A/S FRIED WARNS NATO SYG, PERM REPS OF DANGER OF UN, EU DELAY IN KOSOVO AND OF POLITICAL DRIFT IN GEORGIAN-ABKHAZ CONFLICT

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000265

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C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, NATO, EZ, GG, KV, MK, PL, RS, UNMIK,
UP
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED WARNS NATO SYG, PERM REPS OF DANGER OF
UN, EU DELAY IN KOSOVO AND OF POLITICAL DRIFT IN
GEORGIAN-ABKHAZ CONFLICT

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Richard G. Olson, Jr. for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) SUMMARY. Assistant Secretary Dan Fried met with
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer July 22 in
Brussels and later informally briefed PermReps, delivering a
warning in both meetings about the dangers of continued delay
in UNMIK reconfiguration and EULEX deployment throughout
Kosovo and calling attention to the need for immediate
progress in deescalating the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict to
reverse the deterioration on the ground. In their private
meeting, the SYG expressed concern about the potential for a
divisive debate within the Alliance in December over whether
to grant Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Ukraine and Georgia
in light of what he saw as unwavering German and French
opposition. He floated the idea, which he said German
Chancellor Merkel has hinted at, of agreeing in December to
extend MAP to the two countries in 2010, assuming continue
progress in their reforms (and "unless something horrible
happens"). Fried said such a decision would give perverse
incentives to Russia to instigate "something horrible," e.g.,
a war. Fried also told the SYG and PermReps the U.S. is
willing to listen to details about Russian President
Medvedev's proposal for a new security architecture for
Euro-Atlantic relations, but for now the proposal recalled
Soviet proposals from the 1970s. Fried briefed the SYG on
progress in U.S.-Polish missile defense talks and the SYG
expressed concern about the deterioration in atmospherica
between Macedonia and Greece over the name issue. END
SUMMARY.

SYG SEEKS TO AVOID TRAIN WRECK OVER MAP IN DECEMBER

2. (C) In a July 22 meeting at NATO HQ in Brussels, NATO
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told Assistant
Secretary Fried he saw the need for an "inventive" strategy
in the run up to the December decision of NATO Foreign
Ministers on whether to grant Membership Action Plan to
Ukraine and Georgia. He said he did not see Germany or
France softening their opposition to a positive decision in
December and wanted to prevent an Alliance-splitting debate.
The SYG added that whatever the decision, it needed to keep
Russia under pressure and should not link MAP to progress in
the frozen conflicts since such a linkage would only give
Russia an incentive to further inflame the conflicts. The
SYG noted that German Chancellor Merkel had floated the idea
of deciding in December that Ukraine and Georgia would get
MAP in 2010, "unless something terrible happened," an
approach he thought would keep pressure on Russia while
preserving Allied unity.

3. (C) Fried agreed that any link between MAP and progress
in the frozen conflicts only gave Russia incentives to cause
problems and noted that the current Friends of Georgia
framework is flawed since Russia is a member of the group,
and thus a facilitator in efforts to resolve the conflict
while at the same time a party to the conflict. Regarding
the proposal to decide in December to grant Ukraine and
Georgia MAP in 2010, Fried said this approach could give a
perverse incentive to Russia to stimulate something
"horrible," and Russia might calculate that it would be
better to provoke a conflict sooner rather than later in
Georgia. The SYG said he would have to give the idea more
thought, and cautioned that simply increasing the pressure on
Germany would not change its position. He also pleaded with
Fried to tell Georgian President Saakashvili not to pull any
surprises during the North Atlantic Council's September 4-5
visit to Georgia.

FRIED: "GOLDEN HOUR" IN KOSOVO PASSING AS EUROPE DITHERS

4. (C) On Kosovo, Fried said he was worried about paralysis
in the negotiations between UN and EU over reconfiguration
from UNMIK to EULEX. This continued dithering risked wasting
the "golden hour" when NATO and the EU have maximum leverage
over a moderate government in Kosovo and the situation on the
ground is still stable. He did not want to look back on this
time in several years as a missed opportunity before Kosovar
politics become radicalized and violent in response to
frustrations with the West's inaction. There is currently no
plan for getting EULEX into the north, or to fully
re-establish the border crossings in the north, and he
worried that time was wasting while the UN and EU
bureaucracies dithered over minute details. He also warned
that the phrase "status neutral" being used by some
international organizations was dangerous since it led down a
path to giving equal legitimacy to illegal Serb parallel
institutions (often dominated by radical Serbian elements and
simple thugs) and the Kosovo government. He told the SYG he


hoped NATO would never use the term.

5. (C) The SYG replied that he would never use the term
"status neutral" publicly but there were still members of the
Alliance who had not recognized Kosovo. He said he was
worried about the plan UNSRSG Zannier announced at the July
18 "Friends of Kosovo" meeting to raise the UN flag over the
Mitrovica courthouse, phase in European judges and staff, and
then eventually raise the EU flag. The SYG was concerned
because Zannier said he had not consulted the Kosovo
government about this plan, even though they might well
support it. The SYG commented that he intended to ask NATO
Military Authorities to try to "find a way around" the
impasse that prevented the North Atlantic Council from
approving a revised OPLAN for KFOR so the negotiations would
not hit the same blockage when they resume.

RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, DECREASE OF
OIL SHIPMENTS TO CZECH REPUBLIC

6. (C) Fried noted that Russian President Medvedev's
proposal for a new security architecture for Euro-Atlantic
security recalled Soviet era proposals. The U.S. did not
know what exactly the Russians were proposing; perhaps
neither did the Russians. The SYG said PermReps would have a
discussion that afternoon on the issue and it was on the
agenda for an upcoming NATO-Russia Council meeting. The SYG
said the Alliance needed to be careful since after the NRC
Russian Ambassador Rogozin may publicly tout the fact that
NATO was discussing Medvedev's proposals.

7. (C) Fried reported that the Czechs had asked the U.S. to
be low-key in its response to Russia's reducing of its oil
shipments to the Czech Republic shortly after the signing of
the U.S.-Czech agreement on missile defense. Russia barely
denied that the cutback was politically motivated, which was
worrisome, Fried said. When Russia cut the oil supplies to
the Ukraine in 2006 Russia denied it was politically
motivated and they were embarrassed by the outcry in Europe.
But now they merely go through the motions of denial of
political motivations of use of oil for political leverage.
Such pressure tactics were becoming "the new normal." The
SYG commented that many European governments still deny that
the use of oil as a political tool was part of Russian
foreign policy.

U.S.-POLISH MISSILE DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS

8. (C) In response to a question from the SYG, Fried
reported on his July 21 meeting with Polish PM Sikorski on
missile defense, saying that the Poles were asking for the
stationing of U.S. Patriot batteries in Poland. The U.S. had
proposed rotational, rather than permanent, U.S. deployments
of Patriots, but the Poles wanted more. The U.S. would look
at what other offers it might make, but would not likely give
a guarantee of permanent basing of Patriots. Fried said he
had told the Poles that if Patriot missiles were the main
outstanding issue, it would be helpful to resolve all
secondary matters and focus attention on the Patriot issue.
He thought the two sides now had offered enough to sign a
deal: a strategic partnership, a willingness to develop
creative financing for PAC acquisitions or other purposes,
and rotational deployment of Patriot missiles. The SYG said
he had warned the Poles not to undermine Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty by asking for more and more from the U.S.
on a bilateral basis as part of the missile defense agreement.

MACEDONIA

9. (C) The SYG expressed concerns about recent Macedonian
actions, such as PM Gruevski's public letter to PM
Karamanlis, that were dimming prospects for an agreement on
the name issue. Fried noted that the Greeks also shared the
blame for the deterioration in the negotiations. He said
Gruevski had told him he sent the letter to Karamanlis as a
way of pushing back against the Greeks inserting extraneous
(historical) issues into the negotiations. Fried said he had
cautioned Gruevski that while the Macedonian reaction was
understandable, it was nevertheless an unhelpful way to push
back against the Greeks. Macedonia needed to keep its eye on
the goal of reaching agreement on the name issue. The SYG
noted that Gruevski had also just sent a letter to European
Commission President Barroso with the same complaints.

BRIEFING TO NATO PERM REPS

10. (C) On July 23, Fried informally discussed Kosovo with
NATO Permanent Representatives, expressing frustration with
the lack of movement on UNMIK's reconfiguration and the EULEX
UN, EU DELAY IN KOSOVO AND OF POLITICAL DRIFT IN
GEORGIAN-ABKHAZ CONFLICT

deployment. Characterizing the situation as urgent, Fried
warned that we were in danger of losing the opportunity of
relative peace and stability in Kosovo while the EU and the
UN dither over the draft MOU. He said that despite the UN
SYG's order for UNMIK reconfiguration last month, nothing had
actually happened and that issues such as use of office space
were holding up an agreement between the UN and EU. "This is
the golden moment, and we are wasting it," he said. He
further pushed that EULEX should deploy to the north as soon
as possible and that while dialogue with Serbia could
continue, no one should seek permission or hand a veto on
EULEX deployment to Belgrade. Further delays in EULEX's
deployment would only thrust KFOR into the role of first
responder. Fried urged Allies to press the EU and the UN to
find a way forward.

11. (C) Allies who spoke on Kosovo - Spain, Italy, and
Belgium - acknowledged that delay served no one, but said
that other important issues such as privileges and immunities
were also delaying the transition. Spain noted that the new
UN representative for Kosovo, Lamberto Zannier, had only just
met with EU reps for the first time and that the transition
phase had only just begun. Allies endorsed Fried's points on
continued engagement with Serbia and remarked that all EU
colleagues are clear on no veto for Belgrade. Fried agreed
with Allies and recognized the importance of resolving other
issues such as privileges and immunities, but emphasized that
the situation could become more difficult if there is
continued delay.

12. (C) Fried briefed Permanent Representatives on the
current deteriorating situation in Abkhazia, Georgia as a
result of increasing rhetoric and violence from both sides.
Saying the U.S. feared a "hot August," Fried said there was
an increased resolve in Washington to try to find a way
forward through the Western Friends of Georgia which would
include engagement with the Abkhaz. Commending German
Foreign Minister Steinmeier and the German-led initiatives,
Fried said he was cautiously optimistic that engagement with
the Abkhaz could open up a new process for achieving
stability and give Sokhumi other options than relying on
Moscow. Fried told the Allies, however, that Russia might
overplay its hand by either slowing or blocking the process -
in which case Russia should have to pay a political price -
and might lead to an unstable situation by the fall. Fried
concluded by saying that the U.S. is actively working with
Germany and was looking forward to next week's Friends of
Georgia meeting in Berlin.

13. (C) Fried responded to Canadian questions about
Georgian efforts to declare Russia's peacekeeping presence
illegal by saying that the U.S. had actively discouraged such
a move since it would not change the situation on the ground
and it would do more harm than good. In response to a
Canadian question regarding Medvedev's proposals for a new
Euro-Atlantic security architecture, Fried described the
proposal as being "back in the 1970s" and that while the U.S.
was willing to listen to details and engage on constructive
proposals, it would not support anything that would
subordinate NATO to other organizations or undermine the CFE.
Fried was supported by the Spanish and Italian PermReps who
said that in reality there was nothing to the Russian
proposal.

14. (U) Assistant Secretary Fried cleared this message.
OLSON