HOW UKRAINIAN, GEORGIAN MAP IS PLAYING AT NATO

S E C R E T USNATO 000225 NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR TBRADLEY; STATE FOR EUR, EUR/RPM; OSD FOR DASD FATA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2018 TAGS: PREL NATO UP GG SUBJECT: HOW UKRAINIAN, GEORGIAN MAP IS PLAYING AT NATO REF: A. BERLIN 744 ¶B. OTTAWA 773 ¶C. BERLIN 840 ¶D. KYIV 1201 Classified By: CHARGE R.G. OLSON: REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 1.(C/NF) Summary: Discussion of Ukrainian and Georgia MAP prospects at NATO remains highly charged and polarized. Germany leads the "Gang of Five" critics (France, the Netherlands, Spain and Norway plus sometimes Portugal),while the U.S. and Canada champion the pro-camp otherwise comprised of the Poles, Balts, Czechs, Romanians and Bulgarians. The UK, Denmark and Italy lead off the "wavering West" of on-again, off-again Allies who are fence-sitting in most meetings. Greece and Turkey expend energy trying to avoid being pinned down here, but show skeptical colors when pressed. We welcome lateral post perspectives on Georgian and Ukrainian MAP prospects as seen in capital and any "soft spots" on advocacy which we should explore. End Summary. 2.(C/NF) From a NATO headquarters perspective, as Germany goes, so goes the prospect for Ukrainian, Georgian MAP attainment at or before the December NATO Foreign Ministerial. USNATO appreciates ref. A and notes that the German NATO delegation also conflates MAP and membership, asserting that both would need to be on the verge of attaining full membership readiness before MAP were appropriate. The Germans here up to the PermRep level are in active denial that the Bucharest statement already agreed membership for both aspirants. His statements to the GoU in Kyiv indicate as much. 3.(S/NF) Tactically, Germany expends great energy on undermining and questioning prospects for MAP for Ukraine and Georgia, but dwells more on quashing Kyivs progress. This may be because locally the Dutch and French are more than happy to attack Georgian policy as each opportunity arises. (Note: Germany cleans up with formal comments that Georgian democracy is immature and informally adds that it is incomprehensible for NATO to "import another Cyprus" into the fold.) The German NATO delegation dwells most on para. 12, ref. "whither the compensation strategy for Russia" question in its small group talks, sometimes including even U.S. officers, and formally asserts that Ukrainian MAP must be shown to benefit "all of Europes security." They foresee a need to develop a CFE answer for Russia of undetermined nature (although often decrying how Romania is distorting the CFE process to the detriment of NATO security); developing further NATO-Russia Council access for Moscow in Alliance decision-shaping; offering Russia a "real partnership opportunity of substance," suggesting a greater role in Afghanistan and maybe a meatier MD/NRC TMD cooperative approach than presently on the table; and developing a common Allied analysis of how Ukraines NATO tilt might be offset to assuage Russian strategic calculus. The latter is rarely elaborated by Germans, but some Allied delegations and informed NATO International Staff theorize that there is not a German government common line and the general reference may be an effort to probe Allied opinion on expansion of the three "Nos," a Ukrainian non-foreign forces stationing unilateral declaration, Russian Black Sea Fleet Crimea access extensions or other political sweeteners for Moscow. 4.(C/NF) Germany repeatedly asserts that the December Foreign Ministerial review of Ukraine and Georgias MAP candidacy "will only be the first of many." Recently the German PermRep has challenged whether Ukraine, even following the recent NAC trip to Kyiv, really is united in seeking a "yes" from NATO on MAP in December. (Note: The French PermRep sang the same tune in that conversation. End Note.) Occasionally we hear signs of a Foreign Ministry/Chancellery split on the lead reason to oppose Ukrainian MAP arise in conversations with the Germans or their "Gang of Five" colleagues discussing why Berlin opposes Ukrainian MAP. The MFA is credited with more of a Russian reaction/security interest-centric calculus while Chancellor Merkels thinking is asserted to center more around questions of Ukrainian reform credentials and divided public sentiment on Ukraines NATO interest. 5.(C/NF) French resistance to Georgian/Ukrainian MAP usually comes in the role of "enforcer" in the "Gang of Five," but here clearly is attuned to follow the lead on the German chorus in a given discussion. Lately French officers have challenged whether Ukraine and Georgia have "even moved past intensified dialogue" and asserted that "NATO is only reviewing the Ukrainian annual target plan this year the same as any other year" in the ten-year history of the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership. When Germans ask about starting a small group discussion of a Russian reaction strategy, and especially when how CFE might fit into it, the French usually go silent to see how others will respond, but they dont initiate that question. 6.(C/NF) The Dutch are most vocal and active in opposing Georgian MAP, although they routinely chime in support after major German anti-Ukraine MAP flourishes in committee meetings. On Georgia, they characterize Georgian democracy as immature; Saakashvili as an emotional, corrupt and unreliable leader; and assert his administration is intolerant of opposition and prone to squeezing out checks and balances in the Georgian government and civic society, particularly in the judiciary and on freedom of media. They are quite critical of the Georgian Armys national reserve plans, consider its force structure postured to undertake offensive actions in the conflict zones and question the NATO interoperability implications and defense planning prudence of its weapons purchases, particularly from non-NATO traditional suppliers. 7.(C/NF) Norway has adopted a strong "me-too" approach in support of German and Dutch arguments, especially on Georgia, and says on occasion when pressed for its anti-Map rationale for Ukraine that it is concerned about "unanswered strategic questions." This is an occasional refrain from Spain as well, which also shares the "me too" posture most frequently in support of other lead doubters. Many Allies note that Spanish opposition is estimated to be strategic, too, and in line with its EU posture, where it is viewed as fearing that Ukrainian and/or Georgian MAP is a net gain for Europes "Eastern Dimension." These NATO/EU Allied observers say that Madrid consistently views potential eastern shifts of balance in Europe as a threat to Madrids influence, its preferred focus on the Maghreb and Mediterranean basin and eventually to its claim on EU regional subsidy funds and NATO security infrastructure investment spending. 8.(S/NF) While the UK privately asserts that it is supportive of Georgian and Ukrainian MAP, it usually avoids outward expressions of support beyond very nuanced general statements. Both the UK and Denmark squirmed vocally when asked to participate in the so-called "New Friends of Georgia" Group in May and asserted to Georgia in the closed meeting, upon instruction, that they "were fellow travelers in the path ahead, but not willing to wear the clubs jersey." UK NATO officers plainly tell USNATO officials that London ebbs and flows on supporting the two, especially Georgia (Note: citing the protracted nature of the Abkhaz conflict. End Note.). UK Caucasus Special Representative Sir Brian Fall also has advocated in NATO meetings that Georgia should offer a "no first use of force" public statement as a pre-condition for MAP accession. They add that London (often identified more as FCO than MoD) lately has been convincing itself that NATO must "answer the questions of the Black sea Fleet and Ukrainian/Russian defense industrial impact in the wake of NATO accession" to make progress on Ukrainian MAP. UK PermRep Eldon espoused this line on the margins of the NAC Ukraine trip as well. His deputy chief of mission (DCM) and defense advisor (about to become DCM) echo this theme. UK contacts dodge the question frequently when pressed how they see the December Foreign Ministerial review, avoiding stating whether HMG would support MAP accession and shifting to how to move Germanys position. 9.(C/NF) Italy postures itself on the fence in most discussions, but sometimes pushes back at more aggressive German efforts to dilute the Bucharest wine. Privately, they assure USNATO that "while we may look at MAP more than just once in December, we wont have to do this more than a few times" before MAP is granted to both Aspirants. Italy also expressed private consternation to USNATO at some more aggressive German committee efforts to walk back Bucharest high level decisions. That said, they say they would welcome the same Russian strategic calculus small group discussion for which the German NATO delegation fishes. OLSON