ELBARADEI DESPAIRS ON PROSPECTS FOR SYRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000630

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2018
TAGS: PREL IAEA MNUC KNNP SY
SUBJECT: ELBARADEI DESPAIRS ON PROSPECTS FOR SYRIA
INVESTIGATION

REF: UNVIE 618

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory Schulte for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e)


1. (C) Summary: Meeting with the Ambassador on November 26,
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reaffirmed his
disagreement with US efforts to block the Agency's nuclear
reactor feasibility Technical Cooperation (TC) program for
Syria and offered suggestions for a framework (subsequently
adopted by the Board of Governors) to ensure continued close
scrutiny of the project. Responding to the Ambassador's
criticisms of the procurement elements of the TC project, the
Director General offered his "personal assurance" that
procurement "will happen only when technically required."
Updating on the IAEA investigation into the undeclared Al
Kibar reactor, ElBaradei editorialized that his Syrian
interlocutor, Ibrahim Othman, was completely in the dark
regarding the facility at Al Kibar. End Summary.

The DG Wades In
--------------


2. (C) Following several messages from UNVIE to the
Secretariat questioning the Director General's tactics in
delivering a highly inappropriate public endorsement of the
Syria TC project, and then recusing himself from the
subsequent fight inside the IAEA Board, ElBaradei asked to
see the Ambassador early on November 26. Noting that the
issue "will only become worse if it goes to the Board,"
ElBaradei advised that we shouldn't focus on "how we got here
-- the issue is how we fix this mess." The DG argued that
the Syrian state is controlled by their military, and
therefore the questions about the Al Kibar facility will be
resolved only through a political understanding, and not by
working through technical counterparts like Ibrahim Othman.
"They are totally separated," ElBaradei editorialized, so
Washington would be well advised to approach Damascus on a
political level or via the military "to help them get out of
their hole."


3. (C) ElBaradei endorsed a statement developed by the
Secretariat that accommodated three key US goals: signaling
continued close IAEA scrutiny of the TC project for a nuclear
reactor feasibility study, reaffirming the phased character
of procurements for this project, and reserving to Board
members the right to revisit this project in light of
developments in the safeguards investigation of the Al Kibar
reactor site. In appealing to us to accept this compromise,
ElBaradei emphasized his view that this was not the right
issue on which to challenge Syria. The political
sensitivities around TC (and the sense among developing
countries that TC is an entitlement) made the Syria project a
lightning rod for other delegations. Without conceding
ElBaradei's point on the TC project, the Ambassador agreed
that the only parties benefiting from divisions within the
Board of Governors are Iran and Syria. "That doesn't serve
our purpose or help the Agency," he cautioned. But, the
Ambassador continued, "the IAEA has to do its job," which in
this case should have included earlier scrutiny of the Syria
project

Counsel for the Defense
--------------


4. (C) ElBaradei replied that there are two distinct issues
-- the IAEA's obligation to strictly implement its rules for
a country (Syria) that has not been found guilty of any
safeguards violation, and the integrity of the TC process.
Frankly, he added, "you could have done this like the French"
and simply noted that you would have preferred for the
project to have been delayed, without actually threatening to
block it. Returning to his exposition on Syrian politics,
ElBaradei emphasized that Othman and the Syrian Ambassador in
Vienna "aren't in the loop." "We will write more letters,"
the DG continued, "but without a political opening it's not
moving...we're at the end of our wits." "This thing will not
be solved technically."


5. (C) Echoing his November 20 comments to Under Secretary
Rood, ElBaradei argued that on both Syria and Iran the IAEA
"is just going through the motions" as long as the
governments concerned are holding out for direct engagement
from Washington. In the case of Syria, however, the division
of the Board of Governors will endanger other US priorities,
to include the Additional Protocol, the proposal for an
internationally administered nuclear fuel bank, and
engagement on nuclear safety. "This should have been handled
differently," he again complained.


6. (C) Concluding the Syria discussion, ElBaradei offered his
"personal assurance" that procurement "will happen only when

technically required." In the meantime, he promised, the DG
would use his engagement with the Syrians to send the message
back to President Asad regarding the Al Kibar investigation
that "this thing doesn't look good for you and you need to
get yourselves out of the hole."


7. (C) Comment: ElBaradei refused to take responsibility for
a problem that he created by blocking the Board Chair's
efforts to defer the Syria TC project. His advice on Syrian
politics sounds like his long-standing message on Iran --
that the only way to get cooperation is through a political
settlement that can only be achieved by direct US engagement.
Whatever the merits of his political assessment, we will
continue to remind him that his job is not political, but to
press forward with the IAEA investigation and to press the
governments involved for full disclosure of their clandestine
activities. End Comment.
SCHULTE