UN SRSG EIDE SHARES INITIAL THOUGHTS WITH NAC AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000140 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2018 TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF SUBJECT: UN SRSG EIDE SHARES INITIAL THOUGHTS WITH NAC AND ISAF CONTRIBUTORS Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan Kai Eide told NATO and ISAF SIPDIS Ambassadors in a joint NAC meeting April 16 that the June 12 international donors' conference in Paris must leave no doubt about international commitment to the development and political sides of the Afghan equation, and he was focused on making his part of it a success. Cautioning that he had only spent nine days thus far in Kabul, he shared views on nearly every aspect of UNAMA's role in Afghanistan, highlighting the need to improve donor efficiency and align it with the Afghan National Development Strategy, do more on police training, improve governance, and ensure successful Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Eide stressed his commitment to enhance civil-military coordination and expand UNAMA's presence nationwide. PermReps were complimentary and supportive of Eide, with Ambassador Nuland welcoming Eide's intent to partner with ISAF, encouraging him to help the Afghans get the most out of the Paris Conference, and urging him to defend ISAF publicly. Many PermReps called for the expansion of UNAMA to the south and east, and for establishing a liaison in each of the ISAF regional commands. In a dinner the previous night with Eide and his team, Nuland and US MilRep Sullivan urged him to: - Assign deputies to each of the RCs to strengthen campaign planning with ISAF at all levels; - Help the Afghans set concrete, achievable goals for the Paris conference and work with the IC to match them with money; - Quickly determine his staff and support needs so that Washington could help him lobby the UN; - Ensure his aspirations for the UN to play a role in reconciliation were fully in line with Afghan government thinking and USG red lines Eide is very focused on Paris as a vehicle to demonstrate his leadership in delivering more in Afghan-IC coordination plus development and good governance results. He knows he needs a short list of key goals but hasn't yet developed them. This offers Washington a great target of opportunity to shape his thinking when he visits next week. END SUMMARY. -------------- Paris will be the first milestone -------------- ¶2. (C) SRSG Eide pointed to the upcoming Afghanistan Support Conference in Paris on June 12, and stated his top priority is preparing for this conference. Paris must leave no doubt as to the international community's resolve to tackle development and political challenges in Afghanistan, he said. Eide cautioned that he had only spent nine working days thus far in Kabul, but ran down a long list of issues where he believed progress in Paris would be important: a.) Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS): Hailing the achievement of the Afghans in putting together the ANDS, which could be approved in Paris, Eide stated that Paris needed to result both in more resources pledged by nations to Afghanistan, as well as a commitment by all donors to increase the effectiveness of their aid. Eide called for nations to get more of their aid money into Afghan hands, and make a better effort at aligning these resources behind the ANDS, in order to reduce duplication. b.) Donor coordination: Eide said he was working with the Afghans to reform the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB),which had become too cumbersome and process-oriented, USNATO 00000140 002 OF 004 into a leaner mechanism more delivery-oriented, and focused on supporting the ANDS. He urged donors to do a better job speaking with one voice to the Afghans, citing the fight against corruption as a policy challenge where his Afghan interlocutors had often complained about receiving conflicting advice from the international community. c.) Afghanistan Compact: Paris would offer the opportunity to take stock of progress on the Compact, he stated, and we should not overlook achievements to-date. d.) Police: Eide pulled no punches in his negative assessment of progress thus far in building up the Afghan National Police. He characterized the international effort as too fragmented, and stated the international community was still not sure of the type of police force it wished to create; the "big players" needed to agree to a strategy, he said. Eide noted the United States was making a "tremendous effort," and called for a stronger EU effort, stating that the EU needed to raise its level of ambition and double the size of its mission, at a minimum. e.) Governance: The SRSG praised Jolani Popal, Head of Afghanistan's Independent Directorate for Local Governance, and the importance for the international community to support his efforts. Notwithstanding significant challenges at the national level, Popal's efforts at the local level stand to result in better administration, better policing, better services, and to create a populace more politically primed to welcome reconciliation. f.) Elections: Eide recognized that the recent compromise to hold Presidential elections in 2009 and Parliamentary elections in 2010 was not cost-effective, but stressed that this Afghan consensus was the only tenable solution, which the international community must now support. He shared his view that security will be a real concern for the elections, and highlighted that unsuccessful or problematic 2009/2010 elections, compared to successful 2004 elections, stood to demoralize Afghan and international public opinion, and therefore all must do their utmost to ensure success. g.) Reconciliation: Eide was clear that the Afghan government must lead any reconciliation efforts, and the role of the international community is to support the government when asked. Reconciliation could not be seen as a sign of weakness by the Government or international community, and therefore a continued robust military effort was needed to ensure a position of strength. Reconciliation must be politically driven, not intelligence driven, he stated, and not undermine the constitution. -------------- Beyond Paris -------------- ¶3. (C) Civil-Military Coordination: SRSG Eide assured the NAC of his commitment to fulfilling the civil-military coordination role of UNAMA's mandate. He had already spoken with COMISAF twice, he stated, and hoped to organize regular meetings. Specifically noting this would help fight the insurgency, Eide stated that he hopes to develop plans with the military that will better enable UNAMA to deliver support to the Afghan people. He sought to sensitize the NAC to the difficulties he faces in managing the civilian side of the deal, though, given the aversions of many in the UN humanitarian and NGO community to working with the military. The buy-in of the civilian community will be crucial, he said, and part of getting this was to deftly pitch them ideas, and not merely tell them to pack up, fall into line, and move into areas the military had just cleared. Eide USNATO 00000140 003 OF 004 asked for understanding if at times he had to say things publicly that "COMISAF or some of you might not like," but stated he cannot afford to have his relations with the UN humanitarian community and NGOs fragment. Already, he conveyed, "too many" NGOs were calling for the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to split off from UNAMA. ¶4. (C) UNAMA Expansion: Eide stated he was committed to expanding UNAMA's presence in Afghanistan. Citing resource restraints, he explained that he will need to work with New York to get more resources and people ("the right people"), and welcomed any assistance that national governments could give him on this. He said that he needed to find more qualified staff from nations around the world, in order not to employ only "pale white faces." He was receptive to the idea of establishing a UNAMA presence within the ISAF regional commands, but admitted he needed to time to work on establishing this mechanism and staffing it. The U.S., UK, Polish, Hungarian, Dutch, and Danish PermReps called for expanding UNAMA's presence, while the U.S., Romanian, Polish, Dutch, and Canadians welcomed the intent to establish a presence in the RCs. No PermReps opposed. ¶5. (C) Counternarcotics: Eide stated he had "no answers you don't have," at present, but did note the need for ISAF nations to move beyond the focus on "their" individual province, and tie in more to a national perspective. Using the analogy of "immunizing" poppy and insurgency free provinces before problems developed, he questioned why the worst performers received the bulk of international development assistance. ¶6. (C) Regional Issues and Strategic Communications: The SRSG stated he intends to travel regularly to Islamabad and Tehran, and seeks to establish relationships of trust and confidence. On strategic communications, he explained the need to move beyond repetition of the number of girls in school and the number of schools built, and to develop a narrative backed by facts of real progress on the political front. We need to develop Afghan capacity, in order to help us. -------------- Discussion Period Solidifies NAC Support -------------- ¶7. (C) Nearly every PermRep spoke and all offered support for Eide and UNAMA's mission. Ambassador Nuland welcomed Eide's intent to partner with ISAF, encouraging him to work with NATO on an integrated, overarching international civil-military "campaign plan" to bring together all aspects of the international community's job in Afghanistan. On police, she said the U.S. did have a concept for what the ANP should look like, and stressed the need to quadruple the current number of police mentors now working with ANP. She agreed that the upcoming Afghan Support Conference in Paris presented major opportunities, and urged Eide to mentor the Afghans through the conference and beyond, keeping things simple in order to get the most out of donors present there. She assured Eide that the NAC was ready and able to hear criticism and engage in frank discussions with him, but urged him to be on the same page with ISAF publicly, and to defend the mission when unavoidable tragedies in a conflict occurred, such as civilian casualties. ¶8. (C) The Canadian PermRep, too, urged Eide to support ISAF publicly, and asked him for some context on remarks Eide had made the previous week in Kabul on the UN's "impartiality." Eide stated he regretted the word choice, and would not use the term "impartiality" in the future. We are not impartial USNATO 00000140 004 OF 004 he stated, but we must be independent. The Danish PermRep announced that pending a Parliamentary decision, his government planned to send 3-4 light recce helicopters, plus 50-75 crew and maintenance personnel, to Helmand in June. The UK PermRep urged Eide to work closely with the NGO community to encourage an "intelligent" NGO attitude toward the benefits that closer military cooperation would bring. The French PermRep agreed with Eide's assessment of the Paris conference, and noted that France would also host on May 24 a conference among civilian stakeholders, including NGOs, that could be useful in developing their views. The German PermRep stated that Germany favored doubling the size of EUPOL. The Bulgarian PermRep agreed that increasing the numbers of the EUPOL mission was important, but stressed that EUPOL needed to increase its reach, to include training at the district level. NULAND