COULD THE EU LOSE MACEDONIA IN 2009?

S E C R E T USEU BRUSSELS 001881 NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE AND EUR/ERA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MK SUBJECT: COULD THE EU LOSE MACEDONIA IN 2009? Classified By: CDA Christopher Murray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Well-placed EU Council Secretariat sources tell us that there is great concern within the Secretariat that the EU is losing credibility in the eyes of Macedonians based on recent signals the EU has sent concerning Macedonia's EU membership aspirations. These sources are also concerned that relations with Skopje could further deteriorate if visa liberalization is not achieved in the coming year, and that the EU could face a "Bucharest Two" situation towards the end of the Swedish presidency in 2009. End Summary. ¶2. (S/NF) Meeting with Poloff following the December 8 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC),two well-placed Council Secretariat sources told Poloff that there is great concern within the Secretariat that the EU is losing credibility in the eyes of Macedonians. Recounting the "great progress" made by the Macedonians this fall (to include no additional letters from Macedonian PM Gruevski to EU leaders among others),these contacts are concerned that recent statements by the French presidency - specifically French FM Kouchner's on December 3 (in which Kouchner linked no forward movement on either NATO or EU membership until the name issue with Greece was resolved) and following the December 8 GAERC - are eroding the EU's credibility in the eyes of Macedonia's political elites. ¶3. (S/NF) EU Director General for External Relations and Political-Military Affairs Robert Cooper has reportedly called the situation "a disgrace." The Secretariat is confounded by the presidency's actions and is trying to ascertain whether this is a political message or policy on the part of the presidency, or just Kouchner and others straying off message during conferences. Contacts of the Secretariat within the presidency have reportedly assured the Secretariat that it is the latter, but the Secretariat is not convinced. ¶4. (S/NF) Moving forward, there is concern within the Secretariat that the EU could do itself further damage in the eyes of ordinary Macedonians if an agreement on visa liberalization cannot be achieved in 2009. Unlike a membership decision which would require unanimity, a decision on visa liberalization would only require a qualified majority. Based on the presidency's recent statements and actions, and a new "undercurrent," the Secretariat is concerned that even a qualified majority might be threatened. ¶5. (S/NF) As we understand it, the Greeks drafted the GAERC conclusions on Macedonia for the presidency, something which did not go unnoticed and reportedly angered a number of EU Member States. While angering Member States, the issue was not discussed further as there was no interest in opening up the GAERC discussions to Kosovo/Serbia and EULEX deployment. Further, with Bulgaria feeling cornered, the Bulgarians have suggested (reportedly through their PSC Ambassador) that they might be interested in reopening the history books with Macedonia. With no "serious" Member States stepping up to champion the case of Macedonia (the Slovenians providing the only solid, consistent support, according to our contacts), the Secretariat is concerned that a combination of Greek and Bulgarian concerns could endanger even visa liberalization. ¶6. (S/NF) Our contacts believe if progress on visa liberalization is not achieved and the EU's credibility is lost in the eyes of ordinary Macedonians, there is a danger that Government of Macedonia could give up on the process, threatening the underpinnings of the Ohrid agreement. They are also concerned that PM Gruevski might go ahead and force the issue by submitting a forml membership request at the end of 2009 (afte the Commission's progress reports come out mi-October due to the Commission's November changeover), forcing a "Bucharest Two outcome, i which a near fully qualified candidate, but one) lacking political merits (Macedonia) is possibly passed up by a not fully qualified candidate with political merits (Serbia)." ¶7. (S/NF) In order to address the issue, the Secretariat is going to do three things. First, they are going to work on getting the EUSR's mandate extended through September 2009 (it currently expires in February 2009). Second, Council Secretariat Western Balkans unit head Jonas Jonsson will probably travel to Skopje the first week of February. Third, the Secretariat is going to submit to HR Solana a memo (to be delivered early next week) outlining these concerns and calling for him to reengage on the issue (to include the possibility of a visit to Skopje where he has not been in years). ¶8. (S/NF) Comment: While our contacts were in no way asking for our assistance, we feel that it would be worth conveying to the Macedonians that the good progress towards EU membership and restraint displayed vis--vis Greece during the continuing name dispute this fall was noted positively by at least some EU officials. Equally important, we could reinforce the need for the March 2009 elections to go as smoothly as possible in order to prevent detractors from possibly making this an issue during the next EU-Macedonia Stabilization and Association Council meeting scheduled for July 2009. End Comment.