PAKISTAN: ALLIES SUPPORTIVE OF PROPOSALS TO DEEPEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000231 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2018 TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR KPAO AF PK SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: ALLIES SUPPORTIVE OF PROPOSALS TO DEEPEN NATO ENGAGEMENT REF: A. STATE 70664 (NOTAL) ¶B. USNATO 221 ¶C. USNATO 212 USNATO 00000231 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge Richard G. Olson, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General Ambassador James Pardew briefed the NAC on his June 25-26 meetings in Islamabad (Reftels A and B) during a June 30 informal NAC "coffee" meeting. Pardew characterized his meetings as positive and productive, noting his interlocutors were keen to develop deeper relations with NATO, but would expect tangible assistance as part of a partnership. He stated the Pakistani government welcomes increased high-level engagement with NATO. Pardew's proposal to form a "Task Force" among the NATO International Staff and International Military Staff to develop further ideas for NATO engagement with Pakistan met with PermReps' broad concurrence. PermReps were broadly supportive of deepening NATO's political engagement, with the Netherlands and UK expressing interest in opening NATO's Partnership for Peace toolbox and Canada suggesting naming a NATO "Contact Point Embassy" in Islamabad, Greece emerging as the most skeptical toward any further engagement, and Belgiu m laying down a Partner-phobic redline against expanding cooperation beyond immediate operational needs in Afghanistan. Charge Olson supported engagement with Pakistan by the SYG, cautioned against politicizing the Tripartite Commission while urging its revitalization along existing military lines, highlighted the need for Pakistan to reciprocate with Border Coordination Centers on its side, and expressed skepticism about non-enforceable peace deals with Pakistani militants that result in increased violence in Afghanistan. Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer committed to provide Allies a document mapping out the way ahead at NATO to develop a policy and messages in advance of his autumn trip to Pakistan. The Turkish Ambassador to Pakistan also briefed during this meeting, per arrangements made by the Turkish Delegation to NATO. END SUMMARY. -------------- --- AMB Pardew: NATO Can't Afford Not to be Engaged -------------- --- ¶2. (C) Ambassador Pardew stated that Pakistan is central to NATO's effort in Afghanistan, and urged the NAC to consider NATO's policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan as a package: NATO was engaged militarily in Afghanistan, and should consider becoming more engaged politically in Pakistan. "Can we afford not to be engaged," he asked, "and risk hostile or remote relations with a nation key to NATO's success in Afghanistan?" While appreciative of the Pakistani desire for a deeper relationship with NATO, he was struck by the poor state of Afghan-Pakistani relations and the fragile political and security situation in Pakistan. He noted he had come away from his stop in Islamabad with a sense of looming crisis. He had perceived a weak Pakistani government focused on issues such as energy, education, judges, and President Musharraf's future, distracted and disinclined to take meaningful, difficult decisions in the FATA and NWFP. Pardew shared the highlights of the written trip report (emailed to EUR/RPM) that h e had passed to PermReps earlier in the morning. He noted his interlocutors: -- Welcomed a visit by the NATO SYG in autumn; -- Accepted the SYG's written invitation to PM Gilani to address the NAC, and it was "well received"; -- Suggested that NATO's policy engagement at the Assistant Secretary General/Deputy Assistant Secretary General level become regularized via semi-annual meetings rotated between Islamabad and Brussels; USNATO 00000231 002.2 OF 003 -- Committed to participating in the Tripartite Commission when the next date is set by ISAF; -- Committed to participation in the Border Coordination Centers and to provide personnel to the Khyber BCC in Afghanistan, but expressed "major political difficulty" with establishing BCCs on the Pakistani side of the border; -- Remained skeptical on key jurisdictional issues, particularly Vienna Convention status, related to a NATO-Pakistani transit agreement long under negotiations, but welcomed the establishment of a NATO/ISAF liaison office in Islamabad, and gave "clear indications" that an expansion of liaison functions to include political representation would be welcomed; -- Expressed a desire to participate in NATO schools and training courses; -- Expressed interest in enhancing public diplomacy activities related to NATO, and NATO's role in Afghanistan. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Pardew recommended that NATO set up a Task Force of International Military Staff and International Staff officials to develop ideas for further NATO engagement with Pakistan. He recommended that NATO military authorities send an assessment team to Islamabad before the end of July to develop a detailed proposal for a NATO/ISAF liaison arrangement to be passed to the Pakistani government for consideration, and that NATO HQ consider whether a political representation within that office would be appropriate. He also recommended that NATO Public Diplomacy officials follow up with the appropriate Pakistani authorities on possible joint work in the PD realm. -------------- -------------- Allies Generally Favor Expanded Military and Political Ties -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Allies generally welcomed DASG Pardew's recommendation to set up a Task Force. Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Spain, Turkey, and the UK all spoke in favor. Canada, joined by the Netherlands and Norway, proposed establishing a NATO "Contact Point Embassy" in Islamabad (comment: a CPE is an embassy of a NATO Ally in a Partner country, which acts as a channel for disseminating information about the roles and policies of the Alliance. End comment.) The UK and Netherlands advocated opening select Partnership for Peace instruments, strategically chosen, in order to enhance NATO-Pakistan relations and practical cooperation. Poland offered that the North Atlantic Council should travel as a group to Islamabad in the fall, for political talks and public outreach (comment: the NAC routinely travels to Afghanistan, as well as countries with which NATO has relations, as it recently did with Ukraine. End comment.) ¶5. (C) Belgium supported forming an IMS/IS Task Force, but took a rigid partner-phobic stance toward expanding any sort of cooperation beyond short-term, practical efforts that could be concretely tied to Afghanistan; several nations made the point in reply that the situation was not as black and white as the Belgians may prefer. Portugal, joined by Germany, noted the need to develop a NATO policy in time for the SYG's autumn visit, and cautioned that India and its views must be factored in. Greece agreed that NATO must agree a policy framework prior to the SYG's autumn visit, but was the most skeptical toward greater engagement, stating that the most important thing was for Afghanistan and Pakistan to talk to each other, and questioning the capacity and authority of any interlocutors with whom the NAC or SY might meet. The Greek questioned the utility o dialogue, noting that the FATA and NWFP pose th greatest problems, but that even if the Pakistan gvernment agreed with every point NATO made, i doe s not control those territories and thus cold not act. USNATO 00000231 003 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Charge Olson drew on guidance sent in Reftel A, supporting engagement with Pakistan by the SYG, cautioning against politicizing the Tripartite Commission while urging its revitalization along current military lines, and highlighting the need for Pakistan to reciprocate with Border Coordination Centers on its side. Building on an earlier Canadian comment about communicating "NATO red lines" to the Pakistani government about its peace deals in the FATA and NWFP, he drew Allies' attention back to the June 5 briefing to Allies by USD/P Edelman, and expressed skepticism about non-enforceable peace deals with Pakistani militants that result in increased violence in Afghanistan. He assured that the United States conveys these concerns to the Pakistani government. The Charge noted that increased public diplomacy activities would be beneficial. -------------- -------------- SYG: Will Map out a Way Ahead in Advance of his Fall Trip -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) The Secretary General agreed that the NAC must continue the discussion, and devise a policy framework and messages for him to bring to Pakistan in October. He committed to map out and share with Allies a way ahead procedurally at NATO to accomplish this. He drew attention to the need to "calibrate" any NATO policy with any thinking and work that UN SRSG Kai Eide is doing toward Pakistan, though clearly stating the NATO policy would stand on its own. He also urged prudence in developing a political relationship, urging the NAC "not to go into overdrive," and to craft a strategy that would build on the trust and confidence engendered during NATO's 2006 earthquake relief effort in Pakistan. -------------- -------------- Turkish Ambassador to Pakistan Provides the View from Islamabad -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Turkish Ambassador to Pakistan Engin Soysal, whose presence at the meeting had been arranged at the request of the Turkish Delegation, briefed his view from Islamabad prior to Pardew's brief. He hailed the February 18 general election as a momentous achievement, urged patience with Pakistani efforts to negotiate with militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North West Frontier Province (NWFP),and advocated for expanded NATO political engagement in Islamabad. He urged Allies to move NATO's relationship with Pakistan beyond the short-term focus of Afghanistan, and treat Pakistan as a significant regional power in its own right. Soysal gave a sympathetic view of the challenges facing the government, and went to very great lengths to "explain" the motivations of extremists and terrorists operating in the FATA and NWFP, citing factors such as the Palestinian situation, the situation in the Middle East, and their frustration with their lot in life. Charge Olson thanked the Turk f or his brief, and commended Turkish efforts at enhancing Afghan-Pakistan relations. OLSON