EU INFORMAL DEFMIN MEETING, DEAUVILLE, AND EU

C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 001716 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2018 TAGS: MARR MOPS MCAP EUN FI SUBJECT: EU INFORMAL DEFMIN MEETING, DEAUVILLE, AND EU STRATEGIC PLANNING CAPABILITY: A FINNISH VIEW Classified By: USEU/POL M-C Chris Davis, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: Finnish Defense Counselor (protect) discussed with USEU Defense Advisor the October 1 EU's Informal Defense Ministers' Meeting at Deauville, and a UK-France-Germany proposal for an EU crisis management and planning capability. On capabilities, the French presidency views its capability goals as paramount. They are: European Air Transport Fleet, helicopters, maritime counter-mine warfare, maritime aviation, military space activities, and the relationship between the EDA and OCCAR. Ministers discussed, with the participation of the NATO Secretary General, the challenges of creating and maintaining multinational high-readiness forces and of generating the political will to use them. The necessity of U.S. support for operations was also discussed. Ministers reviewed current EU operations in Bosnia, Chad and off the coast of Somalia. Finland supports a minimalist approach in Bosnia and will send troops to a UN operation in Chad. Ministers drew no conclusions on the juridical challenges of anti-piracy operations. Finally, our Finnish source was surprised that ministers did not take up a UK-FR-GE proposal to develop, under Council General Secretariat, a civil-military strategic planning structure, which he described in detail. END SUMMARY -------------- Capabilities la Franaise -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) Janne Kuusela (protect),Finnish Defense Counselor, reading from Finnish reporting cables, told us the Deauville meeting was unusually dynamic and interesting, not the normal recitation of goals. The Chief Executive of the EDA, Alex Weis, made the initial presentation delineating European priorities derived from the Capability Development Plan. Weis was then, according to Finnish reporting, humiliated by the French, who downplayed the EDA's effort and insisted that the capability goals of the French presidency were paramount. The French made no mention of the Capability Development Plan's conclusions nor the fact that these same ministers had endorsed those conclusions previously. The French cited their well-known preference for the European Air Transport Fleet (Kuusela was skeptical this would ever fly), helicopters, counter-mine warfare in the littoral waters of Europe, maritime aviation, military space activities, and the relationship between the EDA and OCCAR, the French hope being that the latter would act as a procurement agency for the former. -------------- Battlegroups: Use it or lose it -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) Kuusela described a robust and useful discussion at Deauville about the use of EU Battlegroups. After the Finnish MoD's suggestion that the EU use its Battlegroups or lose them, the UK intervened to say that it agreed, but that HMG felt the EU should first discuss whether it ever intended to engage in major military operations. The UK also pointed out the very useful transformational aspects of developing and establishing a Battlegroup. Poland interjected that the Battlegroup is a Rolls-Royce of rapid reaction that is best kept in the garage until a sufficiently important operation warrants its use. Romania said it preferred to get its transformational benefits from participation in NATO's NRF. France thought that the EuroCorps was too often overlooked for operations. The Chairman of the EU Military Committee, French General Henri Bentgeat, then said that there are a great many multi-national formations not affiliated with the EU and that any discussion of their use must take NATO's need int o account as well. Further, he said merely establishing a Battlegroup, especially if it is not used, is too costly as 50% of the cost of a high-readiness unit is just in getting it ready. Next, it was suggested that the Battlegroup fill the role as the EU's strategic reserve for operations. General Bentgeat felt that if the situation warranted the use of a Battlegroup, then the political will to employ it would be forthcoming. The real problems of political will aside, the UK re-iterated the need for the transformational benefit in capability and mentality that come through the process of standing up a Battlegroup. -------------- The U.S. as Military Partner -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) According to the Finnish Defense Counselor, the NATO Secretary General, who for the first time attended the entire ministerial -- fulfilling a French proposal -- remarked that within NATO a similar discussion was under way with respect to the NRF. Importantly, he reportedly challenged ministers by asking if Europe or NATO really contemplated conducting a significant military operation without the participation of the United States. He said NATO could not employ the NRF without the U.S. wondering if the EU could employ a Battlegroup in an emergency without U.S. assistance. General Bentgeat, reportedly noting the "wisdom" of the NATO Secretary General's words, discussed the lessons learned from the Nordic Battelgroup experience. He cited the lack of lift and political will, and also the failure to agree on costs, noting that the EU has still not decided whether rapid reaction operations would be commonly funded. -------------- To Catch a Thief -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) Ministers also discussed a French proposal on maritime surveillance and evacuation (NFI) and were briefed on the French operation to rescue the crew of the private yacht seized off Somalia. According to reporting from which Kuusela was reading, the French paid the ransom at sea and then using UAVs, helicopters, and other electronic means tracked the pirates to land at which point the apparently very numerous pirates split up and headed out in a great many directions, too many in fact for the French to follow and intercept. The result was that most of the ransom money was lost and few of the pirates were apprehended. -------------- Operations -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Somalia: Kuusela related conversations among EU naval planners at the ministerial who first estimated the size of the EU's operational area as 300 square nautical miles, which all thought was well beyond the capacity of a few ships to patrol, given the small size of the pirate dinghies. Then the estimate was raised to 500 square nautical miles to the chagrin of those present. Ministers, he said, also discussed the well-known list of practical and juridical issues related to dealing with pirates without coming to any conclusions, to include the inability to put them ashore into the hands of a functioning police and judicial system in Somalia, and the difficulty of identifying them as pirates in the first place, since they usually claim to be well-armed fisherman. ¶7. (C/NF) Chad: Relief by a UN operation is imperative, concluded ministers from six nations, including Finland, which promised to commit troops to a UN effort. Kuusela said that current Finnish commitments to UN operations post-Lebanon needed to be increased and Finland was positioning itself for key positions in the UN hierarchy; therefore, offering Finnish troops to a new UN operation in Chad would have other benefits as well. Now that the rainy season is coming to a close, he anticipated an increase in rebel and bandit activity, while remarking that "Sweden left us during the rainy season." ¶8. (C/NF) Bosnia: Kuusela said Finland favors the least robust option of all those under consideration for reducing the size of the EU force in Bosnia, because of the resource drain of ALTHEA on other commitments. Kuusela added that the consensus moved quickly in this direction. -------------- EU OHQ: In the Planning Stage -------------- ¶9. (C/NF) Kuusela next discussed a UK-FR-GE proposal on a structure for military strategic planning in Brussels that he had thought would be discussed in Deauville. He reported that the discussion did not take place as planned, presumably because President Sarkozy considers the matter to be too important a decision for defense ministers, preferring to announce it at December's European Council meeting of Heads of State and Government. -------------- UK-French Win-Win -------------- ¶10. (C/NF) In laying out the proposal, Kuusela said that it had to be a tri-partite one in order to gain the necessary support, but that the Germans were merely bystanders. (COMMENT: The original Battlegroup proposal was developed in a similar fashion with the French bringing the Germans in at the last minute END COMMENT) Kuusela said the effort was to find a way forward in which the British, who did not object in principle to strategic or advanced planning at the European level, and the French, who want a stand-alone structure at the strategic level in Brussels, could find common ground. The British proposed a comprehensive civilian-military center on the compound at SHAPE that could integrate the work of both the EU and NATO; a proposal Kuusela believed had U.S. support. The French objected as this idea did not give France something in Brussels with a European label. Kuusela's Finnish reporting said that a UK-French agreement was reached in mid-late September; however, the Elyse and Whitehall still disagree on some of the details. The accord calls for a strategic military-civilian planning and coordination function, with an emphasis on coordination, under Javier Solana in the Council General Secretariat. This mechanism is designed to produce rapid strategic assessments to inform the EU decision-making process in Brussels, while respecting the chain of command. The proposal would not add any new billets, personnel or structure in Brussels (presumably a win for the UK position), but would enable the EU to function more effectively as a unitary actor at the strategic political and strategic military levels within the EU (a win for France). -------------- EU Crisis Management and Planning Capability -------------- ¶11. (C/NF) Within the Secretariat and under Solana's Terms of Reference, the new structure will combine DG E VIII, Defense Aspects of ESDP, with DG E IX, Civilian Aspects of ESDP, with the EU Military Staff, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Planning and Early Warning Unit. According to our discussion with Kuusela, the new structure will lean heavily on the Situation Center (SitCen) and the relevant offices of the External Relations Directorate General of the European Commission. The role of the NATO Permanent Liaison Team to the EU Military Staff in this arrangement is to be determined, as are permanent links to NATO's strategic planning staff. This organization will also have a Deployable Augmentee Cadre, a body of experts that would detach itself in times of crisis to the responsible organization, for example, to a framework nation's Operational Headquarters (OHQ). The Military Committee and the Civilian Committee will remain as advisory bodies according to their current functions. -------------- Wind in Sarkozy's NATO Sail -------------- ¶12. (C/NF) The UK does not see this as a fundamental change in the intent of having a Council General Secretariat for ESDP, but it will be a good way to put wind in the domestic political sails of Sarkozy to help steer him back into NATO. The French president will say, according to the Finns, that this is a physically small change but a giant mental leap forward. SILVERBERG .