RFG: NATO-RUSSIA: A PROPOSED WAY FORWARD

S E C R E T USNATO 000309

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS RS GG
SUBJECT: RFG: NATO-RUSSIA: A PROPOSED WAY FORWARD

Classified By: Ambassador Kurt Volker. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) This is a request for guidance for a September 2 NATO
PermReps informal discussion of the way ahead on NATO-Russia.
See paragraph 13.


2. (S) SUMMARY: On September 2, NATO PermReps will discuss
how to take forward the August 19 Foreign Ministerial
decision that it is not "business as usual" in the
NATO-Russia relationship. In light of the Russian
recognition of independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
we believe we must take an even harder line than was taken at
the ministerial. We request that Washington instruct us to
propose the suspension of the "at 27" relationship, while
maintaining channels of communication with Russia via the "26
plus 1" mechanisms found in the Partnership for
Peace/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council mechanisms. We also
urge the suspension of most NATO-Russia specific activities,
excepting a limited number that meet our larger interests --
such as those related to the war in Afghanistan.
Additionally, we request guidance instructing us to raise
several points related to NATO's assistance to Georgia, the
NATO-Georgia Commission, and the Alliance's need to take
steps to reconfirm its Article 5 commitments. END SUMMARY.

The Issue
--------------


3. (S) At their September 2 lunch, NATO PermReps will discuss
how to implement the August 19 Foreign Ministerial decision
that it is not "business as usual" in the NATO-Russia
relationship. Allies have had very different opinions on
what exactly this means. In light of the Russian recognition
of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence, we must forge
an Allied consensus for firm actions that reshape our
engagement with Russia.

A Proposed Way Forward
--------------


4. (S) As a result of the Russian actions since the August
19 ministerial, we believe that we must use the September 2
meeting to call for an even tougher Allied stance against
Russia than we did at the ministerial. We must also use the
opportunity to lift Allied deliberations to a strategic
discussion of how to shape our engagement with Russia, rather
than focusing on bureaucratic or procedural issues. As a
result, we suggest making the following proposal with regard
to NATO-Russia relations:

-- We suspend the "at 27" special relationship that
defines the NRC, all procedural rules related to the NRC,
and all "at 27" meetings until Russia implements the
ceasefire and reverses its recognition of the two regions.
No other partner of NATO--not even aspirants--have an "at 27"
relationship. All other partnerships are in "26 plus 1"
format. Russia has lost the right for this special status.
This would mean blocking nor only NRC meetings per se, but
the Prepatory Committee and working group activities;

-- We identify activities and mechanisms that NATO is
involved in that include Russia as only one of a number of
partners and allow those activities to move forward. Russia
should not be allowed to prevent us from doing the important
work of the Alliance. Activities and meetings of the
Partnership for Peace/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(PfP/EAPC) are but one example of this. Russia remains a
member of EAPC/PfP.

-- We identify a handful of NATO-Russia specific areas of
practical cooperation (such as on Afghanistan,
counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and humanitarian issues)
that we will agree to allow to continue, suspending the rest.
Special consideration would be given to areas of cooperation
that support the Alliance's larger goals, as identified in
the point above. Any committee work that is required on
these issues will be done in a "26 plus 1" framework with
Allied precoordination;

-- We call a special, one-off meeting at the Ambassadorial
level to inform Russia of these decisions and to give Allies
a chance to present a unified message of condemnation of
Russian actions. Importantly, however, we do this in a "26
plus 1" meeting within the context of NATO's Partnership for
Peace/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (PfP/EAPC),instead
of within the NRC framework. Use of this mechanism would
show Allies that we do have an alternate to the NRC as a
channel of communication with Russia. Moreover, since our
meeting with Georgia at the start of the crisis was also a
"26 plus 1" within the PfP/EAPC framework, we can argue that
there is a logical balance to do it this way. (Note: We
assess that there is a high likelihood that Russian
Ambassador Rogozin would refuse to attend a meeting in this
format.)

-- We leave open the possibility of additional 26 plus 1
meetings within the PfP/EAPC format, as needed.

-- We ask the NATO International Staff to remain engaged with
the Russian Mission, keeping open an additional channel of
communication.


5. (S) Gaining consensus on this proposal will not be easy
and will likely reqire efforts by senior U.S. officials.
Washingtonmay wish to consider calling another
extraordinay meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers to discuss
te way ahead with NATO.

Other Issues to Raise inthe PermReps Lunch
--------------


6. (S) In addition to the NATO-Rusia specific points, we
wish to use the September2 lunch to make the following
points on several elated topics:

A) NATO's Aid to Georgia

-- NTO's assistance to Georgia should be value-added, tking
into account U.S. bilateral assistance; and

-- NATO's contribution to the reconstitution ofthe Georgian
military could include assistance ad advice relating to the
national military strucure, airspace, leadership education
and training,and command and control issues.

B) NATO-GeorgiaCommission

-- We support a short framework docuent, which should be
agreed now;

-- The Commision should oversee the process set in hand at
Bcharest, as well as the implementation of the Alliace's
assistance;

-- The Commission should proide a framework for meetings at
various levels, ncluding at ministerial and summit level;

-- The Commission should include a mechanism for emergency
consultations;

-- We should hold a 26 plus 1 meeting with Georgia prior to
the NAC visit to Tbilisi, confirming that the Private Office
intends to schedule one for September 10;

-- We should hold the first meeting of the NATO-Georgia
Commission during the NAC's September 15-16 visit to Tbilisi.

C) Reconfirming Our Article 5 Commitments

-- The Alliance should begin contingency planning for the
Baltic states;

-- It should also develop permanent air policing options;

-- We should conduct an Article 5 exercise in Central Europe,
possibly Poland; and

-- We should send high-level delegations to visit Allies
bordering Russia.

Background
--------------


6. (S) When NATO Foreign Ministers agreed at their August
19th meeting that there would be "no business as usual" in
the NATO-Russia relationship (at least until Russia
implements all elements of the ceasefire),Allies seemed to
accept that there would be no Ambassadorial level meetings of
the NATO-Russia Council. Allies remain divided, however, on
how else we should operationalize the ministerial agreement.


7. (S) A significant number of Allies (and the International
Staff),believe that the bi-monthly Prepatory Committee
(PrepCom) should continue to meet because it is "required to"
by the NATO-Russia Council's Rules of Procedure--which were
agreed "at 27" by all NRC countries (i.e. the Allies and
Russia working as co-equal partners). They also argue that
the PrepCom remains our only channel of communication with
Russia, something they desperately wish to hold on to. We,
however, have argued that it makes no sense to hold a PrepCom
meeting when there is no Ambassadorial meeting to prep,
adding that political considerations should not be overcome
by rules of procedure.


8. (S) Many Allies have also argued firmly that practical
cooperation with Russia on a number of specific issues,
particularly Afghanistan, should be allowed to continue
because of the significant importance of these issues.

RFG
---


9. (S) Request for guidance: We request Washington instruct
us to deploy the proposal outlined in paras 4 and 6 above at
the September 2 PermReps' lunch.
VOLKER