IAEA/IRAN: TECHNICAL BRIEFING LARGELY REPEATS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000628 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: TECHNICAL BRIEFING LARGELY REPEATS DG'S REPORT -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) On November 21, Ops B Director Herman Nackaerts provided Member States a technical briefing on the Director General's (DG) report on Iran that largely repeated the same points covered in the report. Nackaerts provided an overview of Iran's enrichment- and heavy water-related activities and presented a few additional details about centrifuge operations at Natanz. The majority of the briefing focused on "possible military dimensions" (PMD) and how the IAEA expects Iran to cooperate on the IAEA's investigation. End Summary. -------------- More Specifics About Natanz -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In addition to what was reported in the DG's report, Nackaerts noted that Iran has maintained the same number of operating centrifuges as was reported in September, but has continued installation of the remaining cascades in the second 3000-centrifuge machine unit. He said that as of November 7, eighteen centrifuge cascades in unit A24 and five centrifuge cascades in unit A26 in the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz were operating on UF6. An additional seven centrifuge cascades in unit A26 were completely installed, but were not operating on UF6. The remaining six centrifuge cascades in unit A26 were being installed. The annual physical inventory verification (PIV) at the FEP at Natanz was currently taking place and the results will be reported in the next DG's report before the March 2009 Board. -------------- Expectations for Iran on the "Possible Military Dimensions" -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Nackaerts highlighted that in order for the IAEA to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations, three things must happen -- verification of the nondiversion of nuclear material; implementation of the Additional Protocol (AP); and resolution of all ambiguities regarding the PMD. He said Iran has not cooperated on two of these three core requirements. Identifying all the issues that make up PMD, Nackaerts stated that the "alleged studies, if correct, point to the development of a nuclear payload for the Shahab-3," and that the future process for dealing with PMD issues is for Iran to tackle them as a package and not in a piecemeal fashion as it had in the past. Nackaerts emphasized that the IAEA expects Iran to identify elements of PMD that are accurate and those Iran claims are not, give serious attention to the entire package of PMD, show what portion of the alleged work is not nuclear-related, and provide the IAEA with information that confirms Iran's statements about the material. -------------- Questions and Answers -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Cuba, France, Canada, Germany, and the U.S. all asked questions after Nackaerts presentation. Cuba asked if the Member State that provided the IAEA with the "alleged studies" documents has allowed the IAEA to provide copies of the documents to Iran, as the DG noted in both his last report on Iran and in his opening statement to the September Board. And if these documents have not been provided to Iran, why was it not included in the DG's November report? Nackaerts replied that there had been no change in the provision of documents, but emphasized that Iran has not provided the IAEA with any answers since September, which constituted the "no progress" as noted in the report. (Comment: Although Cuba, and later Iran (see below), attempted to place the onus on the U.S. to provide copies of "original" documentation, Nackaerts' presentation helpfully did not focus on the issue as he had in his Technical Briefing in September.) ¶5. (SBU) France started by rebutting comments made by Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh during his first intervention following Nackaerts' presentation about the uranium metal document, in which Soltanieh claimed there was no need to discuss the document further and that it was not sensitive, i.e., could be found on internet, produced by graduate student, etc. France stated that "experts" in Paris assess the uranium metal document's only use would be for developing nuclear weapons, and that although the document is under IAEA UNVIE VIEN 00000628 002 OF 003 seal, it should perhaps be removed from Tehran and stored in Vienna because of the proliferation concern. France then asked if Iran's refusal to allow the design information verification (DIV) at the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor (HWRR) in Arak constituted a breach in Iran's Safeguards obligations. Nackaerts replied that Iran links the DIV refusal to its unilateral suspension of Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement, which the IAEA does not agree with. Nackaerts then asked the IAEA's senior Legal Advisor to reply. Johan Rautenbach replied that it is the right of the IAEA to ask for the DIV and the right of Iran to refuse, but the refusal is not consistent with Safeguards obligations. ¶6. (SBU) Canada asked the IAEA to share the key elements that led the IAEA to assess the "alleged studies, if correct, point to the development of a nuclear payload for the Shahab-3." Nackaerts first noted that the IAEA has not expressed its opinion of the authenticity of the information, but in its totality, the information is credible and comprehensive, and if correct, points to the development of a nuclear weapon. He reported this assessment is based on the payload's dimensions and weight, as well as the missile's re-entry vehicle (RV) modification to carry various other payloads. Nackaerts also noted that the IAEA shared this information with the Iranians, who also came to the same conclusions. The Iranians' conclusions, however, were based purely on the technical data, and not the accuracy and authenticity of the material, and in no way did they admit to conducting such work. ¶7. (SBU) The U.S. asked if Iran's refusal on the DIV at the HWRR had long term negative implications for the IAEA's safeguards assurances at that site, since continued civil construction would soon make imagery monitoring less useful. Nackaerts replied that the IAEA last visited the HWRR in August, so there is not yet a "long term negative implication." The U.S. also noted that the DG's September 2008 report had referred to possible foreign assistance on experimentation with initiation of a hemispherical high explosive charge suitable for an implosion type nuclear device, and asked if the IAEA had received any cooperation from the Member State that had been the source of that assistance to Iran. Nackaerts said the IAEA has not received any help from the Member State about the possible foreign assistance. -------------- Iran's Interjections -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh spoke twice during the Technical Briefing, once right after Nackaerts gave his presentation, and then again after Cuba spoke. Soltanieh's first statement was a request for Nackaerts to read the passage from the August 2007 work plan regarding the uranium metal document and the "alleged studies" document, so as to prove to the Board that Iran has met every obligation under the work plan, and therefore, these issues are completed and over. Nackaerts replied that he did not have a copy of the work plan, so Soltanieh, noting that he brought a copy with him, volunteered to read the requested passages. After reading the "alleged studies" section, Soltanieh explained how Iran was not allowed to have copies of the documents and that even the DG had expressed his own dissatisfaction for lack of the provision of documents: he again asserted that portion of the work plan was concluded. Nackaerts agreed that Iran had fulfilled its obligations to provide the IAEA with a copy of the uranium metal document, but now the IAEA has additional questions about it that need to be answered. Nackaerts also stated that Iran has been given sufficient access to the "alleged studies" documentation, but Iran has chosen not to answer the IAEA's questions. ¶9. (SBU) Soltanieh's second interjection was directed at France, saying that the uranium metal document was mostly information found in a text book, and that the French Mission should report that back to its Paris "experts." He also noted that Iran could have made a copy of the document anytime before it was sealed by the IAEA if it had really wanted a copy. Soltanieh then noted how the Secretariat's focus on the Green Salt project jeopardized the credibility of the entire IAEA. He said (as he has in a previous technical briefing) that one Iranian's "lousy drawings" were ridiculous, and this one person's work was useless because the uranium conversion facility at Esfahan is producing 100s of tons of green salt. Soltanieh emphasized that Iran decided to suspend Code 3.1 because the issue was "illegally" moved to the UNSC and that Iran would not implement the AP or Code 3.1 in the current situation. UNVIE VIEN 00000628 003 OF 003 SCHULTE