IAEA/SYRIA/IRAN: PRE-BOARD ENGAGEMENT WITH BOARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000616 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018 TAGS: IAEA PREL KNNP TRGY SY IR SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA/IRAN: PRE-BOARD ENGAGEMENT WITH BOARD MEMBERS REF: STATE 123074 Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) Preliminary Views on a Syria Resolution -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte hosted consultations with 16 Board members (Russia, China, Algeria, Albania, Brazil, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, India, Iraq, Ireland, Lithuania, Mexico, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland) on November 20 to solicit views on the Iran and Syria reports and next steps in the Board/TACC. With respect to Syria, Ambassador Schulte made it clear that the U.S. believed, based on the DG's report, a Board resolution was in order. He also said the U.S. was not in position to join consensus at the TACC on the proposed TC program if it included the current proposed project to provide to Syria a nuclear power feasibility study. He noted the study raises both technical and nonproliferation issues. None of the Missions present had received instructions on either of the reports, released just the evening before, and all spoke in a personal capacity. ¶2. (SBU) Reaction was lukewarm on the prospect of a Board resolution on Syria, with Russia explicitly opposing. Even Ireland, which shared our concerns, questioned whether a resolution at this early stage would push Syria further down the Iranian path, and was the best way to encourage Syria to "do the right thing." Finland found the Syria report to be "surprisingly clear," but also "drawing on the lesson of Iran," was more inclined to send a clear message to Syria early in the process. This need not be a confrontational message, Finnish Ambassador Kaupi stressed. Describing both reports as factual and telling, Germany observed that Syria must cooperate to address the many open questions. Lithuania too was open to exploring Board action in dealing with the serious considerations raised by the report. Notably Switzerland, which has taken an unhelpful stance in previous Board statements on Syria, assessed that the DG report had "exceeded expectations" and was considering how to proceed. ¶3. (SBU) The most outspoken opponent was Russian Ambasador Zmeyevsky, who personally saw no necessity for Board action and had a "different reading" of the Syria report, a reading that coincided with the DG's views on the unilateral use of force. The DG was "not asking for Board help" and the albeit uneasy cooperation with Damascus should be allowed to continue, he opined. China hoped that any Board consideration would be conducive to a solution to the issue and noted "contradictions" in the report which it hoped would be addressed in the November 21 technical briefing. None of the other Missions present offered any opinion on the prospect of a resolution. Tread Carefully on TC -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte advised that the U.S., though committed to the TC program, could not join consensus in the TACC if the Syrian feasibility study is included. His description of the technical shortcomings of the project -- the Secretariat's assessment in project documentation that Syria lacked the technical capacity for a nuclear power plant and the project being out of step with the Agency's Milestones document and other TC feasibility studies -- gained the most currency with Board members. However, even like-minded countries such as Germany advised that we keep the TACC discussion at a "technical level" and cautioned against "politicizing" TC. Ireland could see technical issues with the project and Switzerland appreciated the technical analysis and considerations, though it supported the right to nuclear power. Lithuania believed it important to have consensus on TC but saw the discrepancy between the DG report on Syria and the TC project. Finland also acknowledged valid views on the TC project but was cautious about any challenge to the "special place of TC in the Agency." Furthermore, Ambassador Kaupi feared that focusing on the TC project would divert attention from the "real" issues of Syria's suspect nuclear activities. ¶5. (SBU) Among the G-77 members present, Brazil was categoric about its belief that we should not create political benchmarks or attaching strings to TC. China also strongly supported adherence to the Statute and technical criteria for TC. Again, Russia was the most opposed to blocking the Syria TC project arguing that there were no legal grounds to do so. Russia supported Syria's cooperation with the Agency on nuclear power and cautioned against any effort to block TC before anything "serious" had been determined. Iran -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte highlighted the DG report's findings that Iran is continuing to build its enrichment capacity; its violation of modified Code 3.1 and denial of access to Arak, and most disturbingly, the lack of progress on PMD due to Iran's intransigence. For the most part, the reaction to the Iran report was "nothing new." Ireland noted that the report was even clearer than previous reports that Iran was to blame for blocking the investigation. Germany questioned how the Board should react to now repeated DG reports of Iran's lack of cooperation, which has gone from "bad to worse." Russia emphasized that there was no need for a Board resolution following the passage of UNSCR 1838 while China predictably saw the window for P5 1 negotiations with Iran as "still open." Finland expressed concern that there was indeed "nothing new" while Iran pressed forward on the ground at Natanz. Ambassador Kaupi did not envisage a resolution but encouraged national statements calling for full cooperation and resumption of talks. Ambassador Schulte seconded the call for strong national statements placing the onus on Iran. (Note: Subsequent to the meeting, the German Ambassador told us that his political director would be circulating the text of a draft Iran resolution to his "EU3 3" colleagues. End note.) DG Promises No Help On Syria TC -------------- ¶7. (C) In a subsequent meeting with Director General ElBaradei (to be reported in detail septel),ElBaradei defended the Syrian TC project on technical grounds and made a "due process" argument for its approval. He said he would tell the Board that he saw no basis in the IAEA Statute for its disapproval. Addressing Syria at the TACC and Board -------------- ¶8. (C) Comment: Per Refs, mission is continuing to press the case on several fronts to avoid approval of the Syrian TC project and adopt a supportive resolution at that Board on the safeguards investigation. Next steps with regard to the Board resolution include securing agreement from either Australia or New Zealand to take the lead in sponsoring a resolution; both have sought instructions and we hope to hear their response on Friday, November 21. Specific timing/tactics of circulating a draft resolution will need to be formulated in partnership with the lead resolution sponsor. We are also consulting with likeminded technical experts in advance of the Secretariat's November 21 Technical Briefing on the Syrian safeguards investigation in order to coordinate helpful questions. Since any Board resolution will not be by consensus (NAM Troika Egypt, Cuba, Malaysia will certainly not support a resolution, at least a few others are likely to join them) we suspect additional demarches to targeted Board members may be necessary at some point to help ease concerns over a "split Board." ¶9. (C) Regarding efforts to disapprove the Syrian TC project of concern, Ambassador Schulte, joined by Germany, Australia, and perhaps Canada and France, will inform TACC/Board Chair Ferouki tomorrow that the U.S. cannot currently join consensus and appeal to her to help lead consultations that would allow us to avoid setting the precedent of a vote on the TC program. In various fora, Mission will also insist the Secretariat share details of the Safeguards Department review of this project. As the above report from today's discussion with Board members shows, most Board members are extremely wary of "politicizing" the TACC discussion. It is extremely likely that we would lose a vote if we forced one. Thus, Mission's strategy will be to stress 1) the technical problems with the scope and design of the project; and 2) any concerns the Safeguards Department may have expressed. In light of both, we intend to argue that the TACC make no decision on this project at this time, while perhaps giving the Secretariat the remit to reconsider the project and resubmit as appropriate to a future TACC meeting. SCHULTE