IAEA/DG RACE: MINTY,S CAMPAIGN PITCH TO WEOG

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000643 SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018 TAGS: AORC PREL PARM IAEA KNPP JA AR SF SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: MINTY,S CAMPAIGN PITCH TO WEOG Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) Meeting with Western European and Others Group (WEOG) Ambassadors, at his request, on December 1, South African Governor Abdul Minty fielded a wide range of pointed questions on Agency priorities as a prospective candidate for IAEA Director General. Minty informed WEOG members that his Minister officially delivered his nomination on the margins of the November 27-28 Board of Governors meeting, and he was now consulting with regional groups on his candidacy. He acknowledged that, in addition to managing the Agency, the Director General operated in a "political context" and that DG ElBaradei was leaving a "strong foundation" in this regard. In response to WEOG member concerns, Minty stressed the importance of nuclear security and safeguards, though he was short on specifics as to the Agency's role in the former and hedged on the question of regular budget funding for nuclear security. Minty presented himself as a consensus builder on Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF) who could bridge the North-South divide, though he admitted to having "no easy answers." As to the "political" role of the DG, Minty envisioned a "good offices" function on issues such as Middle East safeguards and RANF, and recalled his constructive role as General Conference President in 2006. He expressed commitment to the "One-UN" approach and better coordination across IAEA departments and with other UN agencies on technical cooperation (TC). Minty acknowledged the role of Member States in setting policy for TC but cautioned against second-guessing particular projects, when asked about the TACC debates on Iran and Syria. He was similarly cautious in speaking about the Agency's role in assisting with disarmament tasks, and noted that the IAEA cannot be an advocate for disarmament. ¶2. (C) Overall, Minty did better than expected in this 90-minute job interview with WEOG, and offered well-reasoned and persuasive answers on Western priorities. It is not clear that he won any converts, but he left the impression that he was not beholden to the G-77/NAM, in particular, on safeguards and security issues, and demonstrated an ability to think on his feet that other candidates will find hard to match. Japanese Ambassador Amano will make himself available for a similar Q&A session with WEOG in January. In our capacity as Co-Chairs of the Geneva Group, the U.S. and UK are also planning to invite Minty and Amano to meet with the group in the near future. Mission welcomes Department input on management issues, including DG term limits, to raise with both DG candidates in the Geneva Group. End Summary and Comment. Nuclear Security -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador Schulte solicited Minty's views on integrating nuclear security in the Agency's core mission and budget, as well as promotion of UNSCR 1540 implementation and HEU minimization. Germany and Norway also stressed the importance of regularizing funding for nuclear security. Minty did not offer a strategic vision for the Agency on nuclear security. Although nuclear terrorism is a collective problem, he said, it was the role of member states to implement and enforce nuclear security guidelines. He noted that the SAG had undertaken a program to downblend HEU, but added that HEU has legitimate uses for radioisotopes, and exclusive focus on HEU minimization overlooks the greater proliferation risk of plutonium. The SAG saw safety and security as paramount, and explicitly disagreed with developing countries that predicate regular budget funding for nuclear security on "balance" with technical cooperation (TC). Minty recommended greater coordination among DDGs to "mainstream" nuclear security in core functions; noted the unique capabilities of the Agency, e.g. to conduct inspections; and sought to make the IAEA's work on nuclear security better known. ¶4. (SBU) Pressed further by Norway on regular budget funding for nuclear security, Minty opined that it was not healthy for an international body to rely on voluntary contributions for a core program, as was also the case for the Safeguards Analytical Lab (SAL). He hedged on the question, claiming that the advisors to President-elect Obama acknowledged doubts, in light of the financial crisis, about being able to follow through on campaign pledges to double the IAEA budget. He suggested cost savings through use of new technology, and proposed regional coordination on safety and security issues at the expert level. This would not mean delegating national responsibility to the region, but such cooperation would be better than "purchasing" nuclear safety and security as, he noted, the UAE was doing. Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Germany raised the risks of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the difficulty of moving forward Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF) given continued anxiety among the G-77 about Article IV rights. Minty acknowledged the increased risks brought by the nuclear renaissance, and attributed the polarization of the debate on RANF to an early proposal that would have required states to "forgo" enrichment, which still clouds perceptions. South Africa had advised that rather than set such conditions, the focus should be on making enrichment the inefficient choice, and RANF proposals have since taken this on board. Yet suspicion remains and last spring at a Berlin conference Minty heard concerns from developing world technical experts about whether there was "a plan" to disrupt commercial supply. The lack of an effective dialogue between recipients and suppliers continues to frustrate the RANF debate. In view of Minty's nomination, the SAG is taking more of a leadership role on this issue, and has proposed consultations among countries of the "South" and outreach to countries like Thailand and Argentina to try to get at "real concerns." Erosion of Article IV rights remains a concern in the developing world, as evidenced in the NPT Prepcom. Minty had "no easy answer" as to how to structure the RANF debate in Vienna but recommended the focus be on specific proposals. He noted that there may not be unanimity of G-77 views on the specific proposals. ¶6. (SBU) The UK noted the role of the DG and Secretariat with respect to a RANF mechanism was to serve as the supranational guarantor or custodian, and as such, the DG's focus in getting the message out should be forward-, not backward-looking. Minty acknowledged the role of the Agency in promoting RANF but cautioned that no DG can get too far ahead of Member States. Much of this was a matter of timing and political sense as well as interaction with capitals. Getting at "real concerns" would help forge consensus, he added. This political role of the DG should be clearly separate, however, from the technical work of the Agency on RANF. ¶7. (C) Advising that the EU was seriously considering a financial contribution to the proposed IAEA-administered International Fuel Bank (INFB),France asked about specific eligibility criteria for accessing this mechanism, and whether access should extend to non-NPT members. Minty returned to his point that a fundamental consensus was needed on RANF before conditions about eligibility criteria can be set. He noted that non-NPT members are IAEA members but also acknowledged the views of suppliers and their sovereign decisions, citing the Russian proposal. We do not want to "perpetuate discrimination" but there were "real concerns" on both sides and "no easy answers," he repeated, as to how to break this logjam. (Comment: In short, he punted. End Comment.) Strengthening Safeguards -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Finland expressed concern about the "politicized atmosphere" that threatened to undermine safeguards, citing the reluctance of some countries to accord the IAEA greater legal authority through universalization of the Additional Protocol (AP). The deficiencies of SAL also put in question the credibility and integrity of Agency safeguards. Minty deeply regretted the polarization of safeguards issues and underlined the SAG's commitment to strengthening the safeguards regime. Safeguards need not be a logjam, he said, recalling the SAG's role in helping to secure indefinite extension of the NPT at the 1995 Prepcom. Minty stressed the need for the 30 NPT members that have not done so to conclude Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) and South Africa's full support of the AP, though he noted it would be problematic to make the latter a condition of fuel supply. Interestingly, Minty argued that universalization of the AP was a symbolic and secondary goal, and that the main target should be the conclusion of APs by countries that have the capacity to proliferate. Furthermore, he added in response to Australia, the AP may not be adequate and making it the end-all and be-all could be dangerous, noting that the SAG has proposed that Iran undertake additional transparency measures. The objective was to increase the reach of the Agency in sovereign countries. Rather than "pressure," Minty concluded, speaking in generalities, that the DG should use his "good offices" to ensure the credibility and authority of Agency safeguards. ¶9. (SBU) Switzerland also asked about the perspective of bringing non-NPT countries under Agency safeguards in light of the India agreement. Minty said the SAG thought of the India agreement more as a step forward for nuclear power, albeit one that had serious implications for the NPT, and noted that the NSG exception was not intended as a precedent, though we should "wait and see" what other countries do. DG "Good Offices" on Middle East -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Minty reminded WEOG Ambassadors of his handling of Middle East issues as President of the 2006 General Conference (GC). He regretted the disproportionate focus in the GC on the Middle East at the expense of other Agency priorities. Asked by the UK to elaborate on how he would deal with unproductive GC discussions on disarmament and the Middle East, Minty proposed that what may be needed is a clearly defined mechanism for the DG's "good offices" function, as in other international organizations. Such a "good offices" role would provide more transparency than ad hoc mediation or intervention. He noted that he had received positive feedback from several governments on this proposal. Minty envisioned that the DG could use his "good offices" on issues ranging from the Middle East to RANF, which would include direct interaction with capitals. ¶11. (C) In the highly charged atmosphere of the 2006 GC, following the Israeli-Lebanese conflict, Minty recalled how he had sought to bring all the parties and groups together and came very close to agreement on a Presidential Statement, were it not for the fact that the Arab Group was constrained by Arab League Ministerial-level decisions. He was not sure if the DG could in such a case contact the Arab League directly. The GC President also need to be firm, as he had been during his tenure, in making clear to the parties that the discussion would not go beyond the last day of the Conference, so as to conclude in a "dignified manner." He also recommended early high-level interaction among concerned parties. Minty further recalled the SAG's reluctance to participate in the DG-sponsored Middle East Forum, counseling that a discussion of regional security should precede "frontal" engagement on nuclear weapons. Such a frontal approach would not work, whether it was in the Middle East or with regard to India-Pakistan. (Comment: Minty was clearly playing to this audience of WEOG Ambassadors on Middle East issues. End Comment.) Technical Cooperation: "One UN" and "One-IAEA" -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Norway asked about better integration of the IAEA in the UN family, for example, on implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Minty expressed the SAG's disappointment in this regard, and underlined the need for more synergy between the IAEA and other UN organizations, and not just on MDG goals. This was particularly true in Technical Cooperation (TC),where he cited the IAEA-WHO and FAO Joint Divisions. The IAEA has an important technical capacity but cannot become a development agency, he asserted, and suggested tapping into development funding through UNDP country programs and the like. ¶13. (SBU) France observed that with regard to TC, there was hardly a "One-Agency" much less a "One-UN" approach, and noted the need for greater coordination among departments and guidelines on non-proliferation for TC projects. Minty acknowledged the need to take account of technical capacity, safety and security in the implementation of TC projects. He also saw the need for more coordination, and not just at the DDG level but also base-level interaction among departments. ¶14. (SBU) Pressing the issue further, Finland noted TACC debates on TC projects in Iran and Syria and G-77 insistence on old understandings about TC not being touched. "Should member states have more of say on the TC program, or is it a holy cow?," Finnish Ambassador Kauppi inquired. Minty noted that the Agency Secretariat was the servant of Member States who set policy, citing the question of whether TC should fund projects in the EU. However, Member State second-guessing on individual TC projects can be a "slippery slope," he cautioned obliquely, and can set the dangerous precedent of "questioning" Agency documents, including verification reports. Disarmament -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Finland also raised the issue of the Agency's Statutory role and tasks with respect to disarmament. Minty underscored South Africa's commitment to disarmament, and saw a role for Agency assistance with disarmament tasks, disputing those who claim the IAEA has no Statutory mandate or lacks expertise in this domain. He was careful to note that the IAEA cannot be an advocate for disarmament, but it also cannot work in a vacuum as it fulfills its primary mission of "atoms only for peace." Minty also took note of U.S. and UK efforts on disarmament and discussions in other fora. (Note: In a November 27 press conference on the margins of the Board of Governors meeting, Minty highlighted his work on disarmament and non-proliferation throughout his adult life. End Note.) Comment -------------- ¶16. (C) Speaking to a consciously skeptical audience, many of whom are publicly wary of Minty's past role as a NAM cheerleader, the South African Governor delivered a strong performance. He came across as well-prepared and adept at thinking on his feet. His Japanese competition will be challenged to meet the same bar. SCHULTE