USD(P) EDELMAN BRIEFS ON AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000208 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2018 TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF PK SUBJECT: USD(P) EDELMAN BRIEFS ON AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AT NATO Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for reasons 1.4(B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman used his June 5 meeting with NATO PermReps and a separate session with NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer to brief on his May 27-June 5 visit to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Lebanon and to urge Allies to contribute more to Afghan police training and use their political influence with Islamabad. USDP Edelman said he found President Karzai concerned about political turmoil in Pakistan and recent border developments. Meanwhile, Pakistan's new political leadership underestimates the threat from its domestic insurgency, and its military is in need of retraining to confront it. Regarding Lebanon, USDP Edelman was "more optimistic" than he had expected to be. END SUMMARY. -------------- AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN -------------- ¶2. (C) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman told NATO PermReps on June 5 that, after his recent visit to Kabul and Islamabad, he believes Afghanistan will require a long-term approach that focuses efforts on improving local governance and security. Among his findings: - (C) Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are far along in their plans to assume leadership for security in Kabul city this summer. ANSF are already providing "95 percent" of Kabul's security. - (C) In the next few months, the U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan (CSTC-A) will be short more than 100 district-level 12-person Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs). European countries are well-suited for the high-end training of police, and Germany and Italy have already expressed interest. Focused District Development (FDD), CSTC-A's police training program, gets the Afghan National Police (ANP) to about "the 80 percent level", but PMTs are needed to mentor them and finish their training. Edelman reported that on his visit to Kapisa province (in RC-East, where French forces will soon deploy) the difference was clear between towns where the ANP was trained and operating effectively versus areas where they were not and as a result the Taliban was active. - (C) Local governance is key to success. USDP Edelman encouraged Allies to support the GoA's Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). The estimated cost to implement the overall IDLG strategy over a five-year period is USD 296 million, of which USD 26 million is for IDLG's recently unveiled Afghan Social Outreach Program (ASOP) that focuses on developing local governance in eleven troubled provinces. - (C) UN SRSG Kai Eide needs support, especially in New York where Allies should help ensure he gets the financial and staffing resources he requests. - (C) The enemy is adaptive. Officials in Regional Command East and Regional Command Capital have seen an uptick in insurgent attacks in Khost, Nangarhar, Kabul, and other areas where ISAF has been successful with its development projects. The enemy realizes it must destroy what has been built or risk losing the support of the people. USNATO 00000208 002 OF 004 - (C) The Pakistani leadership, including the President, Prime Minister, Defense Minister and new National Security Advisor all say they are committed to fighting terrorism. Edelman raised with them U.S. concerns about the peace agreements in the tribal areas, noting that ISAF already sees an increase in incidents in eastern Afghanistan attributable to reduced pressure on militants in Pakistan. - (C) Pakistan has two fundamental problems: the insurgency in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),which the political class underestimates because it remains focused on political machinations in Islamabad; and the grave economic crisis, characterized by low growth and balance of payments problems, which are exacerbated by political instability. Edelman urged Allies to weigh in with Islamabad on the need for a strong counterinsurgency effort, to visit Pakistan at the senior level, and to consider economic development programs in the tribal areas. -------------- PermRep Questions -------------- ¶3. (C) In response to the Greek ambassador, USDP Edelman commented that he is not overly concerned about the possibility that Karzai might seek to manipulate local governance and development programs for his electoral ends, because his political base and the root of the insurgency overlap in the Pashtun areas. ¶4. (C) In response to the UK ambassador, Edelman noted that Pakistani CHOD Kayani has told senior U.S. officials that he wants the Pakistani military out of politics, but he noted that the army needs retraining and reequipping to confront domestic extremists with a counterinsurgency strategy, since it is currently oriented towards the Indian threat. In Kabul, Edelman added, he found Karzai eager to divert attention to Pakistan as a source of all of Afghanistan's problems. ¶5. (C) In response to the Czech ambassador, USDP Edelman commented that the U.S. wants to reinvigorate the Tripartite Commission and has a very active mil-to-mil relationship with Pakistan. Admiral Mullen and other senior U.S. officials make frequent visits to Islamabad. ¶6. (C) In response to the French ambassador, Edelman said that neither ISAF nor the Afghan government has been successful on counternarcotics, and that eradication programs focus mostly on small farmers, making some Allies uneasy. Edelman urged greater focus on drug labs and high-value targets, such as drug traffickers who are also insurgents. He pointed out that U.S. Marines in Garmsir District of Helmand Province discovered a Taliban poppy "agro-business" had sprung up in the absence of a GoA/ISAF presence. The UK ambassador added that going after traffickers and high-value targets has not had a negative effect on local opinion, in the UK's experience. Ambassador Nuland commented that doing nothing about narcotics also damages ISAF's image with Afghans and noted "neutrality is not an option" when dealing with traffickers. ¶7. (C) In response to the Italian ambassador, Edelman commented that our efforts to strengthen local governance do not undermine the Afghan central government because there has never been a tradition of strong central government. The USNATO 00000208 003 OF 004 best approach is to improve local governance and then link it to the central government in Kabul. ¶8. (C) In response to the Norwegian ambassador, Edelman expressed optimism regarding the transition to the ANSF of security in Kabul, noting that the ANSF have shown improvement. Regarding Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),Edelman similarly urged a phased transition to allow the Afghans to assume more and more responsibilities. Transition will occur at different paces in different places and should not be viewed as ISAF's exit strategy. ¶9. (C) In response to the Polish ambassador, Edelman said that Karzai sees two fronts (Iran and Pakistan) to his dilemmas. Edelman noted that when the U.S. Marines went into Garmsir District recently, they learned a lot of new information about insurgent and narcotics activities, and he is concerned that a similar "blind spot" may exist in Nimruz along the border with Iran. ¶10. (C) In response to the Canadian representative, Edelman said that the notion of a unified approach to the Pashtun problems in both Afghanistan and Pakistan was something U.S. policy makers had considered, but it would be difficult to implement on both sides of the border. -------------- LEBANON -------------- ¶11. (C) In response to the Greek ambassador, USDP Edelman said this was his third visit to Beirut in six months and he said he was "more optimistic than expected." President Suleiman is now more self-assured than he had been as CHOD and gave an impressive inaugural speech. Still to play out is the question of whether Hezbollah over-reached and damaged itself by taking up arms against Lebanese in the recent crisis. He added that he is skeptical that the recent Syrian/Israeli dialogue will be successful given the nature of the Damascus regime. Edelman noted that the U.S. is developing a good mil-to-mil bilateral relationship with Lebanon. -------------- SecGen de Hoop Scheffer -------------- ¶12. (S//NF) In his conversation with NATO SYG Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, USDP Edelman said that he had raised with Karzai the latter's unhelpful comments in Der Spiegel ("I wish I Had the Taliban as My Soldiers"),and that Karzai apologized and claimed he was misquoted. SecGen commented on a similar interview with the Indian press saying that such coverage could lead parliaments in troop contributing nations to question the value of sending their troops to Afghanistan. SecGen wondered aloud which Karzai would show up for the Afghan Donors, Conference in Paris-- the erratic Pashtun politician or the rational national leader. Edelman observed that Karzai seemed preoccupied with blaming Pakistan for Afghanistan's problems. SecGen responded that this does not bode well for efforts to reinvigorate the Tripartite Commission. ¶13. (S//NF) SecGen reported that attempts to update the Kosovo Operations Plan had run aground due to Turkish "paranoia". The Turks have prevented PermReps from USNATO 00000208 004 OF 004 discussing the updated plan because of concerns about their relationship with the European Union. SecGen asked for U.S. assistance in convincing the Turks to be more flexible. ¶14. (S//NF) SecGen indicated that he disagreed with the U.S. response to Turkish complaints about the possible involvement of Greek aircraft from a disputed island in the Aegean in NATO exercises. He is concerned that this could lead toward a situation in which NATO could never exercise in the Aegean. ¶15. (U) USDP Edelman has cleared this cable. NULAND