313 Classified By: A/DCM W. S. REID III For Reasons 1.4(B) and (D). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Afghan Defense Minister Wardak briefed the NAC with ISAF contributors on September 4 on the current security situation in Afghanistan, the rationale for expanding the Afghan National Army (ANA) and methods to reduce civilian casualties. He portrayed the security situation as serious, with 2008 on a course to be the bloodiest year since 2003. He presented a well organized case to Allies and partners for expanding the ANA to 122,000 in the near future, which was generally supported by Allies. The issue of civilian casualties loomed large due to recent events, and Min Wardak proposed methods to enhance cooperation and limit civilian casualties. He also answered PermRep questions, particularly on ISAF,s support to counter-narcotics. He proposed a joint Afghan/Pak/ISAF task force to enhance coordination and security along the border. END SUMMARY. SECURITY SITUATION SERIOUS ¶2. (SBU) In a 4 September meeting with NATO PermReps and Ambassadors from non-NATO ISAF troop contributing countries, Minister Wardak highlighted the seriousness of the Afghan security situation. He noted that security incidents tripled in 2007 versus 2005, and that 2008 will be the bloodiest year since the insurgency began. He explained that there were more Taliban in more provinces, and that terrorists were &flooding through the porous borders.8 The recent concentration of attacks on roads and convoys were an attempt by insurgents to show the weakness of the Afghan Government. He said the increase was primarily due to an increase in foreign fighters; more elaborate preparation; new tactics and equipment; and sophisticated planning of attacks. Wardak said the enemy can not maintain the current operational tempo, but the ANA and international forces were stretched. He praised ISAF forces and said a tremendous amount had been accomplished in Afghanistan, but stressed that sustaining the progress was at risk. THE CASE FOR A LARGER AFGHAN ARMY ¶3. (SBU) Minister Wardak presented a well organized case to Allies and partners for expanding the ANA to 122,000. He began by highlighting the shortcomings of the ANA, particularly in ground mobility and air support. He specifically listed four areas where the international community could further support the ANA: - Better operational planning and coordination - Support in capabilities and capacity building - International pressure to deny sanctuaries in neighboring countries - Support for the election process ¶4. (SBU) Minister Wardak noted that the calculations for the ANA size were based on the threat in 2002, which is no longer realistic. He stated that an Afghan solution to the security challenge is more cost effective and will save international lives. He also highlighted the ANA as a success story; an army under democratic control that serves the whole nation. He said the ANA recently passed 75,000 soldiers and will reach its currently authorized level of 80,000 next year. To show its effectiveness, Minister Wardak noted that the ANA led 68 percent of the deliberate operations it participated in from May through July. ¶5. (SBU) The Minister relayed that help was needed to implement the strategy of clearing and holding territory. To perform all the tasks for this mission and to train and reconstitute, the ANA would need a larger force of 122,000 soldiers, plus a training pool of 12,000. This would fill gaps and meet the needed capability requirements including 26 infantry battalions, 3 commando battalions, reaction forces and air support. He stated that the capacity exists to complete the build-up not later than 2011. He also added that he would seek support for additional operational mentoring and liaison teams (OMLTs) after the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approval of this plan. HOT ITEM: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION ¶6. (SBU) Minister Wardak stressed civilian casualty events such as the Shindand incident risk losing &all of our hard won progress.8 He relayed the main points from his recent USNATO 00000320 002 OF 003 letter to the NATO Secretary General (Reftel) where he called for establishing procedures to minimize civilian casualties due to air strikes, uncoordinated searches of private homes and detention of innocents by international forces. He stated that because we cannot afford to drive a large portion of the population into the Taliban's hands, he has been directed to work with international partners to develop procedures to reduce these incidents. He added that the current agreements with international forces were made when the government was in an &embryonic stage8 and now needed a review. The Minister relayed that Afghanistan has the highest regard for NATO due to its professional skill and vision. He stated that excellent progress has been made, but at a large human price. He noted that Afghanistan has a strong desire to stand on its own feet and grow into a country that can support its partners. NAC AMBASSADORS DISCUSS CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND COUNTER-NARCOTICS ¶7. (SBU) All interventions by NATO PermReps and ISAF contributors addressed the regrettable civilian casualties and several ambassadors posed questions about counter-narcotics and ANA enlargement: - Turkey: Ambassador Ildem noted that civilian casualties are hard to completely avoid given the difficult operational circumstances and insurgent exploitation efforts in Afghanistan. He added that, although the message of Minister Wardak,s letter is clear, any request for a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) would have to be examined carefully. He noted Turkey earmarked $5 million for election support, and was facilitating trilateral dialogue to eliminate the safe havens in Pakistan. - Canada: Ambassador McRae asked for Wardak,s views on an Independent Commission for investigating civilian casualty events and noted a common methodology for counting civilian casualties was needed. Canada supports ANA enlargement and Afghans taking more responsibility. He asked if the increase in foreign fighters had any impact on public opinion about the Taliban, whether the Tri-Partite Commission could be built upon to enhance coordination, if Mn Wardak had comments on political reconciliatio and if there are any details on a move to protect the highways with a civilian force. - Norway: Ambassador Traavik noted that not all civilian casualty events were due to ISAF and that there is a need for better coordination between the ANA and ISAF. He noted the existing military technical agreement and said it would need to be discussed. - Sweden: The Swedish representative supported the ANA increase and noted that quality of the new troops must also be addressed along with quantity, flagging a desire for more ANA human rights training. - France: Ambassador Andreani supported a gradual increase in Afghan responsibility. She also stressed that it must be an immediate priority to coordinate between military authorities, UNAMA and the Afghan government to avoid damaging credibility. - Spain: The Spanish Ambassador also noted that the public debate on civilian casualties had a negative effect on public opinion in both the Allied countries and Afghanistan. He added that Spain is committed to train the ANA with 2 OMLTs. Finally, he stated the need for coordination with Afghanistan's neighbors, particularly Pakistan. - Netherlands: Dutch Charge noted that despite the utmost attention and strict procedures to avoid civilian casualties, they are never perfect. He supported a combined investigative body and emphasized the importance of a coordinated message. - US: Ambassador Volker relayed the shared goals we have with Afghanistan: security development, governance, a larger ANA, and increasing Afghan responsibility. He stressed the need for close coordination between the Afghan government, ISAF and UNAMA to investigate and speak with a common voice on civilian casualties and to counter fabrications. The US supports the ANA increase and will look with Allies for methods to finance, train and equip the army. He also noted the UNODC and SACEUR recommendations for counter-narcotic support and asked for Minister Wardak,s view on the Afghan USNATO 00000320 003 OF 003 government's role and public opinion on this issue. - Australia: The Australian representative supported the US position on civilian casualty investigations. He also strongly pushed the UN Chapter 7 mandate as a sound legal basis that provided adequate and proper underpinnings to the international force presence. - Germany: Ambassador Brandenburg noted the increase in Afghan forces taking responsibility and relayed that Germany will increase its training contributions to strengthen Afghanistan. He also asked for an assessment of current and future Afghan counter-narcotics capabilities. - Italy: Ambassador Stefanini called for closer coordination, which should also include UNAMA. He also expressed an interest in Minister Wardak,s ideas on counter-narcotics. ¶8. (SBU) Wardak,s Answers: Minister Wardak provided his answers to questions in the following groups: - Civilian Casualties: Minister Wardak emphasized the common enemy we face and the difficult situation in Afghanistan where the enemy does not wear a uniform and intentionally uses civilians as shields. He stressed the need for better intelligence fusion, planning integration and coordination as a means to reduce civilian casualties. He also agreed that public bickering over competing casualty numbers is not helpful to any of us and we should provide a &united front.8 Minister Wardak stressed that a larger ANA would reduce the need for indirect fire (artillery and mortars) and air strikes, thus reducing the likelihood of civilian casualties. - Public Opinion: Minister Wardak said the Afghan people looked at the international forces as &saviors8 and that they give hope for a brighter future. He also noted the increase in foreign Taliban fighters has led to greater public resistance to foreign presence. - Relations with Pakistan: Minister Wardak said that Afghanistan would press Pakistan to end safe havens for insurgents and requested Allies and NATO to do likewise. On Pakistan relations, he described the recent military tripartite commission meeting as helpful, the establishment of a border coordination center, and a proposed joint Afghan/Pak/ISAF task force that the Pakistanis had agreed to study. - Increasing Afghan Responsibility: Minister Wardak stated that the entire Afghan campaign strategy is based on shifting ownership to the Afghans. As an example, he cited the recent transfer of security responsibility for Kabul to the Afghans. He also noted the progress on fighting corruption with the passage of laws and setting up of institutions, such as special courts and attorneys offices. - ANA Status: Minister Wardak stated that by the end of this year, 50 percent of ANA units will be certified as capable of independent operations. As an example of current agreements that need review, he noted the ANA must currently get ISAF permission to leave the barracks. - Counter-Narcotics: Minister Wardak made the clear connection between drugs, terrorism, and organized crime. He stated that more could have been done in the last 5 years by both Afghanistan and the international community in the areas of eradication, interdiction and providing alternate livelihoods. He stated that there would be no reaction from the populace if ISAF assists in counter-narcotics, particularly since some in the international community are already engaged. He noted that an increased ANA presence will also have a positive deterrence effect. ¶9. (C/NF) COMMENT: Defense Minister Wardak,s briefing was well received by the Allies, partners and ISAF contributors. This briefing comes just prior to the 10 September JCMB meeting where the ANA expansion to 122,000 will be up for approval. Additionally, Minister Wardak,s comments, along with the UNODC briefing, dispelled some Allied excuses for not pursuing counter-narcotics roles more robustly although their underlying resistance is still in view. END COMMENT. WEINROD