CSTC-A COMMANDER DISCUSSIONS WITH EU PERMREPS:

C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 000882

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM PGOV NATO BO EUN GG IR MARR MOPS
RS, AF
SUBJECT: CSTC-A COMMANDER DISCUSSIONS WITH EU PERMREPS:
INTERNAL EU DIVISIONS ON EUPOL

Classified By: Laurence Wohlers, USEU Minister Counselor for Political
Affairs, for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: In a presentation to EU permrep officials
in Brussels on May 23, MG Robert W. Cone, Commander of
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A),
provided a wide-ranging briefing on the challenges
confronting the international effort to create a modern
Afghan police force. Cone told EU representatives that the
United States was actively working with the EU,s police
mentoring and advising program (EUPOL),praised EUPOL for its
advisory role at the national level, its input on ministerial
reform and its deputy commander, and pushed the EU to take on
a heavier workload at the district level. Cone,s
presentation was well received by the European attendees.
However, several contacts separately told USEU that the
planned doubling of EUPOL and the potential for increased
U.S.-EU police reform cooperation may be in jeopardy if the
EU cannot sort out internal disagreements in the coming
months.


2. (C/NF) A principal issue is EUPOL,s controversial
commander, Jurgen SCHOLZ, strongly supported by his native
Germany, but widely seen as a failure by key member states,
working-level Council officials, and U.S. observers in Kabul.
For the moment, Council officials close to Solana continue
to insist officially that all is well and that the EUPOL
mission is making progress. Privately, contacts hope that the
problem will go away in September, when SCHOLZ,s mandate is
slated to end. However, in the meantime, there appears to be
a serious risk that the EUPOL mission will fail to adapt to
events on the ground and come up with an effective approach
to cooperation with U.S. police training efforts. If that
happens, an opportunity to add significant additional EU
resources to Afghan police training efforts will be lost.
USEU would welcome perspectives and information that other
EU-27 capitals can provide. End Summary.


Focus on the district level
--------------


3. (SBU) On May 23 MG Cone met informally with EU member
state officials and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
(CPCC) representatives to discuss the challenges and areas
for improvement in the international effort to create a
professional and accountable police force in Afghanistan. MG
Cone emphasized that the International Community police
training effort must be comprehensive, addressing the reform
issues from the national to district levels. He further
emphasized that focus on the district level, where the police
represent the face of the government to the Afghan people,
was the essential point of reform and development at this
stage of the Afghan conflict. He stressed that the Afghan
police must be successful at the district level before they
could be effective at the provincial one. Since the greatest
need for mentor personnel is in the districts, Cone suggested
that, if EUPOL wants to stay at the provincial level, they
would need to deploy in sufficient numbers to fill-in for
CSTC-A trainers who could be freed up for district positions.
Regardless, he said, any additional EUPOL personnel should
be deployed outside of Kabul. Cone added that several EU
member states had conveyed to him a desire to accelerate
district-level police reform, to which Cone suggested that
CSTC-A do the heavy lifting at the outset, while EU member
states picked up police training after a district becomes
stable in order to sustain reform and aid transition of the
police towards a more modern police model.


4. (SBU) Several representatives asked MG Cone for his
perspective on the right long term strategy for EUPOL. Cone
replied that in addition to the excellent advice and quality
mentoring in the Ministry of Interior which EUPOL already
provides, EUPOL could help integrate into the Minister of

Interior-EUPOL-CSTC-A program the Police Training Assistance
Teams (PTATs) in PRTs, as well as with Criminal
Investigations Divisions (CID) and Internal Affairs training,
and police non-commissioned officer standardized training.


Elephants in the room
--------------


5. (C/NF) Not addressed in the briefing, but widely known to
both sides, was a significant leadership problem facing
EUPOL. Key member states (UK, and the Netherlands) and CPCC
leadership view current EUPOL Head of Mission (HoM) Jurgen
SCHOLZ as ineffective. SCHOLZ replaced the first EUPOL HoM,
Friedrich Eichele, after his resignation in September 2007,
following complaints of Eichele's management style,
contentious relations with Solana's Special Representative in
Afghanistan, and EU leaders' serious concerns regarding
EUPOL's then weak start. Member state and CPCC contacts have
told USEU privately that SCHOLZ is viewed as ineffective
because he is reluctant to travel to the various provinces
where the EUPOL mandate extends and because he is erratic in
his dealings with Brussels and the International Community
(IC). However, member states would be reluctant to try to
remove SCHOLZ because he would be the second German commander
removed within a year. It is rumored (but not confirmed)
that SCHOLZ may leave at his one year mark as Head of Mission
in September 2008. However, according to CPCC contacts,
Berlin does not seem to understand that Jurgen SCHOLZ is
ineffective and needs to be replaced. While silent about
SCHOLZ during his briefing to member state representatives,
Cone mentioned several times that Kenneth Deane, EUPOL Deputy
Head of Mission, was effective because he understood the
counter-insurgency policing environment. Member state
contacts told USEU following the briefing that Cone's
frequent references to Deane had not gone unnoticed.


6. (C/NF) Member state and CPCC contacts have also suggested
to USEU that a personality conflict between the CPCC Chief of
Staff Matthew Reece and SCHOLZ may account for some of
SCHOLZ's erratic dealings with the IC. It is possible that
SCHOLZ returns to Kabul with the impression that his efforts
are criticized too sharply and not appreciated by Brussels,
and therefore may be more reluctant to lead and coordinate as
effectively as he could. The new Civilian Operations
Commander, Kees Klompenhouwer, returned last week from his
first visit to Afghanistan, where he assessed EUPOL.
Klompenhouwer is expected to deliver his report to member
states soon. CPCC contacts hope that the recent appointment
of a new Civilian Operations Commander will alleviate the
problems caused by personality conflict between the CPCC
Chief of Staff and SCHOLZ.


7. (C/NF) Another problem for EUPOL -- raised indirectly at
the meeting -- is that bilateral efforts by member states on
police reform are more effective than EUPOL, largely because
there tend to be fewer limits placed on the operations of
individual member states. In the briefing, Cone highlighted
the UK's bilateral policing work at the district level. When
the Italian PSC representative asked for Cone's perspective
on an advance plan on border policing (Italy has a border
police training mission),Cone suggested that the United
States and Italy work on it together. In the context of a
EUPOL that isn't able to do what we want, the superseding
practical need seems to be moving us to work more bilaterally
with Europeans in order to ensure effective police training
efforts with maximum participation.


8. (C/NF) Lastly, there is an unresolved issue that
continues to color every discussion we have with the EU on
EUPOL. The EU twice has requested discussions on a bilateral
technical agreement in which the U.S. would provide
logistical, force protection and medical support for EUPOL
police to operate in U.S. PRTs and Regional Command Centers.

Without this, EUPOL can not formally deploy to U.S. areas.
To date, the U.S has not responded to the EU's request.
While the EU acknowledges this has not proven a significant
obstacle on the ground, they have made clear their
dissatisfaction with the lack of a formal agreement. The EU
is based on legal agreements and member states would be
furious with the Brussels based managers of EUPOL if it were
determined that an incident involving a EUPOL police officer
were the result of the lack of legally sanctioned support.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) The window of opportunity for the IC to influence
police reform in Afghanistan is closing. The United States
wants EUPOL to make an effective contribution to that effort,
but EUPOL is unlikely to evolve any time soon into a large,
district-based police training mission. That said, we should
focus on finding othr ways that EUPOL can contribute to
advancingU.S. goals. To do so, EUPOL needs strong
leaership, more personnel, a more flexible mandate and
better complementarity with CSTC-A. Poliical and Security
Committee (PSC) representatives from member state foreign
ministries decide on the details and size of EUPOL. There
was a big push by a number of member states in 2007 to get
EUPOL up and running, partly in response to the USG's request
that the EU do more in Afghanistan. The political capital
expended on building up EUPOL ensures that it is here to
stay. Therefore, our efforts should focus on influencing
EUPOL's form and structure.


10. (C) Unfortunately, the internal EU coalition that
created EUPOL is now split between those who do recognize the
gravity of EUPOL's leadership and mandate problems and those
who do not. In the EU universe, this is a recipe for policy
blockage. While EUPOL's existence won't stop member states
from working with us bilaterally, it will draw on their
resources (especially the Germans). From our vantage point
in Brussels, the best approach going forward is to look at
how we can support the UK, the Dutch, the Irish and other
like-minded member states most inclined to lobby for changes
in EUPOL's leadership and mandate. In this respect, we would
welcome perspectives from London, the Hague, Dublin, and
Berlin -- those member states most engaged in the EUPOL
project. We should keep in mind that continued dysfunction
at EUPOL is in nobody's interest, but neither is an
acrimonious end that could endanger further EU engagement in
Afghanistan. In that vein, it would be useful to take key
member states' pulse on how to make EUPOL as effective as
possible while continuing to benefit from complementary
bilateral contributions to the police reform effort. End
Comment.



11. (U) MG Cone has cleared those portions of this report
pertaining to his engagement.

MURRAY
.